The formula of "a just and agreed-upon solution in accordance with
Resolution 194" does not convey an implied readiness for any hypothetical
Palestinian compromise regarding the right of return. "Agreed" means that
one should coerce Israel to agree to implement the Palestinian demands for
"justice."
The Palestinian Refugees on the Day After “Independence”
by Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi
Published December 2010
JCPA, Beit Milken, 13 Tel Hai St., Jerusalem 92107, Israel, Tel:
972-2-5619281 Fax: 972-2-5619112, jcpa@netvision.net.il
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=84&FID=253&PID=369
The Palestinian Refugees on the Day After "Independence"
Jonathan D. Halevi
* The gap between Israel and the Palestinians on the refugee question
cannot be reconciled. The Palestinians demand a "just peace," which implies
recognition of the right of return according to their interpretation, and
rejects any compromise on the issue.
* The Palestinian position, which receives support from Palestinian and
even some Israeli human rights organizations, looks to UN resolutions that
uphold the right of return as a "private right" of every refugee. This means
that the representatives of the Palestinian people (as well as the Arab
League and the United Nations) have no authority to waive this right in the
name of the refugees.
* According to the Palestinian consensus, non-implementation of the
right of return will leave open the gates of the conflict with Israel. This
implies justification for the continued armed struggle against Israel even
following the establishment of a Palestinian state.
* By rejecting "patriation" or the resettlement of the refugees in any
Arab state, the Arab Peace Initiative essentially leaves each refugee with
no choice but to go to Israel itself. The Arab states rejected any solution
that involves "resettling [of the Palestinians] outside of their homes."The
Arab Peace Initiative does not envision the Palestinian refugees being
resettled in a West Bank and Gaza Palestinian state.
* The transfer of border crossings to Palestinian control and/or the
establishment of a Palestinian state is likely to bring about a wave of
immigration, combined with a mass expulsion of Palestinians (primarily from
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) toward the Palestinian territory even without a
political agreement on the refugee issue. This could lead to the
infiltration by Palestinians into Israeli territory, as well as legal claims
by refugees at the International Court in The Hague for the right of return,
restitution of property, and compensation.
* Since the Israeli consensus holds that the mass return of Palestinian
refugees to Israel means national suicide, Israel will require robust
international support in negotiations on a final status agreement to reach
an accord on the basis of defensible borders, and to find a permanent
solution to the refugee problem based primarily on the Palestinian refugees
receiving citizenship in their host countries or their absorption in a
Palestinian state.
On September 2, 2010, Israel and the PLO relaunched negotiations for a
political settlement to resolve their conflict, with America providing
sponsorship, pressure, and go-between services, and with Egypt and Jordan
providing political backing. Among the core issues to be resolved, one of
the toughest is the Palestinian refugee problem. Yet the Palestinian
consensus does not leave Palestinian leaders with any room for maneuver
whatsoever regarding the right of return.
The PLO Position on the "Right of Return": The Private Right of Every
Refugee Is Not Subject to Negotiation
The PLO, the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian
people, and the Palestinian Authority that derives its authority from the
PLO, religiously adhere to the historical, fundamental position of the right
of return for all Palestinian refugees and their descendents, wherever they
may be (their number is estimated at over 5,000,000 people), to their
original dwelling places that are currently located within the territory of
the State of Israel. The Negotiation Department of the PLO, responsible for
conducting diplomatic negotiations with Israel, views UN General Assembly
Resolution 194 and the decisions of international institutions as the source
of legal authority for the Palestinian demand. The Internet site of the
Negotiation Department states: The right of return is enshrined in
international law:
UN Resolution 194 - (passed on 11 December 1948 and reaffirmed every
year since 1948):
"[Palestinian] refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of
those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which,
under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by
the governments or authorities responsible."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country." (Article 13(2))
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination:
"State Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination on all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone,
without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of...the right to leave
any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country." (Article
5(d)(ii))
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country." (Article 12(4))
International Practice:
In Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Rwanda refugees have had their right
of return honored. In Kosovo, the right of return was considered a
"non-negotiable" issue.1
On this basis, the Negotiation Department details the official Palestinian
position on the refugee issue as:
Palestinian refugees must be given the option to exercise their right of
return (as well as receive compensation for their losses arising from their
dispossession and displacement), though refugees may prefer other options
such as: (i) resettlement in third countries, (ii) resettlement in a newly
independent Palestine (even though they originate from that part of
Palestine which became Israel), or (iii) normalization of their legal status
in the host country where they currently reside. What is important is that
individual refugees decide for themselves which option they prefer - a
decision must not be imposed upon them.2
The Palestinians, who demand the implementation of all UN resolutions
regarding the refugees, also find support in UN General Assembly Resolution
3236 of November 22, 1974, that "Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the
Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been
displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return."3
Therefore, from the PLO's perspective, the right of return is not an issue
that is up for discussion in negotiations between leaders or states, but the
private right sanctified by international law of every Palestinian defined
as a "refugee." Accordingly, every refugee has the option of returning to
his place of residence in the territory on which the State of Israel has
been established.
