IMRA Middle East News Updates

When Demilitarization Commitments Ignored: Violation Facilitated Germany's Invasion of France

Sun, 28 Dec 2025 08:54:01 -0500

When Demilitarization Commitments Ignored: Violation Facilitated Germany's
Invasion of France
Dr. Aaron Lerner 28 December 2025

Step-by-Step Explanation of the French Withdrawal from the Rhineland in 1930
and Subsequent Events
Background: Demilitarization of the Rhineland under the Treaty of Versailles
(1919)

After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles imposed strict limitations on
Germany to prevent renewed aggression. The Rhineland-defined as the
territory west of the Rhine River and a strip extending 50 kilometers east
of the Rhine-was designated a demilitarized zone.

The relevant provisions were:

Article 42:
"Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on
the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn
50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine."

Article 43:
"In the area defined above, the maintenance and assembly of armed forces,
either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as
well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same
way forbidden."

Article 44:
Any violation of Articles 42 or 43 would be regarded as a hostile act
against the treaty powers and as an act calculated to disturb the peace of
the world.

These provisions created a security buffer intended to protect France and
Belgium from renewed German attack.

To guarantee compliance, the treaty also provided for Allied military
occupation of the Rhineland. Under Articles 428-432, occupation was to last
15 years from the entry into force of the treaty, with withdrawals in three
stages (after 5, 10, and 15 years), conditional on German compliance.

The Locarno Treaties (1925): Reconfirmation and Guarantee of
Demilitarization

In 1925, Germany (under Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann), France,
Belgium, Britain, and Italy signed the Locarno Treaties. The key agreement
was the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (Rhineland Pact).

Under this treaty:

Germany, France, and Belgium mutually recognized the inviolability of their
western borders as fixed by Versailles.

Britain and Italy acted as guarantor powers, pledging to assist any victim
of aggression.

Crucially, the parties explicitly guaranteed "the observance of the
stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles concerning
the demilitarised zone."

Locarno did not replace Versailles. Rather, it reconfirmed and guaranteed
the existing demilitarization regime within a new diplomatic framework. It
was politically significant because Germany accepted these obligations
voluntarily, unlike the imposed terms of 1919.

French and Allied Withdrawal from the Rhineland (1930)

Although occupation was originally scheduled to continue until the
mid-1930s, events accelerated its end:

In 1929, the Young Plan restructured Germany's reparations, reducing annual
payments and extending the payment period.

As part of the Hague agreements linked to the Young Plan, the Allied powers
agreed to accelerate evacuation of the Rhineland.

France, initially reluctant, accepted early withdrawal in exchange for
financial and political concessions.

The final Allied troops-primarily French-completed their withdrawal on 30
June 1930, five years earlier than originally planned.

Importantly, the end of occupation did not terminate demilitarization. The
legal obligation to keep the Rhineland free of German troops and
fortifications remained fully in force under Articles 42-44 of Versailles
and was reaffirmed by Locarno.

Germany's Violation: Remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936)

Under Adolf Hitler, Germany openly violated these obligations.

On 7 March 1936, Germany sent 19 battalions (approximately 20,000-30,000
troops) into the demilitarized Rhineland.

Hitler claimed that the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact (1935)
constituted a threat to Germany and rendered Locarno void.

This action directly violated:

Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade the presence or
assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone.

Article 42, once Germany subsequently began constructing fortifications.

The Locarno Rhineland Pact, which guaranteed observance of those Versailles
provisions.

Britain and France protested diplomatically but took no military action. The
matter was referred to the League of Nations, but no enforcement measures
followed. Hitler had instructed his forces to withdraw if met with
resistance; none came. The episode emboldened further German expansion.

Role of Rhineland Remilitarization in the German Victory over France (1940)

The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a critical enabler-though not the
sole cause-of Germany's rapid victory over France in May-June 1940.

Its strategic consequences included:

Elimination of France's primary security buffer. The demilitarized Rhineland
had allowed France to threaten rapid entry into western Germany in the event
of German aggression. Remilitarization removed this deterrent.

Construction of the Westwall (Siegfried Line). After 1936, Germany built
extensive fortifications along the western frontier, opposite the French
Maginot Line. This reduced German fear of a French counteroffensive.

