The American-Iranian nexus is the most dangerous challenge for Israel’s
national security in the near future.
The Middle East Turmoil and Israel’s Security
by Prof. Efraim Inbar
April 13, 2015
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 294

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: An American-Iranian entente that leaves Teheran with the
capability to produce nuclear weapons and which strengthens the Iranian
drive for regional hegemony is the most serious challenge to Israel’s
national security in the near future. For Israel, none of the other Mideast
upheavals and uncertainties pose nearly as great a threat.

The Middle East is in great turmoil. The statist order that has underpinned
the region for a century has collapsed. Several states have lost their
monopoly over the use of force and are no longer able to provide law and
order. This is especially true of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. Even
Egypt, the only historic Arab state, has had difficulties effectively
enforcing its sovereignty over its territory. Many of the militias
challenging these state entities have a radical Islamist ideology,
reflecting the rise in the appeal of political Islam in the Arab world. In
contrast to the leaders of these states, who are inefficient and corrupt,
the Islamists actually deliver services to the people and have a reputation
for being brutal but honest. However, the likes of Al Qaida in Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) or the so called Islamic State (IS) are hardly the proper
agents for modernizing their environments and their popularity dooms the
Arab world to continuous ignorance and poverty. For this and other reasons,
Israel will need to remain vigilant in the years ahead.

Outside Looking In

The decline of the Arab world has been paralleled by the rise of non-Arab
Muslim powers – Turkey and Iran. Both countries fare better on development
indices and display nowadays an ambitious foreign policy fueled by imperial
and Islamist impulses. Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ‘zero problems’
approach to foreign policy, Turkey has gradually distanced itself from the
West. In 2003, for example, Ankara rejected the United States’ request to
open a “northern front” against Iraqi forces. More recently, Turkey has
opposed sanctions levied by the United Nations and the West against Russia
and Iran.

For its part, Iran has successfully advanced its nuclear program despite the
displeasure of the international community. Comparatively, recent
developments in the Middle East and beyond have also allowed Tehran to
establish a ‘Shiite Crescent’ stretching from Tehran to the eastern
Mediterranean. This has provided Iran with countless opportunities to
project power into the Middle East and Balkans, much to the chagrin of Saudi
Arabia and others. Indeed, the successes of Iranian Shiite proxies in
Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa underscore the Tehran quest for hegemony
in the Middle East.

By contrast, US influence around the Middle East appears to be in decline,
primarily as a result of the Obama administration’s foreign policy outlook.
Correcting Washington’s overextension in the Islamic world is indeed
necessary, but insensitivity to the concerns of its allies such as Egypt,
Israel and Saudi Arabia is destructive to the regional balance of power.

In this respect, Washington’s efforts to strike a deal with Iran that
basically legitimizes its nuclear breakout status and awards Tehran the role
of the regional policeman will be viewed by Cairo, Riyadh and Jerusalem as a
colossal strategic mistake. The inevitable result will be further nuclear
proliferation as none of these countries are likely to want to stay behind
in uranium enrichment capabilities. Moreover, the regional instability could
lead to more bloodshed. Relying on a radical and revisionist regime in
Tehran to provide stability is the height of strategic folly.

The View from Jerusalem

The implications of the Middle East’s ongoing turmoil for Israel’s security
are mixed. Like Iran and Turkey, a democratic and politically stable Israel
is also a rising non-Arab power and a player in the regional balance of
power. The power differential between Israel’s national might and its
neighbors has further increased, given that it has managed to prosper
economically and develop a high-tech powerful military. In addition, the
strong armies of Iraq and Syria have disappeared, decreasing the chances for
a large-scale conventional encounter with Israel. Moreover, the pro-Western
Sunni states such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia see Israel as an ally
against a rising Iran, as well as against radical Islamist movements. This
also comes at a time when the United States is viewed in many quarters as a
less dependable ally.

