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Saturday, November 22, 2008
Clip and Save: Amos Gilad interview shows mindset driving Israeli policy today

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Is Amos Gilad part of the solution or part of the
problem? His interview in the Jerusalem Post provides the opportunity to
get an idea of the mindset that appears to be driving current Israeli policy
towards Hamas and others. ]

The enemy is getting stronger, but so are we
David Horovitz , THE JERUSALEM POST Nov. 20, 2008
www.jpost.com
/servlet/Satellite?cid=1226404793044&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

In a rare, detailed interview, Amos Gilad, head of the Defense Ministry's
Diplomatic-Security Bureau, talks candidly about the security challenges
facing Israel, the lessons learned from past conflicts, and the importance
of choosing "the right moment" to act.

Stationed on the same floor of the Kirya military complex in Tel Aviv as
Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad seems to play a key
role in most every aspect of Israeli security affairs.

Formally, he heads the Defense Ministry's Diplomatic-Security Bureau. He
also, temporarily, serves as the government's coordinator of activities in
the territories, because the defense minister and the chief of General Staff
have been unable to agree on a permanent appointee to that post.

Who played a central role in brokering the fraying "tahadiyeh" (calm) with
Hamas in Gaza, via Egypt's good offices? Amos Gilad. Who has helped keep
Gilad Schalit's family apprised of the status of efforts to release their
kidnapped son? Amos Gilad. Representing the defense minister in contacts
with the Palestinian Authority? Amos Gilad. Putting Israel's case to the US
over arms sales? Gilad. Ties with NATO? Gilad. Highlighting the Iranian
threat? Amos Gilad.

Unsurprisingly, then, the silver-haired general, now nearing 60, is a busy
man. But pinning him down for interview is worth the postponements and the
wait. Delivered in clipped, no-nonsense staccato sentences, his assessments
are strikingly clear: The Syrians do have an interest in making peace.
Nobody's yet come up with an appropriate military solution for Gaza.
Diplomacy won't stop Iran.

For an insider's take on Israel's current defense thinking, this is about as
candid as it gets:

David Horovitz: Are we witnessing the collapse of the tahadiyeh?

Amos Gilad: No, what happened [at the start of the current deterioration two
weeks ago] is that the IDF received credible information that Hamas intended
to kidnap another soldier, and had dug a tunnel for the purpose. The details
are known.

We weighed [the decision to raid the tunnel on November 4] carefully. What
prevailed in the end ... is that saving the life of a soldier or the lives
of soldiers is a supreme value in and of itself...

[Hamas's overall] interest, as far as can be judged, is to return to the
"calm." But Hamas is committed to the destruction of the state. That is part
of its ideology. It accepts none of the Quartet's conditions [for its own
legitimization via recognition of Israel]. It wants to take over the PLO. At
present, for tactical and strategic reasons, it is interested in the "calm."

David Horovitz: If they planned such a kidnapping, what does that say about
Hamas's commitment to the tahadiyeh?

Amos Gilad: Their intention was out of the blue one day to announce that
they had captured another soldier. They would not have said how. They'd have
said it's not a breach of the "calm." And they would have threatened us not
to respond. They would have demanded that we free prisoners in exchange.

David Horovitz: Haven't we been buying relative calm at the price of greater
violence later?

Amos Gilad: Hamas belongs to a group of players inspired by Iran which are
acting against Israel. There are threats from the north, from Syria, from
Iran... Sderot and the areas adjacent to Gaza had been subjected to
unceasing attacks. And the state came to the conclusion that the time had
come to put an end to this. It found an opportunity to reach a calm which
enables the IDF to prepare much more effectively.

Decisions such as this have to take into account the whole range of
problems. In Gaza, one can be confident that the army is capable of carrying
out a successful military operation. But afterwards, holding a civilian
population on this scale, dealing with hostile Arab propaganda, the
implications for the Palestinian Authority - there are all kinds of
factors...

When the political echelon and the top military echelon take a decision [to
operate forcefully in Gaza], they need to determine the appropriate time for
Israel and minimize the damage and maximize the usefulness.

Experience shows that military operations don't always solve problems in the
Middle East. You have to find the optimal solution. To date, no appropriate
military solution was found for the Strip.

This is an opportunity to severely criticize those who are slating the
Egyptians. It's absolutely wrong. It actually harms Israel. Israel's
strategic peace with Egypt, its importance and value, outweigh any criticism
we may have. Criticism is legitimate but there's a difference between
criticism in the Middle East and insult.