Greater freedom of force concentration. With the western frontier secured,
Germany could allocate forces with greater confidence to offensive
operations.

Strategic risk acceptance in 1940. During the Battle of France, German
forces bypassed the Maginot Line by advancing through Belgium and the
Ardennes. The existence of the Westwall helped reassure German planners that
France could not easily strike into Germany during the campaign.

The result was the rapid encirclement and defeat of Allied forces in
northern France and Belgium, culminating in the evacuation at Dunkirk and
the fall of France within six weeks.

Summary

The 1930 Allied withdrawal ended military occupation but did not end
demilitarization, which remained guaranteed under both the Treaty of
Versailles and the Locarno Treaties. Germany's 1936 remilitarization was a
clear treaty violation that removed France's principal security safeguard,
enabled German western fortifications, and altered the strategic balance in
Europe. This unopposed breach played a significant role in creating the
conditions that made Germany's 1940 Blitzkrieg against France possible and
devastatingly effective.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Deploying Turks in Gaza Risks Catastrophic Conflict

Wed, 24 Dec 2025 16:17:01 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Deploying Turks in Gaza Risks Catastrophic Conflict
Dr. Aaron Lerner 24 December 2025

President Trump's team continues to press for us to accept the participation
of Turkish troops in the International Stabilization Force (ISF) to be
deployed in the Gaza Strip.

These Turkish forces can be expected to do everything in their power to help
Hamas effectively remain heavily armed and dangerous.

I write "effectively" because the Turks could certainly participate in
meaningless photo-op disarmament events.

Turkish forces could not only deploy as human shields for the benefit of
Hamas, but also as a force positioned opposite Israeli lines to intercept
and/or repel Israeli attacks against Hamas targets.

I appreciate that President Trump is not on the same page as we are when it
comes to Turkey in general and Erdoğan in particular.

Washington completely ignored Erdoğan's 30 March 2025 call during Eid
al-Fitr prayers: "May Allah destroy Zionist Israel."

Instead, President Trump praised Erdoğan as "tough" and "very smart."

But Washington's attitude toward Turkey is irrelevant.

Under all circumstances, the Trump team does not want a catastrophic
conflict involving Israel and Turkey.

I appreciate that even if one were to carry out a series of conflict
simulations examining how the deaths of Turkish soldiers in Gaza might play
out under various scenarios, the outcome is never escalation to the point of
a catastrophic armed conflict between Turkey and Israel.

The experts would note that decision-makers would have no choice but to show
restraint, knowing full well that everyone would have too much to lose.

But these simulations take place before real Turks with real families are
killed by Israel.

Not killed in one isolated incident but repeatedly killed as Turkish forces
refuse to back down from shielding Hamas.

A series of deaths that ignites the Turkish street.

This would be followed by a spiraling conflict caused by misjudgments by
both sides and a great deal of bad luck.

Are the odds 50%? 20%? Even just 10%?

None of us - Americans, Turks, or Israelis - can afford to roll the dice on
this.

For everyone's sake, Turkish forces cannot be part of the ISF.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Observation: Difficulties in the IDF for the Religious Don’t Negate Their Duty to Serve

Thu, 18 Dec 2025 10:03:02 -0500

Observation: Difficulties in the IDF for the Religious Don’t Negate Their Duty to Serve
Dr. Aaron Lerner 18 December 2025

Someone shared this article with me:

“The IDF Doesn’t Want Chareidim; It Wants to Re‑Educate Them,” Noam Chairman Says
The Yeshiva World December 15, 2025
https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/israel-news/2486186/the-idf-doesnt-want-chareidim-it-wants-to-re%E2%80%91educate-them-noam-chairman-says.html

I posted my observation in the comments section following the article: (posting times are apparently USA)

DR_AARON_LERNER says:
December 16, 2025 2:55 pm at 2:55 pm
If this were any other mitzvah which secular elements made harder for religious Jews to carry out I am certain that Noam Party chairman MK Avi Maoz would be among the first to call on religious Jews to overcome the obstacles to perform the mitzvah.

That’s the bottom line.

I am proud that my children and nephews all carried out the mitzvah of serving in this latest war.

