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Sunday, December 14, 2014
Lone Terrorist – A Role Model

Lone Terrorist – A Role Model
Against the background of the increase in attacks by individual terrorists,
Meir Gershuni, a former senior Shin Bet official, believes that a
comprehensive strategic treatment of terrorists and their environment should
be incorporated in training for intelligence gathering
Meir Gershuni 13/11/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=534&ArticleID=3213

Lone Terrorist – A Role Model We have recently witnessed a notable increase
in the number of attacks carried out by individual terrorists. This is not a
new phenomenon; however, this backlog of deadly stabbing attacks in Tel Aviv
and West Bank and four (other) attacks in Jerusalem, some deadly, within two
months, carries significance in terms of the potential stimulation of others
and pushing them to emulate the "success" – as perceived in the Palestinian
street.

Dealing with a lone terrorist is a complex task to begin with, certainly
when dealing with a rampage executed through vehicles, which have, at first
sight, the justification to be driving on the road. This is a difficult
challenge for the intelligence and forces in charge of securing the
infrastructures and the residents. However, the answer is there, and it
requires adjustments and integrated preparation of intelligence, offensive
security and physical protection. The lone terrorist phenomenon has
accompanied the world throughout history, while the assailants use different
action agendas, and with specific emphasis on public figures (including in
Israel, in which we have witnessed the problem in full force with the murder
of Prime Minister Rabin, RIP) that receive wide attention and often provoke
consequential strategic moves.

Recent years have seen an expansion in the volume of such attacks (lone
terrorist), as well as the spread of the phenomenon to new arenas, with an
emphasis on the European continent, in which lone Muslim terrorists were not
significant in the past. Failure to prevent any attack or thwarting it in
the advanced stages of implementation, inevitably leads to a thorough
investigation of all relevant security arrays, with the intention of drawing
lessons in the intelligence and operational levels and formulating an
appropriate response. When facing attacks as those in recent months – the
"run over attacks", using tractors and cars, and the assassination attempt
of Yehuda Glick – the difficulty in preventing and thwarting such
spontaneous attacks is reinforced due to the lack of early intelligence, due
to the nature of the lone attacks which are missing various elements of
"organized" terrorism, often leading to information that helps in the
prevention of the attack.

It should be noted that these facts, which constitute an operational
advantage for the enemy in general and the lone terrorist in particular,
have not escaped the eyes of terror leaders who are trying to realize the
potential. An example was given by a senior of Al Qaeda, Abu Musab al Suri,
when in 2004 he published a 1600-page treatise designated "Strategy of a
Thousand Cuts", which encouraged and guided lone terrorists. The approach
has been adopted and revived the blessing of the organization's leaders,
Zouheir and others. The individual Islamic terrorists are driven by
religious incitement goading them to carry out terrorist acts, which would
be considered a success and a source of pride for them, and strengthen the
concept for the leadership. The has created a kind of a circuit cycles
through the presentation of these terrorist acts, together with acts of the
past, as an inspiration and a role model.

The Role Model notion is reflected in both the organizational strategic
level and the individual tactical level. The influence in the organizational
strategic level can be seen in the declaration of the "Ansar al Maqdis"
organization (or at least part of it) last week of joining ISIS, which was
reflected in the beheading of a group of its opponents throughout the Sinai.
The "imitation" is also reflected at the individual tactical level, as
occasional terrorists are working on their own without the operational
organizational infrastructure – although definitely in light of the massive
and focused propaganda, and with reference to the recent terror attacks in
Jerusalem directed by Hamas. In recent years Europe also knew a number of
large-scale attacks by individuals, most notable of which is two attacks
carried out by Anders Breivik in July 2011, during which he detonated a car
bomb in the government complex in Oslo and then went on a killing spree at a
summer camp for the children of the ruling party – attacks resulted in the
murder of 77 people.

An attempt to detonate a car bomb weighing four tons was carried out also at
the forefront of the Polish Parliament; the lone terrorist in this case is a
Polish professor of chemistry. Fortunately, this attack was thwarted by the
domestic security services while awaiting execution. In the past two years,
there is a solid trend of executing individual attacks in Europe by Muslims
terrorists; Western European nationals are "graduating" training courses of
religious extremism; and participating in Islamic extremist organizations
fighting against NATO forces, Syria and recently – fighting as part of ISIS.

Not surprisingly, in a significant portion of the cases, the targets were
Jewish targets. So was in the attack carried out by the French Muslim
Mohammed Merah who, during the week beginning 11 March 2011, executed three
shootings attacks during which he murdered two French paratroopers, and on
March 19 he carried out the attack at the Jewish school in Toulouse, during
which Rabbi Jonathan Sandler, his two sons and another student were killed.
Another major attack was carried out by Belgian Muslim Mehdi Nemmouche, at
the Jewish Museum in Brussels on 24 May 2014, during which four Israelis and
Jews were killed. It should be noted that Nemmouche himself grew in the
shadow of his role model, Lionel Dumont, a Frenchman of Algerian descent who
joined the mujahideen in Bosnia in the '90s and operated against NATO
forces.

The two terrorists, Merah and Nemmouche, underwent a process of
radicalization – the one of Merah's took place in Egypt and later Iraq,
while Nemmouche experienced the process of radicalization in Syria. The
thwarting of "lone terrorist operations" is not a simple challenge, and it
seems that thwarting lone terrorist attacks as those that were conducted
recently in Jerusalem is even more difficult, especially when compared to
the known attacks that occurred overseas.

The immediate observation that can be made between individual terrorists who
execute large-scale attacks – such as Breivik and to some extent the cases
of Merah and Nemmouche – and Palestinian terrorists who carried out the
recent attacks in Jerusalem, is focuses on the process and the duration of
the logistical organizing (although carried out independently). The former
planned the attacks for a long time, acquired weapons and equipment,
gathered information about the targets and thus may have created the
opportunity to expose their intention early on, before the attacks. However
it appears that the Palestinian terrorists were almost spontaneous and due
to a specific trigger took the weapons available nearby – in most cases a
car – and went on to run over Jews – seemingly an occasional target. Without
examining the details of the investigation of the events, which are unknown
to the writer of these lines, we can assume that the selected targets were
crowds, in order to maximize the damage. Another note worth mentioning is
the fact that the terrorist who attempted to assassinate Yehuda Glick
conducted one last verification regarding the identity of the target before
the shooting and asked, "Are you Yehuda Glick?". It is implied that was a
final information gathering effort in order to confirm the target.

Without regard to the nature and method of intelligence gathering by the
entities in charge, who are working to extract every bit of information
about elements who have the potential of carrying out an individual attack,
a backup of the activity at this level by creating field intelligence
through the defense forces, will allow to improve the pretreatment which
will lead to a more effective prevention and deterrence. It seems that the
tactical decision to shield some of the light rail stations in Jerusalem is
the required immediate response against run-over attacks, concerning the
physical security of the crowds, but it is clearly not enough. The presence
of defense forces on the ground and their in-depth familiarity with the
environment is an opportunity to achieve a force multiplier against the
opponent.

It seems that the training of the various defense forces for locating
suspicions indications in the immediate vicinity of the scene of operations,
will allow additional time interval, even if it is a limited period of time,
to respond in a timely manner and to nip the attack in the bud.
Incorporating these security activities within the comprehensive strategic
treatment of terrorists and their environment, may allow a more effective
response against these attack scenarios and contribute to strengthening the
essential deterrence versus the opponent.

The writer is Senior Vice President, Homeland Security, at Maydex AG.

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