[Dr. Aaron Lerner - Take a look at the restrictions on the "independent"
state Ze'evi described: "responsibility for the State of Ishmael's security
and foreign affairs will be in Israel's hands. Israel will be permitted to
maintain military forces in the abandoned camps of the Jordanian Arab army
or in operational deployment as needed."

That's an autonomy.

Then consider the context of his proposal:

This is what he faced: a proposal from Military Intelligence (ok, yes,
there is the old joke the military intelligence is a contradiction in terms)
to set up a Palestinian state in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip and
also play around with the status of the Old City of Jerusalem:

<<...June 12, 1967, two days after the end of the fighting, the defense
minister convened a "consultation on the areas of occupation." ...a
six-point blueprint for a political plan, drawn up a few days earlier by
MI's
research department, was presented. It stated that Israel supported the
creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip...and the Old City of Jerusalem ?(within the walls?) would become an
open city. >>

So here is what happened:

< would make a settlement possible. After working for two days, Ze'evi
submitted his proposal for the State of Ishmael, under which East Jerusalem,
the Mount Hebron area, the Jordan Rift Valley and the Latrun enclave
?(halfway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv?) would be annexed to Israel. The
rest of the West Bank was to become part of the state of Ishmael. "The Arab
refugees in the Mount Hebron area ?(and in other annexed regions?) will be
transferred to the State of Ishmael and rehabilitated there," Ze'evi
explained. From the demographic viewpoint, he added, "Although the
annexation of the Jerusalem region will bring with it a large Arab
population, it is important for other reasons." >>

That's right. Surrounded by a bunch of left wingers itching to retreat,
Ze'evi came up with a proposal to placate them by creating a Palestinian
autonomy in part of Samaria while annexing the rest.

Now here is something typically Israeli about how the entire story is
related to: clearly no one goes beyond the headline of the item before
commenting.

Ehud Olmert, Shimon Peres, etc. gleefully talk about Ze'evi as favoring a
Palestinian state while those from the national camp asked to comment mostly
mumble in response instead of going to the content and context of his
proposal.]

The Palestinian state of Ishmael, as envisioned by Rehavam Ze'evi
In the full flush of victory after the Six-Day War, as the Israeli military
scrambled to impose its rule on its newly acquired territory its leaders
also drew up plans for a Palestinian state. A rare look at slain right-wing
leader's plan.
By Shay Fogelman Haaretz Magazine Latest update 11:27 15.10.10
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/the-palestinian-state-of-ishmael-as-envisioned-by-rehavam-ze-evi-1.319271

Three years ago, in a special Knesset session to mark the sixth anniversary
of the assassination of tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi by Palestinian
gunmen, then-prime minister Ehud Olmert related that Ze'evi was actually one
of the first to advocate the establishment of a Palestinian state.

"Two or three days after the Six Day War," Olmert told the MKs and invited
guests, among them Ze'evi's children, "Major-General Rehavam Ze'evi, who was
then assistant to the head of the Operations Branch of the IDF General
Staff, hurriedly submitted a plan for the creation of a Palestinian State
whose capital would be Nablus, and he even gave it a name: "The State of
Ishmael." More interestingly: Gandhi [Ze'evi's nickname, owing to his
perceived youthful resemblance to the Indian leader] called for the
establishment of the Palestinian state as soon as possible and cautioned,
and I quote, that: 'Protracted Israeli military rule will expand the hate
and the abyss between the residents of the West Bank and Israel, due to the
objective steps that will have to be taken in order to ensure order and
security.'"

Olmert, speaking a month before the Annapolis peace conference, was assailed
by members of right-wing parties for choosing to cite this particular part
of Ze'evi's legacy. MK Limor Livnat ?(Likud?) lashed out at the premier,
saying: "You are making political use [of Ze'evi's idea].

Gandhi cannot respond to you." MK Zvi Hendel ?(National Union-National
Religious Party?) went further: "If at a memorial for a 'son of this land,'
who was most faithful to it, [Olmert] saw fit to explain the degree to which
Gandhi was actually not faithful to his country ? it is impossible to sink
to lower depths. If this is the mental state of [Olmert], he constitutes a
true danger to the country."

