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Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Weekly Commentary: Signaling a shift from quiet for quiet

Weekly Commentary: Signaling a shift from quiet for quiet
Dr. Aaron Lerner Date: 15 April 2015

A dramatic addition to the Government Guidelines would be some wording
indicating that Israel no longer accepts an open ended “quiet for quiet”
policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip.

Consider this:

“The Government of Israel cannot accept the development of a military
capacity in the Gaza Strip that constitutes a serious threat in the event of
conflict.”

It’s a vague enough wording that leaves open what military capabilities
would cause us to act, but at least sets the stage for a shift away from the
dangerous “quiet for quiet” principle.

A reminder: Under “quiet for quiet” the Palestinians can literally do
anything and everything in preparation to attack Israel within the Gaza
Strip:

They can:

+ Manufacture any rocket or other weapons – including chemical weapons.
+ Deploy any rocket or weapon they manage to smuggle into the Gaza Strip.
+ Test fire these weapons inside the Gaza Strip and towards the open sea.
+ Prepare attack tunnels up to the very edge of the Gaza Strip.
+ Prepare strategic reinforced positions for an assault on Israel.
+ Fly unarmed and armed drones within the Gaza Strip.
+ Deploy observation balloons equipped with cameras and night vision to
provide real time monitoring of areas within a very broad swath of Israeli
territory adjacent to the Gaza Strip.
+ Arm and train an unlimited number of soldiers.

Advocates of “quiet for quiet” remain confident that under any and all
conditions we are outpacing the Gazans in our expanding defensive/offensive
capabilities so that, on net, quiet for quiet isn’t a problem, since when
the inevitable day comes that we find ourselves engaged in a full blown
operation we will do a progressively better and less costly job fighting
them until quiet for quiet is restored.

But this view is based more on hope than solid analysis.

I appreciate that this sounds implausible and a bit bizarre, but to the best
of my knowledge, with all the very bright people on salary in the IDF and
elsewhere, there aren’t a handful of very bright people in a “Red Team”
brainstorming what they would do if they were Hamas and had what we knew
Hamas possessed.

As a result, as we learned in the last round, it turned out that the defense
and security people who were supposed to think this through were stunningly
clueless as to what the Gazans might possibly do with all the capabilities
that they developed during “quiet for quiet”.

And the last round was in isolation. There’s no telling what other regional
actors may also be in play the next time.

“Quiet for quiet” is certainly a comfortable policy.

Kicking the can down the road takes considerably less effort and has
magnitudes less immediate consequences than crushing the can.

But the cumulative effect of “quiet for quiet” could very well be
catastrophic.

No. I don’t expect a change overnight.

Just a nudge in the right direction.

“The Government of Israel cannot accept the development of a military
capacity in the Gaza Strip that constitutes a serious threat in the event of
conflict.”
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

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