At the bottom line, it may be concluded that all of the moves made by IDF
during the 50 days of Operation Protective Edge had been anticipated by
Hamas and Islamic Jihad well in advance. IDF did not take the enemy by
surprise even one significant time, and only operated according to a
firepower intensity scale that varied in response to the moves made by the
enemy.

The IDF's Force Build-Up Pursuant to Operation Protective Edge
As the battles subside, the process of drawing the lessons from the fighting
that took place in the Gaza Strip has begun. The victory notwithstanding,
the IDF must re-examine some concepts, notably the duration of the campaign
and the issue of the ground maneuver and how to enhance it

Amir Rapaport 18/9/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3123

The war waged by Israel in the Gaza Strip in July-August 2014, known as
Operation Protective Edge, challenged the force build-up concept of the IDF,
consolidated pursuant to the Second Lebanon War of 2006, which took a sharp
turn under Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz as the IDF Chief of Staff and Lt. Gen.
(res.) Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon as Minister of Defense. In view of the initial
lessons drawn from this recent campaign, another sharp turn is expected, and
the pendulum is expected to swing, once again, toward the reinforcement of
the ground maneuvering capabilities. The absolute priority hitherto assigned
to military intelligence, in terms of manpower quality and resources, should
be re-examined, at least with regard to its intensity.

Some tough questions will also be asked regarding the duration of the
fighting: a campaign lasting 50 days is incompatible with the national
defense concept and exacts excessively heavy tolls on the Israeli economy.
Could the results of this campaign, where Hamas eventually accepted the
dictates of Israel and Egypt, be reached in a shorter time?

In order to understand the point where the IDF is poised in terms of the
force build-up concept pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, we should go
back eight years, to the days following the Second Lebanon War. During that
war, the IDF lost dozens of warfighters to antitank missiles and IEODs – the
primary causes of fatalities in that war. The most severe threat to the IDF
vehicles was the advanced Russian antitank missile Kornet, which is
currently available to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

After the war, the IDF decided, subject to the authorization of the
political-defense cabinet, to enhance its ground maneuvering capabilities,
with the emphasis placed on protected vehicles adapted to urban warfare
operations. According to the decisions made just before the end of the
previous decade, IDF should have acquired an increased amount of Merkava
Mark-IV tanks fitted with the Trophy active missile defense system.
Additionally, IDF should have stepped up the acquisition of Merkava APCs –
the new Namer model – also fitted with Trophy systems. Additionally, Trophy
systems were to be fitted to many other vehicles that could become the
target of antitank weapon attacks, like the older Merkava Mark-III tanks,
bulldozers and other vehicles taking part in the war effort.

The above notwithstanding, on the second day of the ground maneuver phase of
Operation Protective Edge, the public realized that most of the
recommendations remained on paper: an M-113 APC of the Golani infantry
brigade, more than 40 years old and fitted with a protective system that
could not even stop small arms fire, advanced into the town of Saja’iya and
broke down while traveling towards its objective.

How did it happen that contrary to the decisions made pursuant to the Second
Lebanon War, most of the vehicles were still unprotected?

IDF, like any other military in the world, is always required to decide
between the age-old alternatives of the battlefield: stand-off fire or
maneuvering. In July 2006, during the week in which the Second Lebanon War
broke out, a scheduled meeting of the IDF General Staff should have endorsed
the multi-year plan designated Kela. The plan, which was to come into effect
in 2007, should have reduced about one third of the number of tanks in the
IDF and assign the absolute priority to the IDF Intelligence Directorate and
IAF.

When that war broke out, maneuvering turned out to be in a highly
problematic state. Before the war, the troopers had not trained and
competence levels were very low. This poor competence led to an absurd
situation, where the tank crews did not even know how to operate their tanks’
smoke launchers – a basic element of every tank – as money had been saved in
training, and there were no sufficient budgets for ground training
activities. During the manufacture of the new Merkava Mark-IV tanks, it was
decided that as the tank crews did not know how to operate smoke launchers,
no smoker launchers would be installed at all, and the tanks went to battle
without them.

The years 2007 through 2012 were budget-abundant years for IDF. Bridges were
built and various measures were developed to enable effective urban warfare
operations, from highly sophisticated electronic explosive devices to a
massive investment in precision fire, or in the military jargon – PGM
(Precision Guided Munitions).

