IMRA Middle East News Updates

Weekly Commentary: Act on Zini's Warning and Adopt Standards for Handling Kidnappings

Wed, 17 Dec 2025 16:51:37 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Act on Zini's Warning and Adopt Standards for Handling
Kidnappings
Dr. Aaron Lerner 17 December 2025

"The threat of kidnappings has not diminished; it has increased and will
continue to increase, because there is a price to the way in which we paid
for the release of the hostages."
- Shin Bet head Maj. Gen. (res.) David Zini, briefing ministers at the 11
December 2025 political-security cabinet meeting, as reported by Ynet
https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14614905

Our demonstrated willingness to trade large numbers of terrorists in
exchange for the release of hostages isn't our only hostage-related problem.

Yishai Elmakis-Elram revealed in a report published in the 12 December 2025
edition of Makor Rishon that the IDF was ordered not to encircle or attack
Hamas forces in areas where Israeli hostages might be located.

Now that our enemies know that Israeli hostages can be used strategically as
human shields, there is no telling how Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and
Israel's other enemies will exploit this Israeli Achilles' heel in future
wars.

It did not have to be this way.

"Soldier Gilad Shalit has returned home, and the time has come to regulate
the treatment of captive and missing soldiers, and to stop the slippery
slope we find ourselves on following the Jibril deal, the Tannenbaum deal,
and the exchange of Gilad himself."
- Defense Minister Ehud Barak, upon receiving the Shamgar Report, May 2011

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to seek Cabinet approval for the
guidelines and restrictions proposed by the Shamgar Report, and they were
never enacted into law.

As politically challenging and painful as it is, adopting and enacting into
law clear guidelines and restrictions governing how Israel deals with the
challenge of Israeli hostages is necessary to remove hostage-taking from our
enemies' portfolio of effective tools in their war against Israel.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Revealed: Ahead of Merkavot Gideon B, the IDF ordered forces to allow Hamas to smuggle the hostages out of the combat zone

Sat, 13 Dec 2025 16:25:47 -0500

Revealed: Ahead of Merkavot Gideon B, the IDF ordered forces to allow Hamas
to smuggle the hostages out of the combat zone

Guidance documents for Division 36 during the operation, obtained by Makor
Rishon, show how directives from the Prisoners and Missing Persons Command
forced the IDF into inefficient fighting.
The proposed principle of operation in an area where there is feasibility of
hostages: "avoid contact with the terrorists."

Yishai Elmakis-Elram
Makor Rishon - 12 December 2025 page 8
[Translation of the Hebrew article]

When the IDF was engaged in preparations to deepen Operation Merkavot Gideon
B in the Gaza Strip, even before a ceasefire agreement and a hostage deal
came onto the agenda, unusual directives were issued in Southern Command to
the maneuvering forces, requiring the fighters on the ground to place
themselves and the mission at risk - in order to almost completely avoid
endangering the hostages, and even to allow the terrorists to escape with
them to the Mawasi area, the humanitarian zone west of Khan Yunis. The main
concern of the commanders was harm to living hostages, many of whom were
held in the urban combat area.

The explicit orders appear in an official document of Division 36 that
reached Makor Rishon already at that time, but only now can it be revealed.
The directives reveal a troubling picture: the IDF planned a ground
operation contrary to every known principle of warfare. Among other things,
the document details "situations that place the hostages at risk," which are
lessons learned from previous incidents in which hostages were apparently
killed during maneuvering. Among the dangers listed in the document:
"physical and tangible proximity" between the forces and the terrorists
holding the hostages; "lack of escape capability and a sense of encirclement
on the part of the terrorists"; situations in which the hostages become a
burden on terrorists seeking to flee; and also "enemy surprise situations in
proximity to POW/MIA" (prisoners and missing persons - Y.E.).

The operational response proposed by the document is divided into three:
reducing risk to the hostages even at the cost of harming the mission -
which, as remembered, is the defeat of Hamas; managing risks by marking
areas suspected of holding hostages; and preserving maneuver principles
unique to an area in which hostages may be present.

The operational solution defined according to the directive of the POW/MIA
Command is almost completely contrary to the familiar IDF combat doctrine.
Instead of surprise, encirclement, and rapid movement, the document states
that the forces must "avoid encirclement, including a sense of encirclement,
and leave escape routes."

Above ground, it is required to "maintain open escape axes and avoid
neutralizing shafts." Underground, it was determined that one must ensure
"relative operational clarity for the enemy so that he avoids a sense of
encirclement and understands that he has escape routes." Accordingly, the
instruction was to operate slowly, in a "gradual, systematic, linear, and
non-eruptive operation, in order not to alarm the terrorists." The forces
were also required to "avoid the use of violent means underground" and to
fire "coordinated and selective fire." In addition, it was noted that in the
event of resistance by terrorists underground or in front of doors and other
obstacles that are possible signs of "the presence of hostages, one must
immediately stop for a situation assessment" and "prioritize intelligence
and POW/MIA efforts at the expense of the rate of advance."

