Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Israel Intelligence' Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC)
March 4 , 2007

The implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 after six months
Interim report
For annotated version:
www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/res_1701e0307.htm

1. An examination of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701
six months after its passing shows that that implementation to be only
partial and that the Lebanese army and UNIFIL have not enforced its
essential provisions . Basically, south Lebanon has not become a
demilitarized zone free of terrorist organizations and their weapons,
Hezbollah as an organization was not disarmed, the process of rehabilitating
its military strength continues, and an effective embargo on smuggling arms
from Syria to Lebanon has not been imposed. The quiet prevailing in south
Lebanon since the war ended is to a great extent a function of Hezbollah's
focus on rehabilitating its military strength. In our assessment, as the
rehabilitation process continues and Hezbollah's confidence increases, so
will its daring and willingness to continue disregarding the implementation
of Resolution 1701.

Interim report on the implementation of Resolution 1701

2. On August 12, 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which
ended the second Lebanon war and was supposed to create a new situation in
south Lebanon . The resolution went into effect on August 14, after having
been approved by the governments of Israel and Lebanon . 1

3. The Resolution had two main components :

A. Regarding south Lebanon (especially the area south of the Litani River):
security arrangements in south Lebanon were based on the deployment of up to
15,000 Lebanese troops concurrent with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces
to the international boundary between the two countries (the Blue Line). The
Lebanese army was supposed to enforce the authority of the Lebanese
government over south Lebanon , where there was supposed to be only one
source of weapons, the Lebanese government, and to rid the area of the
presence and activities of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. To carry
out the mission the Lebanese army was to be supported by an upgraded UNIFIL
force of up to 15,000 soldiers.

B. Regarding north Lebanon : the resolution called for the disarming of
Hezbollah and other terrorist groups (without specifically naming them)
based on previous Security Council resolutions and internal Lebanese
decisions (mainly the 1989 Taif agreement). The agreement imposed an embargo
on delivering arms to Hezbollah (and other terrorist groups) and called for
the Lebanese government to supervise the Lebanon borders (on land, at sea
and in the air) with UNIFIL support (should the Lebanese government so
desire). The resolution also calls for the unconditional release of the
Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah.

4. An examination of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701
shows the following :

A. Regarding south Lebanon : an unprecedented Lebanese army force was
deployed (approximately 10,000 soldiers, i.e., four brigades), supported by
an upgraded UNIFIL force of more than 12,000 soldiers. Their deployment
created a new situation on the ground and Hezbollah is no longer the only
significant force operating in south Lebanon . So far the area has been
quiet (with the exception of a single incident) because Hezbollah, which
focuses on rebuilding its military strength, has avoided initiating
incidents. However, the Lebanon army and UNIFIL do not act to demilitarize
south Lebanon and to oust the terrorist organizations and their weapons, as
demanded by Resolution 1701, nor do they effectively hamper Hezbollah in its
military rehabilitation. Hezbollah continues its routine operational
activities in south Lebanon while adapting to the new situation, enabling it
to deal easily with Lebanese army and UNIFIL actions.

B. Regarding north Lebanon : Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations
(including groups belonging to the global jihad and the Palestinian
terrorist organizations based in the refugee camps) were not disarmed. No
serious attempt was made by the Lebanese government to deal with them. In
Beirut and the Beqa'a Valley (as in the south), Hezbollah's military
infrastructure continues its rehabilitation with no meaningful interference.
The embargo on delivering weapons to Hezbollah is not enforced and arms
continue regularly to cross the Syrian-Lebanese boundary. (The Lebanese
army's impounding of a truckload of Katyushas was an exceptional act and not
part of an overall policy.) The two abducted IDF soldiers held by Hezbollah
are still in captivity and the Lebanese government does nothing to secure
their release.

5. The crisis faced by the Lebanese government over the past few months,
manifested by Hezbollah's efforts to collapse Fuad Seniora's government,
also makes it difficult to enforce Security Council Resolution 1701. The
Lebanese government is struggling to survive and avoids challenging
Hezbollah's status in south Lebanon , and the Lebanese army has even had to
move troops from the south to Beirut to deal with the internal crisis. The
developments have an impact and are liable to influence UNIFIL's resolve to
carry out its mission in supporting the Lebanese army in implementing
Security Council Resolution 1701.

