[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: This article was written before the IDF Spokesman
challenged the veracity of the Times of London quote (copy below) "Since I
know the positions of the Intelligence Branch regarding events in Syria, I
find the quotation is not reliable. I would even say far-fetched."]

“The Devil We Know” Revisited: Israeli Thinking on the Future of the Assad
Regime
Rabinovich, Itamar
INSS Insight No. 427, May 19, 2013
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=11464

On May 17, 2013, The Times of London quoted “Israeli intelligence sources”
who argued that “an intact, but weakened, Assad regime would be preferable
for the country and for the whole troubled region.” The paper went on to
quote “a senior Israeli intelligence officer” in the north of the country:
“Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls
into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold
there.” We do not know who the Israeli sources were, but the Times story
provides a window into the deliberations and disagreements within Israel’s
national security establishment as to the country’s priorities with regard
to Syria.

The expression “the devil we know” was famously used by former Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005 when he explained to President George W. Bush
why he opposed the US President’s desire to topple Bashar al-Assad.
President Bush became hostile to the Syrian President who supported the
rebellion in Iraq against the US occupation and opened his borders to jihadi
infiltrators and military equipment in support of the rebellion. While not
enamored of the Syrian President, Sharon thought that from Israel’s
perspective it was preferable to have a familiar regime in Damascus rather
than face an uncertain future and the prospect of the Muslim Brotherhood,
the only organized opposition in Syria, taking over the country. Assad was
Iran’s ally and provided it with a land bridge to Hizbollah in Lebanon and
supported Hamas and Islamic Jihad. But he did maintain a quiet border in the
Golan Heights and inherited his father’s reputation as a familiar, and on
the whole, predictable enemy. Throughout his political career and his five
years as prime minister, Sharon opposed the idea of a settlement with Syria
and withdrawal from the Golan that was part and parcel of such a settlement.

Israel’s perspective changed in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War. For Prime
Minister Olmert, who succeeded Sharon, the war demonstrated the severity of
the threat posed to Israel by the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis. The conclusion
he drew, with the support of the defense establishment, was that it was a
high priority for Israel to dismantle this axis and to do it primarily by
pulling the Syrian brick out of the Iranian dominated wall. To this end, in
early 2007 he began a Turkish mediated effort to explore the prospect of an
Israeli-Syrian settlement. The negotiation lasted until its collapse in
December 2008, although it was temporarily suspended in September 2007 when
according to foreign sources Israel destroyed the North Korean-built Syrian
nuclear reactor in al-Kibar. It could be argued that there was no point in
negotiating a settlement with a Syrian president capable of such radical
action, but Olmert calculated that this was all the more reason to defuse
the conflict with Syria. He and others were also impressed by the fact that
Assad displayed maturity and self control when he refrained from retaliating
after being humiliated by the attack.

Another Syrian-Israeli negotiation was conducted in 2010-2011, during the
final two years of Benjamin Netanyahu’s previous tenure, through mediators
on behalf of the Obama administration. According to these mediators, this
was a very serious negotiation, Netanyahu’s public rejection of a withdrawal
from the Golan Heights notwithstanding. The outbreak of the Syrian crisis in
March 2011 put an end to this negotiation as well.

The Syrian crisis, which began as a series of demonstrations and developed
into a brutal civil war and a sectarian conflict, transformed Israel’s view
of Assad and his regime. The Syrian civil war soon became a focal point of
regional and international conflict. On the regional level, it became a
conflict between Iran and its adversaries. Iran and its proxy, Hizbollah,
have invested huge efforts to protect this strategic asset. Iran’s rivals
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan have extended support to the
opposition. Internationally, Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are
providing the Assad regime with a defensive shield in the Security Council
and other forums. Russia also continues to provide Assad’s regime with
sophisticated weapon systems. For Russia, protecting its investment in Syria
and preventing it from falling into the US orbit is a high priority.