Saeb Erekat, the head of the PLO Negotiation Department, stated at a meeting
of Fatah activists in the Hebron region on April 15, 2009: "The right of
return is the private right of every Palestinian refugee and states will not
take any decision whatsoever on this matter. The historical obligation rests
upon Israel's shoulders for the suffering of these Palestinian refugees and
[for granting] indemnity for the injury caused them and compensation to the
state that hosts them."4 At another Fatah meeting in Jericho on November 10,
2009, Erekat stated, "The right of return is a private right and there is no
regime in the world that can compensate for it."5
At the same time, Erekat defended PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas against
criticism over what had been perceived as a retreat in his position on the
right of return:
It seems that the message of President Abbas in his last speech was not
properly understood. There is nothing constituting surrender or frustration,
for the president will not bargain over anything concerning the fundamental
principles and rights. Our struggle focuses on realizing the fundamental
principles that find expression in establishing the independent state in the
1967 boundaries with its capital in East Jerusalem, the return of the
refugees, the release of the prisoners, the dismantlement of the
settlements, our right to water, the dismantlement of the racist separation
fence, and all the rights and fundamental principles which the Palestinian
people agree to. These were the points that were cited in the last speech by
the president and they themselves are the heart of the political plan of the
Fatah movement and its Sixth Congress that took place in August....There is
no lower ceiling than these rights, and they constitute the ceiling [of the
positions of the] PLO on whose behalf the Palestinian Authority was
established and is the very purpose on whose behalf all the [Palestinian]
wings and organizations exist.6
In a letter sent on October 28, 2010, to Robert Seri, the UN special
representative to the Middle East, Erekat expressed his disappointment over
the words of Andrew Whitley, director of the New York office of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), and his call to the refugees to stop living under the illusion of
realizing the right of return and to Arab states to discuss their
resettlement in their territory. In his letter, Erekat praised UNRWA's
official disassociation from this position and noted that the right of
return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes and lands is one of the
most important Palestinian rights." He wrote that the "Palestinians never
waived this right ever since Palestine was witness to its disaster in the
year 1948, when Israel expelled over 700,000 Palestinian refugees, and they
will never forgo this right." Erekat added, "Despite Israel's insistence on
denying the right of Palestinians to return to their homes and lands, the
right of return is a legitimate right that has been upheld by international
law and ratified by UN resolutions, and first and foremost by Resolution
194."7
Mahmoud Abbas' Position on the Right of Return - Insistence on a "Just
Peace"
Erekat's statements regarding the Palestinian position dovetail with the
declared positions of the PLO and Palestinian Authority Chairman Abbas, who
has never publicly deviated from the PLO's fundamental position on this
matter. Abbas' attitude is totally identical to that of Yasser Arafat, the
founder of the PLO. Like Arafat, Abbas emphasizes "justice" as the
cornerstone, and as a material condition for resolving the conflict. At the
September 2010 summit meeting in Washington that launched the renewed
political negotiations with Israel, Abbas reiterated three times in his
short address the importance of establishing a "just peace," and said that
the Palestinian people "need more than anything else, security, justice, and
peace."8
The word "compromise" was never mentioned, and it does not appear at all in
his reference to a future agreement with Israel and particularly regarding
the refugee problem. "Justice" totally negates compromise, according to
Abbas' concept, as he views Resolution 194 as expressing justice according
to the Palestinian interpretation; that is to say, it awards legal
legitimacy to the demand for return by the Palestinian refugees. Abbas'
public comments reflect this concept:
On November 20, 2009, in an address commemorating the death of Arafat, Abbas
said:
We take the initiative in our hands in the sense that we do not leave an
opportunity in the hands of the occupying state to control the rules of
conflict management and the rules of managing the diplomatic process. This
is in order to reach a comprehensive and balanced political solution to the
conflict that will provide security and stability to all peoples and
countries of the region, and first and foremost via a Palestinian state with
its eternal capital in Jerusalem, and will guarantee the rights of the
Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in accordance with the
legitimate international decisions and first and foremost Resolution 194.9
On September 24, 2009, in a speech before the UN General Assembly marking 60
years since the establishment of the UNRWA, Abbas said:
The suffering of the Palestinian refugees, whose number currently totals
4.7 million people and constitutes more than half of the Palestinian people
throughout the world, is still the heading of the Palestinian people's
disaster and the solid foundation of the Palestinian historical narrative
and the search for justice and peace....[The refugees] to this very day are
looking for a just solution to their suffering on the basis of UN General
Assembly Resolution 194 that was adopted on December 11, 1948, and which
emphasized in an unambiguous fashion the refugees' right to return to their
homes and to live in peace with their neighbors and receive just
compensation in accordance with international law....
A just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees on the basis
of Resolution 194 is still one of the issues heading the order of priorities
pertaining to Palestine and accordingly in all the international initiatives
and agreements that were signed with the Israeli side. This issue is one of
the substantial issues in the final agreement to the conflict which is based
on the principle of land for peace and realizing the rights of the
Palestinian people that cannot be denied, including the right to
self-determination and establishing our independent Palestinian state whose
capital is East Jerusalem....
The time has arrived for Israel to assent to the wish of the
international community in order to realize the just and comprehensive peace
and the realization of historic reconciliation between the two peoples in
the holy and tormented country. At this opportunity I will reiterate what I
said on previous occasions: Israeli security is contingent upon our
independence and our security and that leaving the occupation in place and
the continuation of the nakba will not provide security for anyone.10
On May 14, 2009, in a speech commemorating the nakba, Abbas said:
I repeat to you the oath, according to which we adhere to our
fundamental national principles [embodied] in the establishment of our
independent state whose capital is noble Jerusalem, and the rights of our
refugees to return in the framework of a just and agreed-upon solution in
accordance with Resolution 194. These are fundamental principles over which
there will be no wavering or haggling, and these were rights that were
ratified by UN decisions and all the international initiatives from the
Roadmap program and up to the Annapolis [Conference], and likewise they are
the basis for the Arab Peace Initiative, which we stick to and we demand
that all sides should adopt and implement.11
On May 15, 2008, in a speech marking Nakba day, Abbas stated:
We reiterate our steadfastness behind our fundamental principles for
peace, a peace that will bring about the termination of the occupation of
all Palestinian lands conquered since ‘67 with noble Jerusalem at their
heart, and finding a just and agreed-upon solution to the problem of the
Palestinian refugees in accordance with Resolution 194....Oh, the new
generations who grew up in the shadow of the nakba, the expulsion and
occupation, on your behalf and together with you we will perform this
important deed of peace based on justice, liberty, independence, and
return.12
On December 16, 2006, Abbas declared:
We have fundamental principles on whose behalf we are always struggling
and they are: an independent Palestinian state in the 1967 borders that will
exist alongside the State of Israel, and its capital Jerusalem. Jerusalem is
ours, the settlements are illegal - all settlements are illegal, and as
noted in the Arab initiative, a just solution to the problem of the refugees
in accordance with Resolution 194 which fixes compensation for anyone who
does not want to return, and I accept this. Whoever does not want to
exercise a return has the right to compensation and he who wants to return
enjoys the right.13
On November 2006, in a speech marking Arafat's death, Abbas said:
Yasser Arafat cleaved to the permanent national rights that cannot be
diminished [and they are:] noble Jerusalem, the sacred places to Islam and
Christianity, and an agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem on the
basis of Resolution 194....We state today, we will not deviate one iota from
the principles of Yasser Arafat and his objectives, that the desired for
peace, the peace on which Yasser Arafat signed, the peace of the brave, the
peace that will restore us our rights. Oh sisters, oh brothers, I am turning
to you in the name of the people who stand strong against occupation,
aggression, settlements, and the fence on the homeland's soil. [I am
turning] to our people, the refugees in the camps, in the diaspora and
throughout the world, to say to them that the Palestinian refugees have a
right to return to their homeland. This is a right that is anchored in
international legitimacy, and that the refugee problem is an issue of the
homeland and identity and for this reason we refused and we will continue to
reject today all the plans for settlement [of the refugees].14
Abbas establishes a link between security and peace and the realization of
all Palestinian rights, and first and foremost the right of return. In other
words, without the establishment of a "just peace" according to the
Palestinian conception, there will not be any security in the region and the
basis for the conflict and for violence will continue to exist. The use that
Abbas makes of the formula "a just and agreed-upon solution to the refugee
problem on the basis of Resolution 194" is not a sign of pragmatism, and
does not convey his readiness for compromise on this matter. His
interpretation of the meaning of Resolution 194 is unequivocal and requires
Israeli recognition of the Palestinian right of return. "Agreed-upon" in
this context means by coercion if Israel will not agree to recognize the
right of return voluntarily. In any case, Abbas admits that he has no
authority to take any binding decision on the issue of the right of return,
and he declared on September 26, 2007, that the results of the negotiations
with Israel taking place in the name of the PLO will be submitted for
ratification in a public referendum.15
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's Position on the Right of Return: A Commitment
to Arafat's Legacy
The formula of "a just and agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem"
serves the Palestinian leadership in messages targeted at Israel that are
intended to create an impression of apparent pragmatism. In an interview
with Akiva Eldar from Ha'aretz on July 19, 2007, Palestinian Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad responded to the question: "How does one solve the right of
return and the mention of Resolution 194 in the Arab League initiative?"