Two years later, at a state memorial for Ze'evi on Mount Herzl, in
Jerusalem, President Shimon Peres also referred to the plan to establish the
state of Ishmael. After repeating the details and quoting the same comment
by Ze'evi about the hatred that would swell under military occupation, Peres
added: "Gandhi followed closely the changes that occurred in the
geographical map, and demographic developments, and what he grasped and
proposed already in June 1967 became in our time the basis for a different
plan."

Right-wing MKs were again outraged. "The president made a mockery of
Gandhi's
memory by turning him into a member of Peace Now and claiming he supported a
Palestinian state in his youth," Michael Ben Ari ?(National Union?) said,
adding, "Peres' obsession led to the disaster of Oslo and its murderous
consequences, and he is doing everything ? including distorting history ? to
go on making his deceptive allegations."

In strictly factual terms, the truth seems to lie on the side of Olmert and
Peres. Ze'evi's plan to create the state of Ishmael, in the form of a secret
four-page document, has been gathering dust in the archives of the Israel
Defense Forces since it was conceived. But anyone who examines the details
closely will not likely describe it as a dovish project, reflecting a
recognition of the Palestinians' national rights.

Submitted to then-chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin five days after the end of
the Six-Day War, the plan was entitled "Political Arrangement for the West
Bank ? A Proposal." Ze'evi begins by noting, "The following proposal follows
conversations held recently and in light of the task assigned to me to put
forward a proposal on the subject." It does not, he notes, "refer to
possible solutions for the Gaza Strip, which need to be considered
separately."

Ze'evi's proposal called for the establishment of "an independent Arab state
in part of the West Bank, which would be tied to Israel by a contract that
would ensure the rights of both sides. The new state will be called the
state of Ishmael ?(and not Palestine, in order not to increase its
'appetite'
and representation?)."

Under the rubric of "implementation," Ze'evi wrote, "The speed of the
decision, and implementation of this proposal, even if done without
administrative and organizational preparation, is important because of the
willingness of the local Arab leadership ? which is still reeling from the
shock of defeat ? before it can be turned around and incited by Damascus and
Cairo. And before the great powers and the UN have spoken out clearly on the
subject."

Ze'evi's final argument in support of his case was the comment about the
abyss of hatred that would develop under the occupation, which was quoted by
Olmert and Peres.

Political vacuum

The plan in question was created within a political vacuum. Immediately
after the 1967 war, the political leadership said nothing about the future
of the occupied territories. Similarly, in the period preceding the war, the
country's leaders had been silent about its goals and about a possible
solution to the conflict. There is nothing explicitly mentioned about the
future of the territories and their inhabitants in the minutes of the
cabinet or of Defense Ministry meetings, which have been declassified.

However, the army, in contrast to the political echelon, had contingency
plans. In addition to the operational plans, the IDF had over the years
compiled a systematic doctrine for the creation of a military government in
occupied territory. Besides the experience gleaned from such a government
that already ruled Israel's Arab population ?(1948-1966?), the army had
learned much from its five-month occupation of the Gaza Strip following the
Sinai War in 1956. In the early 1960s, the IDF, drawing on those lessons,
produced a number of memoranda and orders relating to different aspects of
its activity in occupied territory.

The last such memo was issued two months before the Six-Day War and was
based on previous doctrinal material, particularly a paper called "Summary
of Military Government in Occupied Territories," published in 1964 under the
auspices of the Prime Minister's Office.

This document enshrines some of the principles that guided Israeli policy in
the occupied territories for decades. Indeed, in many senses, the vestiges
are discernible in policy to this day.

"The most important means of control is 'reward and punishment,'" the
document states.

Under the "reward" rubric the authors include: "Removal of restrictions that
were imposed. Granting permits to open and run businesses. Giving work to
the unemployed. Appointments to key posts. Priority to returning seized
property or giving compensation."

Recommendations for "punishment" were: "Administrative detention. Exile.
Dismissal from job. Searching of homes."

