Why Israel Should Be Worried About Russia’s Role in Syria
Israel may feel abandoned by Washington, but Moscow is not the antidote. If
anything, Russia’s growing influence in Syria does not bode well for Israel.
Nadav Pollack War on the Rocks - October 8, 2015
http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/why-israel-should-be-worried-about-russias-role-in-syria/

On September 21, Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu met with Russia’s
President Vladimir Putin, a meeting that focused on staying out of each
other’s way in Syria. According to statements by both leaders, it seems the
meeting went well. Netanyahu emphasized Israel’s main concerns in Syria,
namely arms shipments to Hezbollah and Iran opening a new front against
Israel in southern Syria. Putin gave his own analysis of the situation,
stressing that the Assad regime is weak. Both sides agreed on forming a
joint committee to coordinate their military activities in Syria.

Watching from the sidelines, some analysts in Israel posited that this
meeting — and Russia’s increased involvement in Syria — is a net positive
for Israel. Giora Eiland, who was the national security advisor under Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, told me in a conversation that the new alliance
between Russia, Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah can deescalate tensions between
this axis and Israel. For example, Eiland claimed that Hezbollah will need
to take into account the Russian interest of maintaining peace with Israel
and might therefore avoid provoking the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
Curtailing the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s advance toward western Syria
will be another benefit, according to former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz.
While these statements might make Israelis optimistic about Russia stepping
up, they do not tell the full story. Overall, it appears that Russia’s
involvement will be a net negative for Israel.

In recent years, Israel has worked very hard to prevent any advanced weapons
systems from falling into the hands of Hezbollah, which is currently Israel’s
most potent adversary. As early as January 2013, Israel drew a redline: It
would not allow Syria and Iran to exploit the chaos in Syria to boost
deliveries of sophisticated weaponry — advanced anti-ship missiles such as
the Yakhont, or advanced surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-17 and
SA-22 — to Hezbollah. On multiple occasions, the Israeli air force targeted
these shipments and destroyed the weapons systems. This, it was hoped, would
change the risk calculations of the parties involved.

Israel has also repeatedly asked Russia to not sell these weapons to the
Assad regime, warning that the weapons would eventually be transferred to
Hezbollah. Russia did not comply with some of these requests. Russian
weapons were finding their way to Hezbollah via Syria long before the Syrian
civil war started. During the Second Lebanon War, in 2006, Hezbollah
targeted Israeli tanks with an array of advanced anti-tank missiles. Most of
them were Russian-made and had been sold to Syria, yet somehow ended up in
Hezbollah’s arms depots.

Russia’s growing presence in Syria will limit Israel’s ability to cope with
these arms shipments to Hezbollah. Consider this scenario: Israel detects an
arms convoy in Syria it believes is on its way to Hezbollah. Through the
joint committee with Moscow, Israel notifies Russia that it has credible
intelligence that suggests that this convoy is heading to Hezbollah. Russia
asks for Israel to present the intelligence indicating Hezbollah’s
involvement. Israel, in order to not endanger sensitive intelligence
sources, does not show Russia the incriminating evidence, fearing Russia
will share this intelligence with Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. In response,
Russia declares that it sees no such threat and warns Israel that an Israeli
attack on Syrian territory would interfere with Russian operations in the
country. Israel would then find itself in a bind: allow the arms convoy to
reach its destination, or challenge the Russian military. Given the advanced
Russian surface-to-air missiles recently installed in Syria, Israel would
need to think hard before ordering an attack deep inside Syria. This leaves
Israel with the possibility of targeting the convoy the minute it crosses
into Lebanon, but that option is risky too, as it could mean escalation with
Hezbollah.

On the Israeli–Syrian border, where Iran recently increased its presence,
the situation will be complicated as well. In his meeting with Putin,
Netanyahu stated that Iran, assisted by the Syrian army, is trying to open a
“second terrorist front” in the Golan. Putin dismissed Netanyahu’s claim,
saying that the Syrian army is weak and barely able to uphold the Syrian
state, let alone open a new front. Putin added that, as far as he knew,
“these bombardments” — that is, the bombardments of Israel from Syrian
territory — “are carried out by homemade systems,” implying that the Syrian
regime is not involved.

Putin’s response to Netanyahu indicates that an Israeli retaliation against
the Assad regime will probably not be received kindly in the Kremlin. As
Moscow’s objective is to strengthen the Syrian regime, every actor that
works against Assad or its partners might be challenged by Russia. Last
Sunday, on September 27, Israel targeted Syrian army posts on the
Israeli–Syrian border in response to errant mortar fire that landed in
Israeli territory.