Fayyad said: "Have those who spoke about the right of return read the League
declaration? They wrote there that the accord and the solution must be
agreed upon. Agreed upon with whom? With Israel, of course. This means that
the agreement will not exist without the other party."16
Similar to Abbas, Fayyad does not speak about compromise as a basis for "a
just and agreed-upon solution" with Israel, and he, too, believes that
Israel must recognize Palestinian justice voluntarily or by coercion. In a
speech before the donor conference to the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in
northern Lebanon on June 23, 2008, Fayyad said that one must "obligate
Israel to accept the sources of authority [on the refugee issue]...including
the Arab Peace Initiative, which provided an historic opportunity to reach a
just, permanent and comprehensive peace that the peoples of the region
require...as well as to arrive at a just and agreed-upon solution to the
refugee problem in accordance with Resolution 194 as incorporated in the
Arab Peace Initiative."17
Fayyad concedes that his loyalty is to the ideological legacy of Arafat, who
never gave up demanding the return of Palestinian refugees to the territory
of Israel. In an address before students in Nablus on July 30, 2009, Fayyad
said:
Loyalty to the eternal President Yasser Arafat, and his renewing memory
within us all, finds expression in rallying around the national
program....This is our obligation to President Abu Amar and all the
shahid-martyrs....This is our obligation to our people and our refugees and
our expellees to persevere in steadfastly maintaining national rights as
they are recognized by international legitimacy without the derogation of
any one of them, and in a manner that will guarantee the end of the
occupation and the discovery of a just solution to the refugee problem in
accordance with Resolution 194, and as approved by the Arab Peace
Initiative.18
To remove any doubt, Fayyad said in an interview to Al-Arabiya television on
January 2, 2008, in response to the question: Did the Palestinian Authority
forgo the right of return at the Annapolis Conference? "By no means, in no
way whatsoever; it is impossible in any way whatsoever."19
Fayyad's position supporting the demand for the return of Palestinian
refugees already appeared in an address he delivered upon assuming the
office of prime minister in 2007 when he presented his objectives for the
coming years:
One should work for the end of the occupation and the establishment of
an independent state, with its capital in noble Jerusalem, on all the
Palestinian territories conquered in 1967, relying on the principles and
conditions that were set in the Declaration of Independence from 1988,
finding a just and agreed-upon solution to the problem of the Palestinian
refugees on the basis of Resolution 194, the aspiration to put an end to
settlement and the separation fence, and removing all the material and
political obstacles that constitute an impediment to obtaining these
objectives.20
The issue of the right of return again appears in a report of the Fayyad
government summing up the first quarter of the government's second year
(June 16, 2008-September 16, 2008). In the framework of surveying the
government's achievements it is written, "The Information Ministry works to
present the daily suffering of our Palestinian people as a result of the
actions of the occupation authorities and to transmit the Palestinian
narrative to all the media outlets and also operates to inform people of
Palestinian rights and first and foremost the right of return,
self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state whose
capital is noble Jerusalem, alongside buttressing the legitimacy of the
national authority."21
Fayyad's plan to establish a Palestinian state that was published in August
2009 clarifies in an unambiguous manner that the realization of Palestinian
"justice" on the refugee issue is a substantive condition for peace and, by
inference, for regional stability and security. "Despite the fact that the
refugee issue will be discussed in the negotiations on the permanent
agreement, the Palestinians, of course, will not accept any diplomatic
agreement that will not be based on justice and an agreed-upon solution to
the main issue in accordance with international decisions including UN
General Assembly Resolution 194."22
In another speech that he delivered at the Kalandia refugee camp north of
Jerusalem, Fayyad made it clear that "a lasting peace will not be
established without finding a solution to the refugee problem in accordance
with the legitimate international decisions and especially Resolution
194."23 At another occasion, Fayyad said: "The refugee problem is the heart
of the Palestinian problem and the solution of the problem and the
implementation of a just peace constitutes the heart of the PLO national
program and the diplomatic struggle the PLO is waging in the name of all
members of the Palestinian people in the homeland and in the diaspora
countries on the way to realizing all the legitimate rights embodied in the
return, liberty, and self-determination of an independent Palestinian state
within all the 1967 borders."24
At an event in Ramallah marking 61 years since the nakba (May 14, 2009),
Fayyad said: "The time that has passed does not cancel our right to return
and our people persevere in their struggle until they realizes their freedom
to return."25 A similar message formed the foundation of Fayyad's address to
mark Nakba Day in 2008: "We say that the commitment to the suffering of the
refugees and their rights as it pertains to us means reinforcing the
steadfast stance and holding on tight against expulsion and uprooting...and
this means continuing the struggle to end the occupation, realizing
independence, and guaranteeing that a just solution to the refugee problem
reached in accordance with legitimacy and international law and the Arab
Peace Initiative."26
A Palestinian Consensus: The Gates of the Struggle Remain Open If the Right
of Return Is Not Implemented
According to the Palestinian conception, without the realization of the
right of return, the conflict with Israel will continue until "justice" is
obtained. Uthman Abu Gharbiyya, who was chosen to fill the important post of
Secretary of the Sixth Fatah Congress and previously headed the national
guidance apparatus of the Palestinian Authority, explained the Palestinian
stance regarding the realization of the right of return soon after the
convening of the Camp David conference and on the eve of the outbreak of the
Second Intifada in 2000. In a lecture before the officers of the security
apparatuses, Abu Gharbiyya said: "The gates of violence will not be closed
from an historical standpoint, except with the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state whose capital was Jerusalem and the return of
the refugees....We fought and we sacrificed blood and dead in order to
obtain liberty, honor, and independence. We will not forgo this in any way.