6. The quiet and lack of incidents that have prevailed in south Lebanon
since the end of the second Lebanon war are to a great extent a function of
Hezbollah's focus on rearming. However, the situation may change, and in our
assessment the more progress Hezbollah makes, the more daring and willing it
will become to initiative incidents and increase the erosion of the
implementation of Resolution 1701. Hassan Nasrallah's growing
self-confidence was manifested in a defiant speech given on February 16, in
which he publicly admitted the his organization was rearming and secretly
moving weapons to south Lebanon . 2

7. This document has two appendices:
A. Appendix I : A comparison between the main points of Resolution 1701 and
its implementation (as of February 2007)
B. Appendix II : Maps of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL deployment in south
Lebanon

Appendix I
The main provisions of Security Council Resolution 1701
and the status of their implementation

# 1 Provision: An end to the hostilities and the establishment of a
permanent ceasefire along the international Israeli-Lebanese border (the
Blue Line, delineated by the UN's cartographers when Israel withdrew from
Lebanon in May 2000).

Implementation

The resolution marked the end of the second Lebanon war. In general the
ceasefire has been maintained with the exception of one incident between
Israel and Hezbollah.

On February 5 the IDF uncovered a chain of side charges in the central
sector of south Lebanon (near moshav Avivim) which was apparently placed
there by Hezbollah. During the follow-up operation on February 7 to uncover
other charges the Lebanese army fired at the IDF, which returned fire.

2 Provision: The Lebanese government will enforce its authority and control
of all Lebanon .

As part of that, the Lebanese army will deploy in south Lebanon concurrent
with the IDF's withdrawal. Also mentioned is the decision made by the
Lebanese government on August 7 regarding the deployment of up to 15,000
Lebanese soldiers armed with the necessary weapons and supported by UNIFIL
forces.

Implementation

The Lebanese has broadly deployed its forces in the south (10,000 soldiers:
Brigades 6, 10, 11 and 23).
Approximately 8,000 soldiers have been deployed along the Syrian-Lebanese
boundary, Brigades 1, 5 and 8 plus commando units).

The Lebanese army in the south views its role, first and foremost, as
preserving quiet in the region. However, it avoids direct confrontations
with Hezbollah and does not take effective action against the smuggling of
weapons to Hezbollah .

The Lebanese army has shown readiness to collaborate with Hezbollah in
several fields, including help in smuggling weapons and evading UNIFIL
roadblocks.

3 Provision: The Lebanese government will be supported by a large, upgraded
UNIFIL force and will undertake broader missions .

The operative provisions of the resolution allow for up to 15,000 UNIFIL
solders and broader missions.

The main missions are supervision of the end of the war, supporting the
Lebanese army to deploy in the south as far as the
Blue Line and to establish its authority, and to provide humanitarian
support for the civilian population.

The scope of UNIFIL's action has been widened and it is charged with aiding
the Lebanese government (should the government request) to secure its
boundaries to prevent weapons from being smuggled into its territory.

Implementation

The UNIFIL force is significantly larger than it was before the war.

Currently there are approximately 10,500 land forces in Lebanon and 1,800
marines deployed along approximately 12 miles of the Lebanese coast. UNIFIL
is shortly expected to be increased to 12,5000.

The principal countries which contributed forces to UNIFIL: Italy (two
infantry battalions and regional headquarters), France (two infantry
battalions), Spain (an infantry battalion, an interference force and
regional headquarters), Indonesia , Ghana , India , Malaysia and Nepal (one
infantry battalion each).

UNIFIL, especially the European battalions, try to locate and confiscate
weapons. The UNIFIL soldiers have recently become bolder, leading to
friction with Hezbollah and the local population.

UNIFIL avoids frontal confrontations with Hezbollah and does not disarm the
organization as required by Resolution 1701.
UNIFIL does not aid (and was not asked to aid) the Lebanese government in
securing its borders and preventing weapons from being smuggled into
Lebanese territory.

4 Provision: Security arrangements will be determined for the region between
the international boundary (the Blue Line) and the Litani River .

Only the Lebanese government and UNIFIL will operate in the above region and
armed groups (i.e., Hezbollah) will be forbidden to enter; weapons will be
forbidden and "assets" (i.e., posts and fortifications) will not be allowed.

Implementation
The principle that only Lebanese government security forces will be armed is
not maintained. Hezbollah continues to preserve and rehabilitate its
military strength in south Lebanon , and to bring in weapons.

Hezbollah is vigorously rebuilding its military infrastructure in south
Lebanon in both populated and unpopulated areas. In addition, the
Palestinian terrorist organizations have strongholds in the refugee camps.

