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Thursday, July 24, 2014
MEMRI: Egypt's Position On Operation Protective Edge Reflects Conflict

July 24, 2014
MEMRI: Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1106
Egypt's Position On Operation Protective Edge Reflects Conflict Between Its
Hatred For Hamas And Its Solidarity With The Palestinians
By: L. Lavi*
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8088.htm

Introduction

The position of the Egyptian regime and its supporters regarding the current
fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza is characterized by the internal
conflict between their hostility towards Hamas and their desire to express
solidarity with the Palestinians.

Egypt sees Hamas as responsible for the crisis, because of the June 12
kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens by its members. It also blames
Hamas for the Gaza residents' ongoing suffering, arguing that the movement
had abandoned the Palestinian national struggle and instead was pursing
power, undermining the unity and interests of the Palestinian people, and
serving the interests of foreign elements – chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB), Qatar, and Iran. Finally, it blames Hamas for escalating the crisis
and triggering an IDF ground assault by rejecting the ceasefire initiative
of Egyptian President 'Abd Al-Fattah Al-Sisi.

In the eyes of the Egyptian regime that followed the June 30, 2013 ouster of
president Muhammad Mursi, Hamas is an enemy. 'Imad Al-Din Adib, columnist
for the Egyptian daily Al-Watan who is close to the regime, sees Egypt as no
longer applying the concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"
vis-à-vis Hamas. Instead, it views Hamas as a branch of the MB that it
considers to be working against the will and interests of the Egyptian
people.[1]

However, along with the accusations in the Egyptian media against Hamas, and
its schadenfreude at Hamas' misfortunes since Israel launched its attack on
Gaza,[2] there have also been calls to not allow these sentiments to deflect
Egypt from its decades of commitment to the Palestinian cause and from its
efforts to actualize the rights of the Palestinian people. Headlines such as
"Palestine is not just Gaza" and "Gaza is not all Hamas" have appeared
numerous times on op-eds in the Egyptian pro-regime press since the start of
the conflict.[3] 'Imad Al-Din Adib summed up the Egyptian dilemma on this
matter as follows: "How can [Egypt] support the [Palestinian] 'people'
without paying Hamas back what it deserves for its insane and hostile policy
vis-à-vis the Egyptian regime and people?"[4]

In this context, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said, at a breaking
of the Ramadan fast with Egyptian journalists: "The Egyptian people are very
sympathetic towards the Palestinian people, but they may be outraged at the
Hamas leaders' involvement with the MB, because of the ideological
connection [between them]. But our brothers in Gaza are besieged and face
extermination, and Egypt will never hesitate to support them. The
Palestinian people realize that the Egyptian people loves and supports it.
Egypt is capable of dealing with Hamas as it [also] preserves both its own
rights and the rights of its people." He added: "Whoever opposed Egypt's
initiative bears responsibility for the current situation."[5]

The MB and their supporters, on the other hand, have expressed complete
solidarity with Hamas, and have criticized the conduct of what they call the
"coup regime" in the current crisis, comparing it to that of the Mursi
regime during the November-December 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense. The MB
presents President Al-Sisi as an Israeli agent, the Egyptian media as the
"Zionist lobby," and Israel as the "real enemy" against which Hamas stands
alone, as Al-Sisi and other Arab rulers combat their own people. According
to the MB, Egypt is no longer capable of mediating fairly between Israel and
Hamas – and the "coup regime" is causing the erosion of Egypt's role as the
leader of the Palestinian cause, and of the region in general.

Egypt During Operation Protective Edge vs. Egypt During Operation Pillar Of
Defense

In official political terms, while during 2012s Operation Pillar of Defense,
president Mursi spoke harshly against Israel, recalled Egypt's ambassador,
dispatched his prime minister and foreign minister to Gaza to show
solidarity, announced that the Rafah border crossing was completely open,
and renewed meetings with Hamas political bureau head Khaled Mash'al, Egypt
under Al-Sisi has been as harsh on Hamas as on Israel. This harsh tone was
expressed in a slew of articles in the pro-government press condemning Hamas
and its leadership, described Hamas as "the ugly face of the Palestinian
resistance," a "trader in the lives of innocents," and "an accomplice to the
elimination of its people."[6]

