Iran's New Strategic Horizons at Sea
by Dr. Shaul Shay
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 175, July 26, 2012
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/perspectives175.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: As tensions rise in the Middle East over Iran's nuclear
weapons program, Tehran has upped the ante by developing an aggressive new
naval strategy and sent warships to the Mediterranean for the first time
since 1979. In addition, it threatens to block key straits in the Red Sea
and Persian Gulf that would cripple Western shipping routes. Such bold moves
by the Iranian navy are clearly meant to intimidate the West from continuing
its pressure on Tehran regarding the nuclear issue, to show that Iran is
able to foment trouble in the region, to aid its allies and counter the
American naval presence, and to encroach with physical proximity upon
Israel.

In June 2012 Iran announced that it would hold a naval exercise together
with Syria and Russia in the eastern Mediterranean. This reflects an ongoing
change in Iranian naval strategy. For years Iranian vessels have operated
exclusively in the Persian Gulf. A new evolving strategy has now caused Iran
to send military vessels to other waters including the Gulf of Oman, Caspian
Sea, Red Sea, and even the Mediterranean Sea. Iran's naval leadership has
declared that since today's major global threats are sea-based, Iran must
update its naval forces and strategy.

In February 18, 2012, Iranian Admiral Habibollah Sayyari announced that two
warships entered the Mediterranean for the second time since the 1979
Islamic Revolution, showcasing Iran's "might" to regional countries. They
docked at the Syrian port of Tartous, marking Iranian naval cooperation with
the Syrian regime.

This expanded naval presence has been accompanied by threats in response to
the ever-harsher sanctions being imposed on the country over its nuclear
program. For example, in February 2012, Hossein Ebrahimi, a vice chairman of
the Iranian Parliament’s national security and foreign policy commission,
called the ships "a serious warning" in case of any US strategic mistake in
Syria.

The strategy is result of the Iranian attempt to achieve regional hegemony
and a response to the perceived threats to its national interests, in
particular Western attempts to stop Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons.
Therefore, Iran has adopted a new strategy of naval presence in the region,
sending ships to the Red and Mediterranean seas.

Iranian Naval Strategy in the Red Sea

Iran recognizes the Red Sea as a strategic area of interest because of its
desire to gain control over the main maritime oil and gas route to the West,
the straits on each corner of the Arabian Peninsula: Hormuz to the east and
Bab-el-Mandeb to the west. The latter forms the southern tip of the Red Sea
between Eritrea and Yemen, places of strategic importance for Iran. Control
of this area is also important when combatting Somali pirates who operate in
the Gulf of Aden and threaten international oil shipping routes. The Red Sea
route is also a main channel of communication and arms supply from Iran to
its regional ally Hamas in the Gaza Strip, allowing Iran to funnel weapons
to the Strip via Yemen, the sea, and through Sudan to Sinai and ultimately
Gaza.

The straits of Bab-el-Mandeb are situated three kilometers from Eritrea and
Yemen and constitute the closest spot to the Gulf of Aden, which connects
the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, the passageway for oil
tankers and cargo ships in the African and Southwest Asian regions.

Eritrea has fostered close political, military, and economic ties with Iran.
Iran has mist likely used Eritrea as a base to provide weapons to Shiite
Houthi insurgents in Yemen. According to the Yemeni military, Iranian
weapons have been used by Houthi rebels against the Yemeni government.

The Iranian Navy has been conducting anti-piracy patrols in the high seas,
including the Gulf of Aden, since November 2008, when Somali raiders
hijacked the Iranian-chartered cargo ship MV Delight, off the coast of
Yemen. In September 2010 the Iranian Navy dispatched its tenth flotilla of
warships to the Gulf of Aden to defend the country's cargo ships and oil
tankers against the continued threat of attack by Somali pirates. The
presence of the Iranian Fourth Fleet in the Gulf of Aden is useful in
smuggling weapons to Iranian proxies in Somalia and Yemen.

Iranian Naval Presence in the Mediterranean Sea

The deployment of the Iranian ships in the Mediterranean is no surprise. In
September 2010, Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari
relayed Iran's plan to continue naval deployment in the high seas as part of
Tehran's strategy for defending its interests abroad. In addition, he
announced several months later that Iran would deploy its first home-made
destroyer, Jamaran, in international waters. Soon after, on February 25,
2011, two Iranian warships docked in Syria after passing through the Suez
Canal into the Mediterranean Sea, the first time Iranian ships passed
through the canal since 1979.

This new development comes at a time of significant turmoil in the region
and illustrates the Iranian search for strategic dominance in the region and
Iranian efforts to support its regional allies in the Mediterranean: Syria,
Hizballah, and Hamas.

Iran has used maritime routes to send arms shipments to Hizballah and Hamas
through Sudan or the Mediterranean and has smuggled weapons into Gaza. In
fact, from 2002–2012 the Israeli Navy intercepted five of these ships: the
Karin A in 2002, the Abu Hasan in 2003, the MV Francop in 2009, the Victoria
in 2011, and the Atlantic Cruiser in 2012.

In addition, an Iranian naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean could
complicate a future maritime struggle near Gaza. Ali Shirazi, Khamenei's
representative in the Revolutionary Guard, claimed in 2010 that Iran's elite
Revolutionary Guards were ready to provide a military escort to cargo ships
trying to break Israel's blockade of Gaza.

Iran is also a strategic ally of the Assad regime in Syria. Its naval
deployment sends a strategic message of support in turbulent times for
Assad. It also adds to Western concerns that the Syrian crisis could boil
over into a regional conflict. Iranian presence could also deter a Western
intervention in Syria.

Finally, the naval Iranian presence is intended to intimidate the West from
continuing its pressure on Tehran and the nuclear issue. If a significant
number of Western warships can operate in the Gulf – which Iran sees as its
maritime backyard – then Iran can also deploy vessels to the Mediterranean,
which NATO countries regard as their maritime backyard. It complements the
Iranian campaign of terror against Israeli targets that can be expanded to
Western targets as well.

Conclusion

The arrival of Iranian military vessels to the Mediterranean represents a
clear sign of Tehran's widening strategic horizons and serves several
functions. The efforts invested in building a stronger navy buttress the
Iranian quest for expanding its influence in the Red Sea region and eastern
Mediterranean. It is able to foment trouble and aid its allies, as well as
counter the American naval presence. It also encroaches upon physical
proximity to Israel, an arch-enemy. For now the Iranian naval deployment in
areas close to Israel, the Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean is limited
but nonetheless is of concern for Israel.
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Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Shay is former Deputy Head of the Israel National
Security Council and a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies. He lectures at Bar-Ilan University and the Herzliya
Interdisciplinary Center.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family