As a neighbor with a high stake in Syria’s future, Israel must decide on its
own preferences. Early on, Israel chose a passive stance. Whatever its
preferences, it calculated, correctly, that its ability to affect the
outcome of the civil war was limited. It has no influence on Syria’s
domestic politics and if it were to extend any support to the opposition it
would play into the regime’s hands. Assad and his spokesmen argued from the
outset that this was not a genuine domestic rebellion but a conspiracy
hatched from the outside, and the regime would seize the opportunity to
embarrass the opposition by pointing to any Israeli link or support. At the
same time, Israel made it clear that it had its own red lines vis-à-vis
Syria. It announced that it would interrupt the transfer of sophisticated,
game changing weapon systems to the hands of terrorist groups, be they
Hizbollah or the jihadi groups that have come to play an important role in
the Syrian armed opposition. In January 2013, Israel reportedly destroyed a
cache of missiles in the Damascus area en route to Lebanon. In order not to
embarrass the regime and to minimize the risk of retaliation, Israel took no
credit for this action. But in May 2013, Israel acted twice and in a manner
that could not be secret. Clearly, Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah were upping
the ante. So was Russia, which is about to provide Syria with sophisticated
S-300 missiles whose entry into the Syrian-Lebanese arena is unacceptable to
Israel. Israel may find itself in a cycle of violence in which it acts again
and again against arms transfers via Syria to Hizbollah, eventually
triggering a response, whether by Syria or by Hizbollah. It was in this
context that an Israel official stated last week to the New York Times that
should Assad retaliate, Israel will topple his regime, meaning that the
destruction of Assad’s air force and armor by Israel would lead to the
opposition victory. Be that as it may, Israel finds itself deeply involved
in the regional and international conflict over Syria’s future as well as in
the question of the regime’s future.

Indeed, there is a debate within the Israeli defense establishment as to the
desirable outcome of the Syrian civil war. Some argue, in line of what was
said to the London Times, that at the end of the day is it better for Israel
that Assad remain in power, probably as a weakened ruler over part of the
country. Their argument is that given the strength of the jihadi and
Islamist elements among the militias fighting against the regime, a jihadi
or Islamist takeover or a state of anarchy with jihadi elements free to
launch terrorist activities is the most severe threat to Israel’s security.
Against this backdrop, Assad once again becomes “the devil we know.” Others
argue that the continuation of Assad’s regime in the service of Iran and in
close partnership with Hizbollah presents a graver threat to Israel’s
national security. They further argue that it is of course not desirable
that jihadi groups take over Syria of parts of Syria, but that Syria is not
the Sinai and Israel would be able to act if confronted with terrorist
threats from Syria.

This latter school of thought is the more convincing. Bashar al-Assad
demonstrated his ability to take radical dangerous actions when he built a
nuclear reactor in league with North Korea. He demonstrated his willingness
to brutalize his own population and use missiles and chemical weapons
against it. He is now purely a tool in the service of Iran. This, however,
does not mean that Israel should come out openly against Assad and the
future of his regime. Israel’s recent entanglement in the Russian-American
conflict over the future of Syria is a negative development. While
protecting its vital security interests, it should seek to return to the
policy it pursued during most of the civil war, i.e., refrain to the best of
its ability from being drawn into the crisis and into Syrian politics, and
protect its vital security interests firmly, but cautiously and discretely.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Itamar Rabinovich, Vice Chairman of the INSS Board of Directors,
is a former president of Tel Aviv University and a former Israeli ambassador
to Washington.

The Institute for National Security Studies • 40 Haim Levanon St. • Tel
Aviv 61398 • Israel • 03-640-0400 • e-mail: info@inss.org.il
ICS
============
IDF Spokesman on Facebook: denies Times of London story
[IMRA translation]
IDF spokesman - Brigadier - Gen. Yoav (Poly) Mordechai
19 May 2013
https://www.facebook.com/dovertzahal?fref=ts

An unnamed intelligence source is quoted in the Times of London.

I do not know who he was.

I learned a lot these past two years on the wise use which can be made of
such quotations to serve one purpose or another.

Since I know the positions of the Intelligence Branch regarding events in
Syria, I find the quotation is not reliable.

I would even say far-fetched.

We in the IDF continue to monitor and prepare for every scenario in the
northern region as well as in every other sector, which does not leave us
too much time to speculate about the future.

Good week.