Excerpts: Politically passive Arab states June 27, 2009

+++THE DAILY STAR (Lebanonb) 27 June '09:"Why is it that the Arabs don't
revolt?",By Rami G. Khouri
QUOTE:"the lack of popular Arab revolts is ...the declining allure of the
prize of political incumbency"

The stark contrast between the street demonstrations in Iran in the past two
weeks and the absence of any such popular revolts in the Arab world during
the past half-century is more than just fascinating in terms of political
anthropology. A major question that hangs over the Arab world like a ton of
bricks is: Why do its top-heavy, non-democratic political control and
governance systems persist without any significant popular opposition or
public challenge?
The events in Iran - the second major popular rebellion there in the past 30
years - accentuate the relative quiescence in the Arab world, but this is
not for lack of grievances among Arabs. The same pressures and indignities
that annoy many Iranians and push them to openly challenge their rulers are
prevalent throughout much of the Arab world: abuse of power by a
self-contained ruling elite, the absence of meaningful political
accountability, dominance of the power structure by security-military
organs, prevalent corruption and financial abuse, mediocre economic
management, enforced leadership-worshipping and personality cults, and
strict social controls, especially on the young and women. . . .
.
Arabs ...seem to largely ignore their governments, and instead set up
parallel structures in society that satisfy the same practical services and
needs that governments in more coherent countries normally provide.
Discontented citizens throughout the Arab world have channeled their energy
into several arenas that coexist in parallel with the state. These include
Islamist and other religious movements, tribal structures, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector to a lesser extent. Some of these
movements, like Hizbullah and Hamas, grew briskly and have become parallel
states in every respect, including military power, social services, economic
clout, and international diplomatic engagement.
. . .
It is possible that the lack of popular Arab revolts against the state is
less a comment on the passive nature of Arab citizenship and political
psyche, and more a comment on the declining allure of the prize of political
incumbency in Arab governance systems whose impact and legitimacy continue
to fray at the edges, and that cater to a smaller and smaller constituency
of true believers at their core.
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Sue Lerner - Associate, IMRA