With regard to declarations and statements, while Egypt has reiterated its
commitment to the Palestinian cause, in practical terms it has only opened
the Rafah crossing to accept a small number of injured Gaza residents and
supplied 500 tons of medicine and food to Gaza.[7] Moreover, in recent days
Egypt has stopped convoys comprising hundreds of civil activists from
passing through the Rafah crossing into Gaza, and also prevented an airplane
coming from Tunis with medical aid from landing near the Gaza border.[8] It
is also continuing to destroy tunnels on the border and to thwart Hamas'
attempts to fire rockets from the Sinai into Israel.[9]

Hamas senses that the Egyptian ceasefire initiative does not represent
Hamas' interests, and that Egypt is no longer an honest broker in the
conflict, since it did not directly consult on the matter and furthermore it
rejected Hamas' demand to fully and permanently open the Rafah crossing –
one of the main objectives for Hamas' initiation of the conflict with
Israel.[10] Hamas' assumption that its recent reconciliation with the
Palestinian Authority (PA) would remove all pretexts for Egypt to keep the
Rafah crossing closed and force it to open it was not realized.[11] Egypt
refused, stating that doing so would allow terrorists to infiltrate its
territory; currently, it fears that doing so would be considered a victory
for Hamas that Egypt did not want to provide. In its ceasefire initiative,
Egypt was prepared to allow the passage of goods and people under certain
conditions, but at this time it is unwilling to relinquish its control over
the crossing and hand it over to international forces.[12]

On the popular level, the current Israel-Gaza conflict has not led to mass
protests in Egypt against Israel or Al-Sisi, aside from some pro-Palestinian
marches held mostly by MB supporters, which augment the daily anti-regime
protests that they have been conducting for months. Popular movements such
as Tamarrud and the Popular Stream called for expelling Israel's ambassador
from Cairo, recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Israel, nullifying the
Camp David Accords, and imposing an economic boycott against Israel.
However, these protests, held, for example, outside the Egyptian Foreign
Ministry, drew only a few dozen activists.[13]

The longer the Israel-Gaza conflict continues, and the higher the Gaza death
toll rises, the more intellectuals and politicians, including former MP Amr
Hamzawy and former presidential candidate 'Abd Al-Mun'im Abu Al-Futouh, have
called on Egypt to open the Rafah crossing for the welfare of the Gaza
residents and not necessarily as a token of support for Hamas' demands.[14]
But so far, such calls have remained on the verbal level; there is little
actual popular pressure on the regime to change its policy, and Hamas is
considered culpable because it could have prevented the death of innocents
had it agreed to the Egyptian ceasefire initiative.[15]

Explaining The Egyptian Position

There are several central explanations for the official Egyptian position
and the reaction on the Egyptian street to the current Israel-Hamas crisis,
all of which stem from the ouster of the MB from power in Egypt. These
include: a) the anger against Hamas amongst the Egyptian regime and its
supporters, and its view of it as a branch of the MB; b) Egypt's own
internal problems, first and foremost its struggle against terrorism, its
economic situation, and the completion of the process of the transition to
an elected regime with the upcoming parliamentary elections; and c) its
desire to present itself as the most influential force in the region and to
preserve its title of the primary patron of the Palestinian cause, against
the backdrop of the competition for the leading role in the Middle East
between the axis of Egypt and most of the Gulf countries, headed by Saudi
Arabia, and the axis of the MB-supporting countries, that is, Turkey and
Qatar, together with Hamas.

1. Egypt's Criticism Of Hamas

Criticism of Hamas has been voiced by the Egyptian military and by opponents
of the MB since the beginning of the revolution – that is, January 25,
2011 – with a focus on several central accusations:[16]

a) The jailbreak from Egyptian prisons, in the first days of the January 25
revolution, and the freeing of Hamas and MB prisoners – including Muhammad
Mursi himself, who was in Wadi Nathroun prison.