Someone responded:
coffee addict says:
December 16, 2025 7:17 pm at 7:17 pm
“If this were any other mitzvah which secular elements made harder for religious Jews to carry out I am certain that Noam Party chairman MK Avi Maoz would be among the first to call on religious Jews to overcome the obstacles to perform the mitzvah.“

Ever heard of a Mitzva Habaah BeAveira

I guess you didn’t learn that when you became a doctor

I replied:

DR_AARON_LERNER says:
December 17, 2025 2:45 am at 2:45 am
Thank you for raising the issue. The principle you are referring to — often rendered as “a mitzvah that comes through a transgression” — is indeed a genuine concept in Jewish law, but its scope is frequently misunderstood.

The Talmud (Sukkah 30a) establishes that a stolen lulav is invalid because the act of theft is inseparable from the performance of the mitzvah. Maimonides codifies this explicitly in Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shofar, Sukkah v’Lulav, chapter 8, where he lists stolen items among the four species that are invalid for the mitzvah, with related disqualifications discussed in the surrounding halachot.

Crucially, this rule applies only where the mitzvah itself is performed through an inherent wrongdoing. It does not apply where external difficulties, burdens, or sacrifices make fulfilling a mitzvah harder.

Jewish tradition consistently teaches the opposite principle: hardship does not negate a mitzvah but can enhance its value — “the reward is according to the effort” (Ethics of the Fathers 5:23).

Accordingly, many leading authorities classify the defense of the Jewish people as a milchemet mitzvah (obligatory war), following Maimonides (Hilchot Melachim 5:1), a category that obligates participation precisely because of its necessity.

Jewish law therefore draws a clear distinction between:

A mitzvah invalidated because it is inseparable from wrongdoing, and

A mitzvah that remains binding — and even elevated — when fulfilling it entails real sacrifice.

That distinction is well grounded in the classical sources.

[Since then no comments have followed]
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Act on Zini's Warning and Adopt Standards for Handling Kidnappings

Wed, 17 Dec 2025 16:51:37 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Act on Zini's Warning and Adopt Standards for Handling
Kidnappings
Dr. Aaron Lerner 17 December 2025

"The threat of kidnappings has not diminished; it has increased and will
continue to increase, because there is a price to the way in which we paid
for the release of the hostages."
- Shin Bet head Maj. Gen. (res.) David Zini, briefing ministers at the 11
December 2025 political-security cabinet meeting, as reported by Ynet
https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14614905

Our demonstrated willingness to trade large numbers of terrorists in
exchange for the release of hostages isn't our only hostage-related problem.

Yishai Elmakis-Elram revealed in a report published in the 12 December 2025
edition of Makor Rishon that the IDF was ordered not to encircle or attack
Hamas forces in areas where Israeli hostages might be located.

Now that our enemies know that Israeli hostages can be used strategically as
human shields, there is no telling how Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and
Israel's other enemies will exploit this Israeli Achilles' heel in future
wars.

It did not have to be this way.

"Soldier Gilad Shalit has returned home, and the time has come to regulate
the treatment of captive and missing soldiers, and to stop the slippery
slope we find ourselves on following the Jibril deal, the Tannenbaum deal,
and the exchange of Gilad himself."
- Defense Minister Ehud Barak, upon receiving the Shamgar Report, May 2011

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to seek Cabinet approval for the
guidelines and restrictions proposed by the Shamgar Report, and they were
never enacted into law.

As politically challenging and painful as it is, adopting and enacting into
law clear guidelines and restrictions governing how Israel deals with the
challenge of Israeli hostages is necessary to remove hostage-taking from our
enemies' portfolio of effective tools in their war against Israel.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Revealed: Ahead of Merkavot Gideon B, the IDF ordered forces to allow Hamas to smuggle the hostages out of the combat zone

Sat, 13 Dec 2025 16:25:47 -0500

Revealed: Ahead of Merkavot Gideon B, the IDF ordered forces to allow Hamas
to smuggle the hostages out of the combat zone

Guidance documents for Division 36 during the operation, obtained by Makor
Rishon, show how directives from the Prisoners and Missing Persons Command
forced the IDF into inefficient fighting.
The proposed principle of operation in an area where there is feasibility of
hostages: "avoid contact with the terrorists."