In this context the document added, "Reward and punishment should be
exploited to find a leadership that will collaborate. The reward and
punishment measures are intended 'to persuade' the leader that it is
worthwhile to collaborate; but, more than this, using them vis-a-vis the
people under his influence will determine the extent of that influence.

Accordingly, benefits should be granted to people who support a cooperative
leader."
As for those who refuse to play ball: "When a decision is made to humiliate
a leader who does not collaborate, it is not enough to deny benefits to him
and his followers. A rival candidate for leadership should be sought within
the clans he represents and cultivated by being made a conduit for the
distribution of benefits. He should be shown open preference by means of
visits to his home and so forth."

The document's authors also recommended "exploiting an offense committed by
a particular leader as a means of pressure for collaboration. This refers to
offenses which are not known to the public and are not security related. The
threat to place him on trial if he does not collaborate is more effective
than trying and punishing him."

The framers of the document cautioned against arresting public leaders and
thereby turning them into "martyrs": "They should be punished in other
purposeful ways, which will hurt then without increasing their public
prestige, such as by economic sanctions, undermining their social relations
and so forth. It is a mistake to create a single, homogeneous leadership.
Ensure that the local leadership is split and that competitive leaderships
exist."

In conclusion, the writers recommended "keeping things on a low burner ?
preventing extreme mass despair and bitterness." Even though "in most cases
the Arabs themselves are far from carrying out what they say, they
appreciate others doing so, particularly if the fulfillment of promises is
to their benefit. Accordingly, binding promises should not be made,
especially if they are of the type that cannot be kept."

Apparently, the final written guidelines for the army's activity in the
occupied territories before the war were issued by the then-military
advocate general, Meir Shamgar, a future attorney general and Supreme Court
president. On the first day of the war he issued a document that was sent to
the GOCs and chief of the operations branch in the General Staff. Entitled
"Modes of Legislation in Occupied Territory," the document, which sets forth
the operational principles permitted in occupied areas under the
international laws and conventions, was drawn up by Shamgar several weeks or
even months earlier.

Today Shamgar says he does not recall the circumstances which prompted him
to write the document, but thinks it probably stemmed from "the desire to
ensure that my unit, of the military advocate general, would, like other
legal units of other armies, be expert in the realm of the rules of war."

Ideal borders

About two weeks after the war, defense minister Moshe Dayan told a closed
meeting of IDF commanders: "The geographic, military and political
achievements of this war have first of all afforded the maximum borders that
anyone ever wanted to dream of, the most ideal ones ... If someone had taken
the broadest brush to demarcate the biggest and widest borders, he could
propose for Israel, he would not have gone one kilometer beyond what the IDF
reached in this war."

Dayan knew whereof he spoke: A perusal of minutes of the meetings held by
the General Staff on the eve of the war shows that not even the most
optimistic of the generals believed the IDF would emerge from just six days
of fighting with an achievement on this scale. But the mechanism of rule in
the newly conquered territories was quickly set in place.

At Shamgar's directive, four orders and three proclamations concerning
"proper administration, security and public order" were issued already on
the second day of the war and disseminated among the inhabitants of the
conquered areas. On the same day, three military commanders were appointed
for the new regions: Sinai, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Also that day,
at the conclusion of a meeting of heads of branches in the Defense Ministry,
in the office of the deputy chief of staff, there was a call for discussion
on when to implement the military government and arrange the army's activity
in the occupied territories.

For his part, on June 12, 1967, two days after the end of the fighting, the
defense minister convened a "consultation on the areas of occupation."
Taking part were chief of staff Rabin, assistant to chief of operations
Ze'evi,
director of Military Intelligence Aharon Yariv, Maj. Gen. Haim Bar Lev and
former chief of staff Zvi Tzur, who was Dayan's aide.

In the meeting, a six-point blueprint for a political plan, drawn up a few
days earlier by MI's research department, was presented. It stated that
Israel supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This state would be barred from maintaining a
military force, and the Old City of Jerusalem ?(within the walls?) would
become an open city.