The gates of struggle are open."27
A position justifying the continuation of the armed struggle as long as
Palestinian refugees and their descendents have not realized the "right of
return" received additional sanction at the convening of the Sixth Fatah
Congress in 2009 that updated the movement's ideological platform for the
first time since its previous convening in 1989. In the framework of the
diplomatic program that was ratified, Fatah determined that one of its
fundamental principles was what was defined as "a right to resistance.":
"The Fatah Movement cleaves to the right of the Palestinian people to oppose
occupation with all legitimate means including its right to realize the
armed struggle, that is approved by international law, as long as the
occupation and settlement continue and the Palestinian people are deprived
of their full rights. The continuation of the struggle for the liberation of
the homeland to establish an independent Palestinian state and the return of
the refugees requires the activation and unification of our fighting
movement and realizing Palestinian national unity."28
The Palestinian leadership, that is not conceding one iota on the demand for
the return of the refugees, is also constrained by the decisions of its
official institutions that clearly defined the Palestinian stand on this
issue:
A. The PNC - The Palestinian National Council published an announcement
marking Nakba Day in 2009 which said, we "emphasize at this opportunity the
steadfastness behind it [Resolution 194] and we will not accept any solution
whatsoever that will derogate from the right of this [Palestinian] people to
return to the homes from which they were expelled and to dwell in them
honorably, just like other nations of the world."29
B. The PLO - The PLO Executive Committee on May 15, 2010, published a
declaration announcing the organization's steadfastness behind "the right of
the Palestinian people to return to its dwelling places from which they were
expelled by the Zionist gangs 62 years ago," relying on international
legitimacy to realize this right.30 Dr. Zakaria al-Agha, a member of the PLO
Executive Committee and head of the organization's Refugee Department,
documented the demands that were transmitted to Israel in the political
negotiations of 2000, prior to the Camp David Conference. The Palestinian
position, according to Al-Agha's version, included the following points:
* Israeli recognition for a "just" agreement on the refugee problem.
* Israel will recognize its moral and legal responsibility for the
"forcible transfer" of Palestinian residents from their homes during the
1948 war and preventing the return of the refugees to their homes in
accordance with Resolution 194.
* All the refugees will be entitled to exercise the right of return
and the Palestinians residing in Lebanon could exercise it within two years
from the signing of the agreement with Israel.
* The process of absorbing refugees would take place on a graduated
basis and each year Israel would obligate itself to absorb an agreed-upon
number of refugees.
* Decision on return or waiver of the right of return would be a
personal decision of each refugee and the realization of the right of return
would be implemented in a manner that would guarantee the integrity of the
family.
* Immediately upon their return to Israel, the refugees would
receive Israeli citizenship and at that time their status as refugees would
conclude.
* The refugees or their heirs would receive the lands that they
owned.
* Israel will indemnify the refugees for death, wounding, transfer
costs, psychological injury and loss of property.
* Israel would provide assistance to every refugee for the purpose
of his absorption and acculturation in the state.
* Israel would compensate the PLO for public Palestinian assets
within the State of Israel.
* Palestinians electing not to return to the territory of the State
of Israel would receive compensation for waiving the right of return.31
C. Fatah - The political platform of the Fatah movement as ratified at
its Sixth Congress in Bethlehem in September 2009 determined that as a
fundamental principle Fatah adheres to
dedicated activity for realizing the rights of the refugees to
return, compensation and restoration of property, and the unity of the
refugee problem without reference to their place of location, including the
refugees in the 1948 lands. The movement views it a necessity to preserve
the [refugee] camp as the fundamental political testimony of the refugees
who were denied the right to return to their homes until a solution to their
problem [is found]. And it is essential to cleave to UNRWA as the
international address for recognition of the refugee problem until their
return to their houses and villages, coupled with activity to ameliorate the
conditions of refugees in camps with the emphasis that the PLO is the source
of political authority for the Palestinian refugees.
It was further noted in the list of fundamental principles that the
Fatah movement "opposes the principle of forcible settlement or the call for
an alternative homeland in Lebanon and opposes an alternative homeland in
Jordan."32
D. The Palestinian Authority - An official document (August 2009)
clarifies that it will not assent to any political agreement whatsoever that
will not be predicated on justice and on UN decisions including Resolution
194; that is to say, the right of return.33
The Foreign Ministry of the Palestinian Authority officially bases its
diplomatic positions on the PLO concept, inter alia, of "steadfastness
behind the rights of the refugees in accordance with Resolution 194 awarding
them the right of return and compensation."34
Paragraph 9 in the National Accord document from 2006 expressing the
position of the major Palestinian organizations (Fatah, Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, the Popular Front, and the Democratic Front) notes "the necessity of
the activity and redoubling the effort to assist, support, and display
concern for the refugees and protecting their rights, and working to convene
a popular representative committee of the refugees that will be a monitoring
body, and the role of the committee will be to emphasize the right of return
and the steadfastness to it and call upon the international community to
implement Resolution 194 with regard to the right of return of the refugees
and the granting of compensation to them."35
In August 2008, these organizations and others signed a letter to the
chairman of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, in which
they detailed their position with regard to the right of return:
A. "The right of the Palestinian refugees to return, the restitution of
property, and compensation is a permanent right in accordance with
international law and the relevant international decisions and first and
foremost Resolution 194 and UN Security Council Resolution 237. These are
rights that are nonnegotiable in their essence without any connection to the
means adopted to realize them."