Yishai Elmakis-Elram
Makor Rishon - 12 December 2025 page 8
[Translation of the Hebrew article]

When the IDF was engaged in preparations to deepen Operation Merkavot Gideon
B in the Gaza Strip, even before a ceasefire agreement and a hostage deal
came onto the agenda, unusual directives were issued in Southern Command to
the maneuvering forces, requiring the fighters on the ground to place
themselves and the mission at risk - in order to almost completely avoid
endangering the hostages, and even to allow the terrorists to escape with
them to the Mawasi area, the humanitarian zone west of Khan Yunis. The main
concern of the commanders was harm to living hostages, many of whom were
held in the urban combat area.

The explicit orders appear in an official document of Division 36 that
reached Makor Rishon already at that time, but only now can it be revealed.
The directives reveal a troubling picture: the IDF planned a ground
operation contrary to every known principle of warfare. Among other things,
the document details "situations that place the hostages at risk," which are
lessons learned from previous incidents in which hostages were apparently
killed during maneuvering. Among the dangers listed in the document:
"physical and tangible proximity" between the forces and the terrorists
holding the hostages; "lack of escape capability and a sense of encirclement
on the part of the terrorists"; situations in which the hostages become a
burden on terrorists seeking to flee; and also "enemy surprise situations in
proximity to POW/MIA" (prisoners and missing persons - Y.E.).

The operational response proposed by the document is divided into three:
reducing risk to the hostages even at the cost of harming the mission -
which, as remembered, is the defeat of Hamas; managing risks by marking
areas suspected of holding hostages; and preserving maneuver principles
unique to an area in which hostages may be present.

The operational solution defined according to the directive of the POW/MIA
Command is almost completely contrary to the familiar IDF combat doctrine.
Instead of surprise, encirclement, and rapid movement, the document states
that the forces must "avoid encirclement, including a sense of encirclement,
and leave escape routes."

Above ground, it is required to "maintain open escape axes and avoid
neutralizing shafts." Underground, it was determined that one must ensure
"relative operational clarity for the enemy so that he avoids a sense of
encirclement and understands that he has escape routes." Accordingly, the
instruction was to operate slowly, in a "gradual, systematic, linear, and
non-eruptive operation, in order not to alarm the terrorists." The forces
were also required to "avoid the use of violent means underground" and to
fire "coordinated and selective fire." In addition, it was noted that in the
event of resistance by terrorists underground or in front of doors and other
obstacles that are possible signs of "the presence of hostages, one must
immediately stop for a situation assessment" and "prioritize intelligence
and POW/MIA efforts at the expense of the rate of advance."

According to the document, the principle of operation in an area where there
is feasibility of living hostages is "to avoid any contact with the
terrorists, in favor of pushing the enemy and the POW/MIA into civilian
areas without maneuver," while creating updated intelligence and conditions
for their extraction.

In the divisional document it was defined that in the Khan Yunis area "the
desired situation" is that all living hostages will be transferred - by the
enemy, of course - to the Mawasi area, where they will be protected and
outside the maneuver sector.

In the Khan Yunis sector it was defined that as long as it is not possible
to rule out the presence of living hostages in a specific tunnel route, an
escape route must be left to a central tunnel that served as the
headquarters of senior Hamas figures. It was also determined that one must
not approach it under any circumstances above ground or below it, and that a
passage route from it to Mawasi above ground must be preserved. It should be
noted that immediately after the return of the living hostages, that
senior-officials' tunnel was bombed from the air.

The method of warfare taking place these days in Rafah against terrorists
who are not holding hostages is completely opposite. The action against
terrorists entrenched in tunnels includes tight encirclement, reduction of
water and food supplies, and aggressive combat actions above ground and
underground. This pressure, say the IDF, leads the terrorists to surface,
where some surrender and others are eliminated. According to the army,
dozens of terrorists were also eliminated inside the tunnel itself, and the
number of those remaining alive is very low.

