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Tuesday, September 2, 2014
PSR post ceasfire poll of Palestinians: Haniyeh 61% Abbas 32%., Hamas 46% Fatah 31% - 54% supported killing the kidnapped Israeli teenagers

"As expected, and as we saw in previous instances during and immediately
after Israeli wars with Hamas, findings show a spike in the popularity of
Hamas and its leaders and a major decline in the popularity of Fatah and
president Abbas. But, as in previous cases, these changes might be
temporary and things might revert in the next several months to where they
were before the war."
PSR: Special Gaza War Poll
http://www.pcpsr.org./en/special-gaza-war-poll

Gaza War ends with a victory for Hamas leading to a great increase in its
popularity and the popularity of its approach of armed resistance: for the
first time since 2006, Hamas wins parliamentary and presidential elections
if they were to take place today while West Bankers support transferring
Hamas’ approach to the West Bank

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center
for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
between 26-30 August 2014. The period before the poll witnessed the eruption
of the Gaza War which was preceded by the kidnapping and killing of three
Israelis. More than 2000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, were killed during
the war. About 70 Israelis, mostly from the military, were killed during the
war. Our fieldwork started on the last day of the war and continued during
the first four days of the ceasefire. This press release covers public
perception of the war, who came out a winner, the ceasefire agreement,
targeting of civilians, evaluation of the performance of various Palestinian
actors during the war, and war impact on reconciliation. It also covers
Palestinian elections, the internal balance of power, the June kidnapping
and killing of the three Israelis, and others. Total size of the sample is
1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations.
Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid
Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of this special Gaza War poll highlight dramatic changes in public
attitudes regarding major issues. It goes without saying that the war was
the major driver behind these changes. As expected, and as we saw in
previous instances during and immediately after Israeli wars with Hamas,
findings show a spike in the popularity of Hamas and its leaders and a major
decline in the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas. But, as in previous
cases, these changes might be temporary and things might revert in the next
several months to where they were before the war.

It is worth noting that the size of the change in favor of Hamas is
unprecedented since 2006. Indeed, if presidential elections were to take
place today, Ismail Haniyeh would easily win over Abbas and Hamas would win
the largest percentage of the popular vote in parliamentary elections. The
overwhelming majority of the public views Hamas as the winner and Israel as
the loser in this war. Furthermore, a similar majority views Hamas’ approach
of armed confrontation with Israel as the most effective means of ending
Israeli occupation. Indeed, an overwhelming majority of West Bankers wants
to transfer “Hamas’ way” to the West Bank and rejects the demand to disarm
the Islamist group or to disband the other Gazan armed groups. Findings also
indicate that the public see Iran, Turkey, and Qatar as the most
instrumental in supporting Hamas and helping Gazans remain steadfast against
the Israeli attacks. By contrast, Egypt’s role is seen as week and
unhelpful. Indeed, a majority believes that Egypt played a negative role in
the ceasefire negotiations.

Finally, despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, and prime
minister Rami al Hamdallah received little positive evaluation for their
role during the war, a majority tends to give the reconciliation government
a big role in the affairs of the Gaza Strip in the post war period. For
example, a majority wants it to control border crossings and to supervise
police and security sector employees; the largest percentage wants it to
control borders with Israel and Egypt and to lead the reconstruction process
in the Strip.

(1) Gaza War:

79% believe that Hamas has won the Gaza War; 3% believe Israel came out the
winner; and 17% believe the two sides were losers.

79% believe Israel was responsible for the eruption of the Gaza war; 5%
believe Hamas was responsible; and 12% believe the responsibility lies with
the two sides.

63% believe that the ceasefire agreement satisfies Palestinian interests,
but 34% disagree with that. Moreover, 59% are satisfied with the
accomplishment gained in the agreement compared to the human and material
losses sustained by the Gaza Strip; 39% are dissatisfied with the
accomplishment.

An overwhelming majority of 86% support the launching of rockets from the
Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.

60% say that Hamas does not launch rockets from populated areas, but 30% say
it does. 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from
populated areas and 46% disagree with that. Percentage of those who believe
that launching rockets from populated areas is unjustified increases to 59%
among Gazans while standing at 38% among West Bankers.