B. "The right of return to the original houses is a private right of
every Palestinian refugee and passes on from the previous generation to the
succeeding one, and there is no statute of limitations and it relies on the
free choice of every person; it cannot be transferred to someone else and is
not canceled by any bilateral, multilateral, and/or international political
agreement whatsoever."
C. "The right of return of the Palestinian refugees is a collective
right that is not restricted to this group or another....The right of
self-determination will not be complete as long as refugees will not succeed
in realizing their right of return to their original homes."36
The "Pragmatic" Palestinian Viewpoint Does Not Deviate from Fundamental
Palestinian Principles
The positions of prominent Palestinian personalities, considered by the West
as belonging to the moderate political current, do not deviate from the
consensus with regards to the right of return. Marwan Barghouti, head of
Fatah in the West Bank who is serving a life prison sentence for the murder
of Israeli civilians, said in an interview with the newspaper Al Hayat on
September 28, 2007, that negotiations with the Israeli government prior to
its commitment to principles [including the right of return] is "useless."
Barghouti added that it would be erroneous to conduct negotiations with
Israel "without it [Israel] obligating itself to the legitimate
international decisions, the principle of concluding the occupation,
withdrawal to the ‘67 boundaries including from east Jerusalem, the right of
return of the refugees in accordance with Resolution 194, the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty, and the release
of all the prisoners." According to Barghouti, the Palestinians were
striving for an agreement in the framework of which "refugees would realize
their right to return in accordance with Resolution 194."37 Hussam Khader, a
Fatah leader in Nablus, clarified, "Any [Palestinian] president who will
sign in the name of the refugees on a waiver of the right of return...we
will be obligated to kill him or rebel against him."38
Hanan Ashrawi, another prominent representative of what is depicted as the
"pragmatic" stream, presents positions similar to the Palestinian consensus
and emphasizes that the right of return is a private right of every refugee.
In other words, representatives of the Palestinian people have no authority
to waive it. In an interview with the Hebrew paper Zman Yerushalayim on
September 25, 2007, Ashrawi - currently the head of the nonprofit Miftah
organization for promoting democracy and human rights in the Palestinian
Authority, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, and a member of the
Palestinian Parliament - says: "One must recognize rights according to
international law and Resolution 194 of the United Nations. There is not a
single Palestinian who will forgo the rights of the refugees. A leader who
will tell you he will do this in order to propitiate you will lose
credibility among his own people." Referring to a way to solve the refugee
problem, Ashrawi said: "The options will be diverse and will provide various
solutions, according to law. The most important aspect is the right to
choose. They will choose like any human being who wants the best for his
children....The moment that you thaw out and recognize the iniquity, they
will be free to make decisions. One should try this, but the moment that
they can choose - and many choices exist according to law - then we will see
what option they will select."39
Dr. Samir Abdallah signed the Geneva Initiative in 2003 that aroused
criticism in the Palestinian arena over passages that were implicitly
interpreted as a compromise on the right of return. When he served as
Minister of Labor and Planning in the Palestinian Authority, Abdallah
addressed the issue in a newspaper interview on April 12, 2008. In response
to a question: "Do you still stick to the right of return?" he said: "Of
course, we will never forgo it. This is a collective and private right and
the return of the refugees is the most important card from this standpoint
in the negotiations, and its value pertaining to the Palestinian people is
higher from a diplomatic and material standpoint than all the other
topics."40 Additional Palestinian personages (including Iyad Sarraj, Nabil
Kasis and Fayha Abd-el Hadi) who signed the Geneva Initiative were parties
to the dispatch of a public letter to Abbas in 2010 in which they expressed
their vigorous opposition to renewing negotiations with Israel without a
prior agreement on the source of authority for the discussions that were to
have included, according to them, the guarantee of the right of return.41
Preparation for Absorbing Refugees in a Palestinian State without Waiving
the Right of Return
The PLO and Palestinian Authority leadership, based on the fundamental
positions presented above, vigorously negate any agreement that will include
the settlements and granting of citizenship to the Palestinian refugees in
other countries or in the future state of Palestine, due to fear that this
will be considered a waiver of the implementation of the right of return. At
a press conference in Ramallah at the close of the Sixth Fatah Congress on
August 13, 2009, Abbas said, "We are talking about our objective to bring
about the end of the occupation and the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state. I emphasize that Fatah totally opposes plans for a
temporary state and plans for settlement and the alternative homeland."42
In an interview with the newspaper Al Hayat on February 27, 2008, Abbas
said,
We will never accept a solution that will lead to the granting of
citizenship to the thousands [of Palestinians] in Lebanon. We will not
accept a solution that will lead to a demographic change in Lebanon. This is
unacceptable; it is not realistic and is not on the agenda. We will never
accept a solution that will compel Lebanon to grant citizenship to even a
single Palestinian. We will find a solution that will satisfy the desire of
both the Palestinians in Lebanon and Lebanon. The issue of citizenship for
even one Palestinian in Lebanon is unacceptable and is not on the agenda.43
In a later interview with Al Hayat, Abbas sought once again to broadcast a
soothing message to the Lebanese government which at the time was discussing
the status of Palestinians in its territory, saying: "The important issues
for the Lebanese which I have emphasized on more than one occasion is that
we are working so that not a single refugee will remain in Lebanon, and, in
other words, that the problem will be solved. It is possible that some of
the Palestinians will return to Israel and some of them to the homeland, and
some others will carry Palestinian citizenship and they will not be a burden
upon Lebanon."44
Beyond this soothing message, in a (successful) attempt to persuade the
Lebanese government to alleviate some of the restrictions imposed on
Palestinians in that country, Abbas' words conveyed the prevalent evaluation
that the establishment of a Palestinian state with sovereignty over the
border crossings, even without a permanent, comprehensive arrangement with
Israel, would open the gates to the arrival of many Palestinians, including
those defined as refugees, to live in the area of the new state. This
evaluation is based, inter alia, on the experience of the Palestinian
Authority which, since its establishment in 1994, absorbed in its territory
over 400,000 Palestinians from abroad. In his address at the Sixth Fatah
Congress, Abbas said: "In practice we have returned 350,000 Palestinians to
the areas of the Palestinian Authority, and we have a passport recognized by
all the countries in the world. Likewise, we managed to obtain Palestinian