The intelligence that the IDF had regarding the presence of living hostages
in tunnels in the Gaza Strip led the POW/MIA Command to determine the
operational combat concept for the maneuvering forces. It appears that were
it not for the ceasefire agreement imposed on the IDF - which halted the
deepening of the maneuver in Gaza - the ground operation that was planned in
the slow, schematic, and predictable method, which allows the enemy to
retreat and survive, could have ended at a much heavier price - both for the
fighters and for the hostages.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Voluntary Liquidation of Hamas-Linked Assets in Turkey For Seed Money for Removal of Gaza Rubble

Thu, 11 Dec 2025 18:55:31 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Voluntary Liquidation of Hamas-Linked Assets in Turkey For Seed Money for Removal of Gaza Rubble
Dr. Aaron Lerner 11 December 2025

If Hamas and its allies are truly committed to building a peaceful Gaza then, along with relinquishing its arms in Gaza, Hamas should liquidate its assets overseas.

While Israel most certainly has every right to lay claim to these assets as partial compensation, the move would be more palatable for Hamas and its allies if the proceeds went towards funding the removal of rubble from Gaza.

The timeline below relates to all the Hamas assets in Turkey and shows ranges of time reflecting different assets.

It can be expected that a considerable sum of money could already be transferred within five months.

This would fit the schedule if the implementation of the rubble removing program is made contingent on the completion of the complete disarmament of Hamas and the other terror groups in Gaza.

This plan is to liquidate approximately US $200-300 million in Turkish-registered companies and real-estate holdings beneficially owned by Hamas or Hamas-designated individuals, and to transfer the net liquidation proceeds to an international escrow account (Board of Peace–managed Gaza Reconstruction Trust), without:
- designating Hamas as a terrorist organization under Turkish law,
- invoking coercive seizure authorities (Law 6415 / Law 3713), or
- triggering adversarial criminal proceedings.

This plan relies entirely on voluntary civil/commercial procedures, consistent with the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC 6102), the Financial Crimes Law (5549), and the Foreign Direct Investment Law (4875), combined with one unavoidable political authorization for the final transfer.

The $250 million voluntarily liquidated from Hamas’s Turkish assets becomes the first-loss seed equity that allows the World Bank and Arab sponsors to issue a $1-1.5 billion Gaza Recovery Bond at investment-grade rates. For the first four to six years, debt service is securely covered by a pre-committed Gulf “solidarity top-up” ($80-120 million per year shared by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar), a small earmarked Palestinian clearance revenue, and early rubble-processing proceeds - none of which requires new political decisions once the bond is signed. Beginning around year four, commercial recycling of Gaza’s 68 million tons of rubble generates $180-250 million annually at realistic throughput and market prices, fully replacing the Gulf top-up. Verified carbon credits from avoided CO₂ emissions add a further $40-60 million per year as a conservative cushion. In effect, Hamas’s Turkish assets de-risks the entire structure, limits Gulf involvement to a short and contractually locked bridge, and then lets Gaza’s own destroyed buildings pay private investors to clear themselves - with no further donor or taxpayer money required after the initial phase.

Here are details of the plan for the Hamas assets in Turkey:

I. Legal Mechanism
Core Legal Vehicle
Voluntary corporate dissolution under:
- TCC Arts. 529-548 (Joint-stock companies - A.Ş.)
- TCC Art. 643 (Limited-liability companies - Ltd. Şti., applying A.Ş. rules)
Regulatory Verification
Non-criminal AML/CFT review by MASAK under Law 5549 (information requests, compliance review).
International Outbound Transfer
Under FDI Law No. 4875, Art. 3, liquidation proceeds may be freely transferred abroad after tax, AML, and FX compliance, with political authorization required in high-visibility cases.

II. Step-by-Step Process

Step 1. Notarized dissolution resolution + liquidator appointment
Action: Hamas-controlled shareholders issue a notarized general assembly resolution approving voluntary dissolution and appointing liquidators (standard practice: at least one Turkish resident).
Responsible Institution: Notary Public → Trade Registry (MERSİS)
Legal Basis: TCC Arts. 529, 540
Realistic Timeline: 3-10 days

Step 2. Registration of dissolution + UBO disclosure to MASAK
Action: File resolution and liquidator details; provide full beneficial-ownership documentation to MASAK upon request for AML compliance.
Responsible Institution: Trade Registry + MASAK
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 540; Law 5549 Art. 17
Realistic Timeline: 1-3 weeks