Only 30% believe that Hamas should warn Israeli civilians in the specific
targeted areas before launching its rockets; 68% believe it should not do
so.

57% oppose disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip while 25% support such a
measure after the ending of the siege and the conduct of elections; 13%
support this measure but only after reaching a peace agreement with Israel.
In our June 2014 poll, only 33% said it opposed disarming and dissolving
armed groups in the Gaza Strip.

Despite the current opposition to disarming Gaza groups, a majority of 54%
support and 40% oppose Abbas’ position that argues that the reconciliation
government must be committed to existing agreements reached between the PLO
and Israel and rejects Hamas position that opposes Abbas’ argument. In our
previous poll in June, support for Abbas’ position stood at 59%.

Yet, only 43%, compared to 53% last June, agrees with the statement that the
inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means an implicit acceptance by Hamas of the
PLO peace program and the existing agreements with Israel.

About two thirds (64%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have
given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks
and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 9% believe
Egypt too has contributed to that. Iran comes on top with 28%, followed by
Turkey (21%) and Qatar (15%); 25% select other countries or actors.

Moreover, only 25% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as
positive while a majority of 52% describe it as negative and 22% as neutral.

94% are satisfied with Hamas’ military performance in confronting Israeli
forces; 78% are satisfied with its defense of civilians in Gaza; and 89% are
satisfied with its media and communication performance.

In an evaluation of the performance of the various Palestinian actors during
the war, Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah comes at the bottom, with 35%
giving him a positive rating. The PA comes next with 36%, Abbas with 39%,
the reconciliation government with 43%, and the PLO with 44%. On top comes
Khalid Mish’al with 78% approval and Hamas with 88% approval. The approval
rating for Abbas rises to 49% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 33% in the West
Bank. By contrast, Khalid Mish’al’s approval rating drops in the Gaza Strip
to 70% and rises to 83% in the West Bank.



(2) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split rises
to 69%; 28% remain pessimistic. In our last poll in June 62% were
optimistic.

Three months after its establishment, 46% are satisfied with the performance
of the reconciliation government and 46% are dissatisfied. Indeed, 60%
prefer to get rid of the reconciliation government and form a unity
government in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would
participate; 34% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation
government. The preference for a unity government drops significantly to 49%
in the Gaza Strip and increases to 66% in the West Bank.

A majority of 51% wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of
the Rafah crossing, but 38% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. In the
Gaza Strip, 64% want to place the Rafah crossing under the control of the
reconciliation government and only 25% want it under Hamas’ control. The
same, with minor variation, applies to control over the crossings with
Israel.

48% want the reconciliation government to control the border with Egypt and
39% want it under Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation, applies to
the border with Israel; with 45% in favor of keeping the border under the
control of the reconciliation government and 41% say they should stay under
Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, 56% say borders with Egypt should come
under the control of the reconciliation government and 49% say the border
with Israel too should come under the control of the reconciliation
government.

44% believe the responsibility for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip
should be placed in the hands of the reconciliation government while 39%
prefer to place it in Hamas’ hands.

83% want the reconciliation government to pay the salary of the Gaza public
sector that served the previous Hamas government; 13% are opposed to that.

65% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the
work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under
Hamas government; 29% disagree with that, wanting instead to keep these
employees under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, the demand for placing
the security sector employees under the control of the reconciliation
government rises to 72% and only 24% want them under Hamas’ control.

Nonetheless, 72% agree with Hamas’ demand that security and police should
remain under its control during the next 6 months, up until the elections;
24% disagree with that. Two months ago 66% agreed with that.


(3) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated,
Haniyeh, for the first time since we have started asking about his
popularity about 8 years ago, would receive a majority of 61% and Abbas
would receive 32%. Vote for Haniyeh stands at 53% in the Gaza Strip and 66%
in the West Bank. Abbas receives 43% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in the West
Bank. Two months ago, Abbas received the support of 53% in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip and Haniyeh 41%. The rate of participation in such elections
would reach 71%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases from 50% two
months ago to 39% in this poll.

