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Sunday, August 24, 2014
Bottom line from Shlomo Brom INSS Gaza proposal: agree to divide Jerusalem - otherwise can't get third parties to help in Gaza

Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: It was only a few days ago that Israeli Leftist
commentators were moaning that the Israeli public of greater Tel Aviv,
experiencing the reality of the 90 second warning to reach shelters, will
never ever agree to a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank that
would shave that time down to 15 seconds.

But not to fear. It's that fantastic Israeli attention span at work once
again.

So here we have, literally a few days later, Shlomo Brom pitching the idea
that the solution to our problems in the Gaza Strip hinges on the
participation of third parties in a program in the Gaza Strip and that the
"collaboration of these nations will be possible only in a context where
there is a chance for real change in the relations between Israel and the
Palestinians. In other words, the Israeli government must change its current
attitude in exchange for the joint efforts of these countries."

That's right.

A new excuse for dividing Jerusalem.

It won't bring peace.

It won't save us from a non-existent demographic threat.

But it will get some third parties to be willing to get involved in the Gaza
Strip.

A suggestion for INSS since they most certainly have the budget for it:
take a bunch of your people and assume for the moment that Hamas and the
rest aren't lying when they say their goal is the destruction of the Jewish
State and then think what you would do if you were Hamas in the Gaza Strip
and you wanted to exploit the program proposed below in order to move
towards achieving this goal?

I venture that the results would be shocking.


==========
Israeli Policy following Operation Protective Edge: Continuity or Change?
INSS Insight No. 595, August 24, 2014
Shimon Stein, Shlomo Brom
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7565

The third round of fighting between Israel and Hamas in less than six years
shows that the approach that has shaped Israel’s conduct to date has failed.
The alternative proposed in this article, which includes the abandonment of
conflict management as a substitute for conflict resolution and opts for a
return to an approach that strives for conflict resolution, holds the
potential for a graduated change over time in the basic attitudes of Hamas,
as well as Israel. The organization would then have two options: either it
becomes an integral part of the process of achieving stability in Gaza,
whereupon it will find itself in a situation in which the constraints on
using violence will grow so that it will be forced to change basic
attitudes, or it cleaves to violence and gradually becomes politically weak
to the point of irrelevance.

Israel’s positions in the Egyptian-mediated indirect talks with Hamas –
suspended on August 19, 2014 – reflect an unbending Israeli approach to the
management of the conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, with the exception
of few tactical adjustments required by the situation. In other words,
continuity guides Israel’s policymakers, despite the fact that the shorter
intervals between the three rounds of fighting with Hamas in recent years
should spark doubt about the effectiveness of this approach.

Several basic components of Israel’s thinking prevent a changed approach:
1. The perception that the struggle between Israel and Hamas is a zero sum
game: What is ignored is the fact that there may be situations that benefit
both sides. For example, improving the lot of the Gazan population is good
for Hamas and good for Israel. While it allows Hamas to take credit for
success, it also exerts pressure on Hamas to maintain the calm. People who
have nothing to lose often favor exploding the situation through the use of
violence.
2. The notion that in order to weaken Hamas it is necessary to make sure
Gaza persists at a sub-standard level, i.e., limited economic activity that
basically – and barely – precludes a humanitarian crisis. Trucks move in one
direction alone and bring goods into the Gaza Strip, but there is no export
of goods from Gaza.
3. Addiction to the image of victory: Hamas can present any change in Israel’s
Gaza policy as a victory, and therefore Israel avoids any policy change. In
this context, consider that at the end of the Yom Kippur War, Egypt
presented its population with the image of victory when Israeli forces were
sitting on the west bank of the Suez Canal as well as encircling the
Egyptian Third Army, yet no interest of Israel was harmed as a result. Some
even claim that this was one of the factors that jumpstarted the process
that eventually led to peace with Egypt.
4. Continued separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank: This stance is
based on the divide-and-conquer illusion and the assumption that it is
possible to separate the two and handle each independently without there
being repercussions for the other.
5. Abbas is not a partner, certainly not someone who can lead the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip to an agreement with Israel, and therefore Israel must
oppose a unity government between Fatah and Hamas.
6. Fears and reservations about international intervention, including
international supervision of the implementation of agreements.


