At this point, Israel, Judaism, and Jews are still not in the actual circle
of enemies of IS and similar organizations, other than the radical groups
operating in the Sinai Peninsula. But there is considerable concern that the
day will come when they are viewed as targets for attack.

The Islamic State: Another Angle of the Threat
INSS Insight No. 631, November 19, 2014
Reuven Paz
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8120

SUMMARY: The struggle against the Islamic State (IS) organization led by the
United States and its allies appears thus far to be something of a Sisyphean
war: ineffective, limited to scratches on the surface of the jihadi pyramid,
beyond the roots of the phenomenon, unable to end the civil wars in Syria
and Iraq, and relegated to serve as another layer in the existing chaos in
Syria and Iraq, and soon perhaps in part of Lebanon as well. The destruction
plaguing the Middle East is accompanied by a frightening thought in the
Western world of IS alumni returning to their native countries to undertake
terror attacks, and the Western world has become increasingly anxious. It
finds relief in airstrikes and partial humanitarian aid for the millions of
refugees created by civil wars in the Middle East.
.
The struggle against the Islamic State (IS) organization led by the United
States and its allies appears thus far to be something of a Sisyphean war:
ineffective, limited to scratches on the surface of the jihadi pyramid,
beyond the roots of the phenomenon, unable to end the civil wars in Syria
and Iraq, and relegated to serve as another layer in the existing chaos in
Syria and Iraq, and soon perhaps in part of Lebanon as well.

The Syrian chaos in particular evokes conflicting interests among the
various forces on the one hand, and a strange commonality of interests on
the other, although this has still not led to practical alliances or actual
cooperation among the various warring factions. At the center are President
Bashar al-Assad and his regime; for its part, the Western coalition is
unable to determine its position toward them. Assad has an interest in
leaving IS and other organizations of its ilk intact so that the West will
view them as the greater Satan. To the moderate liberal forces in Syria,
which have largely disappeared from the public arena, it is not clear who is
more evil, Assad or IS. Turkey is entering this labyrinth and giving mixed
messages. Iran, Hizbollah, and the Kurds are also players, and their
position in the various equations is not clear. Iran, after years of being
the nuclear terror of the West, has become an ally of sorts of the United
States. At times it seems that the United States and the Obama
administration still fear the volatility of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
more than anything taking place in Mesopotamia.

The destruction and devastation plaguing the Middle East is accompanied by a
frightening thought in the Western world of IS alumni returning to their
native countries to undertake terror attacks, and perhaps even behead
innocent civilians. There is much panic, and coupled with the fear of the
Ebola epidemic, the Western world has become increasingly anxious. It finds
relief in airstrikes and partial humanitarian aid for the millions of
refugees created by civil wars in the Middle East.

However, the more the fight against IS takes the form of airstrikes and
Western leaders do not even venture to hint that they might send ground
troops into Iraq and Syria, the more attention is diverted from another
aspect of the IS problem. Alongside IS are many other such elements – the
“classic” al-Qaeda; Jabhat al-Nusra, which is supposedly more moderate than
IS; the Taliban, which is poised to take over Afghanistan again once the
United States leaves; other violent jihadi groups throughout the world; and
several hundred Islamist clerics, who by virtue of the freedom of the
internet, are galvanizing their flock and moving them in apocalyptic
directions. The West should be worried by the question of what causes so
many young and not-so-young people from the West, Muslims and non-Muslims
who have converted to Islam, second- and third-generation immigrants, to be
so influenced by IS/jihadi propaganda that they join the struggle in
relatively large numbers.