One example of the projects developed during that period is the project
known as “accurate map reference”. IDF and the defense industries made a
substantial investment that led to an accomplishment no one could even have
imagined a few years previously. It involves the ability of a field element
to point to a target on a map and immediately close the sensor-to-shooter
cycle between ground and aerial forces. All the user has to do is simply
point to a target on a handheld computer screen and the aircraft will launch
munitions that would hit that target. This may sound trivial, but as maps
are not accurate to within one meter and there are numerous discrepancies
between different maps, many engineers and much technology were required in
order to complete this project, known as “Poter Shamayim”, successfully.

In those years, substantial investments were made in C4I, too. Project
Tzayad (Digital Ground Army), which interconnects the ground forces, and C4I
projects throughout the military, were launched. A giant leap was
accomplished last year, when Project "Network IDF," led by the Lotem Unit of
the IDF C4I Directorate, succeeded in interconnecting, within a single
network, intelligence gathering and target striking elements from totally
different service branches, including the IAF, Corps of Intelligence, IDF
Navy and the ground forces.

But, at the bottom line, IDF has shifted, in the last few years, toward the
implementation of the Kela multi-year plan of Gantz and Ya’alon, which had
been neglected in 2006, as far as the OrBat of the IDF armored corps, in
tanks and APCs, is concerned. Substantial investments were made in “light
formations” using fast, agile vehicles that move through the territory on
wheels rather than tracks. In 2013, severe cuts were made in the defense
budgets – especially with regard to the ground forces.

Land: The primary weakness of IDF in the war in the Gaza Strip involved the
ground combat operations. IDF Southern Command wanted to initiate a ground
move against the subterranean attack tunnels from the first day of the
operation (this move was only sanctioned on the tenth day of the operation),
but apparently, no one had anticipated that the military challenge would be
as difficult as it turned out to be, and that casualties would be so severe.

The responsibility for the competence deficiencies of the IDF Ground Arm is
shared by the Ministry of Finance, which had waged an all-out war against
the defense budget, and the IDF high command and IMOD, which preferred to
divert the lion’s share of the resources allocated to them to the Corps of
Intelligence and the IAF, even at the cost of severely damaging the ground
forces. This damage was reflected in the reduced acquisition of protective
systems such as the Namer APCs and the Trophy active protection system, as
well as in the reduced scope of training activities. The Prime Minister, who
had served as Finance Minister the last time when the defense budget was so
severely cut, in the years prior to the Second Lebanon War, should have been
aware of the implications such cuts would have when the crucial day has
come.

At the bottom line of the ground warfare aspect, even if casualties by
“friendly fire” are regarded as a force majeure that occurs in every war
(this time – four servicemen killed by friendly fire according to
investigations which are yet to be concluded), it will still be impossible
to ignore the fact that a major percentage of the casualties were sustained
in incidents that could have been prevented or avoided.

In this campaign, IDF sustained more than 40% of its casualties from mortar
fire. The IDF have already approached all of the defense industries so that
they submit prompt and effective solutions against this threat – through
detection, interception and protection. On the other hand, mortar fire
proved its effectiveness on the offensive side, so projects associated with
this activity will be accelerated, including (probably) the use of a
precision mortar shell.

An intelligent guess: according to the travel of the pendulum, which repeats
itself ad infinitum, the IDF will once again place the emphasis on improving
its ground maneuvering capabilities in the coming years. The budget cuts
applied to the Ground Arm will be alleviated.

The Chief of Staff has already ordered, just before the conclusion of the
operation, the cancellation of a 50% cut in the planned Merkava APC OrBat,
and the General Staff, under his command, will review in the coming months
the acquisition of wheeled APCs fitted with active protection systems, and
the accelerated acquisition of a new self-propelled artillery gun system
(instead of the veteran M-109 guns).

Special attention should be paid to the fact that IDF operates, in fact,
without a proper Engineering Corps. The Combat Engineering Corps of the IDF
Ground Arm has very few engineers in it. Its capabilities focus almost
exclusively on the tactical missions of the combined-arms battlefield.

The fact that IDF was compelled to develop new combat doctrines and
technologies for coping with the threat of the subterranean attack tunnels
during Operation Protective Edge is associated with the fact that the
engineering standards of the Combat Engineering Corps are very low.

Air: The Israeli Air Force lived up to the expectations during Operation
Protective Edge. The seminal event, as far as IAF was concerned, during the
operation was the fact that for the first time in the history of wars,
fighter aircraft provided close air support to the ground forces.

