Western capitulation in the nuclear talks with Iran will only convey a
negative message and encourage Iran. In light of the weak Arab system and
Western dithering, Tehran could well be tempted to make additional
aggressive moves in the turbulent waters of the Persian/Arab Gulf.

Ahmadinejad in Abu Musa: Iran’s Lengthening Shadow in the Gulf
Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall
Jerusalem Issue Briefs , Vol. 12, No. 12 22 May 2012
http://jcpa.org/article/ahmadinejad-abu-musa-irans-lengthening-shadow-gulf/

-The April 11, 2012, visit by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the
island of Abu Musa, which is close to where the Strait of Hormuz opens into
the Persian Gulf, has severely exacerbated the dispute between Iran and the
UAE over possession of the island and two others.

-This dispute joins a long series of Iranian-Saudi rivalries elsewhere. In
Bahrain, Iran is investing great efforts (in propaganda and subversion) to
help the Shiite majority in its struggle with the royal house; in Yemen,
Iran has recently stepped up its activity; and in Syria, Iran is working to
preserve Bashar Assad’s rule while Saudi Arabia backs his opponents. At the
same time, Iran claims that both the UAE and especially Bahrain belong to it
historically, leading to intensified tensions in the wake of the Saudi plan
to confederate with Bahrain and other Sunni Gulf states.

- Amid the intensifying conflict with the West, Iran is maintaining a policy
of projecting force in the Gulf and surrounding areas, building new military
bases along the Gulf’s shores, performing naval maneuvers, and practicing
ship takeovers and special-forces activities.

- With these moves Iran is trying to signal that it is prepared for a
conflict with the United States in the naval domain, seeking to convey both
to the United States and its Gulf neighbors that it is the ascendant power
in the region, and that the region’s security is in its hands and not those
of external powers. Yet this activity has had a unifying effect on the GCC
member states which fear Iran’s lengthening shadow.

- Given the Arabs’ weakness and lack of a charismatic figure who could lead
a Sunni Arab response to the mounting Iranian challenge, the need for
American power in the region – to create the necessary balance against Iran
and protect energy sources – has only grown.

Three Disputed Islands Near the Strait of Hormuz

The April 11, 2012, visit by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the
island of Abu Musa, which is close to where the Strait of Hormuz opens into
the Persian Gulf, has again severely exacerbated the dispute between Iran
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over possession of Abu Musa and the two
nearby islands of Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. The UAE’s foreign minister
condemned Ahmadinejad’s visit to the island, which Iran conquered in 1971,
as a gross affront to the UAE’s sovereignty, asserting: “This visit will not
change the legal status of these islands which are part and parcel of UAE
national soil.”1

The Iranian-UAE quarrel over this issue is of long standing. It is now,
however, erupting at an especially sensitive time. The sanctions on Iran are
intensifying; the United States has declared its intention to deploy a
defensive anti-missile shield in the Gulf states as well as F-22 Raptor
stealth aircraft in the UAE, stoking tensions in the Gulf; and Iran – in the
wake of the sanctions on its oil sector, which Tehran regards as a
“declaration of economic war” – has threatened to block the Strait of
Hormuz, through which much of the oil for the global energy market passes.
The islands’ strategic location adds further to the military tensions
between the United States and Iran, which often emphasizes its naval-warfare
capabilities – particularly of the asymmetrical kind – and preparedness for
possibly initiating a naval clash with the United States.

Another issue accompanying this crisis concerns the name of the Gulf.
Whereas the Gulf states call it the Arab Gulf, Iran calls it the Persian
Gulf. Google Maps decided that, to remain neutral, its maps would no longer
refer to the region. This discomfited Iran, which protested the deletion of
the Gulf from the maps.

