Russian Policies in an Era of Change
INSS Insight No. 343, June 15, 2012,
Magen, Zvi
http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=268&incat=&read=6734

The upcoming visit to Israel by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is
raising eyebrows among the experts as to its purpose, will take place as
political changes are occurring in Russia’s foreign relations, to a large
extent reflecting the transformations that have recently been emerging in
the international arena. Indeed, the fairly intensive Russian activity
taking place in the nation’s foreign relations since Putin took office is
gradually creating the impression that Moscow is engaged in reshaping its
policies. As such, it seems that Russia has also designated specific roles
for the Middle East in general and for Israel in particular to play. These
issues will undoubtedly be thoroughly discussed during the visit.

While Israel is not the main focus of Russia’s current political efforts,
nor is the Middle East as a whole – that focus belongs to the West,
specifically the complex of Russia-United States relations – the complex of
Russia’s recent asymmetric moves vis-à-vis the United States is somewhat
reminiscent of the events that preceded the 2009 reversal in relations
between the two, known as the “reset” program. It seems that this time, too,
similar developments are in the offing. The current crisis developed around
the issue of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense program and started after
the unsuccessful NATO-Russia meeting in Moscow. It seems that the meeting,
which for some reason took place while Putin was entering office and ended,
not surprisingly, without an understanding between the sides, was used by
the Russians to stage a crisis. Against this backdrop, Putin’s participation
in the G-8 conference in the United States was cancelled, including a
planned meeting with President Obama. On the other hand, intensive Russian
activities began with its regional allies (Belarus and Kazakhstan as well as
with China), indicative of preparations to kick off a process to establish a
Euro-Asian alliance, an initiative Putin announced in the months leading up
to his election as president. At that time, in the background of the NATO
summit in Chicago, rumblings of war were also heard as a new Russian
ballistic missile was tested.

However, at the same time, the Russians were sending messages about their
desire to join NATO in some way or another (this may be linked to the new
decision about Putin’s visit to Germany and France). In addition, in March,
Russia joined the activities of the P5+1, where it is actively involved in
dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. It is quite possible that Russia is
encouraging steps to press Iran into acceding to the demands of the
international community, a sense that is growing thanks to the decision to
hold the next round of the sextet’s talks with the Iranians in Moscow on
June 18 this year.

From all of the above one could conclude that Russia is setting up a new
gambit designed to advance an arrangement with the United States and NATO.
In this complex, the payment for certain concessions on Ballistic Missile
Defense issues, and perhaps also for certain understandings with NATO about
cooperation, may come in the form of Middle Eastern coin, i.e., on the
Iranian issue and perhaps also on the Syrian one (it is already possible to
discern changes in the tone Russia is using with regard to Syria); also
noteworthy in this context is the fact that in the meantime a meeting
between Presidents Putin and Obama has been arranged to take place during
the upcoming G-20 summit. Thus, what is emerging is a combined move fairly
similar to the “reset” model familiar from 2009.

In the midst of all this, the Middle East connection to Russia’s moves in
the global arena is emerging. Russia’s standing in the region was undermined
by the Arab Spring, when it lost most of the strongholds it had worked hard
and long to construct. Now Russia is finding itself challenged by Islam’s
rising power and is feeling isolated in the Arab world. In fact, Russia has
been sidelined to defend the Shiite camp given the rising Sunni pressure,
backed by the West, according to Russia’s understanding. In addition, the
worrisome trend – from Moscow’s perspective – of NATO’s eastward spread
continues. It is further weakening Russia’s strategic situation on its
southern border, in the Caucasus, challenged by an anti-Russian and
anti-Iranian axis composed of Georgia and Azerbaijan, with American and
Turkish backing. Turkey in particular is actively opposing Russian interests
not only in the Southern Caucasus but also in the Middle East and the
Mediterranean region, with regard to Greece and Cyprus, where one can
discern another Russian strategic effort. The economy is also part of this
nexus, in light of the disagreement with Turkey about gas production in the
Mediterranean and the routes of the energy pipelines to Europe.

In this new reality, it seems that some part of Russia’s interests is also
in changing its Middle East policy; the echoes of this discussion on the
intra-Russian scene are loaded. Some of the questions on the agenda are the
need for an alternative to the radical axis with Russian involvement in the
Middle East, which is crumbling before its eyes, as well as the
establishment of new levers of influence in this critical area to replace
those that have been lost.

How does Israel fit into these developments? It seems that, in this new
reality, Moscow senses that Russia and Israel are in the same boat, allowing
the former to view the latter as a desirable partner in the region. In
addition to a possible confluence of political interests, the foundation for
such a view is supported by a web of close relations and the positive
potential in a range of areas critical to Russia – the economy (with
emphasis on gas production), technology and defense. All of these have the
potential to help expand political cooperation.

Also emerging is Russia’s interest in promoting strategic cooperation with
Israel, thereby establishing a new regional political axis, with the
possible inclusion of other nations. Candidates mentioned in this context
are Greece and Cyprus, and possibly also some of the Balkan countries. Such
an axis, should it come into existence, would enable Russia to establish new
levers of influence capable of upgrading its status in the Middle East and
the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, challenge Turkey and promote a range
of interests (also economic) connected to sources of energy. Obviously such
an axis would not dissolve existing Russian cooperation with Iran and Syria;
good relations with them would continue unabated. Moreover, parallel Russian
reliance on two such axes would promote its status in the region and serve
its ambition to reach a standing on a par with that of the United States.

Obviously, the position of the United States with regard to all of this has
a crucial if not decisive effect. On this issue, some in Russia think that
there has been a certain cooling in Israel-U.S. relations and that therefore
it would be in Israel’s best interests to develop independent partnerships
with other players, thereby affecting the regional balance of power to its
own advantage.

In any case, in the foreseeable future we may observe further developments
in the drama inherent in Russia’s reshaping of its foreign policy both on
the global level and on the Middle Eastern one, including the Israeli arena.
It is reasonable to think that at least some of the issues presented above
are likely to be part of the agenda during President Putin’s upcoming visit
to Israel.

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