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the
former would receive 45% and the latter would receive 49% of the
participants’ votes. This is the first time in 8 years in which Haniyeh
receives more votes than Barghouti. In our previous poll, Barghouti received
the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%. The rate of participation in this case
would reach 77%.

If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti
and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive 48% of the vote, Barghouti 29%,
and Abbas 19%. The rate of participation in this case would reach 80%. In
our previous poll in June 2014, Barghouti received 36% of the vote, Haniyeh
33%, and Abbas 28%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all
factions, 78% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who
would participate, 46% say they would vote for Hamas and 31% say they would
vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17%
are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and for Fatah at
40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 44% and in the
West Bank at 47%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at
36% and in the West Bank at 27%.

A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months
from today, 14% want them to take place after a year or more, and 12% do not
want elections.



(4) Domestic Conditions:

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 24% two
months ago to 20% today, and positive evaluation of conditions in the West
Bank remains almost unchanged at 32%.

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from
64% two months ago to 22% in this poll. In the West Bank perception of
safety and security drops from 51% to 47% during the same period.

Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to
other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at
20%.

For the first time ever, Hamas’ official TV station, Al Aqsa, is the one
with the most viewership (37%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
followed by al Jazeera (21%), Palestine TV (16%), Ma’an-Mix (11%), and al
Arabiya (5%).

In the West Bank, 35% of the respondents expected economic conditions in
their area to improve and a similar percentage (33%) expected them to
worsen. But in the Gaza Strip 56% expected economic conditions to improve
and only 20% expected them to worsen.



(5) Peace Process:

Only 47% believe the chances for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations are medium or high; 51% believe the chances are low or
non-existent.

The public is divided over the two-state solution: 49% support it and 50%
oppose it. In our last poll two months ago, 54% supported this solution and
46% opposed it.

A majority of 53% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective
means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Only 22%
believe negotiation is the best means to establish a Palestinian state and
20% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route
to statehood.

62% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli
settlement expansion and 35% think it is still practical. Yet, only 24%
support the alternative one-state solution; 75% reject the one-state
solution. These findings indicate a drop in the support for the one-state
solution which two months ago stood at 31%.

81% are worried that they could be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or
that their homes would be demolished and land confiscated. Only 19% are not
worried.

An overwhelming majority of 81% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration
is to annex the land occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them
their political rights. By contrast, 63% believe that the long term
aspiration of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO is to recover part or
all of the land occupied in 1967.

57% of the public say that they supported the June 2014 kidnapping of the
three Israelis in the West Bank when that incident took place. Support for
the kidnapping reached 67% in the Gaza Strip and only 45% in the West Bank.

Similarly, a majority of 54% supported the killing of the three kidnapped
Israelis and 42% opposed it. Support for the killing reached 69% in the Gaza
Strip and only 42% in the West Bank. 52% of the West Bankers opposed the
killing of the three kidnapped Israelis.

The public is divided over the identity of those who carried out the
kidnapping and the killing of the three Israelis: 32% accuse Israel, 30%
accuse Hamas, 21% believe a Palestinian acted on his own, and 2% accuse
Fatah.

In the absence of viable negotiations, 85% support joining more
international organizations; 84% support joining the International Criminal
Court; 62% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 60% support a
return to an armed intifada;

42% support a dissolution of the PA; and 24% support abandoning the
two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. It is worth mentioning
that two months ago only 41% indicated support for a return to an armed
intifada.

61% believe that massive popular demonstrations could contribute to ending
the Israeli occupation. But a larger majority of 72% favors the transfer of
Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank. Support for emulating Hamas in the
West Bank
stands at 70% among West Bankers and 74% among Gazans.

82% say they participate in boycotting Israeli goods that have local
alternatives and 18% say they do not participate in the boycott. An
overwhelming majority believes that the boycott movement is effective and
11% believe it to be ineffective.

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)
Off Irsal street, P.O.Box 76, Ramallah , Palestine , Tel: +970-2-2964933
Fax:+970-2-2964934
email: pcpsr@pcpsr.org

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