Ahmadinejad’s brazen stop in Abu Musa was part of a visit to Iran’s
Hormozgan province on the Gulf coast. In Abu Musa he asserted that, even
though geographers were agreed in using the name Persian Gulf, certain
“uncivilized” Arab and Western states chose to call it the Arab Gulf.2 The
Majlis, Iran’s parliament, aims to pass a law creating a new Iranian
province that is to be called the Persian Gulf and to include, among other
things, the three disputed islands.3

Ever since Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa, the issue has remained on Iran’s
agenda and is referred to almost daily by senior political and military
figures as well as commentators in Iran’s print and electronic media, who
fully support the government’s stance. Moreover, Iran has held several
well-publicized events on the island to demonstrate its sovereignty and
intention to retain it, develop it, and make it an inseparable part of Iran
as well as a tourist center. For example, Farhad Daneshjoo, president of
Iran’s Open University and brother of the science minister, announced the
establishment of a branch of the university on Abu Musa.4

Iran versus Saudi Arabia

The Iranian-UAE dispute over Abu Musa negatively affects Iran’s relations
with the rest of the Gulf states and with the Arab system as a whole,
particularly with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, too, have taken the UAE’s side
in an emergency meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers.
This dispute can be added to a long series of Iranian-Saudi rivalries
elsewhere in the Middle East against the backdrop of the “Arab Spring. In
Bahrain, Iran is investing great efforts (in propaganda and subversion) to
help the Shiite majority in its struggle with the royal house, which is
receiving assistance from the Saudis (including military intervention by the
Peninsula Shield Force and a plan initiated recently to confederate with
Bahrain, which yet again revived Iranian claims that Bahrain is an Iranian
province); in Yemen, Iran has recently stepped up its activity; and in
Syria, Iran is working to preserve Bashar Assad’s rule while Saudi Arabia
backs his opponents.

Iranian Warnings

In response to a statement issued by the GCC foreign ministers’ emergency
meeting in Doha, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed regret over the
reiteration of the council’s “baseless claims” concerning “the three Iranian
islands.” The spokesman condemned the statement and stressed that Iran’s
possession of the islands is something that “cannot be changed and is not at
all open to negotiation.”5 He characterized the disputes between the states
of the region as a “Zionist plot,” of which the region’s rulers should be
well apprised, and declared that the “Islamic awakening” (Iran’s term for
the Arab Spring) had put U.S. and Israeli interests in jeopardy.6

Mohammed Karim Abdi, a member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign
Policy Committee, “recommended” to the Arab League’s member states (given
their support for the UAE’s stance regarding Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu
Musa) “to deal with their tense situation” and with “the slaughter of the
Arabs in Bahrain” instead of interfering in Iran’s domestic affairs. “The
Arab League and the UAE are now knuckling under to the
British-American-Zionist triangle and acting to strengthen the Zionist
regime.”7 Another member of the committee, Zohre Elahiyan, called on Iran’s
Foreign Ministry to take a firmer stance toward the UAE’s claims and toward
what she called its senior officials’ inappropriate behavior.

Yehiya Rahim Safavi, military adviser to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei and former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), warned the region’s states not to become a tool in the hands of
foreign states regarding “the three Iranian islands,” and affirmed that the
“Persian Gulf” is the only correct, original, and historical name for this
body of water as documented in all the books and historical maps. He further
asserted that states should not try to create tensions in the region with
baseless claims, and warned: “Know, then, that if a crisis erupts in the
Persian Gulf region, this crisis also will hurt you.”8 A senior official in
the Iranian Armed Forces also warned that “if a crisis breaks out, the UAE
is the one that will be most grievously harmed by it.”9

IRGC naval commander Ali Fadavi underscored Iran’s full and absolute
sovereignty over Abu Musa and added regarding the president’s visit there:
“The application of Iran’s sovereignty to the island of Abu Musa is no
different than the application of our sovereignty to Tehran, and the
president’s trip to this island is no different than his trip to Isfahan.”
Fadavi referred to Iran’s capabilities to defend the strategic islands and
said both defensive and offensive systems had been deployed in them,
including brigades of IRGC marines. Because of these islands’ strategic
location, he stated, the IRGC navy (IRGCN) would not allow any enemy to
enter them, and any hostile move would elicit a crushing response. IRGC
deputy naval commander Alireza Tangsiri said regarding the strategic
importance of the Strait of Hormuz:

