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Wednesday, October 7, 2015
[Disturbing signal] Russian Involvement in Syria: What has Changed, and the Significance for Israel

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:
Please take note of this disturbing element of the recent Netanyahu-Putin
meeting as reported by Barbara Opall-Rome of Defense News on September 21,
2015:
Putin, according to the Israeli readout of opening remarks, condemned
shelling and mortar attacks on Israel from Syrian soil, which he said were
carried out by “home networks.” That term, when translated from Russia,
distinguishes homemade weaponry from industrial grade weaponry.

The reason that this is disturbing is that Mr. Putin know that Hizbollah has
fired many "industrial grade" rockets - including the 14 July 2006 missile
(likely a Chinese-designed C-802 fired by Hezbollah that reportedly set the
flight deck of the INS Hanit on fire and crippled the propulsion systems
inside the hull. Four crew members were killed during the attack. So if Mr.
Putin is willing to make a barefaced lie about the past - what's to stop him
from doing the same in the future?]

Russian Involvement in Syria: What has Changed, and the Significance for
Israel
INSS Insight No. 752, October 7, 2015
Udi Dekel, Zvi Magen .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=10699

SUMMARY: Russia’s involvement in the Syrian crisis constitutes a new
strategic paradigm in the Middle East and the international arena. This will
have significant implications for the balance of power and the rivalries in
Syria's civil war, and for the struggle between the superpowers for global
influence. Israel is also affected by these implications, given the change
in the balance of power and given the risk of internal Syrian pressures
spilling over into southern Syria and the Golan Heights. Prime Minister
Netanyahu's recent hurried visit to Moscow precluded the possibility of an
in-depth situation assessment that examines the broad ramifications of
Russian involvement in Syria. This assessment is supposed to test whether
there has been a change in the rules of the game in the deep crisis that
seemingly has no way out. The Prime Minister must now strive for Russian
recognition of Israel's interests, among them the need to prevent the
establishment of Salafi jihadi terrorist elements in the Golan Heights
border region.


Russia’s involvement in the Syrian crisis constitutes a new strategic
paradigm in the Middle East and the international arena. This will have
significant implications for the balance of power and the rivalries in
Syria's civil war, and for the struggle between the superpowers for global
influence. Israel is also affected by these implications, given the change
in the balance of power and in light of the risk of internal Syrian
pressures spilling over into southern Syria and the Golan Heights.

The Russian military intervention in Syria was prepared carefully,
apparently in coordination with Iran, but accompanied by an element of
surprise. President Vladimir Putin still views the Assad regime as a vital
component in the solution to the problem of radical Islam and in the end to
the civil war in Syria, and claims that the world does not understand the
importance of President Assad’s role in the fight against jihadist terror.
However, at this stage, only token Russian forces are involved, intended to
defend Assad's stronghold in the Syrian coastal and Latakia regions, where
the Alawite sect is concentrated, aid Assad's forces by attacking rebel
strongholds from the air, and arm and train Syrian military forces loyal to
Assad. Even though this activity is accompanied by Russian messages about
the intention to fight the Islamic State, the first sorties by Russian air
force jets intended to strike at other organizations opposed to Assad. In
addition, the composition of Russian forces in Syria thus far does not suit
the fighting – primarily ground fighting – necessary for combat against the
Islamic State forces. Against this backdrop, Russia announced the
establishment of a coalition against the Islamic State, parallel to the
existing United States coalition with a similar objective.

This development creates a significant challenge for the United States and
President Obama’s Middle East policy, as well as for other nations in the
region, including Israel. The Russian intervention in Syria follows Russia's
intense political activity in the region, which has scored diplomatic
achievements with most of the countries in the region. Russia has also
positioned itself as a leader of internal reconciliation efforts in Syria.
Indeed, in recent months, two rounds of talks between the rival parties have
been held under Russian auspices, and preparations have been made for an
additional round of talks in collaboration with the UN.

