From: Dr. Aaron Lerner
Sent: Sunday, July 20, 2014 5:13 PM
To: Efraim Inbar
Subject: Follow up question to Re: Mowing the Grass in Gaza

Dear Prof. Inbar,
Some people are suggesting that Egypt be encouraged to shift its border to
include the portion of Rafah that is now on the Gaza side of the border with
Israel then having a new and wider "Philadelphi Corridor" separating
between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
Years ago when Israel was withdrawing from the Sinai Egypt refused to
consider having all of Rafah on its side of the border but the argument is
that circumstances have changed.
Do you have any thoughts on this idea?
Thanks.
Best regards,
Aaron

-----Original Message-----
From: Efraim Inbar
Sent: Sunday, July 20, 2014 9:04 PM
To: Dr. Aaron Lerner
Subject: RE: Follow up question to Re: Mowing the Grass in Gaza

Not really
The line was drawn according to the international border. I doubt whether
Egypt wants more Palestinians.
Efraim

Prof. Efraim Inbar
Director
Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 52900
Fellow, Middle East Forum
http://besacenter.org/

________________________________________


Mowing the Grass in Gaza
by Prof. Efraim Inbar and Dr. Eitan Shamir
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 255 July 20 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Israeli military offensive in Gaza reflects the
assumption that Israel is in a protracted intractable conflict. It is
unlikely that Israel can purge Hamas from Palestinian society, nor is a
political solution likely to be achieved. Instead, Israel is acting in
accordance with a “mowing the grass” strategy. After a period of military
restraint, Israel is acting to severely punish Hamas for its aggressive
behavior, and degrading its military capabilities – aiming at achieving a
period of quiet.

Hamas left Israel’s government no choice but to order the Israel Defense
Force (IDF) to start a land incursion. Hamas refused to accept Israel’s
government offer of “calm for calm,” rejected the Egyptian cease fire
proposal and violated the humanitarian cease fire initiated by the UN. It
continuously fired over 10 days more than 1,500 missiles towards towns and
cities of Israel, hoping to kill as many civilians as possible. Moreover, it
uses tunnels in the attempt to kill Israeli civilians and/or kidnap them.

Israel's goal continues to be the establishment of a reality in which
Israeli residents can live in safety without constant indiscriminate terror,
while striking a significant blow to Hamas' terror infrastructure. The
Israeli government wisely has defined limited political and military goals
for this offensive, in accordance with what we call a “mowing the grass”
strategy.

Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state
groups, such as Hamas, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a
protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not
intended to attain impossible political goals, but rather is a long-term
strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy
capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses,
does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes as much
as possible, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a
temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along Israel’s
borders.

As the ground phase of "Operation Protective Edge" progresses, Israel must
be realistic about what can be achieved. Destroying the terror tunnels along
the fence around Gaza is an attainable military goal. In the process
terrorists can be killed and a part of the terrorist infrastructure
demolished. The Israeli ground advance might create unrest within the Hamas
organization, causing some of its military leadership to move around and
make mistakes that could result in better intelligence and opportunities for
targeted killings from the air.

An expansion of the ground operation might exact an even higher price from
Hamas. Continuous shelling of Israel by Hamas may inevitably lead to Israel’s
conquest of all of Gaza. Yet, the strategic calculus should always focus on
cost-effectiveness.

Despite the calls from the political Right in Israel, the demise of Hamas
rule in Gaza is not an attainable military objective. Hamas is well-rooted
in Palestinian society, particularly in Gaza. A recent Pew poll shows 35
percent of the Palestinians view Hamas in a favorable way, and in Gaza the
level of support is always higher. Eradicating Hamas and the subsequent
political engineering of Palestinian society is not something outsiders can
do. Even if Hamas rule can be terminated, the alternatives are Israeli rule,
the rule of more radical groups, or chaos. None are good options.

Similarly, calls from the Israeli Left for reaching a “political solution”
are totally unrealistic. Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Salafist groups see Israel
as a theological aberration, and despite reluctant acceptance of temporary
cease fires, reject any diplomatic course of action intended to solve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fanatic commitment of these militias to a
radical ideology and to a long-term strategy of violent resistance
(Muqawama), turn the situation into an intractable conflict.

As the rounds of violence with Hamas continue, the frustration with lack of
clear military decision or with the absence of a peaceful resolution is
understandable. Nevertheless, employing military force is useful in such
limited small wars with no clear decision. Hamas needs to be punished for
its aggressive behavior and reminded of the cost it must pay for continuing
the violence against Israel. A period of calm can be achieved by destroying
capabilities that are hard and expensive to rebuild. Buying time is a
legitimate goal. Additionally in the current strategic situation Hamas is
isolated, making the rebuilding of its military assets a longer process.

Moreover, other actors in this Middle East neighborhood are watching, and
they also need a clear reminder that aggression against Israel is costly.
Inaction would be perceived as weakness, harming deterrence and inviting
aggression. Israel’s greatest achievement in this conflict so far was its
missile defense system, which allows the home front to maintain a great deal
of normalcy. Israel has also signaled determination, by its readiness for
ground operations, despite the potential casualties.

Those who forlornly ask “when is this going to end?" and use the cliché
“cycle of violence,” have psychological difficulties digesting the facts
that there is no solution in sight and that the violent struggle against
Hamas is not going to end any time soon (not as long as the enemy's basic
ideological motivations remain intact). But still, important periods of
quiet are attainable by military action, and this is what explains Israel's
current offensive.

The Israeli approach described here is substantively different from current
Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.
Western thinking is solution-oriented. This explains part of the lack of
understanding for what Israel is doing.

Against an implacable, well-entrenched, non-state enemy like the Hamas,
Israel simply needs to “mow the grass” once in a while in order to degrade
enemy capabilities. A war of attrition against Hamas is probably Israel’s
fate for the long term. Keeping the enemy off balance and reducing its
capabilities requires Israeli military readiness and a willingness to use
force intermittingly, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home
front despite the protracted conflict.
============
Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is
professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, and the
Shillman/Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. Eitan Shamir is a
research associate at the BESA Center, and a lecturer in political studies
at Bar-Ilan University.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family