According to international sources, 40 percent of the world’s oil passes
through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and the entire length of
this route is under the full and tight control of the IRGC navy that is
stationed in the strait. When any kind of vessel enters the Persian Gulf,
the Revolutionary Guard identifies it with listening devices, naval units,
drones, and radar systems and closely monitors it. Each day 82 vessels pass
through the Strait of Hormuz and they respond to the questions presented to
them by the IRGC forces.10

Iran Has Claims to the UAE and Bahrain

Beyond Iran’s threats and insinuations about its military capabilities to
defend its sovereignty over the islands, Iran claims that both the UAE and
Bahrain belong to it historically. Majlis member Musalreza Servati claimed
that historical documents indicate that states such as the UAE and Bahrain11
are linked to Iran, as are the disputed islands.12

The nationalist-conservative newspaper Jomhouri Eslami is identified with
former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani. When the UAE foreign minister
protested Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa, Jomhouri Eslami, under the
headline “A Recommendation to the Sheikhs of the Emirates,” called on the
UAE sheikhs to beware of their limits and not go beyond them. According to
the paper, in his reaction to Ahmadinejad’s visit, the UAE foreign minister

did not even adhere to minimal rules of speech and honor, like primitive
Arabs using terms that are outside of accepted diplomatic practice. He used
a language from past eras in which the residents of the principalities of
the southern Persian Gulf did not yet have dollars from oil revenues, and
chose to make his incorrect claim in inappropriate language. He claimed that
Abu Musa is part of UAE territory and hence the Iranian president’s trip to
the island was a violation of the UAE’s sovereignty! If these words do not
indicate his ignorance of history, then “hands of imperialist powers and
Zionists” must be behind them. Whoever carries the title of foreign minister
of any country, even if it is small and similar to the smallest province of
Iran, ought to be familiar with the history of the soil on which he lives.
If we make the optimistic assumption that the UAE foreign minister indeed
forgot or did not know history, we will remind him that not only Abu Musa
but all the principalities of the southern Gulf were part of greater Iran
and administered by the central Iranian government. This is a historical
reality that is also documented on maps of the past (emphasis added). In
light of this undeniable reality, I see a need to remind the UAE sheikhs of
a few points:

-The three islands are an inseparable part of the soil of Iran and any claim
regarding them is considered an affront to Iran’s territorial sovereignty.

-The conditions of the region have changed completely amid the tumultuous
waves of the Islamic awakening. Is it not preferable that you use all of
your capacities to preserve your seat and your crown? And avoid creating
problems with your tongues?

-The region and the world will view such false claims as a way of covering
up the crimes and treacherous nature of the Zionists. Today the heads of the
Zionist regime urgently need to distract the peoples of the region with
marginal and unrealistic matters so as to shield themselves from the heavy
blows of the uprisings in Arab countries. Part of this endeavor is directed,
of course, at you, the sheikhs of the Emirates. We recommend that you,
sheikhs of the Emirates, not become fuel for the fires of Hell that the
Zionists and Western imperialism want to ignite in the region.13

Iran Wants U.S. Forces Out of the Region

In the midst of the crisis, the United States announced the deployment of
its F-22 aircraft to a base in the UAE. In response, Iranian defense
minister Ahmad Vahidi (formerly commander of the IRGC Qods Force) called the
planes’ deployment a “damaging move that undermines security in the region
and constitutes a psychological ruse aimed at sowing instability in the
region, and hence Iran does not regard it as a beneficial step.” Vahidi
reiterated Iran’s traditional position that the region’s security must be
achieved by the local states and not by external forces.14 He added that he
viewed the foreign forces in the region as “unwanted guests whose presence
has no justification” and emphasized that it is Iran that plays the
principal security role in the region of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Oman, while foreign forces endanger the region’s security and pollute the
Persian Gulf’s eco-system with their nuclear-powered ships. He criticized
the UAE for its claim to the three islands, stating, “Other countries
flourish at our expense and then they propose unjust and wrong ideas.”15
The lieutenant commander of the IRGC navy, Alireza Tansiri, asserted in this
context that “Iran’s enemies are trying to stoke Iranophobia among the
countries of the region so as to justify their presence in the region and
increase weapons sales to the Gulf states.”16