According to the document, the principle of operation in an area where there
is feasibility of living hostages is "to avoid any contact with the
terrorists, in favor of pushing the enemy and the POW/MIA into civilian
areas without maneuver," while creating updated intelligence and conditions
for their extraction.

In the divisional document it was defined that in the Khan Yunis area "the
desired situation" is that all living hostages will be transferred - by the
enemy, of course - to the Mawasi area, where they will be protected and
outside the maneuver sector.

In the Khan Yunis sector it was defined that as long as it is not possible
to rule out the presence of living hostages in a specific tunnel route, an
escape route must be left to a central tunnel that served as the
headquarters of senior Hamas figures. It was also determined that one must
not approach it under any circumstances above ground or below it, and that a
passage route from it to Mawasi above ground must be preserved. It should be
noted that immediately after the return of the living hostages, that
senior-officials' tunnel was bombed from the air.

The method of warfare taking place these days in Rafah against terrorists
who are not holding hostages is completely opposite. The action against
terrorists entrenched in tunnels includes tight encirclement, reduction of
water and food supplies, and aggressive combat actions above ground and
underground. This pressure, say the IDF, leads the terrorists to surface,
where some surrender and others are eliminated. According to the army,
dozens of terrorists were also eliminated inside the tunnel itself, and the
number of those remaining alive is very low.

The intelligence that the IDF had regarding the presence of living hostages
in tunnels in the Gaza Strip led the POW/MIA Command to determine the
operational combat concept for the maneuvering forces. It appears that were
it not for the ceasefire agreement imposed on the IDF - which halted the
deepening of the maneuver in Gaza - the ground operation that was planned in
the slow, schematic, and predictable method, which allows the enemy to
retreat and survive, could have ended at a much heavier price - both for the
fighters and for the hostages.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Voluntary Liquidation of Hamas-Linked Assets in Turkey For Seed Money for Removal of Gaza Rubble

Thu, 11 Dec 2025 18:55:31 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Voluntary Liquidation of Hamas-Linked Assets in Turkey For Seed Money for Removal of Gaza Rubble
Dr. Aaron Lerner 11 December 2025

If Hamas and its allies are truly committed to building a peaceful Gaza then, along with relinquishing its arms in Gaza, Hamas should liquidate its assets overseas.

While Israel most certainly has every right to lay claim to these assets as partial compensation, the move would be more palatable for Hamas and its allies if the proceeds went towards funding the removal of rubble from Gaza.

The timeline below relates to all the Hamas assets in Turkey and shows ranges of time reflecting different assets.

It can be expected that a considerable sum of money could already be transferred within five months.

This would fit the schedule if the implementation of the rubble removing program is made contingent on the completion of the complete disarmament of Hamas and the other terror groups in Gaza.

This plan is to liquidate approximately US $200-300 million in Turkish-registered companies and real-estate holdings beneficially owned by Hamas or Hamas-designated individuals, and to transfer the net liquidation proceeds to an international escrow account (Board of Peace–managed Gaza Reconstruction Trust), without:
- designating Hamas as a terrorist organization under Turkish law,
- invoking coercive seizure authorities (Law 6415 / Law 3713), or
- triggering adversarial criminal proceedings.

This plan relies entirely on voluntary civil/commercial procedures, consistent with the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC 6102), the Financial Crimes Law (5549), and the Foreign Direct Investment Law (4875), combined with one unavoidable political authorization for the final transfer.

The $250 million voluntarily liquidated from Hamas’s Turkish assets becomes the first-loss seed equity that allows the World Bank and Arab sponsors to issue a $1-1.5 billion Gaza Recovery Bond at investment-grade rates. For the first four to six years, debt service is securely covered by a pre-committed Gulf “solidarity top-up” ($80-120 million per year shared by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar), a small earmarked Palestinian clearance revenue, and early rubble-processing proceeds - none of which requires new political decisions once the bond is signed. Beginning around year four, commercial recycling of Gaza’s 68 million tons of rubble generates $180-250 million annually at realistic throughput and market prices, fully replacing the Gulf top-up. Verified carbon credits from avoided CO₂ emissions add a further $40-60 million per year as a conservative cushion. In effect, Hamas’s Turkish assets de-risks the entire structure, limits Gulf involvement to a short and contractually locked bridge, and then lets Gaza’s own destroyed buildings pay private investors to clear themselves - with no further donor or taxpayer money required after the initial phase.

