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Sunday, December 14, 2014
The Problem that is Also a Solution: Lebanese Fears Play into Hizbollah Hands

The Problem that is Also a Solution: Lebanese Fears Play into Hizbollah
Hands
INSS Insight No. 642, December 14, 2014
Omer Einav
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8363

SUMMARY: In recent months there have been clear signs of Hizbollah’s
legitimacy rebounding in Lebanon’s political and civilian spheres. The
current governmental vacuum suits Hizbollah well, and while Lebanon’s army
has never been capable of standing up to the challenging array of threats
facing the country, Hizbollah is standing steadfast against the current
external threat. Ironically, Hizbollah played a role in creating this
threat, yet has since become the most effective means of dealing with it. In
their despair, more than a few Lebanese are looking to Hizbollah to rescue
the country from the dangers threatening to aggravate the already prevailing
instability. Nonetheless, at present it is not certain that Hizbollah is
capable of drawing widespread support from the Lebanese public and political
systems, and a great deal must occur before the organization can claim the
victory it seeks.

In recent months there have been clear signs, along with much discussion in
the public discourse, of Hizbollah’s legitimacy rebound in Lebanon’s
political and civilian spheres. Given Lebanon’s delicate sectoral and
community balance, any fluctuation in the public mood is likely to steer the
entire country in general and Hizbollah in particular in a new direction,
with potential changes in policy on a host of issues, including vis-à-vis
Israel.

Rumors that began to circulate in late 2011 regarding Hizbollah’s
involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime were
denied by the organization. However, already then Hizbollah soldiers were
likely involved in advising and assisting the regime’s forces, and were
possibly already engaged in actual fighting as well. In 2013, Hizbollah’s
actions in Syria came under public scrutiny with the admission by Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah that Hizbollah operatives were participating in the
fighting. At the time, many in Lebanon regarded Hizbollah as a warmonger
bringing disaster on the country, and the organization was subject to
intense criticism by its opponents in Lebanon. On the international front,
following the July 2012 terrorist attack on Israeli citizens in Burgas,
Bulgaria, the European Union classified the military wing of Hizbollah as a
terrorist organization, and the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon
investigating the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri
focused on Hizbollah as the principal suspect. It appeared that the prestige
enjoyed by Hizbollah in the preceding decade, mainly due to its campaign
against Israel in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, had dissipated, with the
organization’s legitimacy undermined both inside and outside Lebanon. The
principal charge was that Hizbollah’s actions would cause the Syrian civil
war to spread to Lebanon.

Over time, Hizbollah began to see successes on the Syrian battlefield. In
May-June 2013, about a month after Nasrallah first publicly admitted that
the organization was operating in Syria, Hizbollah, together with Assad’s
forces, scored a victory against the rebels in al-Qusayr in the Homs
district, a strategically important location. This victory strengthened the
Iranian-Syrian axis fighting to preserve the regime, whose forces had been
hit hard by the rebels in the months preceding the battle. Hizbollah also
took part in the fighting in the Qalamoun Mountains, in Damascus, and on
other fronts, achieving much while garnering prestige and military
experience. These and other operational successes helped Shiites on Syrian
soil stand tall, which in effect give Hizbollah a symbolic achievement.

Nonetheless, Hizbollah’s leadership was hard pressed to persuade the
Lebanese public that the organizational and military benefits of fighting in
Syria were necessary for the country’s security – until unexpected help came
in the form of Salafi Sunni Islam. Under direct influence from Syria, where
the civilian rebellion began to assume a Salafi-jihadi tone and diverge from
the more moderate tendencies, many supporters of Sunni terrorist
organizations operating in Syria began to appear in Lebanon. This phenomenon
was especially pronounced in the refugee camps in northern and southern
Lebanon and in Tripoli, where strife was rampant. Against this background,
Lebanon experienced a series of severe security-related developments,
including car bomb attacks, which aroused much anxiety in Beirut. The
atmosphere intensified with the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in the summer of 2014, whose extreme jihadist ideology won many
admirers among the Sunni population in Lebanon, combined with growing
sympathy for the Jabhat al-Nusra organization – the Syrian branch of
al-Qaeda.