ID cards for 55,000 families who were stuck (illegal residents, or
apparently after they arrived as tourists] in the territory of the homeland
under the heading of violating the law."45
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who is heading up the plan to establish the
institutions of Palestinian state, said in an interview with Ha'aretz on
April 2, 2007, "We are preparing the infrastructure for absorbing the
refugees. The Palestinians will have the right to live within the
Palestinian state."46 Fayyad's words dovetail with the official work plan of
his government, which includes the chapter, "Guidelines Connected with the
Refugees":
The Palestinian leadership is striving for a just solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem in a manner that will coincide with
international legitimacy on this matter and first and foremost the
directives of Resolution 194 of the UN General Assembly. The interests cited
in this decision reflect the major important interests upon which the
refugee problem is predicated and which should be integrated in the various
initiatives that have been undertaken for establishing a Palestinian state,
and in a way that will not deprive or influence the diplomatic and legal
rights of the refugees. It is necessary to pay attention to the need to
provide the required foundations for absorbing a large amount of refugees
who want to live in the Palestinian state, and this includes beginning to
delineate a policy and legislation that will guarantee this."47
From the Palestinian perspective, the absorption of refugees does not mean a
waiver of the right of return. In his weekly radio address on June 30, 2010,
Salam Fayyad referred to the role of the existing refugee camps in the
Palestinian Authority by saying,
The role of the popular committees in the [refugee] camps that finds
expression in delineating development plans and programs for ameliorating
living conditions in the camps does not mean settlement [of the refugees in
permanent locations] or a waiver of the right of return, but guarantees the
refugees an honorable life until a radical solution will be found for this
suffering, in accordance with legitimate international decisions and the
rules that were set by international law in a manner that will spare our
people and the peoples of the region the disasters involved in continuing
the conflict and the expulsion of millions of refugees.48
Aside from these isolated, general recommendations to prepare for the
absorption of refugees following the establishment of a Palestinian state
without impairing the right of return and support for ameliorating the
conditions in the refugee camps, the Palestinian Authority does not engage
at all in the resettlement of refugees outside of the existing camps. It
remains steadfast in its position mandating the continuing role of UNRWA
until the refugee problem is resolved.49 UNRWA, which began operating on May
1, 1950, provides services in the fields of education, health, food,
employment, and development (including repair and construction of houses and
paving roads) for 4.7 million Palestinians who are defined as refugees in
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan and Syria.50
From the PLO and the Palestinian Authority perspective, the very existence
of UNRWA exemplifies and gives weight to their position that views the
refugee camps as a place of only temporary residence, even after 62 years
have elapsed since the 1948 war. On the basis of this position, the
residents of the refugee camps in the Palestinian Authority are not entitled
to participate in elections to the local authorities, lest their
participation convey a message of reconciliation with the existing situation
and a waiver of the right of return.51 In June 2010, Prime Minister Fayyad
emphasized in his weekly radio address that ameliorating the living
conditions of the refugees in the camps does not mean permanent settlement
or a waiver of the right of return, noting the urgency for the international
community to bear its responsibility and allow UNRWA to continue to fulfill
its obligations towards the refugees.52
The political demand for the right of return dovetails with the more
fundamental positions of the Palestinian public toward eventually reaching
peace with Israel. A November 2010 survey of the Palestinian public,
conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and distributed by The Israel
Project revealed 60 percent support by Palestinians of the proposition that
"The real goal should be to start with two states but then to move to it all
being one Palestinian state."53
There is even stronger support of 66 percent for the proposition that
Palestinians must work "to get back all the land for a Palestinian state."54
The right of return may be viewed as an instrument by Palestinian elites to
realize these two popularly supported goals.
Regarding the question of the actual implementation of the right of return,
the Palestinian historian and researcher, Dr. Salman Abu-Sitta, who heads
the Palestine Land Society, deals with the issue in detail. Abu-Sitta, in
analyzing the demographic dispersion in the State of Israel, argues that
Israel could absorb 4.6 million Palestinian refugees in the rural regions,
and this at the cost of transferring a mere 154,000 residents to the Jewish
central region.55 Human rights organizations in the Palestinian Authority
and even some in Israel (such as Adalah and Mossawa) support the
implementation of the right of return, but do not present a detailed program
for its implementation in practice similar to Abu-Sitta. Attorney Yael
Stein, head of the research department of the B'tselem organization, noted
in June 2001 in an interview with the newspaper Al-Majdal (published by the
Badil organization that has made the promotion of the right of return its
main objective), that B'tselem discussed during the years 2000-2001 ways to
implement the right of return in practice in view of the clash of rights
between Palestinians who want to return to their homes and Israelis who live
in those same homes or territories. In her opinion, the leaders of Israel
and the Palestinians have no authority to agree to a waiver of the
realization of the right of return of millions of Palestinian refugees to
Israeli territory, but rather that the question of return to Israel must be
in the hands of the refugees themselves. She defines the Palestinian
documents dealing with the subject as "good," but she expressed sorrow that
they do not deal with the question of the actual implementation of the right
of return.56
The Attitude of the Arab Peace Initiative to the Right of Return Issue
The Arab Peace Initiative, which was ratified at the summit of Arab leaders
in Beirut in March 2002, presented principles for an agreement in the
Israeli-Arab conflict, and included reference to the Palestinian refugee
problem. The relevant passage in its decisions on this matter determined:
"To accept to find an agreed, just solution to the problem of Palestinian
refugees in conformity with Resolution 194," and "the rejection of all forms
of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of
the Arab host countries."57
By rejecting "patriation" (tawtin in Arabic) or the resettlement of the
refugees in any Arab state, the Arab Peace Initiative essentially leaves
each refugee with no choice but to go to Israel itself.58 The Arab states
used even more explicit language on this point in a Final Statement that
accompanied their initiative. It rejected any solution that involves
"resettling [of the Palestinians] outside of their homes."59 What this means
is that the Arab Peace Initiative opposes keeping any Palestinian refugee
population in Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan; it also does not envision the
Palestinian refugees being resettled in a West Bank and Gaza Palestinian
state.
