Aging Monarchy in a Time of Change
INSS Insight No. 346, June 17, 2012,
Guzansky, Yoel
http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=2&incat=&read=6736

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz has died in a Geneva
hospital. The death of Nayef, thought to be 79, came as no surprise, for he
had been seriously ill for the past several years. Nayef was only named
crown prince in October 2011, following the death of Prince Sultan. Now,
King Abdullah must nominate a new heir for the second time in 9 months.

With a median age of 25.3, Saudi Arabia’s population is younger than the
global average. But you would not know that from the Kingdom’s leadership.
Those at the top of the Saudi royal pyramid are old, and the aging of the
leadership could have geopolitical implications. Specifically, the advanced
age and failing health of King Abdullah should raise concerns about the
future stability of the oil giant in the face of nemesis Iran and the
turmoil rocking the Arab world.

The royal family, so it seems, has been preparing for Defense Minister
Prince Salman, 77, Nayef's full brother, to take over power in the Kingdom.
On November 2011, the former Riyadh regional governor was appointed defense
minister, replacing than Crown Prince Sultan, suggesting he is next in line
to rule. Salman is the only senior potential heir who is well enough to
work. But even Prince Salman’s health is far from perfect: he underwent
spine surgery in the United States (in 2010), has had at least one stroke,
and has an arm that (despite physiotherapy) does not function fully. The
official Saudi media have already been preparing the country for Salman's
ascent, wanting to show that somebody is in charge. Saudi media have been
touting the defense minister as a wise administrator who could act as
mediator to settle disputes between family members as well as handle foreign
policy.

Nayef had a reputation for being a hard-liner and a conservative. He was
believed to be closer than many of his brothers to the powerful Wahhabi
religious establishment that gives legitimacy to the royal family, and he at
times worked to give a freer hand to the religious police who enforce strict
social rules. He was interior minister in charge of internal security forces
since 1975, and was known to have a "strong fist" against the kingdom's
Shiite minority and for his fierce crackdown against al-Qaeda's following
the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. He later claimed that Jews were responsible for
the attacks.

The lack of transparency regarding succession in Saudi Arabia has fueled
speculation about who will succeed the 89-year-old King Abdullah, who has
not been working on a daily basis for at least three years and had three
back surgeries in 12 months. Abdullah rarely ventures outside his palace,
and his brief meetings with visitors are photo opportunities directed at the
Saudi state-controlled media. The royal house is making extraordinary
efforts to project an image of business as usual.

The succession issue is not risk free, if only because most of King Abdel
Aziz Ibn Saud’s living sons are old and in ill health, while all other
candidates lack experience in running the Kingdom. In addition, the process
is attended by fierce struggles, generally occurring behind the scenes,
making it difficult to predict what the Saudi regime might look like in the
coming years.

.Before the Arab Spring, nothing would limit the term of Arab rulers other
than their own life spans. In one of the least stable regions of the globe,
they are the ones still supplying the façade of stability. In the short term
Nayef's death is not expected to trigger any major changes in Saudi oil and
foreign policy. However, even this veneer of stability is no longer certain
given the advanced ages of the rulers and the danger that the expected
changing of the generational guard will undermine stability. The Saudi case
is unique only in that the holy places of Islam are within its borders, it
is the flag-bearer of the Sunni-Arab camp, and it has the largest reserves
of oil in the world.

Until now, maintaining governmental stability was linked to succession going
from brother to brother rather than from father to son; this has ensured the
choice of a successor with experience in managing the Kingdom but has also
created an aging pool of potential heirs. Consequently, it was decided as
early as 1992 in the Basic Law of Governance that a successor could also be
selected from among Ibn Saud’s grandsons.

In the long term, the kingdom cannot evade translating the law into
practice. But the succession may be no less complicated when the crown moves
down a generation to one of Ibn Saud's grandsons. Balancing the interests of
the various wings of the family, the children of former kings and of princes
will be a delicate task. The more prominent grandsons include Mecca Governor
Prince Khaled al-Faisal, a sun of the late king Faisal and brother to
foreign minister. Khalid, 73. Others include Eastern Province Governor
Prince Mohammed bin Fahd, National Guard chief Prince Miteb bin Abdullah and
Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammed bin Nayef. Muhammad, a rising star,
serving as the de facto Interior Minister and in charge of the war on
terrorism, has good working relations with his counterparts in the U.S.

As part of his desire to limit the power of the Sudairi branch of the
family, but also in order to ensure a smoother transition of power by
consensus, King Abdullah established an "Allegiance Council" in 2006. The
group, numbering thirty-five members, has the authority to appoint a king
under circumstances such as the death of the reigning monarch, the
successive deaths of the heir apparent and the king, and illness or other
disability that prevents the king from functioning.

Saudi Arabia’s ability to serve as a counterweight to the rise of Iran and
as a pillar of strength for American policy in the region is intimately
linked to the stability of the House of Saud and the need to manage the
succession smoothly. The fact that the king too might die in the near future
is liable to challenge new institutions that are meant to preserve
continuity of governance. The challenges facing the Kingdom require the
transfer of the crown to a third generation prince who will keep the pace
and direction of the necessary political and social reforms aimed at
reconciling conservative Islamic traditions with the growing needs of a
youthful population.

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