After the meeting Rabin asked Ze'evi to examine the new conditions that
would make a settlement possible. After working for two days, Ze'evi
submitted his proposal for the State of Ishmael, under which East Jerusalem,
the Mount Hebron area, the Jordan Rift Valley and the Latrun enclave
?(halfway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv?) would be annexed to Israel. The
rest of the West Bank was to become part of the state of Ishmael. "The Arab
refugees in the Mount Hebron area ?(and in other annexed regions?) will be
transferred to the State of Ishmael and rehabilitated there," Ze'evi
explained. From the demographic viewpoint, he added, "Although the
annexation of the Jerusalem region will bring with it a large Arab
population, it is important for other reasons."

According to Ze'evi's plan, the state of Ishmael would include "the majority
of the Arab population of the West Bank: permanent residents, refugees in
Samaria and refugees to be transferred ?(23,000?) from Mount Hebron." The
planned state would have a population of 623,000 upon its establishment. The
remaining 260,000 inhabitants of the West Bank ? most of them in Jerusalem
and Hebron ? were to be annexed to Israel.

Ze'evi needed only two days to formulate his proposal. Because he had only
limited data to work from and was unencumbered by policy dictates, his plan
was preliminary only and was missing significant details about the
international status and degree of independence of the envisioned political
entity. In broad terms, Ze'evi determined that "responsibility for the State
of Ishmael's security and foreign affairs will be in Israel's hands. Israel
will be permitted to maintain military forces in the abandoned camps of the
Jordanian Arab army or in operational deployment as needed." The state of
Ishmael was to have free access to an Israeli port, and residents of both
states would have free passage, with one exception: The Ishmaelites would be
barred from taking up permanent residence in Israel.

Ze'evi even specified the borders of the new state and included a map. "In
northern Jerusalem the border has been moved so that the Qalandiyah airport
?(henceforth to be called Jerusalem North?) will remain in Israel's hands.
The Jordan Rift Valley has been left outside the State of Ishmael, with the
border to pass 500 meters west of the longitudinal road, with two
exceptions: 1. Jericho and its adjoining refugee camps, so that no further
population will be absorbed into Israel; 2. the entry to Wadi Fara, where
there is also a concentration of refugees ?(a bypass connecting road can be
built in this section?). The Latrun enclave will be annexed to Israel. There
are only four Arab villages in that area." ?(The enclave has yet to be
annexed, but the residents were expelled during the war and their villages
leveled.?)

In an alternative proposal for borders, which appeared on the attached map
in the form of a broken line, Ze'evi recommended expanding the area under
Israeli control at the expense of the state of Ishmael. However, he noted,
there were two drawbacks to this option: "The addition of an Arab population
to Israel" and "the further reduction in size of the Arab state, a fact that
potential Arab leaders will find difficult to accept."

Ze'evi used the occasion to consider the future of Israel's Arab citizens as
well. "A preliminary examination is being made of a proposal to annex most
of the villages of the Israeli Triangle to the State of Ishmael," he wrote,
referring to the concentration of Arab towns and villages ? notably Baka
al-Garbiyeh, Tira and Umm al-Fahm ? adjacent to the Green Line. "This
proposal has the advantage of 'sweetening the pill' for the future leaders
of the State of Ishmael, but also has the following limitations: reducing
Israel's size; the need to obtain the agreement of the Arabs in the relevant
villages; complications regarding a number of Jewish communities located
between and adjacent to the villages in question; a dangerous precedent of
reducing the size of the 'original' Israel which is liable to stir similar
longings with respect to the Arab Galilee. Accordingly, it is suggested not
to deal with this matter at this stage."

Buffer state

In the view of the veteran peace activist Uri Avnery, who was an MK at the
time, Ze'evi's proposal, as well as the ideas of General Staff officers who
supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state without a
political settlement with Jordan, stemmed from concern that signing a peace
agreement that would restore the West Bank to Jordanian sovereignty might
recreate the dangerous security situation in Israel on the eve of the war.

"They preferred a small, weak Palestinian state that would be attached to
us, rather than a whole eastern front that might be composed of Jordanian,
Iraqi and other auxiliary forces," Avnery says. According to Avnery, Maj.
Gen. ?(ret.?) Israel Tal, who died last month, supported the plan to
establish a Palestinian state without an agreement with Jordan, as did Maj.
Gen. Matti Peled.

