Was it a Mistake to Downsize and Deemphasize Israel's Ground Forces?
A Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Policy Memorandum, July 21, 2014
http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Was-it-a-mistake-to-downsi=
ze-and-deemphasize-IDF-ground-forces-21-july-2014.pdf

In December 2013, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies held a
conference to discuss controversial cuts in the IDF ground forces. "Neglect
of the IDF's ground forces poses a risk to Israel=92s security. There are r=
eal
battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies," warned
the BESA Center's Dr. Eitan Shamir, who organized the conference.

With the IDF now embroiled in an intensive ground battle with Hamas in Gaza,
and many infantry and armor units complaining of insufficient preparation,
it seems that Shamir had a point.

According to conference co-sponsor and speaker, military analyst Amir
Rappaport (publisher and editor of Israel Defense magazine, and a research
associate at the BESA Center), the IDF has clearly decided to invest
primarily in air force capabilities, intelligence, special operations
forces, stand-off precision fire and cyber capabilities; at the expense of
its more traditional units, mainly the ground forces.

IDF Chief-of-Staff, Lt. Gen. (res.) Benny Gantz did not think, he said, that
the IDF would need to fight a conventional army force in the foreseeable
future, nor have to conduct large scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

Two opposing schools of thought were presented in the conference. The
revisionist school supported the direction that Gantz is taking, while a
conservative school of thought expressed concern that these changes will
weaken the IDF and make it too dependent on technology.

An enthusiastic supporter of the new IDF direction was Brig. Gen. Gal Hirsh,
a division commander during the Second Lebanon War and current deputy
commander of the IDF Depth Command (a command formed in 2011 to coordinate
the IDF's long range operations deep in enemy territory). Hirsh argued that
the use of flexible special operations forces equipped with excellent
intelligence provides the best response for the current threat posed by
various terror organizations.

Hirsh=92s view was supported by Brig. Gen. (res.) Avigdor Klein, former Chi=
ef
Officer of the Armored Corps, who voiced his approval for reduction in
armored forces as part of necessary adaptations the IDF has to make.

A different perspective was offered by Vice Admiral (res.) Eli Marom, former
Commander of the Navy. Marom stressed the need to diversify IDF
precision-fire capabilities and not to concentrate it all in the hands of
the air force. Today=92s technology, he explained, allows for precision fire
to be launched from the sea as well, making the IDF a better balanced force.

Another aspect Marom discussed was the importance of the human factor:
motivating soldiers through the education of values. "Not everything is
technology, and to put boots on the ground you need well-motivated
soldiers," he said.

Probably the strongest and most original critique of the new IDF thinking
was offered by Maj. Gen. Gershon Hacohen, the outgoing Corps Commander of
the IDF General Staff. General Hacohen argued that the IDF has become too
dependent on technological solutions, rather than developing different
strategies to cope with new threats.

"Military doctrine is a function of culture; it is never universal but is
rooted in time and place. For years the hallmark of the IDF was the
initiative and creativity of individual soldiers. Instead of the 'art of
war,' today the IDF has become obsessed with the 'science of war' =96
statistics and numbers of targets hit =96 but this does not necessarily
measure effectiveness. The IDF needs to maintain its ability to adapt to
changing circumstances just like some of its rivals are doing. Technology
cannot solve everything!" warned Hacohen.

Hacohen also warned the IDF not to neglect its ability to deploy a mass
army. "A 'smart and small army based on special forces' is a nice slogan,
but sometimes the events dictate the need for large forces to operate. IDF
planning in this regard needs to be reexamined."

By way of bakground, Dr. Shamir of the BESA Center explains that the
backbone of the IDF traditionally has been based on a large land army,
comprised of heavy armored brigades supported by artillery and infantry.
Most of the ground forces were reserve units mobilized from their homes in
the event of war. A strong air force ensured air superiority of the sky and
allowed the time for the reserves to deploy. This system proved highly
effective in Israel=92s first decades of existence, when the main strategic
threat was large conventional Arab armies threatening to invade Israel=92s
territory.

However, Dr. Shamir says that three major strategic shifts occurred in the
last two to three decades. First is the change in the IDF=92s main strategic
challenge. The last time the IDF engaged in combat with a conventional army
was on Lebanese soil against the Syrian army in 1982. Since then, the threat
from conventional armies has diminished. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel (in 1979 and 1994). Iraq=92s army was essentially
eliminated by US invasion in 2003. The Syrian army too has been devastated
by the civil war in that country, with no end in sight.

Instead of conventional armies, the IDF finds itself occupied with
operations against terror and guerilla organizations such as Hamas in Gaza,
Islamic Jihad in Sinai, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The threat to Israel=92s
home front has also changed, from bombardment by hostile air forces to
rocket and missile fire by terror organizations. The country that most
supports and supplies these organizations is a non-Arab state actor that
does not share a border with Israel =96 Iran. Iran also has a nuclear progr=
am
that poses a threat to the entire Middle East. Under these circumstances
Israel must be able to project force thousands of kilometers from home.

The second shift relates to the latest technological developments in the
military (as well as civilian society) and the new possibilities they
present on the battlefield. The introduction of drones and unmanned vehicles
in the air, sea and land; networks of digital command and control; precision
fire that can be launched from almost any platform; and cyber-warfare =96 a=
ll
hold the potential to alter, and in some cases have already changed, the way
armies fight.

The third shift in the strategic environment relates to domestic politics.
The large civil protest demonstrations in Israel of 2011 reflect a change in
priorities of the Israeli public: =93More butter, fewer guns.=94 The result=
is a
growing public pressure on the IDF to become more effective and less costly.

Ideally, like every military, the IDF would like to have it all: The new
F-35 jet fighter and state-of-the-art Dolphin class submarines, the new
Namer APC and a new model of the Merkava tank, and additional batteries of
Iron Dome, Arrow and the new David Sling missile defense systems. However,
due to budget pressures, the IDF must compromise and make hard choices.

The Gaza war currently underway raises the question whether Israel and the
IDF have made the right choices.