Here are details of the plan for the Hamas assets in Turkey:

I. Legal Mechanism
Core Legal Vehicle
Voluntary corporate dissolution under:
- TCC Arts. 529-548 (Joint-stock companies - A.Ş.)
- TCC Art. 643 (Limited-liability companies - Ltd. Şti., applying A.Ş. rules)
Regulatory Verification
Non-criminal AML/CFT review by MASAK under Law 5549 (information requests, compliance review).
International Outbound Transfer
Under FDI Law No. 4875, Art. 3, liquidation proceeds may be freely transferred abroad after tax, AML, and FX compliance, with political authorization required in high-visibility cases.

II. Step-by-Step Process

Step 1. Notarized dissolution resolution + liquidator appointment
Action: Hamas-controlled shareholders issue a notarized general assembly resolution approving voluntary dissolution and appointing liquidators (standard practice: at least one Turkish resident).
Responsible Institution: Notary Public → Trade Registry (MERSİS)
Legal Basis: TCC Arts. 529, 540
Realistic Timeline: 3-10 days

Step 2. Registration of dissolution + UBO disclosure to MASAK
Action: File resolution and liquidator details; provide full beneficial-ownership documentation to MASAK upon request for AML compliance.
Responsible Institution: Trade Registry + MASAK
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 540; Law 5549 Art. 17
Realistic Timeline: 1-3 weeks

Step 3. Creditor notifications in Trade Registry Gazette
Action: Three consecutive announcements (7 days apart) published in Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi; statutory creditor objection period begins.
Under TCC 543,
- Known creditors receive a minimum 3-week call period.
- For unknown creditors, the one-year waiting period may be shortened only if the liquidator provides adequate security for potential claims, subject to court oversight.
Responsible Institution: Trade Registry Gazette
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 543
Realistic Timeline: Minimum 3 weeks (typically 4-6 weeks depending on creditor security requirements)

Step 4. Liquidation operations
Action: Liquidator prepares opening balance sheet, sells assets, settles legitimate debts, and fulfills tax obligations.
Responsible Institution: Liquidator (overseen by Trade Registry)
TCC Arts. 541-545
Realistic Timeline: 3-9 months (simple) / up to 12 months (real-estate heavy)

Step 5. Tax clearance certificate
Action: Revenue Administration confirms all corporate taxes, VAT, and withholding taxes paid.
Responsible Institution: Revenue Administration (GİB / Vergi Dairesi)
Legal Basis: Tax Procedure Law No. 213
Realistic Timeline: 2-6 weeks (parallel to Step 4)

Step 6. MASAK AML verification / no-objection
Action: Revised for accuracy:
MASAK reviews the liquidation transactions for AML/CFT compliance and raises no objections, allowing the liquidation to proceed to final distribution.
Responsible Institution: MASAK
Legal Basis: Law 5549 Art. 5; FATF Rec. 4
Realistic Timeline: 2-6 weeks

Step 7. Final general assembly + authorization of proceeds transfer
Action: Shareholders approve the closing balance sheet and authorize transfer of net proceeds to the Gaza Reconstruction Trust escrow account.
Responsible Institution: Notarized minutes → Trade Registry
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 547
Realistic Timeline: 1 week

Step 8. Presidential Decision / Cabinet instruction
Action: This step is political, not statutory, but is practically required for high-visibility transfers involving foreign entities.
The decision frames the transfer as “humanitarian assistance to Gaza” and ensures interagency alignment (Treasury, MASAK, MFA, TCMB, Trade Registry).
Published in Resmi Gazete, e.g.:
“Filistin’e İnsani Yardım Kapsamında Yapılacak Transferler Hakkında Karar.”
Responsible Institution: Presidency / Council of Ministers
Legal Basis: Administrative practice (2023-2025 precedent)
Realistic Timeline: 2–8 weeks

Step 9. Outward transfer processed
Action: Central Bank receives documentation for transfers above reporting thresholds; executes SWIFT payment to the UN/World Bank escrow.
Responsible Institution: Central Bank of Turkey (TCMB)
Legal Basis: FX Communiqué 2022-32/66
Realistic Timeline: 1-3 days

Step 10. Final deregistration
Action: Company removed from the commercial registry.
Responsible Institution: Trade Registry
Legal Basis: TCC Art. 548
Realistic Timeline:1 week

III. Realistic Total Timeline
- Best-case (simple portfolio, no objections): 5–7 months
- Normal case (real-estate holdings): 8–10 months
- Complex but cooperative: up to 12 months

IV. Key Advantages
- 100% civil/commercial - no terrorism designation required.
- No coercive seizure or freezing - fully voluntary and shareholder-driven.
- Creditor protections built-in (Registry Gazette announcements + security option).
- Liquidation proceeds qualify as “liquidation returns” → free transfer under FDI Law Art. 3 after compliance.
- Only one political step (Presidential Decision), easily framed domestically as humanitarian assistance.
- Entire process auditable by MASAK, the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay), and the international escrow trustee.