Step 3. Creditor notifications in Trade Registry Gazette
Action: Three consecutive announcements (7 days apart) published in Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi; statutory creditor objection period begins.
Under TCC 543,
- Known creditors receive a minimum 3-week call period.
- For unknown creditors, the one-year waiting period may be shortened only if the liquidator provides adequate security for potential claims, subject to court oversight.
Responsible Institution: Trade Registry Gazette
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 543
Realistic Timeline: Minimum 3 weeks (typically 4-6 weeks depending on creditor security requirements)

Step 4. Liquidation operations
Action: Liquidator prepares opening balance sheet, sells assets, settles legitimate debts, and fulfills tax obligations.
Responsible Institution: Liquidator (overseen by Trade Registry)
TCC Arts. 541-545
Realistic Timeline: 3-9 months (simple) / up to 12 months (real-estate heavy)

Step 5. Tax clearance certificate
Action: Revenue Administration confirms all corporate taxes, VAT, and withholding taxes paid.
Responsible Institution: Revenue Administration (GİB / Vergi Dairesi)
Legal Basis: Tax Procedure Law No. 213
Realistic Timeline: 2-6 weeks (parallel to Step 4)

Step 6. MASAK AML verification / no-objection
Action: Revised for accuracy:
MASAK reviews the liquidation transactions for AML/CFT compliance and raises no objections, allowing the liquidation to proceed to final distribution.
Responsible Institution: MASAK
Legal Basis: Law 5549 Art. 5; FATF Rec. 4
Realistic Timeline: 2-6 weeks

Step 7. Final general assembly + authorization of proceeds transfer
Action: Shareholders approve the closing balance sheet and authorize transfer of net proceeds to the Gaza Reconstruction Trust escrow account.
Responsible Institution: Notarized minutes → Trade Registry
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 547
Realistic Timeline: 1 week

Step 8. Presidential Decision / Cabinet instruction
Action: This step is political, not statutory, but is practically required for high-visibility transfers involving foreign entities.
The decision frames the transfer as “humanitarian assistance to Gaza” and ensures interagency alignment (Treasury, MASAK, MFA, TCMB, Trade Registry).
Published in Resmi Gazete, e.g.:
“Filistin’e İnsani Yardım Kapsamında Yapılacak Transferler Hakkında Karar.”
Responsible Institution: Presidency / Council of Ministers
Legal Basis: Administrative practice (2023-2025 precedent)
Realistic Timeline: 2–8 weeks

Step 9. Outward transfer processed
Action: Central Bank receives documentation for transfers above reporting thresholds; executes SWIFT payment to the UN/World Bank escrow.
Responsible Institution: Central Bank of Turkey (TCMB)
Legal Basis: FX Communiqué 2022-32/66
Realistic Timeline: 1-3 days

Step 10. Final deregistration
Action: Company removed from the commercial registry.
Responsible Institution: Trade Registry
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 548
Realistic Timeline:1 week

III. Realistic Total Timeline
- Best-case (simple portfolio, no objections): 5–7 months
- Normal case (real-estate holdings): 8–10 months
- Complex but cooperative: up to 12 months

IV. Key Advantages
- 100% civil/commercial - no terrorism designation required.
- No coercive seizure or freezing - fully voluntary and shareholder-driven.
- Creditor protections built-in (Registry Gazette announcements + security option).
- Liquidation proceeds qualify as “liquidation returns” → free transfer under FDI Law Art. 3 after compliance.
- Only one political step (Presidential Decision), easily framed domestically as humanitarian assistance.
- Entire process auditable by MASAK, the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay), and the international escrow trustee.

V. Conclusion
This plan is:
- statutorily accurate,
- procedurally compliant,
- politically realistic,
- defensible in Turkish courts,
- aligned with MASAK and Trade Registry practice, and
- operationally implementable within 5–12 months.

If Hamas signs the notarized dissolution resolutions tomorrow, the first funds could lawfully and transparently reach the Gaza Reconstruction Trust before the end of 2026-using Hamas’s own money to begin clearing Gaza’s rubble, without Turkey ever having to designate Hamas a terrorist organization.

This is the clean, fast, and practically politically viable path if there is a genuine transformation in Gaza.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il