This phenomenon is not new. It began during the struggle against the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan, and a similar situation developed during the war in
Iraq in the 2000s. Those were years of phenomenal growth for the jihadi
internet, which brought the Islamist struggle to every young person with a
keyboard. Even beheadings were shown on the internet since 2002.
Nevertheless, there were few such incidents and the number of volunteers was
limited. Furthermore, in Iraq in the 2000s, most of the volunteers for
jihadi organizations were Saudi extremists, but particularly over the past
year, volunteering for IS and similar organizations seems to have become
much more international, diverse, extensive, and on the rise. More and more,
volunteering for the jihadi ranks in Mesopotamia has become similar to
volunteering for the International Brigades organized in the 1930s for the
Spanish Republicans’ struggle against fascism. Why are analysts and
commentators in the West not as publicly disturbed by the growing number of
volunteers for IS and similar organizations who are citizens of Western
countries and by their motives, given the potential flood of terror liable
to take place when these volunteers return home?

Likewise noteworthy is the ease of volunteering and the short time that
elapses between a decision to volunteer and implementation of the decision.
Already in the past, a short transition from a decision to carry out a
suicide attack/self-sacrifice to the actual execution, sometimes only a few
days, was a known phenomenon. This was seen among population groups that
underwent prolonged mental training, not necessarily organized, for the
struggle against the enemy. There were many such examples among Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza; Afghanis; Sunnis in Iraq; and Shiites in southern
Lebanon in the 1980s. These populations and societies had undergone training
that included Islamic propaganda and justifications for the struggle against
the occupier. The efforts to persuade young people from these societies to
sacrifice their lives ran deep in society, were socially acceptable, and
were infectious as well. Furthermore, among groups such as the Palestinians,
in which many of those who perpetrated attacks were students with an
academic education, sacrifice/suicide attacks were also carried out because
the perpetrators saw themselves as being part of the social elite, whose
role was to lead the masses in the struggle against the Israeli occupation.

Such a vision, which smacks of romanticism and perhaps even altruism,
appears to be typical, at least in part, of those who volunteer for IS and
other such organizations at this time. It is difficult to explain why
several thousand Muslims who live in the West want to go to Syria and join
IS, while a large number of them have already realized this desire. Most are
well integrated among the middle class, have a higher education, are not
unemployed, and did not stand out for their ties to Islamist elements before
they decided to volunteer. Their process of radicalization took place very
quickly, within a few months, and led them to a quick decision to go to
Syria.

These volunteers serve as very fertile ground for the influence of the
propaganda of IS and other such organizations. This propaganda says that the
organization’s struggle in Iraq and Syria is a heroic struggle to save the
entire Muslim world, which is suffering/oppressed/deprived (mustaz`afin in
the Islamic term) due to tyranny that is ultimately, according to their
belief, a clear result of a Western, “crusader” plot.

At this point, Israel, Judaism, and Jews are still not in the actual circle
of enemies of IS and similar organizations, other than the radical groups
operating in the Sinai Peninsula. But there is considerable concern that the
day will come when they are viewed as targets for attack. A substantial
number of the attacks in Europe in the past two years were against Jewish
institutions. The unswerving faith in the righteousness of the Islamic
struggle and the great speed with which IS is advancing – not only in Syria
and Iraq, but primarily in the arena of threats to the entire West, in
addition to threats against Arab countries – are stoking the imagination of
younger and older Muslims in the West and very rapidly loosening the fetters
of their decisions. The September 11 attacks gave rise to feelings that the
end of days was near and to a belief in the approaching victory of Islam.
Similarly, many who write on jihadi web sites today express apocalyptic
feelings, either between the lines or in them.

Western countries must take this significant aspect of the phenomenon into
account with the same seriousness with which they calculate their military
moves in the Middle East. To crush the head of the serpent with a bomb or a
missile is in no way sufficient for a successful war against the phenomenon.
Today it is seen in IS and other similar organizations, but no one knows how
this will develop in the coming decade.

Israel is also involved in protecting the Jews of Europe, who are a
vulnerable population and a preferred target for organized and independent
terrorists. Therefore, it must pay attention to the speed and scope of IS
recruitment, and in coordination with security officials in European
countries, it must think how to reduce the emerging threat and how to
respond to it if it materializes.