You have to weigh all the interests, all the priorities throughout the area,
because Israel in the next year faces very many challenges.

As for the argument that the enemy is getting stronger, yes, that's true,
but remember, we are getting stronger, too. Israel has considerable
capabilities and the question is your choice of timing.

David Horovitz: Is it inevitable that Israel will return to Gaza?

Amos Gilad: Inevitable...?

David Horovitz: Well, how do you see things developing?

Amos Gilad: First of all, Hamas is not doing that well. They've tried to
take control of the West Bank. They're not succeeding. They tried to impose
their will at the Cairo conference on Fatah and PLO. They're not succeeding.
They're surviving in control of Gaza, but they're not offering any hope to
the residents. The people there are suffering and living in poverty.

They blame us for everything, always. But in truth, they understand. I don't
like to generalize, but from my experience with the Palestinians, they're a
smart people. They are capable of assessing and understanding.

David Horovitz: If there were elections today, they would vote differently?

Amos Gilad: It's very problematic to have terrorist organizations
participating in elections. I'm not sure they would win today. But I don't
have any hard statistics. So it's all speculative, and who am I as an
Israeli to speak for them?

But I am sure that they're suffering. Their economy is pretty paralyzed. We
are maintaining a correct humanitarian reality. Even when they fire at us
and people say we're crazy, we supply solar for their power station so that
their hospitals can work. We don't want to cause a humanitarian disaster.
That's not right for Jews or for the government of Israel. If there was
peace, if there was economic cooperation, they would benefit greatly.

David Horovitz: But you don't detect any cracks in Hamas's control, correct?
They are surviving. Nothing threatens their rule.

Amos Gilad: No, nothing threatens them. The Palestinian Authority was
defeated. Israel [is no threat] so long as it does not carry out a military
operation. Hamas's is a brutal regime, strongly repressive, terrible
prisons, torture, very harsh actions.

David Horovitz: And they're smuggling in everything...

Amos Gilad: The smuggling is problematic and we urge the Egyptians to act
against it, but even with all the smuggling, the situation [for Gazans] is
not soaring.

David Horovitz: Is Hamas replicating Hizbullah's strategy in southern
Lebanon?

Amos Gilad: Same models, same ideas.

David Horovitz: I'm talking about subterranean infrastructure.

Amos Gilad: Hamas is influenced by Iran. It gets financial aid from Iran,
smuggling. The model is Hizbullahstan, an entity stronger than the country,
like a cancer - a Hamastan that is stronger than the Palestinian Authority.
At present, it's not comparable to Hizbullah. They are trying to build a
capability of long-range rockets to threaten Israel and a capacity to defend
themselves if Israel goes back in. They're a long way away [from Hizbullah's
status] because of the differences in their capabilities. But it's the same
idea.

David Horovitz: And they'll get there unless we intervene militarily?

Amos Gilad: Look, we're trying to prevent it and we have some successes, but
from their point of view, they are continuing to get stronger and we're
watching it and getting organized. But I say again, a military operation at
any given moment is not always the right solution. You have to be very well
organized, very well prepared and must take into account all the factors -
public opinion, relations with Egypt, the PLO, the interests of the
residents of the South.

David Horovitz: Why did we not take into account those kinds of
considerations 2 1/2 years ago when we went to war against Hizbullah?

Amos Gilad: In Lebanon, at least one thing was temporarily achieved: We've
got deterrence that has held for a long time. The border is absolutely
quiet. They've also massively strengthened, however. But you can't always
act. That's the difference between policies and feelings. You have to choose
the right moment. You need public legitimacy. Look at Operation Defensive
Shield [in 2002, when the IDF operated against terrorist infrastructure in
the West Bank]. There was a 100 percent-plus response to the call-up of
reservists, because people recognized the urgent imperative for action...

Hizbullah wants to increase its influence in Lebanon as part of the
government. If they were to provoke us, say, in a couple of months, they'd
need to take into account that our response will threaten their status. So
you have a process where they are strengthening, but at the same time there
are greater pressures on them not to act against us in order not to lose
assets.

David Horovitz: And we're now saying that if there is another confrontation,
we'd hold Lebanon to blame - because Hizbullah is now an integral part of
Lebanon's government - and target Lebanese infrastructure?

Amos Gilad: I'm not going to comment on what we might do. An army prepares
infinite options for action.