The Arab states' unwillingness to accept Israel's preconditions for
negotiations led to a number of initiatives to resolve the conflict directly
with the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Dan Bavly cites some
examples in his book "Dreams and Missed Opportunities 1967-1973" ?(Carmel,
2002. Hebrew?). Bavly, who served in the military government as a reservist,
was involved in some of the contacts with the local Palestinian leadership.

The borders proposed in what came to be known as the Allon Plan, drawn up in
July 1967 by then-foreign minister Yigal Allon, were similar to those of
Ze'evi's
imagined state of Ishmael as well as plans drafted by other military and
political figures of the day. Allon's name was also linked to a plan to
establish a Druze state in the Golan Heights.

According to Shimon Avivi, who researched the topic, this idea was first
broached during the War of Independence, before Operation Hiram in Upper
Galilee. "After doubts were raised about the IDF's ability to conquer all of
Galilee, the Foreign Ministry's Middle East desk suggested the idea of
establishing a Druze autonomy with the community's leaders in the Galilee.
In the department's view, this could destabilize the adjacent Arab regimes.
In the end, however, the idea was rejected by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett
and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and was then completely abandoned in the
wake of the IDF's success in the operation."

The idea of creating a Druze state was raised again after Israel's sweeping
victory in the Six-Day War. In a letter to Haaretz dated June 26, 1967,
Binyamin Krisher of Tel Aviv wrote, "I am not very expert in the demographic
conditions of the Golan Heights. But it seems to me that it makes sense to
settle ?(voluntarily?) the Druze from Syria and from Israel in this
territory, which will constitute a Druze unit of self-rule. Naturally, this
can be considered only if the Druze themselves aspire to it." A week later,
on July 2, a similar proposal was raised by another Haaretz reader, Ze'ev
Katz, from Haifa: "After the IDF inflicted a crushing defeat on the Syrian
forces, I think now is the time to pay a debt of honor and help the Druze
liberate themselves from the burden of their generations-long oppressors,
the fanatic Syrian Muslims. It is our duty to extend them aid and support in
their battle to establish a free Druze state on Jabal al-Druze. What we did
not do during the Druze revolt, we must now rectify."

This public mood enjoyed wide backing, including from Jabr Moade, a Druze
MK. His call to create a Druze state drew a tremendous ovation from his
audience at the Bustan Club in Tel Aviv, as described in an October 1967
report in Haaretz. Allon and other politicians were aware of this, though
the majority of Israel's Druze leaders rejected the idea out of hand. In his
book "Copper Plate: Israeli Policy toward the Druze 1948-1967" ?(Yad
Ben-Zvi, 2007.

Hebrew?), Avivi made public a letter classified "top secret" that Allon sent
to prime minister Levi Eshkol on August 20, 1967, containing a proposal to
establish a "Druze buffer state between Israel and Syria." Allon described
the distribution of the Druze population in the area and broadly sketched
the borders of the proposed state.

"With the exception of brief periods, tension exists between the Druze
leaders and Damascus," Allon wrote. "Recently this tension has reached new
heights in terms of the distinctiveness of the Druze community and in terms
of their numbers and the geographic conditions of their pale of settlement.
They might rebel against Damascus in order to establish their own sovereign
state."

According to Allon, the success of this plan depended on the Druze "being
able to accept political guidance and military aid from an external entity.
Our presence on the Golan Heights affords us an opportunity to assist them
in realizing their aspiration." Allon also assigned a role to the Israeli
Druze in the implementation of the plan. In his view, "They can constitute
an important element in organizing the Druze forces in Syria, in addition to
Jewish officers and activists who are fluent in Arabic and are suitable for
this special assignment."

According to Allon, "We can assume that this state will not be viewed
askance by Amman, even if this is not openly admitted." Three days later,
Eshkol sent a laconic reply: "The subject you raised is to some degree being
considered and dealt with and will be updated when more data exist on the
situation." According to Avivi, the idea was raised in talks with Druze
leaders on the Golan Heights, but was torpedoed when the authorities in
Damascus learned of the overtures.