Putin criticized Israel’s attack and added that he was worried by Israel’s
periodic attacks. It seems that in this attack, Israel tried to test the
waters with Russia. If Russia condemned such a limited attack on an
inconsequential post, how might it react to a broader Israeli attack deeper
in Syria as the one that occurred on August 20? According to Amos Harel, a
longtime military analyst for Haaretz newspaper, Putin’s condemnation shows
that despite Israeli optimism, Russia will seek to restrict Israel’s freedom
of movement in Syria. If more rockets are fired into Israel from the Syrian
side of the Golan, Israel might be able to target the organization behind
the attack or Syrian military posts on the border, but bombing Syrian posts
closer to Damascus would likely be off-limits.

Russia fighting for Assad will also strengthen Hezbollah, which has more
than 6,000 fighters in the country. The organization’s involvement in Syria
has come at a price: over 1,200 Hezbollah fighters have been killed and many
more injured, according to Israeli security officials I spoke with recently.
Hezbollah is stretched thin. In recent weeks Iran sent hundreds of Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps fighters to alleviate the burden on the
organization. Russia ramping up military involvement in Syria will reduce
the pressure on Hezbollah by enabling the organization to consolidate its
forces in fewer areas. This will give Hezbollah the opportunity to allocate
more resources back to Lebanon and to keep preparing itself for a conflict
with Israel.

Recently, reports had indicated that Iran and Hezbollah will launch a ground
offensive in northwestern Syria, backed by Russian airstrikes. Along with
reports that Russia might send so-called “volunteers” to join the battle, it
seems that the coordination between Russia and Hezbollah will only increase,
including a possible scenario in which Hezbollah and Russia will fight
together on the ground. Hezbollah has already gained significant experience
conducting complex offensive operations in Syria. Fighting with the Russian
military will give Hezbollah an even a greater boost: learning from one of
the strongest and most experienced militaries in the world.

Former IDF officials, diplomats, and academics recently simulated a war
between Israel and Hezbollah. The exercise emphasized Russia’s increasing
interest in Hezbollah, with one scenario even suggesting that Russia would
not let Israel inflict a decisive blow against the organization while it
shares common cause with Russia. This rationale would only be stronger if
Russian troops and Hezbollah fighters work together on the ground.

The situation in Syria is a symptom of Russia’s rising overall influence in
the Middle East. While the United States still has the greatest military
presence in the region and better relations with many of the local powers,
Arab and Israeli leaders are increasingly hedging their bets with Russia
because they perceive the White House as less committed to shaping outcomes
in the Middle East than an increasingly assertive Kremlin. This explains why
Arab leaders were lining up over the summer to visit Moscow and meet Putin.

For Israel, an assertive Russia that looks to revive its relations with Arab
countries mainly through military exports and nuclear energy cooperation
should be troubling. Russia is already going forward with supplying Iran
with the S-300 aerial defense system, which will improve Iran’s capabilities
significantly. According to Eiland, it is unlikely that Russia will supply
the S-300 system to Syria, but if it does, it will put the majority of
Israeli air traffic under the threat of surface-to-air missiles.

Future Russian arms deals are already being discussed with Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, which might influence the balance of power in the Middle East. Even
if the probability of a conflict between Israel and another Arab country is
currently low, one of Israel’s core national security interests is to
maintain its military advantage. This dynamic, along with Arab countries’
own fear of Iran’s growing influence, could set off another regional arms
race. In the long term, Russia might also increase its naval presence in the
eastern Mediterranean, a move that according to Ely Karmon, a senior
research scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in
Herzliya, could disrupt Israel’s naval activity in the area.

The reality is that Russia’s increasing role in Syria does not give Israel
many options; if anything, it actively shuts them down. Israel is not in a
position to challenge Russian maneuvers. The only thing that Israel can do
right now is to maintain its current course: talking to the Russians and
trying to avoid misunderstandings. One of the few options Israel has is to
turn to its historic partner, the United States, and try to figure out
America’s next steps in Syria. It is in Israel’s interest that the Unites
States will not concede its leading role in the Middle East.

On November 9, when President Obama meets Netanyahu in the White House, it
would be wise for the Israeli prime minister to bring up Israel’s concerns
about Russia’s increasing role, mainly to get a better sense of what the
American response to Moscow’s recent push will be. Israel needs to know that
its redlines will be respected by Russia, and the administration can help
with that by stating the same redlines to the Russians. Doubts will surface
in Israel whether this administration can help enforce Israel’s redlines in
Syria, especially in light of apparent frictions between Jerusalem and
Washington, but as both countries try to bury the hatchet, this can be a
good place to start.
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Nadav Pollak is the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Fellow at The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. A former analyst for the
government of Israel, Pollak also served as an NCO in the IDF Intelligence
Corps.