By contrast, low intensity challenges might intensify. The domestic problems
plaguing weakened Arab states make them increasingly susceptible to radical
Islam and more prone to terrorist violence. As their leaders lose their grip
over state territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and
terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Moreover, as weakened states lose
control over their security apparatus, national arsenals of conventional
(and non-conventional) arms become increasingly vulnerable, which may result
in the emergence of increasingly well-armed, politically dissatisfied groups
that seek to harm Israel. For example, following the fall of Gaddafi, Libyan
SA-7 anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs have reached Hamas in Gaza. The IS
even fights with American weapons captured from the Iraqi army.

Similarly, in the event of the Assad regime collapsing, Syria’s advanced
arsenal of conventional weapons could easily end up in the hands of
Hizballah or other radical elements. This, in turn, raises the prospect of
an emboldened Hizballah and Hamas – both of whom are Iranian proxies located
along Israel’s borders – renewing their campaigns of violence. In recent
years, the fallout from the Arab Spring has helped to detract attention away
from the Palestinian issue. In addition, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA)
ability to harm Israel in order to reignite international interest is also
very limited. As a result, a weak PA has come under increasing pressure from
the popular Hamas. A Palestinian strategic miscalculation, leading to the
eruption of another round of violence, is a possibility that Israel cannot
ignore. Nevertheless, so far Israel has been successful in containing the
threats from sub-state groups and in limiting their potential damage.

The emergence of an uncertain and unstable strategic environment is
conducive to strategic surprises. Israeli intelligence is challenged by a
plethora of new actors and leaders whose modus operandi is far from clear.
Israel has a large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus. Yet it is not
immune to surprises. Therefore, it would be wise to prepare for worst-case
scenarios, rather than succumb to rosy assessments.

Looking West (in more ways than one)

The turmoil in the Arab world is also changing the strategic landscape in
the Eastern Mediterranean basin, where elements of radical Islam are gaining
control. Tunisia, Libya, Sinai in Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey all
play host to groups with Islamist tendencies, thereby threatening the
currently unrestricted access to this area by Israel and the West.
Approximately 90 percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out via the
Mediterranean, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for Israel’s
economic well-being. Moreover, its chances of becoming energy independent
and a significant exporter of gas is linked to Israel’s ability to secure
free passage for its maritime trade and to defend its newly discovered
hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and Tamar. These developments require greater
Israeli efforts in the naval arena. Indeed, Israel is engaged in building a
robust security system for the gas fields and has procurement plans for
additional vessels.

As with other parts of the Middle East, the assessment in Jerusalem is that
the key factor in the developing regional balance of power is Iran’s
nuclearization. This would be a “game changer” that only Israel has the
capability to prevent. Netanyahu’s recent electoral victory left in power
the only leader that might have the political courage to order a military
strike to obstruct the Iranian progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons.
Indeed, his victory was quietly welcomed in the capitals of the moderate
Arab states that are terrified of Iran and have little time for Obama. Saudi
Arabia and Egypt are good examples.

Accordingly, Israel is watching with growing bewilderment the endeavor of
the Obama administration to implement a “grand bargain” with Iran. This puts
Jerusalem on an inevitable collision course with its most important ally.
Israel continues to benefit from a large reservoir of sympathy among the
populace of the United States, and most notably within the Republican
controlled Congress. Yet, while Obama is not popular, as president he can
extract heavy costs in the military, diplomatic and strategic arenas. The
remaining 22 months until he leaves office must be weathered with minimum
damage to the American-Israeli strategic partnership, particularly if Israel
chooses to make good on its threat not to allow Iran to become a nuclear
power. With this in mind, the American-Iranian nexus is the most dangerous
challenge for Israel’s national security in the near future.

This article was originally published in The International Relations and
Security Network, ETH Zurich on April 13, 2015.

Efraim Inbar, a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University,
serves as the director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic
Studies and a Shillman/Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family.
Copyright © 2015 Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.