b) The August 2012 terror attack at Rafah in Egypt, in which 16 Egyptian
soldiers were killed as they broke the Ramadan fast. The attack was aimed at
giving president Mursi a pretext for removing the senior Egyptian military
echelons and the regime headed by Gen. Tantawi, and for taking full control
of the regime – and that is what he did.[17]

c) The kidnapping of Egyptian police officers from the Sinai at the
beginning of the January 25 revolution, and their detainment in the Gaza
Strip for use as a bargaining chip to obtain the release of political
prisoners, as well as the March 2013 attempt to smuggle Egyptian army
uniform fabric into Gaza via a tunnel in the Sinai, for disguising Hamas
militants as Egyptian soldiers, and the May 2013 kidnapping of seven
Egyptian soldiers in Rafah. Some claimed that the aim of this kidnapping was
to bring about the removal of Al-Sisi from his post as defense minister.

d) The illegal entry into Egypt of Hamas members in order to help suppress
protests by opponents of the Mursi regime – with snipers, and other means.

e) Damaging Egypt's security and economy by conducting smuggling operations
via the Gaza-Sinai tunnels: moving terrorists and weapons both ways,
smuggling criminals out of Egypt to avoid punishment, smuggling scarce goods
such as fuel from Egypt into Gaza, and flooding the Egyptian market with
goods from Gaza.[18]

f) Since Mursi's ouster by Al-Sisi, Egypt has accused Hamas of standing with
the MB and against the desire of the Egyptian people; of dispatching its
activists to Egypt in order to help the MB in demonstrations of support for
Mursi that call for restoring him to power; and of encouraging jihadi terror
operations against state apparatuses.

In the eyes of the post-June 30 Egyptian regime, Hamas is nothing but a
branch of the MB movement, which it has gone to great lengths to brutally
suppress and classify as a terrorist organization. Hamas itself was outlawed
by an Egyptian court in early March 2014. Since Mursi's ouster, the Egyptian
military has also greatly expanded its activity to destroy Gaza-Sinai
tunnels. "We have indeed turned our backs [on what is transpiring in Gaza],
wrote 'Adel Na'aman, a columnist for Al-Watan, "because Hamas has paid us
back for our kindness by killing our children..."[19] According to Al-Ahram
Center for Political and Strategic Studies researcher Emad Gad, Hamas is
promoting "its own interests and the interests of [its MB] parent movement
ahead of the national Palestinian interest."[20]

The Egyptians' fury against Hamas boiled over after Hamas political bureau
head Khaled Mash'al, who is currently Doha-based, said at the beginning of
the Gaza-Israel conflict: "We expect the Egyptian army [to use its] spirit
of heroism for the sake of its Arab nation."[21] In response, many writers
rushed to Egypt's defense and portrayed Hamas as dragging Egypt into war,
or at the very least shaming it before its own citizens and before the
world; harming Egypt's central status in the Middle East; and sabotaging its
efforts to advance according to Al-Sisi's road map, thus aiming in toto to
restore the MB to power. They also claimed that Egypt was doing more for the
Palestinians than Hamas' leaders themselves, and more than any other Arab
country. "The poor Palestinians are dying; will your plots rescue them? Let
the big [guys] act, for this is no time for [mischievous] actions by
dwarfs," wrote Al-Ahram in an editorial.[22]

2. Putting Egypt's Own Internal Problems First

Another explanation for Egypt's stance in the Hamas-Israel crisis is its own
internal problems. Columnist Hamdi Razaq responded to Khaled Mash'al's
criticism: "We are sick and tired, Mash'al, of defending the [Palestinian]
cause that you sold cheaply to the MB gang whose path you took, although
they had lost their way... We have enough troubles of our own, and enough
evil conspiracies by your brothers, the members of your movement. You have
bankrupted us. We are now hungry for bread, while you gorge yourselves on
delicacies at the ignominious tables of Doha..."[23]

Egypt is preoccupied with efforts to extricate itself from its dire economic
straits and to reduce its budget deficit, while at the same time calming
public resentment over a series of recent economic cutbacks implemented by
the regime. These included hikes in taxes on cigarettes and alcohol and cuts
in fuel and energy subsidies, along with the accompanying price increases
for fuel, electricity, agricultural produce, clothing, and more – sparking
regime fears of an underclass uprising.

Egypt's first priority is also to defeat the terrorism that has spread
throughout the country since Mursi's ouster, and which is directed primarily
against the police and the military – not only in the Sinai but across the
country. At this very moment, Egypt is mourning the deaths of 22 border
guards killed by terrorists in the July 19 attack at Al-Wadi Al-Jadeed,
approximately 600 km southwest of Cairo, and the killing five days before
that of 11 Egyptians, including a soldier and a boy, in terror operations in
El Arish.