It appears that beyond saving Assad's regime, the Russian move, executed
under the guise of fighting the Islamic State, is intended to advance
Russia's global aspirations and advance its effort for a senior role in the
international arena. For good reason Putin compared the current
circumstances to the World War II era and the need to reach understandings
between the superpowers, similar to the Yalta Conference on the Crimean
Peninsula that was designed to divide the spheres of influence between them
after the war. Putin views his willingness to intervene directly in the
Syrian quagmire by turning the crisis in that country into a lever of
influence that will provide Russia with a position of strength vis-à-vis the
West and aid it in easing the pressure leveled on it due to its policy in
Ukraine.

The September 28, 2015 meeting between the Russian and American Presidents
at the United Nations was intended to lay a foundation of new understandings
between the superpowers, together with an attempt by Putin to achieve
American and Western recognition for Russia's military involvement in Syria.
The parties discussed cooperation in the fight against Islamic State, while
for his part Putin strove to delineate agreed upon spheres of influence.
Advancement of a reconciliation agreement in Syria, including agreement on
Assad's future, is secondary piece in the chess game between Russia and the
United States. In statements at the UN, President Obama had difficulty
granting Assad the status “part of the solution” and stressed that the civil
war erupted because of the regime's brutal response to nonviolent
demonstrations that sought to advance a democratic process in the country.
Therefore, Obama cannot agree to Putin's position, which contends that only
a regime such as Assad's, which is not democratic, can preserve Syria as a
political actor and maintain integrative sovereignty there. Thus in any
case, even if Putin is far from getting everything he wants, the situation
that has been created will nevertheless be regarded as an achievement for
him. Russia has strengthened its position as a dominant actor in Syria,
while President Obama and the West have exhibited helplessness vis-à-vis the
situation. However, without including the international system, even Russia
will find itself mired in the Syrian crisis, and thus Moscow is expected to
promote understandings in this context with the West in general and the
United States in particular.

Is there a Sound Russian Strategic Concept on the Syrian Crisis?

a.Future arrangement in Syria. Will Russia support the division of Syria
while leaving the coastal area under Russian control, or will it rather act
to preserve Syria in cooperation with additional actors? Russian-Iranian
cooperation and Iran's role in the area are relevant in this context. While
Iran does not necessarily view Russian interests in the region as matching
its own, there is agreement between Russia and Iran regarding the importance
of maintaining the core of "Little Syria" that includes Damascus; the artery
northward– to Homs, Hama, and Haleb; the area surrounding Lebanon; and the
Syrian coastal sector. Approximately 80 percent of the Syrian population is
concentrated in this area, even though this constitutes only some 30 percent
of the country's territory. Certainly the Russian-Iranian-Syrian coalition
has no intention of relinquishing control of this area. On the other hand,
the Russians do not want to wear themselves out in ground fighting in
eastern Syria – controlled by Islamic State – but prefer to halt the group’s
westward expansion toward Syria's principal urban centers. Another question
is: Will Russia insist on protecting Assad, or surrender him for the sake of
an arrangement with the West and the opposition to his regime? The rapid
move of Russian military intervention in Syria might also intend to torpedo
a deal that was fashioned between the actors involved in Syria, whose
purpose is to remove Assad from office.

b.The battle against the Islamic State. Will Russia deploy its army in
ground fighting against the Islamic State (which is considered the only
effective course of action in this battle)? At this stage, Russia presumably
will choose to refrain from ground activity and prefer to deploy Syrian and
Iranian ground forces, as well as Hizbollah and Shiite militia forces, with
Russian air support, in addition to military guidance and vital combat
materiel for the Syrian army. Russia aims to consolidate a new international
coalition and has already presented Iran, Iraq, and Syria as its partners in
the battle, and subsequently perhaps, from a position of strength, it might
even join a coalition against the Islamic State led by the United States.
However, in any scenario, Russia is not expected to relinquish dominance in
the Syrian arena and in processes designed to shape the country once the
civil war is over, nor is it expected to forfeit its foothold in the Middle
East.

c.Russia's international standing. Russian intervention is in essence
intended to challenge Western interests in the area, with emphasis on those
of the United States. President Putin is attempting to build an image of the
one who volunteered to save the Middle East after the United States brought
about regional chaos. In this way, Russia is open to dialogue with the West
in order to advance Moscow’s global interests.

