THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY
Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 109
The New Strategic Equation in the Eastern Mediterranean
Efraim Inbar
http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/English-booklet.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For centuries, the Mediterranean Sea was the main arena for international
interactions, before it was replaced by the Atlantic Ocean and subsequently
by the Pacific. Nevertheless, as the historical meeting place between East
and West, the East Mediterranean was the focus of significant superpower
competition during the Cold War and still has strategic significance.
Indeed, the East Mediterranean is an arena from which it is possible to
project force into the Middle East. It is the location of important EastWest
routes such as the Silk Road and the Suez Canal (on the way to the Gulf and
India). In addition, the region is the focal point for many important
international issues, with radical Islam, international terrorism and
nuclear proliferation embedded in its regional politics.

CONCLUSION

The longstanding security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, which
was based on American preponderance, has collapsed. American political
influence has been considerably weakened. Europe, an impotent international
actor, cannot fill the political vacuum created. Russia under Putin eagerly
entered this vacuum, beefing up its naval presence, while Western influence
in the Eastern Mediterranean is also being challenged by the growing radical
Islamic influence in the region. Turkey, no longer a trusted Western ally,
has its own Mediterranean agenda and the military capability to project
force to attain its goals. So far, the growing Russian assertiveness has not
changed the course of Turkish foreign policy. The disruptive potential of
failed states, the access of Iran to Mediterranean waters, and the
competition between countries for energy resources are also destabilizing
the region. But it is not clear that Western powers, particularly the US,
are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern part of the Mediterranean
Sea to Russia/and or radical Islam, or are preparing in any way to forestall
such a scenario. Foolishly, they seem to believe that the so-called “Arab
Spring” still heralds an improved political environment and that Turkey
represents “moderate Islam.” American naiveté and European gullibility could
become extremely costly in strategic terms.

In the absence of an American commitment to maintain a strong presence in
the East Mediterranean, the US should encourage the strengthening
relationship between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. Moreover, it should
sensitize its Mediterranean allies, such as France and Italy, to the growing
threats in this region and press them to cooperate with Israel and Greece.
Washington should also convey to Moscow and Ankara its positions and
interests to minimize destabilizing acts. Unfortunately, the success of
American diplomacy under the weak Obama administration is not guaranteed.

Threats to the freedom of shipping routes and the need to cooperate against
terrorist threats could constitute an awakening call for Western powers.
This could lead to greater willingness to commit military assets to
neutralize emerging challenges. The economic crisis of the Eurozone,
however, has so far led to cuts in defense outlays.

Egypt in the post Muslim Brotherhood rule is an important regional actor
that shares many of the Israeli and Greek concerns. It can be incorporated
in the building of a new security architecture that is based on regional
powers. Every effort should be made by Western powers to prevent Egypt from
moving closer to Russia.

For the time being, Cyprus, Greece and Israel, are largely left on their
own. Thus, Greece should declare its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
reach an agreement with Cyprus on their mutual EEZs. By doing so,
Greek-Cypriot-Israeli energy cooperation could be propelled forward.
Obviously, Greece should not neglect its naval capabilities.

The Israeli perspective on the East Mediterranean region is colored by its
vital need to maintain the freedom of maritime routes for its foreign trade,
and to provide security for its newly found gas fields. While its strategic
position has generally improved in the Middle East, Jerusalem sees
deterioration in the environment in the East Mediterranean. Growing Russian
presence and Turkish assertiveness is inimical to Israel’s interest.
Developments along the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean also decrease
stability and enhance the likelihood of Islamist challenges. This is
particularly true at Israel’s borders. Egypt struggles against radical
Islamists in Sinai that threaten Israel’s southern border. As result of the
civil war in Syria, Israel’s northern border is no longer quiet. So far
Hizballah maintains the dominant position in Lebanon, while Hamas is
entrenching its grip over Gaza. Both continue to be beneficiaries of Iranian
military support, posing a considerable terrorist and missile threat to
Israel.

This predicament clearly dictates greater investment in Israel’s navy to
fend off potential challenges. The need to be able to project force to great
distances has remained constant (also because of the Iranian nuclear
challenge). Moreover, cooperation with Greece, Cyprus and Egypt has to be
strengthened in order to minimize challenges to stability in the
Mediterranean waters. As greater terrorist and missile threats develop along
Israel’s borders, it becomes necessary to enhance the magnitude and quality
of the defensive forces on the borders. Moreover, Israel needs larger
expenditures for a build-up of the various layers of its anti-missile
defenses primarily to protect its strategic assets, such as airfields,
ports, power plants and deployment areas of the IDF.

In civilizational terms, the East Mediterranean served as a bone of
contention in the past between Persia and the ancient Greeks and between the
Ottomans and Venetians. It is the focal point for the struggle between East
and West. After the Cold War, the borders of the West shifted eastward. Now,
they could move in the other direction.