Why did the Arab Peace Initiative adopt such a hard-line stance? Marwan
Muasher, the former Foreign Minister of Jordan, describes in his book, The
Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation, the behind-the-scenes developments
at the Beirut summit that preceded the adoption of the Arab initiative.
According to Muasher, Bashar Assad, the Syrian president, expressed
reservations over the proposed wording and insisted that the right of return
be noted explicitly. He also expressed his vigorous opposition to the
settlement of any Palestinians whatsoever on Lebanese territory because he
was afraid that the ethnic balance in this country would be disturbed.
Muasher contended that the Palestinian representatives at the summit
recognized that the return of all the refugees could not be implemented, but
wanted to preserve the principle of the right of return alongside the demand
for the return of some thousands of Palestinians to Israeli territory.
Lebanon, noted Muasher, understood Resolution 194 as instructing the full
return of all the refugees from Lebanon and, in its viewpoint, all the
refugees who were staying in Lebanon would leave the country, including
those who would opt for compensation.
In the decision that declares that "achievement of a just solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem is to be agreed upon in accordance with UN
General Assembly Resolution 194, according to Muasher, the words "to be
agreed upon" express the desire to propitiate all the parties. That is to
say, these words will guarantee to Israel that the number of refugees that
will return to its territory will not influence the demographic identity of
the state, while noting that Resolution 194 satisfies the Arab side.60 In an
article in Ha'aretz on August 13, 2008, Muasher wrote, in referring to this
decision by the Arab summit, that this was "the first time that the Arab
world committed itself to an agreed-upon solution of the refugee problem,
while responding to Israel's fears that it would be flooded with
refugees."61
Syria's President Bashar Assad, who on a permanent basis emphasized his
commitment to the Palestinian right of return,62 also referred to the
position of the Arab world with reference to this issue as it found
expression in the adoption of the Arab initiative by the Beirut summit. In
an address before the People's Council on May 10, 2007, Assad made it clear
that the right of return is a private right of every refugee and is not a
matter that is subject to the authority of any government whatsoever or even
in the hands of a Palestinian who was not a refugee, and therefore the
decisions of the Beirut summit could not impair the right of return in the
least:
On the Palestinian issue, let me dwell on one point and that is the
issue of the refugees. This is because for a few years various discussions
have taken place in the media and at private meetings between leaders, and
we asked ourselves the question: Can one implement this decision [of the
United Nations regarding the return of the refugees]?
There were those who proposed forgoing it. Prior to the Arab summit
[March 2002] there was an extensive discussion on the issue of dropping this
passage from the Arab initiative. The decision by the Arab summit was of
course vociferous in leaving this passage intact. However, the very
discussion is a mistake due to a simple reason, for the right [regarding the
return of the refugees] is not bestowed upon us as governments; in other
words, we have no right to discuss it at an Arab summit or a meeting of Arab
foreign ministers. This is the right of the refugee.
I have heard rational, logical, and legal arguments from a number of
Palestinian brothers to the effect that it [the right of return] is not even
the right of a Palestinian who was not a refugee. This is the right of the
refugees. And even now, we know that the refugees will not forego this
right, and as long as they have not forgone it, there is no power in the
world capable of annulling this right, and we must defend it by force as
long as the refugee wants to cleave to this right.63
Analysis and Assessment
The right of return is considered sacrosanct among the Palestinian people
and there is no one who disputes it. The representatives of the Palestinian
people, including the PLO and Palestinian Authority, base their position on
the question of resolving the conflict on "justice" rather than on
"compromise." The meaning of "justice," from the Palestinian perspective, is
the realization of the rights of the Palestinian refugees in accordance with
all the decisions of the international institutions, the foremost being UN
Resolution 194 that they see as sanctifying the right of the refugees to
return and receive compensation.
The formula of "a just and agreed-upon solution in accordance with
Resolution 194" does not convey an implied readiness for any hypothetical
Palestinian compromise regarding the right of return. "Agreed" means that
one should coerce Israel to agree to implement the Palestinian demands for
"justice." The PLO and the Palestinian Authority continue to nurture in
Palestinian society the idea of the return of the refugees. They prevent any
option of resettlement of refugees outside the camps and preserve the role
of UNRWA as a symbolic and practical expression of the demand for return.
The Palestinian concept, that receives support from Palestinian and even
some Israeli human rights organizations, views the right of return as a
private right of every single refugee, and this means that the Palestinian
people's representatives (as well as the United Nations) have no authority
whatsoever to forgo this right in the name of the refugees.
Any Palestinian leader who would dare challenge the consensus and waive the
right of return in negotiations with Israel will in the best case find
himself blacklisted and removed from the stage, or in the worst case he will
be executed.
According to the Palestinian consensus, the non-implementation of the right
of return will leave the gates of the conflict with Israel open, and this
implies justification for a continued armed struggle against Israel even
following the establishment of a Palestinian state.
The future Palestinian state to which Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad aspire is prepared to absorb
Palestinians, including refugees, within its boundaries, with the
reservation that this will not be considered in any shape or form as a
waiver of the right of return.
Once the Palestinian entity receives control over the international border
crossings, irrespective of whether it is recognized as a state with full
sovereignty or not, the gates will be opened for the transit of
Palestinians, including those defined as refugees, to areas under
Palestinian control. The Palestinian entity will not be able to prevent the
entry/return of Palestinians to its borders, something that would be
considered national treason and contravene Palestinian basic law and the
Palestinian consensus.
All the Arab states where the Palestinians defined as refugees reside
support the right of return unreservedly. Syria and Lebanon have
traditionally adopted a policy that clarifies unambiguously that the refugee
camps in their territory are only temporary and the refugees must return to
Palestine when the conditions for this mature. It is plausible to assume
that the two countries will have an interest in promoting the transfer of
their Palestinian populations to the areas of "Palestine" both for internal
demographic reasons and also to influence by this measure the creation of a
demographic reversal in the areas of historic Palestine, to influence the
Palestinian regime and make use of the Palestinians in the framework of the
continued struggle against Israel.