The U.S. missile-defense program for the Gulf was also a target of Iranian
criticism, and a senior official of the Iranian navy said those Gulf states
that were joining the program were “naively playing into the hands of the
plot that the Zionist regime and the United States are concocting in the
region.” This plot, he said, was aimed at ensuring Israel’s survival, and
“Iran hopes that the states along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf
will seriously reconsider the matter and realize that the United States will
not remain loyal to them.” He asserted that “the United States, which has
many bases in the region, was trying to protect them against Iran by using
Arab money (an allusion to Saudi Arabia) and stationing an anti-missile
system in the region.”17

Iran Prepares for Asymmetric Naval Warfare

In light of U.S. commitments to give the Gulf states a missile-defense
umbrella and boost their security through the deployment of advanced
aircraft amidst the latest round of escalation over Abu Musa, Iran again
stressed its superior asymmetric capabilities to fight any U.S. naval force
in the Gulf, and particularly to engage in swarm attacks against U.S. ships.
Recently, the director of the Maritime Industries Organization of the
Iranian Defense Ministry, Mostafa Esbati, said Iran was first in the world
in the manufacture of speedboats, this having been one of the lessons of the
Iran-Iraq War. He claimed that the Iranian Defense Ministry regards support
for research in this field as imposing a heavy obligation on those working
in it. Speedboats indeed play a critical role in Iran’s asymmetrical-warfare
strategy, particularly against aircraft carriers and destroyers.

Ali Fadavi, the IRGC naval commander, said that mass-produced speedboats
equipped with rocket launchers have made the IRGC navy a unique force in the
world. He added that while the U.S. battleships can move at a speed of 31
knots, the Iranian boats can travel twice as fast.18 Fadavi added that the
capabilities of the advanced, rocket-launching Tondar frigates of the IRGC
navy have been greatly improved. Referring to statements of former U.S.
defense secretary Robert Gates at the United States Naval Academy about the
failure of the aircraft-carrier strategy, Fadavi said the United States had
admitted to the carriers’ inability to cope with missile-, rocket-, and
torpedo-launcher-equipped speedboats moving at a speed of 60 knots.19 Iran
also emphasizes its capabilities in launching shore-to-sea and sea-to-sea
missiles and its ability to hit all U.S. bases in the region.

What Next?

Amid the intensifying conflict with the West and the continuing nuclear
talks, Iran is maintaining a policy of projecting force in the Gulf and
surrounding areas. Iran is entrenching itself militarily along the Gulf’s
shores, building new military bases and performing naval maneuvers, thereby
signaling that it is prepared to confront any threat or attempt to infringe
on its sovereignty. Recently Iran conducted a five-stage, week-long exercise
to protect its shores and ships, practicing ship takeovers and
special-forces activities. 20

Despite the tightening of sanctions, Iran is projecting great confidence
toward its Gulf neighbors, particularly through naval power and its assets
in the region (including the disputed islands). At the same time, Iran is
exploiting the weakness of the Arab system – which is now concerned mainly
with internal survival amid the Arab Spring, which has particularly affected
the Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar.

Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa was meant to defiantly and bluntly underline
both Iran’s sovereignty over the (mostly unpopulated) island and its ability
to control what happens at the entrance to the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
This deliberate Iranian move was accompanied by proclamations by senior
government and IRGC officials about Iran’s advanced naval capabilities,
which they said can contend well – albeit asymmetrically – with
quantitatively and technologically superior American power in the Gulf.
This, incidentally, involved revealing new capabilities in the areas of
coastal defense, missiles, radar systems, and speedboats.