Egypt's inability to choose between its desire to help the residents of Gaza
and the need to deal with its own problems at home was the subject of a
column by 'Aadel Sanhouri in the Egyptian daily Al-Yawm Al-Sabi'. He wrote:
"[In light of the terror operations in the Sinai], must we defend Gaza and
Hamas and leave bleeding Sinai as prey to the terrorism of the MB, the
legitimate father of Hamas[?] I know very well that there is a huge
difference between Hamas and the Palestinian people, and between Hamas and
the Palestinian cause, and that defending Gaza does not mean defending
Hamas, but, first and foremost, defending Egyptian national security as well
as the fraternal [Palestinian] people that has been fighting and sacrificing
victims for over 50 years in order to obtain their legitimate rights to
establish their independent state.

"But the simplest of Egyptians, and there are millions of them, face a
bitter reality, along wi sights of terrorism, that leave them facing a
dilemma between the [Egyptian] home and the [Muslim] collective or the needs
of the Sinai and defending Gaza at this difficult hour."[24] Also, "Egypt
First," wrote 'Azza Sami, deputy editor of Egypt's official daily
Al-Ahram.[25]

Egypt is preoccupied also with preparations for the parliamentary elections,
set to begin in November 2014 – which are the final stage in the road map
set out by Al-Sisi after he ousted Mursi – as well as with possible
alliances among political parties, and fears of a possible return of the
National Democratic Party that ruled the country during the Mubarak era.

Even one of Al-Misriyyoun's editors, Mahmoud Sultan, who has been identified
with the MB since Mursi's ouster, wrote that the struggle for reforming Arab
countries takes precedence over the Palestinian struggle: "Jerusalem's
liberation begins here, by liberating the Arab peoples first and foremost
from tyranny and from political, financial and administrative corruption.
[Liberation] will begin when the Arab individual has value and carries
weight in his own country... How can a hungry citizen deprived of health
care and proper education, who cannot sleep safely in his own bed, is
physically unwell, and who has nothing to feed his children, be asked to
become a soldier in the campaign to liberate Jerusalem?..."[26]

3. The Egyptian Role In The Crisis As Part Of Regional Power Struggles

Another factor explaining the Egyptian position in the Hamas-Israel crisis
is Egypt's desire to depict itself as an influential regional power, and to
preserve its status as the leading patron of the Palestinian cause. In light
of the development of the regional struggle following the ouster of the MB
regime in Egypt – that is, between the MB axis comprising Hamas, Qatar, and
Turkey, and the anti-MB axis comprising Egypt and the other Arab Gulf
states, headed by Saudi Arabia – Egypt claims exclusive rights to mediating
between Hamas and Israel and dismisses any alternative put forward by the
opposition axis.[27]

Since the June 30 ouster of Mursi, Egypt has been boasting of its
achievements in restoring its leading role in the regional arena by virtue
of its far-reaching diplomatic activity, and it seeks to emerge from the
current Hamas-Israel crisis with a boost to its status as the dominant power
in the Middle East. For this reason, it has refuted claims from both within
it and outside it that it has turned its back on the Palestinians, and
claimed in response that it does more for the Palestinians than the Hamas
leaders themselves, and certainly more than Qatar and Turkey, whom it is
accusing, together with the international MB organization, of torpedoing its
ceasefire initiative.

In his column in the Egyptian daily Al-Masri Al-Yawm, 'Amr Al-Shubaki wrote:
"No one should embroil the Egyptian army in any foreign wars that are far
[removed] from defending its national land, or to compete with its role and
its past. You might have imagined that the Qatari military had, together
with its Turkish counterpart, gone to war to liberate Palestine while Egypt
neglected [it].

"Egypt's battle vis-a-vis Israel is [on the] diplomatic, legal, and
political [level], and is aimed at achieving a halt to [Israel's] aggression
against Gaza. It is not [in the form of] moving armies or pretending to
fancied heroism, like [Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdogan – who
said that Turkey will not turn its back on Gaza, as if he were doing
something in the struggle against the Israeli aggression.

"We do not have to fight in Palestine – but at the same time we don't
require some of us to keep silent over the aggression against the Gaza
residents merely because they are Hamas-ruled, and that the rest of us will
rejoice over the martyrs of the resistance because some of them were from
Hamas.