In the past, safety margins of hundreds of meters were maintained between
the areas in which IAF fighter aircraft operated and IDF ground forces.
Owing to technological improvements, those safety margins could be reduced
for the first time, so that the fighter aircraft participated in the ground
operations as if they were delivering artillery fire. This was reflected
especially during the battle waged by the Givati infantry brigade in Rafah,
in which they were searching for the missing Givati officer, Lt. Hadar
Goldin, and during the attempts to extricate the casualties from the Golani
APC in Saja’iya.

At the same time, the IAF’s target generation and handling capabilities
improved dramatically during Operation Protective Edge. IAF handled about
5,000 different targets, about one half of which had been generated during
the actual fighting and not specified in advance.

The lessons of the IAF indicate that a prolonged pounding from the air, as
executed during Operation Protective Edge, will achieve results eventually,
but the duration of the pounding process is very long, and in view of the
continuous firing at the Israeli rear area, Israel would not be able to
afford to rely on aerial activity exclusively over such a long period of
time.

The fighting in the Gaza Strip also raises the question of whether the
decision to demobilize the Cobra attack helicopter squadrons in early 2014
was premature and hasty, and whether during the last campaign the IDF could
use more close support by attack helicopters.

Intelligence: Operation Protective Edge demonstrated, repeatedly, the
limitations faced by intelligence services – even the best intelligence
services. It is impossible to know of each and every enemy attack in
advance. The military challenge presented by Hamas was more serious than the
IDF had anticipated, and the subterranean warfare turned out to be a
strategic problem rather than just a serious tactical threat.

As a mirror image of the Second Lebanon War, the intelligence elements
provided excellent tactical information to the combat elements on the
ground, but missed the "big picture" according to which Hamas embarked on an
all-out war “until the siege of Gaza is lifted”, rather than on one more
round of fire. On the one hand, the IDF General Staff had received a
strategic warning of a confrontation with Hamas in July, but on the other
hand, if the full implications of this confrontation had been understood,
IDF would have prepared for the war more effectively.

On the bright side, the unprecedented cooperation between the IDF
Intelligence Directorate and Corps of Intelligence and the operational
forces (notably IAF, IDF Southern Command, the IDF Navy and even ISA) is
particularly noteworthy. This cooperation was made possible owing to the C4I
network developed by the IDF in the context of Project Network IDF.

In general, it may be concluded that the IDF Intelligence Directorate
excelled at intelligence gathering, for the most part (including the
conveyance of tactical intelligence to the tactical echelons on the ground
in accordance with the Intelligence-Based Warfare concept), but that it
erred in its analyses and estimates.

The time required in order to subdue Hamas had not been anticipated and the
significance and severity of the offensive subterranean tunnel threat had
not been fully understood.

As far as the subterranean tunnels are concerned, sooner or later we will
realize that better results could have been achieved if all of the parties
involved, IMOD, IDF Southern Command and the IDF Intelligence Directorate,
had cooperated more closely and if more "out-of-the-box" ideas had been
examined. The failure in this context inflicted a severe blow on the sense
of confidence of the inhabitants of the settlements around the Gaza Strip,
and it is doubtful whether this sense of confidence may ever be restored. A
different way of preparing for the tunnel threat could have prevented the
need for the ground maneuver. Alternately, the ground maneuver could have
been less complex to execute.

Generally, the Gaza Strip is much more the ISA’s playground than the IDF
Intelligence Directorate’s, and the intelligence gathering efforts in the
Gaza Strip, by all of the agencies and organs of the intelligence community,
will have to be intensified.

The IDF Navy: The IDF Navy participated in the fighting by launching Tamuz
(Rafael Spike NLOS) missiles and delivering gunfire from the sea at targets
on the shore, and through several raids by the Naval Commandos on rocket
launching installations. Only one raid of several became public knowledge,
as four commandos were injured. The Navy can deliver much more on the
offensive side. On the defensive side, the Navy successfully fulfilled its
tasks of defending the “Tethys Ocean” offshore gas drilling rigs located
opposite the shores of the Gaza Strip and enforcing the naval blockade. The
Navy will continue to play a major role in preventing the smuggling of arms
from Iran into the Gaza Strip – an on-going campaign taking place between
the rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip.

C4I: A major part of the accomplishments of the IDF in this campaign may be
attributed to the wide bandwidth communication option using the same C4I
infrastructure that the various service branches benefited from. The Lotem
Unit – the technological organ of the IDF C4I Directorate, is responsible
for creating and providing this capability. It is expected that pursuant to
the war, the implementation of the Chief of Staff’s plan for an IDF-wide C4I
network, known as Network IDF, will be accelerated.

