The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: What was - and was not - Agreed On

INSS Insight No. 56, May 21, 2008
Benn, Aluf - The Institute for National Security Studies
www.inss.org.il:80/research.php?cat=45&incat=&read=1816

At the Israeli Presidential Conference "Facing Tomorrow," Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert declared that real progress has been made in Israel's talks with
the Palestinian Authority. According to Olmert, "understandings and
agreements regarding highly important matters have been achieved, though
some issues are still outstanding."
The talks between Olmert and PA president Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) in tandem with the talks between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and
Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala) are meant to achieve an agreement of principles by the
end of 2008, as announced at the Annapolis conference. Olmert is interested
in accelerating the time table and completing the formulation of the
agreement by the end of the summer, in order to bring it to the Knesset for
approval during the winter session.
The agreement is supposed to present the outline for the
two-state solution while postponing its implementation for the future, in
accordance with the roadmap. At its core will be the future borders between
Israel and the Palestinian state and the delineation of security
arrangements between the two countries. The question of Jerusalem is to be
postponed, and the two sides are still at odds over the issue of the
refugees.
Apparently the most important understanding achieved in the
talks concerns the status of the settlements in the interim period, from the
time the agreement is signed until its implementation. Determining an
agreed-upon border in the West Bank will clarify which settlements are
headed for future evacuation and the number of evacuees in question. Olmert
made clear that once the border is determined, the government will begin
procedures for "evacuation and compensation" legislation for residents of
the settlements who choose to leave; furthermore, there will be a freeze on
construction in the settlements slated for evacuation. In return, Israel
will be free to build in the settlement blocs that are to remain within its
borders.
The disagreement over the border focuses on the land to be
annexed by Israel and the compensation in kind to the Palestinians. The
Palestinian position during the talks was similar to the proposals presented
during the Taba talks and what appears in the Geneva initiative, whereby
Israel would retain some 3.5% of West Bank land. The Palestinian state would
receive 2% in land exchanges, and another 1.5% in a Gaza to West Bank
crossing. Olmert and Livni suggested that Israel hold on to a larger area of
the West Bank, some 8-10%, and that the land exchange formula give extra
weight to the crossing between the two Palestinian geographical areas
because of its strategic importance to the Palestinians. In the prime
minister's opinion, it is possible to come up with a solution to the border
dispute.
Olmert has also proposed that the agreement refer to the refugee
question as well and include a general declaration about principles for a
solution, even if the discussion over practical steps is postponed.
Apparently the Palestinians are reluctant to concur, and prefer that the
agreement cover only the issues of borders and settlements.
From Israel's point of view, the main advantage of formulating
the agreement lies in easing international pressures to end the occupation
of the West Bank. Through its commitment to a future withdrawal from the
vast majority of West Bank territory, to be accompanied by a building freeze
in the settlements and a voluntary evacuation by the settlement residents,
Israel will be signaling that it does not intend to perpetuate its rule over
the Palestinians. The ratification of the agreement in an international
forum such as the Security Council would lend authorized approval to the
two-state solution and dampen the calls by hostile elements for a one-state
solution.
Attaining the agreement will also be seen as a political
achievement for outgoing US president George W. Bush. One may assume that in
the prime minister's view, proven progress in the Palestinian arena will
make it easier for Bush to take a harsher stance with regard to Iran before
the end of his term, perhaps even including a show of force. The link
between the Palestinian question and the Iranian nuclear issue was
manifested by the speeches of both leaders in the Knesset, which, in all
probability, were discussed in advance between Jerusalem and Washington.
Olmert promised that the agreement with the Palestinians would be approved
in the Knesset by a wide majority, and Bush said that Iran can never be
allowed to have nuclear weapons.
The weakness of the agreement lies in its being a "shelf"
agreement, and its future need to match its conditions to the reality on the
ground. It is hard to set up detailed security arrangements when the nature
of the future Palestinian regime is still unclear. Israel will also have
reason to be concerned if it achieves an agreement with Palestinian
moderates but will have to implement it while a Hamas government is in
power.
If an agreement is reached, the political challenge before
Olmert will not be simple. He will have to recruit the Shas faction, as well
as Knesset members from the right wing of Kadima who might well oppose an
agreement with the Palestinians and an evacuation-compensation law. Without
their support, there is no "large majority" in the Knesset to approve the
agreement.
The main arguments Olmert will present in favor of the agreement
are that it conforms to the basic principles of the government; that its
implementation is postponed and conditional upon the Palestinians making a
change in the conditions on the ground; that it contains the security
arrangements vital to Israel; that it postpones dealing with the issue of
Jerusalem; that it allows unrestricted construction in the settlement blocs
to be annexed to Israel, and that its signing will guarantee Israel
unprecedented backing and support from the international community. It is
safe to assume that selling the agreement will also be helped by
declarations of friendship by President Bush, which will be reinforced with
promises to upgrade the relations between the United States and Israel.
The coming weeks will be decisive, and by the end of the summer
it will be clear whether an agreement has been reached or if the Annapolis
process will join the list of the failures that preceded it.
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