Implications for Israel

Unlike other regional players and the international system in general,
Israel has not voiced any position in relation to a future arrangement in
Syria. The government of Israel, in adopting a policy of remaining on the
sidelines, assesses that any proactive move on its part, except for
thwarting acts of terror and transfers of advanced weapons to Hizbollah,
will entangle Israel in Syria at a time when it has no effective leverage
there. Up to now, Israel has "enjoyed" a situation of "almost no spillover"
of events from Syria into its territory. The Israeli threat assessment views
Iran and Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon as the principal threat,
which is more serious than the threat inherent in the Islamic State or other
Salafi jihadi parties. The question is, will the Russian intervention change
the situation from Israel's standpoint? Beyond insuring damage control, how
can Israel benefit from this development? Prime Minister Netanyahu,
accompanied by Chief of Staff Eisenkot, visited Moscow, with the objective
of enhancing operational coordination between the nations and preventing
friction and erroneous assessments, as well as obtaining a Russian
commitment to prevent transfer of advanced weaponry, intended for the Syrian
army, to Hizbollah forces in Lebanon and Syria. Russia has a clear interest
in avoiding a clash with Israel, certainly on the military level. Therefore,
it appears that Russia will adhere at least to the military coordination
agreed upon during Netanyahu's visit.

Netanyahu's hurried visit to Moscow, however, precluded the possibility of
an in-depth assessment of the situation, which examines the broad
ramifications of Russian involvement in Syria. This assessment is supposed
to test whether there has been a change in the rules of the game in the deep
crisis that seemingly has no way out. Thus, should Israel consider what new
scenarios it must prepare for? Can the increasing Iranian influence in Syria
and Lebanon be reduced through the Russian involvement, even though Moscow
and Tehran have coordinated between them? Should Israel indicate a preferred
solution for Syria? Is this the time to amplify Israel's influence in
southern Syria and the Golan Heights in order to prevent a spillover of
extremist Salafi jihadi elements into this region? In addition, the nature
of the fighting against the Islamic State that Russia is planning should be
ascertained; is it Moscow’s intention to operate in collaboration or at
least in coordination with the regional-Western coalition led by the United
States? What is Israel's role in these coalitions? Clearly there is no place
for Israel in a Russian-Iranian coalition.

The situation assessment should have provided a recommendation for the Prime
Minister to demand that Russia share with the Israeli government plans and
initiatives for the future arrangement in Syria, in regard to a change in
the internal balance of forces in the country, as well as plans to prevent
Iranian dominance in Syria and close to Israel's border with the aid of
Hizbollah. The Prime Minister must now strive for Russian recognition of
Israel's additional interests, among them the need to prevent the
establishment of Salafi jihadi terrorist elements in the Golan Heights
border region. In spite of Russian promises that it is not Moscow's
intention to challenge Israel militarily, time will tell whether Russia will
maintain the understanding to refrain from stationing weapons systems that
undermine Israeli military superiority on Syrian soil, such as S-300 surface
to air missiles. In any case, Israel must also prepare for the possibility
of Russian military entanglement in Syria, which would bring about a
significant reinforcement of the Russian military presence and aid to Assad,
Iran, and Hizbollah, including means that will threaten Israel – even though
at the present time, it is not Russia's intention to challenge Israel; on
the contrary, Moscow is interested in understandings and cooperation in
managing the Syrian crisis. Moreover, one cannot rule out the emergence of
conflicts of interest between Iran and Russia in regard to Iran's drive to
increase its influence in Syria, and in light of Russia's awareness of
Israeli sensitivity to an Iranian presence in the region, conflicts of
interest between them in regard to Israel as well.

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