Druze transfer

In contrast to Ze'evi's plan for the state of Ishmael, Allon's idea for a
Druze state was never formulated in detail. Allon, who was familiar with the
area since his service as a scout in the British invasion force in Lebanon
and Syria in 1941, proposed making Sweida, in southwestern Syria, near the
Jordanian border, the capital of the new Druze state. He also suggested that
Israeli aid in creating the state be contingent on its signing a peace
treaty with Israel, and that border adjustments would be required between
Syria and Lebanon.

According to Taher Abu Saleh, a resident of the Golan Heights Druze village
of Majdal Shams, his father, Sheikh Kamal Kanj, was apprised of the plan and
thwarted it by revealing the details to Syrian intelligence. Kanj was the
most important Druze leader to remain in the Golan after the 1967 war. He
had studied law in Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus, was a colonel in the
Syrian army and was elected to the Syrian parliament in 1952.

In the mid-1960s Kanj returned to the Golan, where he stood out from the
conservative farmers who lived in the villages. "Yigal Allon visited our
home a few times in the months after the war," his son Abu Saleh relates.
"Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and many senior officers and MKs also came to see
my father and other dignitaries of the community. The meetings were very
intensive. Years later, Father told us that Allon and a few Israeli
intelligence officers had tried to persuade him that the time was ripe for
the Druze to have a state. They promised that Israel would help us establish
it," Abu Saleh says.

"According to Allon's plan, as conveyed to my father a few months after the
war, Druze from the Galilee and the Carmel would also be transferred to the
state that would be created. It was obvious to my father that in order to
establish this state it would be necessary to dismantle other states. He
also thought that the establishment of a state on a religious basis would
cause a split among the other communities in Syria and Lebanon. In his view,
the Israelis assumed that in the wake of the establishment of the Druze
state, the Alawites, the Christians and the other communities would demand
states of their own, a development that would be directly beneficial to
Israel.

"But my father was a Syrian patriot and did not want to hurt his people. He
told the Israeli intelligence officers that he needed to review their
proposal with Druze leaders in Syria and Lebanon. Accordingly, he went to
Italy, accompanied by an Israeli intelligence officer whose job was to
ensure that Father did not reveal all the details of the plan and only
tested the waters with the other Druze leaders. In Italy he met with a
Syrian intelligence official of Druze origin, ostensibly an emissary and
agent of the leaders in Syria and Lebanon. In a private meeting in the hotel
cafeteria, without the Israeli officer, Father told him about the whole
plan.

They decided to give all the details to the Syrian leadership and prevent
its realization at any price."

According to Abu Saleh, this was the reason for his father's arrest by the
Israeli security services in May 1971. Up until then, Kanj had been the
toast of the Israeli establishment. Newspapers reported on his numerous
encounters with senior officers and leading politicians.

Menachem Begin, then an MK, ate at his home, while Dayan was an overnight
guest. They marked him out for a crucial role in the region's future. He was
invited to the Knesset and to the President's Residence. One can understand,
then, why Abu Saleh concluded that his father was persecuted for his alleged
"betrayal" of Israel's leaders.

Sheikh Kanj was tried for espionage in the military court in Quneitra, in
the Golan Heights. Eight of the 19 major offenses carried a maximum sentence
of life imprisonment. According to the indictment, only part of which was
cleared for publication, Kanj's main offense was having hosted in his home
Giziya Abu Saleh, a relative and a sergeant first class in a Syrian commando
unit. Abu Saleh allegedly gave Kanj letters from a senior Syrian
intelligence official and from his brother Nur al-Din Abu Saleh, a Syrian
army general who was then a commander in the Damascus area. The prosecution
also claimed that Kanj had gone to Damascus, where he met with his brother
and a Syrian intelligence officer, and that on several occasions he had met
with "a person from Israel whose name is banned from publication, who was to
gather information for him through an intermediary."