The kidnapping of Lebanese security personnel in the border town of Arsal in
August 2014 – an incident that has not yet been concluded – and the
conflicts in Tripoli in October clearly highlight the challenge facing
Lebanon. The border with Syria has become a porous area marked by anarchy.
Salafi Islam has asserted its power, and is threatening to subvert the
political order at a time that the Lebanese political system is essentially
paralyzed by its lack of a president and the lack of a parliament in
session. This governmental vacuum suits Hizbollah well. Moreover, Lebanon’s
army is trying to portray itself as the country’s defender and a unifying
force, although it has never been capable of standing up to the challenging
array of threats facing the country, and certainly not on this scale.

On the other hand, Hizbollah is standing steadfast against the external
threat. Ironically, Hizbollah played a role in creating this threat, yet has
since become the most effective means of dealing with it. For example,
Hizbollah is a mediator in the negotiations with the Islamic State and
Jabhat al-Nusra for release of hostages, and has helped restore quiet to
Tripoli, at least temporarily. In their despair, more than a few Lebanese
are looking to Hizbollah to rescue the country from the dangers threatening
to aggravate the already prevailing instability.

Fortified by this new backdrop, Hizbollah is openly demonstrating growing
confidence, claiming that its contentions that it had a duty to intervene as
Lebanon’s defender against external threats have been validated. Hizbollah
continues to justify its fighting in Syria, while at the same time not
neglecting its original purpose – defender of Lebanon and leader of the
resistance (muqawama). In a speech in Beirut on Ashura Day on in early
November 2014, Nasrallah stressed the importance of the fighting in Syria
and defense against “takfiris” (a derogatory term for apostate used by
Muslims, in this case against Salafi Islam organizations, especially the
Islamic State).

At the same time, against the background of last summer’s escalation between
Israel and Hamas and the increased tension in Jerusalem, Nasrallah unveiled
his traditional perspective on the expected conflict with Israel. The clear
message is that Hizbollah, together with the Lebanese defense forces, is
part of Lebanon’s national defense. Senior Hizbollah official Nabil Qaouk
said, “Thanks to the all-inclusive formula of the people, the army, and the
resistance, Lebanon has become the most invulnerable country in the region
to the two threats: the takfiri threat and the Israeli threat.” This
rhetoric has been accompanied by a change in operational policy. In October
2014, Hizbollah staged an operation against IDF forces in Shab’a farms (Har
Dov) – rare activity since the 2006 war. This measure does not indicate
deliberate escalation, but it is a clear statement of intention on the
organization’s part with respect to its capabilities. Perhaps the recent
airstrikes – attributed to Israel – against the weapons stockpiles in
Damascus will figure in Hizbollah’s strategic considerations that encourage
escalation along the border with Israel.

Hizbollah’s experience echoes the processes occurring elsewhere in the
Middle East. In both Syria and Iraq, the Alawite and Shiite regimes,
respectively, were marked early in the confrontations as troublemakers that
should be neutralized in order to restore quiet. Yet once a worse threat
emerged, these regimes were no longer punching bags for either the local
populations or the West, but became possible partners in blunting the
threat, even if not publicly.

The situation in Lebanon, however, is distinguished in several ways from the
events in the neighboring countries. At present it is not certain that
Hizbollah is capable of drawing widespread support from the Lebanese public
and political systems, and a great deal must occur before the organization
can claim the victory it seeks. As of now, it can take comfort in the fact
that given the immediate dangers facing Lebanon, many among the population
regard Hizbollah as the most stable and reliable element. At the same time,
it is difficult to assess whether Hizbollah is capable of moving another
step forward toward the national consensus. One indication of this design
could be its role in the effort to end the presidential crisis in Lebanon.
In the near future, Hizbollah is scheduled to negotiate with its rival
party, al-Mustaqbal, led by Saad al-Hariri, for the purpose of resolving the
crisis and selecting a president acceptable to all factions. If Hizbollah’s
candidate, former General Michel Aoun, is chosen, it will be a foothold for
Hizbollah in the very heart of the Lebanese national consensus and will
signify its return to the status of the unofficial defender of Lebanon. In
turn, Hizbollah’s freedom of action, including on the border with Israel and
in the Golan Heights, would be greater. Israel will then have to reexamine
its assessment of the organization’s intentions and readiness for a military
confrontation in the near future, and weigh how this escalation might best
be prevented.

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