V. Conclusion
This plan is:
- statutorily accurate,
- procedurally compliant,
- politically realistic,
- defensible in Turkish courts,
- aligned with MASAK and Trade Registry practice, and
- operationally implementable within 5–12 months.

If Hamas signs the notarized dissolution resolutions tomorrow, the first funds could lawfully and transparently reach the Gaza Reconstruction Trust before the end of 2026-using Hamas’s own money to begin clearing Gaza’s rubble, without Turkey ever having to designate Hamas a terrorist organization.

This is the clean, fast, and practically politically viable path if there is a genuine transformation in Gaza.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Yes to Ending Funding - No To Disenfranchising Draft Dodgers

Fri, 05 Dec 2025 09:25:03 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Yes to Ending Funding - No To Disenfranchising Draft
Dodgers

Dr. Aaron Lerner Date: 5 December 2025

Some politicians have floated the idea that draft dodgers be denied the
right to vote.

It is a dangerous move against our democratic values.

There's more than enough to do to draft dodgers:

Draft dodgers should not get a discount on municipal taxes because they are
low income .

Draft dodgers should not get a discount on National Insurance and National
Health insurance because they are low income.

Draft dodgers should not have subsidized daycare for their kids.

Draft dodgers and the yeshiva they are recorded as attending shouldn't
receive government funds because they are studying at the yeshiva.

And more.

But, yes, even draft dodgers should have the right to vote.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Mend the Rifts - State Commission of Inquiry and Pull Draft Law

Sun, 30 Nov 2025 07:31:12 -0500

Mend the Rifts - State Commission of Inquiry and Pull Draft Law
Dr. Aaron Lerner 30 November 2025

"Faced with the security challenges and diplomatic opportunities now
standing before the State of Israel, I am committed to doing everything in
my power to mend the rifts, achieve unity among the people, and restore
trust in the institutions of the state."
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 30.11.2025

Our Prime Minister is completely right.

And therefore, for that same purpose:

- A state commission of inquiry must be established, with its composition
determined by the President of the Supreme Court together with Justice
Solberg. I emphasize: "together" - not merely "in consultation."

- The Draft Law must be withdrawn. It is true that a rift may exist between
those who refuse to share the security and economic burden and those who are
willing to do so, but at this critical time the important thing is to
prevent a rift among those who are carrying the burden and are prepared to
defend the country.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Enable Security Personnel To Warn Political Echelon

Wed, 26 Nov 2025 10:29:43 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Urgent Legislation So Security Personnel Can Warn
Political Echelon
Dr. Aaron Lerner 26 November 2025

Fact: Numerous Israeli security personnel warned their superiors of the
impending October 2023 disaster, but these warnings never reached the
political echelon.

The security echelon already has a set-up which allows for anyone in the
security echelon to jump the chain of command to provide critical
information to the head of their organization.

But today, already two years after the October 2023 disaster, it is
literally a violation of the law for members of the security echelon to
communicate with the political echelon without authorization from the top of
their chain of command.

We urgently need to extend this arrangement to its logical conclusion: a
set-up which allows for anyone in the security echelon to jump the chain of
command to provide critical information to the heads of the political
echelon, the Minister of Defense, and the Prime Minister.

Some have warned that such an arrangement would overwhelm the DM and PM
messages from "nudniks" in the security echelon.

But the arrangement doesn't need to give those who send the DM or PM reports
and warnings the protection enjoyed by whistle blowers.

In fact, the arrangement could require that a copy of any such communication
much also be sent, at the same time, to their immediate superior.

Those choosing to jump the chain of command would be literally betting their
careers on the importance of the information they are sharing.

From what we know today of the frustration of the lower echelons dealing
with "Jericho Wall", the spotters and others, It made sense that these same
people didn't contact the top of their own security groups because they knew
that the security echelon was blinded by the "conception".

It is reasonable, however, to conclude that they would have reached out to
Netanyahu if there was a way to do it, knowing that if there was a record
that the information was brought to his attention that Netanyahu, ever
fearful of future commissions of enquiry, would have acted on it.

It is with a heavy heart that I note that even in the national camp there
are many who vociferously oppose making it possible for people in the
security echelon to jump the chain of command to reach the PM and DM with
critical information.

For the life of me I don't know why so many good Israelis are unable to
connect the dots.

There is legislation stuck in the Knesset addressing this issue.

Even a dog who gets hit by a car learns not to go into the street again.

We urgently need to learn our lesson.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il