The Home Front: The home front truly excelled during Operation Protective
Edge. In addition to the civilian population’s exemplary conduct, the forces
of the IDF Home Front Command and all the other emergency services
demonstrated excellent performance. It was proven that the decision to
assign the full responsibility for the Home Front Command to the IDF and
disband the civilian Home Front Defense Ministry was a correct decision.

Unmanned Vehicles: The employment of unmanned vehicles by IDF was much more
significant than the media gimmick by Hamas. For the first time in IDF
history, the number of flight hours logged by unmanned aerial vehicles
during the operation was much higher than the number of hours logged by
manned aircraft.

Depth Corps: Over the last few weeks, dozens of people occupied the offices
of the IDF Depth Corps HQ in the General Staff building at the Quirya
compound in Tel-Aviv. They were busy planning daring operations in the Gaza
Strip – some of which were truly beyond imagination. Among those planners
were the two “oldest” generals of the IDF General Staff, Maj. Gen. Shay
Avital and Maj. Gen. Gershon HaCohen, the only generals who had donned IDF
uniforms prior to the Yom-Kippur War of 1973. Both will complete their
military careers and become civilians in the next few days.

The operations planned by HaCohen and Avital, had they been authorized,
would have, possibly, enabled the IDF to reach some of the Hamas leaders who
were not eliminated from the air during the long campaign in the Gaza Strip.
The prevailing estimate of the Israeli defense establishment is that most
Hamas leaders were hiding, until the ceasefire that came into effect on
Tuesday, August 26 at 19:00 hours, in the bunker under the Al-Shifa hospital
in Gaza.

The daring raiding plans were submitted to the Chief of Staff’s office on
the 14th floor of the General Staff building, but were rejected one after
the other. For the most part, they were rejected owing to the excessive
level of risk and the relatively limited operational benefit that did not
justify the risk. This does not mean that no covert operations by specialist
units were executed during the fighting – operations that have not been told
to this day and would never be told – but the effects of these operations on
the over-all campaign was marginal. At the bottom line, it may be concluded
that all of the moves made by IDF during the 50 days of Operation Protective
Edge had been anticipated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad well in advance. IDF
did not take the enemy by surprise even one significant time, and only
operated according to a firepower intensity scale that varied in response to
the moves made by the enemy.

Psychological Warfare: Both sides tend to attach too much importance to
psychological warfare. The SMS message campaign launched by Hamas during the
fighting was, to a considerable extent, pathetic.

On the other hand, Hamas made all of the mistakes Israel had made during the
Second Lebanon War: setting sky-high goals (the lifting of the siege and the
release of the prisoners that had been released in the context of the Gilad
Shalit deal and were apprehended again during Operation Brother's Keeper)
and devising a plan that assigns too much weight to influencing the opponent’s
“consciousness” by attacking his home front. During the Second Lebanon War,
the world did not allow IDF to attack the Lebanese civilian infrastructure,
while during Operation Protective Edge, the Iron Dome batteries intercepted
the majority of the enemy rockets. The result – the Hamas representatives to
the negotiations in Cairo will have to settle for symbolic relief at the
Gaza Strip border crossings or reject the cease fire agreement. The bottom
line, as far as Hamas is concerned, will be a crushing defeat, despite their
claim of a divine victory, naturally.

At the bottom line, the fighting in the Gaza Strip evolved into Israel’s
longest campaign since the War of Independence. It was conducted contrary to
the lessons of the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Maj. Gen. Sammy Turjeman said
the following to this writer three and a half years ago: “We will do
everything to keep the campaign as short as possible, and execute a fast and
lethal ground maneuver.” At that time, Turjeman was the commander of the IDF
Ground Arm. During Operation Protective Edge, he served as the general
commanding IDF Southern Command, and the most significant maneuver he
executed was to a distance of just 800 meters from the border fence – in
order to destroy offensive subterranean tunnels. Even this maneuver was
awkward and time-consuming, as the IDF were short of operational plans for
destroying the tunnels. Most of the demolition drills that had not been
prepared in advance had to be invented, in cooperation with the people of
the defense industries and the Ministry of Defense, during the actual
fighting.

Without a doubt, the result was inevitable – the campaign was far too long.

The debriefing phase is currently under way all over the Middle East, not
just in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Have the messages Israel attempted to convey to Hamas and Hezbollah as well
as to other players in the region been received and understood? Only time
will tell.