It may be that other attacks attempted from the Sinai, with no Egyptian
response or activity to prevent them, will necessitate Israeli military
involvement, but the time for such action has not yet come.

Egypt: An Era of Uncertainty
INSS Insight No. 349, June 27, 2012
Eran, Oded
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=6806

The recent events in Egypt signal the start of a period of instability and
uncertainty for the country that will pose serious security and political
dilemmas for Israel. Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate who was
elected Egypt’s fifth president, will launch his term in office with some
serious questions hanging over his victory. The low voter turnout – a little
over half of those eligible to cast a ballot – and the tiny margin over his
opponent will allow the Egyptian opposition to claim that the new president
earned only one-fourth of voter support. Although a legitimate political
victory, for a nation where until 18 month ago the president regularly won
99 percent of the votes, the slim margin is liable to come back to haunt
him.

No less problematic is the limit on presidential powers decreed by the
Supreme Military Council on June 17, 2012, minutes after the ballots closed.
The announcement stated that the Council would appoint the military
commander in chief; the president would be unable to declare war without the
Council’s backing; should internal struggles develop, the president would be
allowed to call on the army to restore order only with the Council’s
approval; and finally, the Council would retain authority regarding
formulation of Egypt’s new constitution. Given the fact that the Council is
the key political power to determine the members of the group writing the
new constitution, the announcement ensures that at least for now, the
Council has control of the main issues of the new constitution.

Similarly, the dissolution of the recently elected parliament, with its
overwhelming Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist majority, on the pretext that
the election process was legally flawed, is indicative of the Council’s
determination to retain its influential position in any new political
arrangement in Egypt. In order to minimize the harsh criticism following the
announcement, the Supreme Military Council charged two of its senior
members, Generals Assar and Shaheen, with the task of explaining that the
steps are temporary and a result of the fact that there is no parliament,
and that full power would be given to the elected president by the end of
June 2012. The two heaped much praise on Egypt’s democracy and the will of
the Egyptian people, but it is doubtful that they managed to assuage the
concerns of those who are eager to see the army end its political
involvement.

Since the end of the second round of presidential elections over one week
ago, one of the most intriguing questions is: did the Supreme Military
Council and Morsi use this time to try to arrive at understandings on these
issues? Furthermore, did they discuss other key questions with implications
for Egypt’s conduct on the regional arena, especially the
Israeli-Palestinian issue? No less interesting is the question of whether
the American administration continued its efforts to reach understandings
with the Muslim Brotherhood and the new president. A direct dialogue with
the United States would be of great importance in the immediate future,
while relations between the army and the new civilian regime are forged and
while Egypt assumes its stance on regional issues. Indeed, Morsi himself, in
a column written for The Guardian (June 15, 2012), roundly criticized Egypt’s
disappearance from the world stage, claiming this created a dangerous vacuum
that threatened regional stability: “Egypt's destiny is to lead. If I am
elected on Sunday, I will make sure that Egypt fulfils its destiny.”

The Grad rockets fired recently deep into Israel and the murder of an
Israeli construction worker on the border fence are signs of the decline in
security along Israel's Egyptian border, and more importantly, of a possible
course of action by Palestinian terrorist organizations that may gain
support – if only passive – from the Egyptian regime that is controlled –
even of not entirely – by the Muslim Brotherhood. An escalation of terrorist
activity from the Sinai Peninsula highlights the dilemma of Israel’s
response. A military reaction seen as containing a line-crossing element,
even if localized, will strengthen the demand made by most of the Egyptian
presidential candidates to renegotiate the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace
treaty, in particular the military appendix limiting Egypt’s military
presence in Sinai (and that of Israel within its territory along the
border). The current lack of clarity about the source of authority in Egypt,
especially on security issues, is liable to last for quite some time,
leaving Israel in a dialogue with the Egyptian military alone and zero
access to the senior civilian echelon. Israel could find itself having to
choose among courses of action, all of which are liable to lead to negative
political consequences with widespread ramifications beyond the bilateral
Israeli-Egyptian domain. On the one hand, Israel’s complaints might remain
unanswered in the no-man’s-land between the Egyptian army and the civilian
authority; on the other hand, military action might negatively affect Israel’s
delicate, still ongoing, dialogue with the Egyptian security establishment,
and this might be used by the civilian regime to prove the need for
abolishing the limits placed on Egypt’s military presence in Sinai.

The United States has a formal position in the context of Israeli-Egyptian
relations, as it is a third-party signatory to the 1979 peace treaty, but
its ability to assist would be limited mainly because of its desire not to
rattle America’s relations with the new Egyptian civilian government. It is
also unclear how effective an American threat to cut military aid to Egypt
would be. The Muslim Brotherhood president and new government are not likely
to mourn the weakening of Egypt’s military. One may assume that this issue
too was discussed in the effort by the president-elect and Egyptian army
leaders to reach preliminary understandings.

At this point, the Israeli government would be wise not to allow itself to
react to provocations intended to draw the IDF into a confrontation in the
Sinai, especially by Gaza Strip Palestinian organizations. The Israeli
government should maintain the line still open with the Egyptian military
establishment and use the channel of communications afforded by the American
administration and Congress. At this stage of internal political change in
Egypt, a restrained Israeli response leaves some hope for dialogue with the
new civilian establishment there, although initial signs are not
encouraging.

References to Israel by key Muslim Brotherhood spokesmen in recent months
have been stereotypical and negative. One may hope that the new leadership’s
attempt to confront Egypt’s major challenges will lead to a more sober and
realistic approach regarding Israeli-Egyptian relations. As against Israel’s
need to clarify to Egypt that Israel cannot accept anarchy and a loss of
Egyptian control over Sinai, Israel must weigh its steps in light of
developments in the region at large. An Israeli military response in the
Sinai would have implications far beyond the peninsula, and the Muslim
Brotherhood might find it advantageous to expand that response, making sure
it came from elements associated with the movement in the Palestinian
territories and Jordan. It may be that other attacks attempted from the
Sinai, with no Egyptian response or activity to prevent them, will
necessitate Israeli military involvement, but the time for such action has
not yet come.

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