[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: "The support of Israel's defense establishment of
the talks with Syria is based on the ...view that when Assad gives his word
he keeps it."

That's right.

They make what might generously be termed a "simplifying assumption" that
the agreement will never be violated by Syria.

A few paragraphs later, Harel notes that "In Israel, Syrian priorities are
generally ranked in the following order: survival of the Alawi regime, the
Syrian economy, the country's role in Lebanon, and the Golan Heights."

OK. Let's put on our thinking caps on for a minute. I promise. Not more
than 60 seconds.

1. Is it conceivable that "survival of the Alawi regime" at some future time
might require diverting attention from domestic problems via a conflict with
Israel
Assad.

2. Is it possible that the Mr. Assad and/or his regime may not last forever?

There are more things to ponder - including if Mr. Assad kept his word with
the Lebanese - but we are out of time.

OK. Fifteen seconds are left:

Question: why does the defense establishment support a deal with Syria on
the basis of reasoning that has absolutely nothing to do with their area of
expertise?]

Too many question marks
By Amos Harel Haaretz 22 May 2008
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/985869.html

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is entering negotiations on the Golan Heights
backed with the kind of support from all senior figures in the defense
establishment that his predecessors never had. From Defense Minister Ehud
Barak on down - with the exception of Mossad chief Meir Dagan - it seems
that there is broad support even for a complete withdrawal from the heights.

However, this advantage is canceled out by the current public standing of
the prime minister. As he embarks on public talks with Syria the level of
the public's trust in him and his motives is frighteningly low.
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Olmert's predecessors also turned to peace talks or to unilateral
withdrawals under less than auspicious domestic political conditions. Ehud
Barak went to the Taba talks with the Palestinians in January 2001 as his
coalition government was disintegrating; some of those who represented him
at the talks said his was a "wholesale" approach.

Ariel Sharon, who announced the disengagement in the winter of 2005, was
accused of trying to avoid being indicted in a corruption case - and his
enemies coined the phrase "the extent of the withdrawal reflects the extent
of the investigation."

Olmert has both a low approval rating and legal troubles; coincidentally or
not the investigation against him is peaking just as news of negotiations
with Syria is officially acknowledged. Under such circumstances, he will
find it very difficult to convince the Israeli public of the purity of his
intentions.

This is a key issue, because a final arrangement with the Syrians will be
much easier to resolve than with the Palestinians. The conditions for the
deal, as well as the cost, have been known since 1994 when prime minister
Yitzhak Rabin offered U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher a promise
that Israel would withdraw from the Golan Heights in return for
normalization and security with Syria. Moreover, Israel has good reason to
think that since 2000, when talks with Syria broke down, that Damascus has
softened its stance on issues such as the location of the border, the
security arrangements and the division of water resources.

A key obstacle in the talks between Barak and Syrian president Hafez Assad
was Israel's refusal to allow Syrians to "dip their feet" in Lake Kinneret.
Since then the waterline has eroded significantly and this is not likely to
remain an issue.

However, even if we assume that all these issues can be overcome Syrian
President Bashar Assad will have to ask himself whether Olmert can deliver
the proverbial goods: a deal that Israelis will support, either through
elections or a referendum.

The support of Israel's defense establishment of the talks with Syria is
based on the assumption that the chances for a breakthrough on this track
are greater than on the Palestinian track. It is also based on the view that
when Assad gives his word he keeps it. To a certain extent it was
high-ranking army officers, including some who have already retired, who
pushed Olmert and Barak to the talks. Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi has been
identified as a strong supporter of negotiations with Syria. His
predecessors, Shaul Mofaz and Moshe Ya'alon, say that Ashkenazi has said
that since the final stop (the Golan Heights in exchange for peace) is known
it is best to take a direct route instead of stopping along the way (with a
war in the middle).

Lurking behind all of this, just like everything else this past year, is
Iran. The army says that peace with Syria will remove a crucial element in
Iran's strategy to create that Shi'ite crescent from Tehran to the Alawi
regime in Damascus and Hezbollah in Beirut all the way to Sunni Hamas in the
Gaza Strip. If Assad can slight loosen the grip of Iran's President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and contains the activities of Hamas in Damascus, the chance for
a violent summer in the Middle East will diminish. Of course, this goes hand
in hand with the continued efforts to achieve a tahadiyeh [truce] in the
Gaza Strip.

Another question is whether the U.S. is considering a military strike
against Iran's nuclear installations. Some of those who heard President
George Bush in Jerusalem last week felt that the answer to this question is
'yes.' If Ahmadinejad offers strong criticism of his ally in Damascus, this
will be a sign that the matter is serious.

In Israel, Syrian priorities are generally ranked in the following order:
survival of the Alawi regime, the Syrian economy, the country's role in
Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. U.S. economic aid will certainly come in
handy for all issues of concern. The problem is that Bush abhors the Assad
regime and is not thrilled by the idea of an Israeli-Syrian accord, even if
he is not vetoing the continuation of talks.