In addition, with these moves Iran is trying to signal that it is prepared
for a conflict with the United States in the naval domain in case the
nuclear talks with the West ultimately fail and its nuclear facilities are
eventually attacked. Iran is thereby seeking to convey, both to the United
States and its Gulf neighbors, that it is the ascendant power in the region,
and that the region’s security is in its hands and not those of external
powers. Past efforts by Iran to limit the foreign presence in the region,
which even involved signing some agreements with the Gulf states, did not
succeed in diminishing the presence of U.S. bases.

At the same time, exploiting the tailwind of the “Islamic awakening,” Iran
keeps trying to boost its influence over the Shiite population in the Gulf
states, especially in Bahrain, thereby seeking to further weaken and divide
the Arab regimes.

Iran has also discerned the fragility of Bahrain and an opportunity there in
light of continuing demonstrations that seek to tip the balance of power in
favor of the Shiite majority in the kingdom. Therefore, Iran has come out
forcefully against the announced Saudi intention to confederate with
Bahrain, and has emphatically repeated its historic claim to sovereignty
over Bahrain. Yet this activity has had a unifying effect on the GCC member
states, which again backed the UAE on the disputed-islands issue. They fear
Iran’s lengthening shadow and stepped-up activity, both in the naval domain
and in political subversion in every one of these countries. The Iranian
threat also enhances the Gulf states’ ties to and security dependency on the
United States, with its protective umbrella.

The Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia (Egypt has “retired” from the race),
are trying to muster an Arab and international response to Iran’s buildup,
defiance, and power projection – so far with no great success. In any case,
the present crisis concerning the islands, and the name Persian Gulf versus
Arab Gulf, well reflects the changes occurring in the Middle East:
essentially, the lengthening of Shiite Iran’s shadow and the shortening of
that of the moderate Arab camp.

Changes in the balance of forces in the Middle East have further escalated
the rising tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran with regard to the core
cleavages in the Middle East: Arabs vs. Persians, Sunni vs. Shiite, and the
continued independence of the Gulf states in the face of Iran’s wish for
hegemony in the region.

Given the Arabs’ weakness and lack of a charismatic figure who could lead a
Sunni Arab response to the mounting Iranian challenge, the need for American
power in the region – to create the necessary balance against Iran and
protect energy sources – has only grown. Western capitulation in the nuclear
talks with Iran will only convey a negative message and encourage Iran. In
light of the weak Arab system and Western dithering, Tehran could well be
tempted to make additional aggressive moves in the turbulent waters of the
Persian/Arab Gulf.

* * *

Notes

1.
http://www.emirates247.com/news/government/uae-condemns-ahmadinejad-s-visit-to-abu-mousa-2012-04-12-1.453562

2. http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1574849

3. http://tinyurl.com/c93cjq9

4. http://tinyurl.com/ctkcvoq

5. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910130000933

6. http://tinyurl.com/cl572da

7. http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1578278

8. http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1584215

9. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910209001043

10. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910211001506

11. Iran has claimed sovereignty over Bahrain ever since it was under
Persian rule (1602-1783). In 1968, when Britain announced its intention to
withdraw its forces from the Gulf, Iran renewed its claim to sovereignty
over the island. In a referendum held under UN auspices in 1970, the
residents of Bahrain had to decide between independence and annexation to
Iran. They chose independence, and in August 1971 they received it.
Subsequently the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, ceased to raise the issue.
Since the Islamic Revolution, however, Iran has occasionally asserted that
Bahrain is one of its provinces.

12. Fars News Agency, May 6, 2012.

13.
http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1391/13910126/13910126_01_jomhori_islami_sar_magaleh_0001.html

14. http://www.alalam.ir/news/1097084

15. Mehr News Agency, May 8, 2012

16. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8101301663

17. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9102111213

18. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9102111337

19. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910204001549,
http://www.iraniandefence.com/upgraded-frigates-delivered-irgc-388

20. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/239331.html;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzlznwpDopw

================

About Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall

IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues
with a focus on Iran, terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.