The Jordanian regime detached itself from the West Bank in 1988 and provided
Jordanian passports to the refugees, but announced that following the
establishment of the Palestinian state, the refugees will have to decide
whether they choose to be Jordanian citizens or return to Palestine. The
massive eviction of a Palestinian population has occurred a few times over
the last three decades. Kuwait expelled 400,000 Palestinians after the First
Gulf War due to PLO support for Iraq. Libya ordered the expulsion of 30,000
Palestinians (and later on agreed to accept them) following the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Iraq expelled scores of
thousands of Palestinians following the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein
regime in 2003.
The refugee problem that was a bubbling lava for scores of years could erupt
after an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a
Palestinian state, and find expression in many areas: The infiltration of
Palestinians into Israeli territory, and legal claims by refugees in Israel
and in the international court in The Hague to provide the right of return,
the restitution of property, and compensation. Focusing the Palestinian
armed struggle on the right of return (a refugee intifada) could escalate
the struggle in the international arena to coerce Israel into agreeing to
the right of return (to avoid the boycott and anti-apartheid campaign).
The widespread phenomenon of Palestinians illegally residing in Israel and
the infiltration of scores of thousands from African countries via the
Egyptian border into Israeli territory exemplify the dimensions of the
challenge that Israel will be forced to contend with in the form of a
similar and much larger phenomenon in scope from the area of the West Bank.
Likewise, Israel can expect to face challenges in the international and
legal arenas, given the position of the human rights organizations in this
context. Israel will find it difficult to prevent infiltration via its long
border with the West Bank. Additionally, the expected economic distress in
the Palestinian state, given the massive arrival of refugees, could invite
international pressure upon Israel to absorb a larger number of refugees
within its territory.
In the final analysis, the refugee problem is at the very heart of the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute and is considered by the Palestinians as a trump
card, via which they can weaken the State of Israel. After the establishment
of a Palestinian state, the Palestinians will be able to overcome Israel via
demography, transforming the country in the long term into an entity that
will be submerged in a Palestinian state stretching from the Mediterranean
Sea to the Jordan River. Since the Israeli consensus holds that the mass
return of Palestinian refugees to Israel means national suicide, Israel will
require robust international support in negotiations for a final status
agreement, in order to reach an accord on the basis of defensible borders,
and to find a permanent solution to the refugee problem based primarily on
the Palestinian refugees receiving citizenship in their host countries or
their absorption in a Palestinian state.
* * *
Notes
1.
http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=nego_permanent_refugees_hrefugeep&title=The_Right_of_Return_of_Palestinian_Refugees_
2.
http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=nego_permanent_refugees_hrefugeep&title=The_Right_of_Return_of_Palestinian_Refugees_
3. http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/025974039ACFB171852560DE00548BBE,
http://www.metzilah.org.il/webfiles/fck/File/plitimshiva/plitim%20FINAL.pdf
4. http://palpress.ps/arabic/index.php?maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=53518
5. http://web.alquds.com/docs/pdf-docs/2009/11/11/page4.pdf
6. http://web.alquds.com/docs/pdf-docs/2009/11/11/page4.pdf
7. http://arabic.wafa.ps/arabic/index.php?action=detail&id=89257
8.
http://www.malaf.info/?page=show_details&Id=21021&table=pa_documents&CatId=106
9. http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content/print/180417.html
10. http://www.alsbah.net/mynews/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=22084
11. http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2009/5/15/page3.pdf
12. http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2008/5/16/page3.pdf
13. http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2006/12/16/67173.html
14. http://www.palvoice.com/forums/showthread.php?t=73026
15. http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/184962
16. http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/882483.html
17.
http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/site/461/default.aspx?tabID=461&ItemID=17580&mid=3101&wversion=Production
18.
http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/site/461/default.aspx?tabID=461&ItemID=17610&mid=3101&wversion=Production
19. http://www.alarabiya.net/programs/2008/02/08/45345.html
20. http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/site/443/default.aspx
21. http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/UploadFiles/Reports/GOV_2Year_1Q.pdf
22. http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/25.08.09/government.doc
23.
http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/site/461/default.aspx?tabID=461&ItemID=17609&mid=3101&wversion=Production
24. http://www.alquds.com/node/270290
25. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=519275&issueno=11126
26.
http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/site/461/default.aspx?tabID=461&ItemID=17587&mid=3101&wversion=Production
27. Al-Ray (Gaza), Vol. 33, July-August 2000.
28.
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout&cid=1248187789828
29. http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2009/5/15/page3.pdf
30. http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2010/5/16/page6.pdf
31.
http://www.group194.net/index.php?mode=article&id=18233.%DE%D6%ED%C9%20%C7%E1%E1%C7%CC%C6%ED%DC%E4%20%C7%E1%DD%E1%D3%D8%ED%E4%ED%ED%E4%20%E6%E3%DD%C7%E6%D6%C7%CA%20%C7%E1
32.
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout&cid=1248187789828
33. http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/25.08.09/government.doc
34. http://www.mofa-gov.ps/ar/index.php?p=foreign_policy1#1
35. http://www.mofa-gov.ps/ar/cp/plugins/spaw/uploads/files/etfaq_watne.pdf
36.
http://www.badil.org/it/press-releases/111-press-releases-2008/1510-a-22-2008
37. http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/185644
38. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MH4Xl9RVX8c
39. http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/160/116.html?hp=54&loc=2&tmp=5304
40.
http://www.sahafi.jo/art_print.php?id=2164e446d790eb2f6bce717168d151afdb4f0bd4
41. http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic/?c=129&a=109459
42. http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2009/8/14/page3.pdf
43. http://daralhayat.com/archivearticle/182300
44. http://daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/59293
45. http://www.israj.net/vb/t3767/
46. http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1160643.html
47.
http://www.mop-gov.ps/web_files/issues_file/261009%20PRDP%20Guidelines1.pdf
48. http://www.alquds.com/node/270290
49. http://www.alquds.com/node/270290
50. http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=85
51. http://www.lacs.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT_ID=892
52. http://www.alquds.com/node/270290
53.
http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/c.hsJPK0PIJpH/b.672581/k.12D7/The_Israel_Project__Facts_For_A_Better_Future.htm
54. Ibid.
55. http://www.plands.org/arabic/books/book-01.pdf
56. http://badil.org/en/al-majdal/item/1131-badil-interviewwith-yael-stein
57. http://www.nad-plo.org/news-updates/heb.pdf,
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=1777&level_id=202
58. Joshua Teitelbau
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