Overall, Hizbullah share's Iran's overview, which sets Israel as a target
and a goal... But there's a paradox. The more they deepen their membership
in and participation in the legitimate Lebanese government, the more they
have to take into account the fate of the state, Lebanon.

David Horovitz: Do you feel we've learned the lessons of the Lebanon War?
You are supposed to be the bridge, in a way, across that rift that was laid
bare between the military and political echelons.

Amos Gilad: The army is carrying out a whole range of activities - training
and preparation - on the basis of the lessons and on the basis of the
intelligence picture. The lessons for any government in the future are very
clear: We need to be ready at all times. We need a strong army. And before
you make a decision, you need to be sure that your levels of preparation are
very high. Sometimes there are alternative courses that provide an answer or
a partial answer.

David Horovitz: Explain to me the apparent contradiction between Israel
hitting a Syrian nuclear site last year and Israel engaging in indirect
peace negotiations with Syria.

Amos Gilad: It's perfectly logical. First of all, Israel does not take
formal responsibility for that incident. And for the Syrians, there is no
contradiction between their efforts to come to constitute a regional super
power via the pursuit of a nuclear capability and other strategic military
capabilities, and having a close relationship with Iran, on the one hand,
while, on the other hand, they want peace according to certain conditions.

There are no negotiations at the moment. There are [indirect] diplomatic
contacts. What the Syrians want is well-known. The question is what the
Syrians are prepared to give. Israel has a range of interests related to the
Syrian threats against Israel. That will be the heart of the dialogue if and
when it opens.

David Horovitz: Are the Syrians seriously interested in making peace?

Amos Gilad: They do have an interest. They have to consider the future of
the Alawite regime, a minority regime. Will Iran swallow them ultimately?
Will Hizbullah come to turn against them? In the past, Syria was perceived
to be so powerful. I'm not sure Hizbullah thinks of them in that way today,
or that Iran does. I'm sure [President Bashar] Assad is looking to the
future and won't want the Syrian regime to end here. This partnership with
Iran is not natural. It takes him out of his natural environment in the Arab
world. It's a partnership with a non-Sunni entity, unlike most of the Arab
world.

David Horovitz: And you believe he can be peeled away from Iran?

Amos Gilad: A peace agreement would take Syria out of the circle of
hostility to Israel, and it would restore Syria to the Sunni world where the
primary concern is less now with Israel than it is with the Iranian threat.

David Horovitz: Before we get to Iran, let me ask you about the status of
the Jordanian-trained Palestinian forces deploying now in Jenin. How capable
are these forces?

Amos Gilad: First of all, the army, the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence,
after a long period in which we were not able to decisively prevail against
terrorism, have now managed to counter terror to such an extent that Israel
is quiet. Sometimes we don't give enough credit to these kinds of
achievements. There was a death industry operated from Damascus and Iran.

That has created a context in which if the Palestinian Authority wants to
take control [of territory], it must have a credible security capability.
[In the PA,] they understand Hamas is also a threat to them. They always
knew this, but after what happened to the Fatah people in Gaza [last June,
when Hamas violently took control], it was clearer still.

So now, Palestinian forces who are trained overseas are operating alone - we
don't tell them what to do - for patriotic Palestinian purposes. They're
working more effectively than in the past, in Jenin. Lately they've started
to operate in the Hebron area as well. There's certainly an improvement. It
has positive economic repercussions too. Roadblocks have been taken down.
And these will be crucial components if there is to be a viable
accommodation.

David Horovitz: A question on Gilad Schalit: Why has Israel been prepared to
agree to such disproportionate "exchanges" to secure the release of captured
soldiers, when the consequences are clearly further kidnappings and
killings.

Amos Gilad: Let's be clear: The effort to kidnap and kill soldiers and
civilians is an ongoing effort. Nothing is going to change that. I don't
accept that this or that exchange caused such actions, or that had there
been no such exchange it would not have happened.

Our soldiers are conscripted. By law. When a soldier is kidnapped, as in the
case of Gilad Schalit, the state has to do everything possible to bring him
home. It's vital for the soldiers, for the state. It's a supreme value. Ask
the defense minister, a former chief of staff. Ask the current chief of
staff. There's also the family, which suffers until the soldier is brought
home, even in tragic circumstances... We have an obligation. And I
absolutely identify with that outlook.

David Horovitz: When you hear the prime minister talking of the imperative
to separate from the Palestinians, do you consider that we are ripe for
compromise and that the problem is on their side, or is it on ours?