"Palestine is a just cause, regardless of how some have damaged it. Its
people are brave and glorious, and it is deserving of material and moral
support in the struggle against the last occupation state in the world –
Israel. We must not reduce Palestine down to the Hamas movement. When the
occupier is the attacker, we must all show solidarity with the victim,
regardless of its political coloration– because the point here is defending
justice and truth, not a [particular] political faction."[28]

*L. Lavi is a research fellow at MEMRI

Endnotes:
[1] Al-Watan (Egypt), July 21, 2014.
[2] See MEMRI TV Clip #4344 – Egyptian TV Hosts Criticize Hamas Leaders: We
Are Sick and Tired of You, July 9-12, 2014; and MEMRI TV Clip #4349 –
Egyptian TV Host Osama Mounir to Hamas Leaders: Dream on! You Belong in a
Mental Asylum, July 16, 2014.
[3] Al-Jumhouriyya, Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 12, 2014.
[4] Al-Watan (Egypt), July 13, 2014.
[5] Al-Watan (Egypt), July 17, 2014.
[6] Al-Dustour Al-Asli (Egypt), July 13, 2014; Al-Ahram (Egypt), July
16,2014; Al-Wafd (Egypt), July 21, 2014.
[7] Al-Watan (Egypt), July 15, 2014.
[10] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1104, Why Did Hamas
Launch Its Current Rocket Offensive Against Israel?, July 15, 2014.
[11] Following Hamas's 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip, Egypt closed the
Rafah crossing, which was considered Gaza's sole lifeline after the closure
of its crossings with Israel. The Egyptian regime defended this decision by
stating that it could not accept control of the crossings by squabbling
factions, and that it would agree to reopen it only after control of Gaza
was returned to the PA under its president, Mahmoud 'Abbas. It also appears
that the fear that Palestinians would move into the Sinai has been in the
minds of the Egyptians since armed Palestinians blasted through the border
fence in 2008. Even during 2012's Operation Pillar of Defense, Mursi did not
open the crossing completely, likely under pressure from the Egyptian army,
Israel, the U.S., and the PA.
[12] The Egyptian ceasefire initiative of 2012 resembles the Egyptian
ceasefire initiative of 2014 – both include a cessation of hostilities
between the sides and the opening of the border crossings – but Hamas is
troubled by a major difference: While the 2012 initiative required the
crossings to open for the passage of people and goods within 24 hours of the
agreement's coming into effect, the 2014 initiative made the opening of
crossings conditional on stability on the ground, and set no timetable.
According to Rassd.com, which is associated with the MB, Al-Sisi formulated
both initiatives – as defense minister in 2012 and as president in 2014.
Rassd.com, July 15, 2014.
[13] Al-Dustour Al-Asli (Egypt), July 10, 2014; Al-Watan (Egypt), July 22,
2014.
[14] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 17, 2014; Al-Ahram (Egypt), July 19,
2014.
[15] Al-Ahram (Egypt), July 14, 2014.
[16] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1003, Hamas Embroiled In Internal
Egyptian Struggles, August 2, 2013.
[17] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 4908, Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi
Rescinds The SCAF's Authority, August 24, 2012.
[18] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 936, To Hamas's Chagrin, Egypt
Increases Anti-Tunnel Activity On Gaza Border, February 20, 2013.
[19] Al-Watan (Egypt), July 17, 2014.
[20] Al-Dustour Al-Asli (Egypt), July 12, 2014.
[21] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 9, 2014.
[22] Al-Ahram (Egypt), July 16, 2014.
[23] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 10, 2014.
[24] Al-Yawm Al-Sabi' (Egypt), July 15, 2014.
[25] Al-Ahram (Egypt), July 15, 2014.
[26] Al-Misriyyoun (Egypt), July 10, 2014.
[27] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1045, Deterioration In Turkey-Egypt
Relations Due To Turkish PM Erdogan's Opposition To Egyptian President
Mursi's Ouster, December 19, 2013, and MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1075,
Unprecedented Tension Between Qatar And Saudi Arabia/UAE/Bahrain Threatens
To Break Up Gulf Cooperation Council, March 14, 2014.

[28] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 12, 2014.

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