On the other hand, the Lebanese army and massive UNIFIL deployments in south
Lebanon make it difficult for Hezbollah to treat the area as its own and it
is no longer the only power in the region. Therefore it has been forced to
change its methods and maintain low visibility in an attempt to adapt itself
to the new situation.

5 Provision: The "armed militias" in Lebanon are to be disarmed and
disbanded in accordance with both Security Council Resolution 1559 and the
Taif Accord (1989).

The UN Secretary General is to present his proposals to the Security Council
for disarming the armed groups (mainly Hezbollah) within 30 days.

Implementation

The Lebanese government has made no effort to disarm or disband "the armed
militias," including Hezbollah, groups belonging to the global jihad and the
Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Hezbollah continues to preserve it military infrastructure thoroughly
Lebanon , in the south, in southern suburbs of Beirut and in the Beqa'a
Valley, and it has no intention of disarming.

Since the end of the second Lebanon war Hezbollah has been rehabilitating
its military capabilities and rebuilding its might while internalizing the
lessons of the war, all with no significant interference.

Since the end of the second Lebanon war groups belonging to the global jihad
have significantly strengthened.

6 Provision: The abducted Israeli soldiers are to be unconditionally
released (a provision appearing in the preamble in the context of the end of
the hostilities but not a condition of the end of the fighting).

An effort is to be made to find a solution for the problem of the Lebanese
prisoners detained in Israel , but no direct link is made between those
efforts and the release of the IDF soldiers.

Implementation
The IDF soldiers have not been released, no sign of life has been received
and the Red Cross has not been allowed access to them.

The Lebanese government does nothing to promote the release of the two
abducted soldiers or of the Lebanese prisoners.

7 Provision: There will be no sales or supply of arms and related materiel
to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government :

A. The Lebanese government is called upon to secure its boundaries to ensure
that weapons will not enter its territory without its approval.

B. All other countries [a hint at Iran and Syria ] are called upon to
prevent arms from being supplied by their nationals or from their
territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft to Lebanon (i.e., to
Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations).

Implementation

The weapons embargo has not been enforced, and Hezbollah receives regular
deliveries of all types of weapons .
Iran and Syria provide Hezbollah with the weapons it wants by smuggling them
across the Lebanese-Syrian border.
The Lebanese government takes no effective action to enforce the embargo and
refrains from asking UNIFIL for support in preventing weapons smuggling,
although according to Resolution 1701 it has the option to do so.

The Lebanese army's impounding the truckload of Katyushas on February 8,
which Hezbollah admitted were its property, was an exceptional event and not
part of a comprehensive policy.

8 Provision: Regarding the Shebaa Farms , the UN Secretary General is asked
to propose delineation of the international borders of Lebanon , especially
in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by
dealing with the Shebaa farms area, to present his proposals to the Security
Council within 30 days.

Implementation
No significant progress has been made in finding a solution for the issue of
the Shebaa Farms.

The Secretary General appointed a cartographer to examine the topic,
although apparently his work has been delayed by the Lebanese government's
lack of cooperation.

9 Provision: The Blue Line (the internationally recognized border between
Israel and Lebanon ) is to be respected .

Implementation

The Lebanese government has complained of Israeli Air Force flights over its
territory in violation of Lebanon 's sovereignty.
Because of the buildup of Hezbollah's military power, the unending passage
of smuggled arms into Lebanon from Syria and the persistent threat of
terrorism from Lebanon , Israel aerial photo flights over Lebanese
territory.

The issue of the village of Ghajar remains a matter of contention, as it was
before the war. An agreement has been reached by Israel and Lebanon but has
not yet received final ratification from the Lebanese government. Its main
points are that the residents of Ghajar will remain Israeli citizens, Israel
will retain sovereignty over the southern part of the village, and the
northern part will receive special status and be the responsibility of the
Lebanese army with UNIFIL support.

Even such an agreement will not solve the problem of the village of Ghajar ,
and it will remain a loophole for terrorist and criminal (smuggling)
activities.

Appendix II

UNIFIL deployment in south Lebanon & Lebanon army deployment in south
Lebanon

Maps:
www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/res_1701e0307.htm

1 For further information see our August 13 Bulletin entitled "Analysis of
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to end the war and an examination of its
significance (primary evaluation)," .
2 For further information see our February 23 Bulletin entitled "Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly admits that his organization is rearming
and secretly transporting arms to south Lebanon, in blatant violation of
Security Council Resolution 1701. ," .