Kanj denied all charges. He confirmed that Giziya Abu Saleh had been a guest
in his home and had brought him letters from his brother, but insisted that
he had never engaged in espionage. Most of the court sessions were in
camera. Kanj's argument, that the Syrians suspected him of collaborating
with Israel and had sentenced him in absentia to a lengthy prison term was
of no avail. He was convicted and sentenced to 25 years.

Kanj was released in June 1973 as part of a deal in which Israel returned
five Syrian intelligence officers seized in Lebanon in exchange for the
release of three captive Israeli pilots. Syria's Druze community was
instrumental in pushing for the deal. Kanj promised, after his release, to
abstain from political activity, but in the early 1980s he was a leader in
the fight against the application of Israeli law in the Golan Heights and
was arrested several times as a result. He died in 1983.

Land office business - Commanders ordered to collect property records in
conquered areas

On June 9, while the war still raged, staff officer Moshe Tadmor issued an
urgent order to the military government headquarters created the previous
day in Gaza, Sinai and the West Bank, on behalf of the civil security unit
of the General Staff Operations Branch: "Maj. Gen. Ben-Gal of the Israel
Lands Administration has asked us to obtain and safeguard all land
registration records" and transfer them to the agency. Two days later,
military commanders in the field received a communique from ILA counsel Maj.
Dov Shefi, instructing them to guard the documents until an ILA official
arrived to take possession.

Ten days after the war, the deputy director of the Justice Ministry land
registration department, Y. Link, met with Maj. Gen. Uzi Narkis, GOC Central
Command and commander of the Israeli forces in the West Bank, and submitted
a formal request to the same effect, signed by the justice minister. Narkis
approved the request and sent a confirmation in writing to military advocate
general Meir Shamgar.

The next day, Shamgar wrote to Link: "I would be grateful if in the course
of conducting the survey that it has been agreed will be done by your unit,
you would pay particular attention to the question of the ownership/leasing
of the Jewish settlement known as Kfar Hashiloh.

Information on this subject interests us, as we know there was a Jewish
settlement in this village for decades. Of course, this is not the only
Jewish settlement of this kind, but I request that you instruct your
assistants to provide us with information about the above-mentioned
settlement as soon as possible."

The Palestinians know Kfar Hashiloh as Silwan.

Money balks -Palestinian currency from the Bank of Israel

On July 2, 1967, defense minister Moshe Dayan convened an urgent meeting
between representatives of the new military government and officials from
the Justice Ministry and the Bank of Israel. The latter requested the issue
of special currency for use in the occupied territories, citing legal and
humanitarian grounds. A decision was made to print the notes but not to put
them into circulation immediately. One week later, Military Advocate General
Meir Shamgar sent a few sample notes to the chief of staff.

According to the central bank's numismatic curator today, Rachel Barkay, on
the third day of the war, Bank of Israel governor David Horowitz and acting
finance minister Zeev Sherf briefly discussed the possible need to issue
currency for the newly captured territories. She relates that a few days
later, after Israel captured the West Bank and the Golan Heights, these
areas were included in the plan to issue emergency currency. The graphic
design studio of brothers Gabriel and Maxim Shamir designed 500-fils and
one-dinar bills for the West Bank and a five-lira note for the Gaza Strip
and northern Sinai. Gerd Rothschild and Ze'ev Lippmann's ROLI Studio
designed the five-dinar note for the West Bank and the one-pound note for
the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai. Lower denomination bills were designed by
the Bank of Israel and the Government Printer.

The designers sought to hew as closely as possible to the design of the
bills that had been in circulation before the Israeli occupation without
violating the copyrights of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian graphic
designers. In an effort to gain the approval of the locals, the studios
incorporated camels, arabesques and Jerusalem's Tower of David in the bills'
design.

The Government Printer began printing the notes in late June 1967, in
Jerusalem.

Urgent orders were also placed with the Dutch printer Enschede and with the
currency printer of Belgium's central bank. But the new currency program was
canceled when it became apparent that Israeli money was being accepted in
the occupied areas without a problem.

The notes remained in Bank of Israel safes until 1978, when it was decided
that there was no reason to keep storing them. Millions of the bills were
incinerated between 1978 and 1980.

The Bank of Israel retained 100 examples of each note for its collection.