Fatah and Hamas representatives in Gaza announcing an agreement to form a
Palestinian unity government, April 23, 2014, AFP/Getty Images
Given the repeated failures of recent years in reducing Hamas’ incentive to
fire at Israel, perhaps after Operation Protective Edge it is time to create
a new balance of factors affecting Hamas’ considerations. If the Israeli
approach does not change, it is more than likely that the renewal of
fighting is only a matter of time. Only a fundamental change in Israel’s
approach provides a chance of not returning to the cycle of violence yet
again.

The key components in the strategy that should guide Israel are:
1. Abandoning what has proven to be a failed approach, i.e., conflict
management as a substitute for conflict resolution, and returning to the
approach that strives for conflict resolution. This does not mean ignoring
the political reality on both sides, which apparently does not allow for the
conflict to be resolved any time soon. The process will be hard and gradual,
but from the outset it is vital to announce that the objective is to resolve
the conflict. New contents must be infused toward a conflict resolution
formula, in order to create a clear, feasible framework for a settlement,
and to work backwards to delineate the gradual steps required to achieve it.
These, alongside negotiations, could be partial or unilateral agreements.
Hamas itself adopted the notion of a partial agreement with Israel in the
form of a long term hudna (armistice).
2. Internalizing the reality that separating the West Bank from the Gaza
Strip has failed and that therefore it is necessary to strive for the
reintegration of Gaza in the Palestinian Authority. A first step in that
direction must be recognition of the Palestinian national unity government
and willingness to work with it. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that
the reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip be spearheaded by the PA and
that the opening of the border crossings is conditional on the presence of
PA security forces on the Gazan side of the border.
3. To the extent possible, the creation of a normal economy in Gaza,
which includes exports and imports, must be advanced. There is no reason why
the Gaza Strip cannot export vegetables and other products to Israel. It is
necessary to aim for a situation (which once existed) whereby Israeli
industrial plants once again work with Gazan subcontractors. It is also
necessary to expand the Gazan fishing zone.

Concomitant with Gaza’s economic reconstruction, renewed force construction
on the part of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in Gaza must be
prevented as a stage in attaining the goal (that for now appears
unrealistic) of demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, i.e., stripping Hamas
and the other organizations of their weapons. Greater openness to the needs
of the civilians in Gaza will facilitate regional and international
cooperation in preventing the rearming of Hamas. Implementing the objectives
of both areas – economy and security – cannot occur without the involvement
of other countries. Israel must work toward the establishment of a
“coalition of the willing” whose objective will be to help the sides create
a new reality in the Gaza Strip. Participating countries must include Egypt
(which will play a key role in changing the Gazan reality), Saudi Arabia,
the Gulf states (with the exception of Qatar), and Jordan. Common to these
countries (and Israel) is, on the one hand, rejection of Hamas as a member
of the radical Islamist axis that includes Iran, Turkey, and Qatar; and, on
the other hand, support for PA President Abbas and, accordingly, a demand to
restore the PA and supplant Hamas. The collaboration of these nations will
be possible only in a context where there is a chance for real change in the
relations between Israel and the Palestinians. In other words, the Israeli
government must change its current attitude in exchange for the joint
efforts of these countries. The United States and the EU, both of which made
it clear during the fighting that alongside the need for a ceasefire there
was great importance in achieving a permanent settlement that would ensure
the security of Israel and provide for Gaza’s humanitarian needs, will also
have to be part of the coalition and prove their willingness to go beyond
rhetoric by working to implement the economic and security dimensions of the
agreement to be achieved. It is worthwhile considering anchoring any
agreement and the mechanisms of its implementation in a Security Council
resolution; this would emphasize the commitment of the principal parties and
the assisting nations to implementation of the agreement.

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it, but the third round of fighting in less
than six years shows that the approach that has shaped Israel’s conduct to
date has failed. The alternative offered herein proposes a different
approach holding the potential for a graduated change over time in the basic
attitudes of Hamas, as well as Israel. The organization will have two
options: either it becomes an integral part of the process of achieving
stability in Gaza, whereupon it will find itself in a situation in which the
constraints on using violence will grow to the point that it will be forced
to change basic attitudes, or it cleaves to violence and gradually becomes
politically weak to the point of irrelevance

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