Amos Gilad: I don't want to assign blame and I won't get into the political
side. From the security point of view, there's a reason we are living in
quiet - that extraordinary success of the army and the intelligence
community to destroy this suicide terrorism, these cheap, directable, human
missiles, which always hurt civilian targets. We can't transfer the
responsibility [for this] to another player [such as the PA] because it
doesn't have the capabilities. For that reason alone, we have to be very
cautious in any accord that we sign. That's only one factor, of course. I
won't go into the question of where you can afford to compromise and where
not.

We may be ready for certain compromises, but the Palestinians don't accept
those [terms]. The Palestinian are always holding to the same formula.

I'm sticking with the security aspect in answering this... The Palestinians,
I'm sorry to say, are a long way from being capable [of effective security
control]. They have to learn those capabilities, as the Arab world has done.
I'm not talking about Lebanon, but Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia -
they've fought with a strong hand. There were predictions that the Saudi
regime would be brought down. It didn't happen...

David Horovitz: Yet we see the opposite happening with the PA. We see Abbas
was ready to meet with Hamas in Cairo for reconciliation talks.

Amos Gilad: I'm not sure you're right. The fact is that no [Fatah-Hamas]
agreement has been reached. Ultimately, Fatah and the PLO are not prepared
for Hamas to take over, because there'll be nowhere safe for them on earth.
There is no agreement because of Hamas's position... Hamas insists that
Israel has no right to exist. It wants to take over the PLO, and that's it.

That Abbas or other leaders go to Egypt is in deference to Egypt's status as
the leader of the Arab world. The Egyptians tried to advance reconciliation
and tranquility, but not by imposing their will on either side.

David Horovitz: Now to Iran. I had the impression until recently that the
consensus here was that Israel cannot be reconciled to a nuclear Iran. Not
only because they might press the button, but because the very fact of this
regime having that weaponry is an existential threat. Do you share the
assessment?

Amos Gilad: Clearly. Yes. And by the way this is another achievement for
intelligence. The strategic assessment [of Iran's nuclear intentions] was
carried out in the mid-1990s. So what's the question?

David Horovitz: The question is whether this assessment still holds, or
whether there is any kind of change, any start of a process of "Well, we
have to begin to prepare for a reality with a nuclear Iran"?

Amos Gilad: Let's begin with the intelligence picture: The Iranians are
determined to obtain nuclear weaponry. Iran is controlled by an ideology and
a regime that has set itself the goal to be rid of Israel. It will do
everything it can to destabilize the Middle East via entities such as
Hizbullahstan and Hamastan. They've got other plans that are even more
grave. They are determined to attain nuclear weapons despite the
international pressure and they will continue. The picture is clear. They
are building more missiles. They're dealing with uranium enrichment. The
assessment has not changed. Quite the reverse. Everybody is now united
around it.

David Horovitz: Diplomatic pressure isn't working?

Amos Gilad: Diplomatic pressure against a state this determined can slow
processes, but cannot halt them.

David Horovitz: And economic pressure?

Amos Gilad: That depends on what kind of economic pressure. Total isolation
in which everything would collapse? But that's not happening. They have oil
and so on.

David Horovitz: So if it's not working...?

Amos Gilad: It's not that it's not working. It's much more impressive than
is understood. But the fact is, it is not preventing the dangerous process
of a nuclear Iran... This is indeed a situation that we can't tolerate. What
can be done about it? First of all, we still stick with the diplomatic
option, and all the options are on the table, as President Bush said. And
that's it and I can't go into details. The details here are very
problematic. And elaborating directly assists the enemy in its war against
Israel. The test will be in the result - whether we are able or not to
prevent this grave threat.

The more we talk about it - however seductive that may be - the more we
brag, the more we weaken our capacity to achieve. We cannot accept a nuclear
Iran. We cannot be reconciled to it.

David Horovitz: I'm wrong to think that there's any tendency to be
reconciled to it?

Amos Gilad: Indeed.

David Horovitz: Reading up on [Israel's 1981 raid on Saddam's nuclear
reactor at] Osirak, it's clear how complicated that was. And Iran is
building its program with Osirak as a case study on how to protect itself
from attack. It would seem to be very difficult to act against the Iranian
facilities.

Amos Gilad: With the air force attack against Osirak, there were many who
said then what you are saying now - that it couldn't be done. And the fact
is, it succeeded. Iran is a country with smart people who have capabilities.
It really would be a considerable challenge. Come the day, if and when this
or that option is adopted, what will matter is the outcome.

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