Israel's Need to Take a Stand against the Assad Regime: A Moral Imperative
and Strategic Necessity
INSS Insight No. 823, May 22, 2016
Amos Yadlin .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11829

SUMMARY: e East is being reshaped by an extended process that began over
five years ago, and its end-point is currently impossible to predict. Still,
it can be assumed that the parties involved with the conflicts in the region
in general, and in Syria in particular, seek resolutions through an attempt
to reshape the power relations between them and the state structures in the
area. Against this background, Israel has a fundamental interest in ensuring
that Iran and Hezbollah will not be the forces that are strengthened within
the framework of a new order in the Middle East. Gone are the days in which
Israel could impartially observe the developments in Syria from the
sidelines. If Israel wants to help shape the nature of the surrounding
region in the years to come and improve its standing in the region, it must
not hesitate, as doing so could mean missing this opportunity to undermine
its most bitter enemies. An assertive, moral, proactive, and creative policy
against the radical axis, revolving around the ousting of the pro-Iranian
Assad regime, is the path Israel must follow. This insight was already
applicable three years ago, after the Assad regime made use of chemical
weapons, and its validity increased substantially when such weapons were
used again.

For the past five years, Israel has chosen not to take sides in the events
underway in Syria. Yet while there were – and still are – some good reasons
for this policy, the time has come for Israel to reassess its position on
the civil war that rages across its border. On May 2, 2016, Haaretz military
analyst Amos Harel wrote, “Syria's embattled Assad regime used chemical arms
against ISIS east of Damascus…The regime apparently decided to use the
lethal gas sarin after ISIS fighters attacked two Syrian air force bases
considered vital military assets.” Since this recent incident, however, the
international community has ignored Bashar al-Assad’s blatant violation of
his 2013 commitment to rid his regime of its chemical weapons and cease any
use of them, and as such, his defiance of universal norms and international
conventions. In addition, despite the ceasefire, the Assad regime and its
allies have resumed their indiscriminate killing in Aleppo, Idlib, and the
Damascus region. These developments underlie the conclusion that Israel must
adopt a position opposing Bashar al-Assad and his regime.

First and foremost, Israel must adopt this position based on moral
considerations. The renewed use of chemical weapons reminds us that the
party bearing the most responsibility for the massacre underway in Syria has
yet to be punished. It also highlights Israel’s obligation to acknowledge
that Assad is a murderer whose actions have led to a chilling human tragedy.
Assad is responsible for 90 percent of the deaths during the war, which thus
far total approximately 400,000. He is also accountable for the more than
two million wounded and the 11 million refugees within Syria and neighboring
countries. The outcome is a humanitarian disaster, the likes of which have
not been seen since the genocide in Cambodia four decades ago and the
genocide in Rwanda 22 years ago. In light of these occurrences, Israel
cannot stand idly by.

In addition to this moral backdrop, which in its own right provides
sufficient justification for Assad’s ouster, the fall of the regime is a
strategic Israeli interest. The radical axis led by Iran that runs through
Assad-controlled Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and embraces the strategic
goal of putting an end to Israel, is the most concrete threat the State of
Israel faces today. The axis’s current military capabilities, and the
additional capabilities it can be expected to acquire, constitute the
industrial and scientific potential resources of a regional power. Its
recent strengthening vis-à-vis its rivals in Syria has made it clear that
action must be taken to prevent this problematic strategic development,
preferably in coordination with major countries in the region and the global
superpowers.

Some argue that the threat posed by the Islamic State is no less serious and
must be dealt with first, and indeed, the severity of the Islamic State
threat, which has been debated in Israel over the past two years, must not
be underestimated. However, contending with this issue should not prevent
Israel from assigning a clear strategic preference to the
Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut challenge. After all, under US and Russian
leadership, and regardless of the involvement of Israel, the international
community has mobilized to contend with the Islamic State phenomenon and has
thus far succeeded in halting its advance and reducing the area under its
control. Furthermore, although the Islamic State attracts some Sunnis in
Syria while Assad remains in power, it is extremely likely that an end to
the Assad regime and the evolution of a moderate Sunni alternative will
greatly weaken the Islamic State appeal. Moreover, recent reports confirm
suspicions regarding cooperation between the Assad regime and the Islamic
State and bolster the assumption that these two extremist parties share a
common interest in weakening and eliminating any moderate alternative and
helping safeguard the survival of one another. Israel, on the other hand,
remains virtually alone against the pro-Iranian radical axis and can rely on
no one but itself. For this reason, it must make action against
strengthening the Russian-supported axis a high priority. The bottom line is
that the Islamic Republic of Iran (and its allies) is exponentially more
dangerous to Israel than the Islamic State.

To cease straddling the fence, Israel should formulate a multi-layered
strategy. One fundamental condition is the establishment of a regional, and
if necessary, covert alliance with forces in the Sunni world, most
importantly Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt. The
prominent Sunni states in the Middle East and Israel have overlapping
interests and seek to advance similar aims: the weakening of Iran and
Hezbollah and the ousting of Assad. For this reason, they should be
mobilized to promote essential processes aimed at advancing these goals. All
this should be implemented in partnership with the United States and perhaps
also through quiet understandings with Russia, which, unlike Iran, does not
regard Assad as a necessary component of a future Syrian order.


What follows are the main policy points of an overall strategy to oppose
Assad and his regime and weaken the radical axis.

First, a clear political and legal process should be launched against the
crimes committed by the Assad regime that will help hold it accountable for
its role in the mass murder and its use of chemical weapons. Israel can help
in the disclosure of most of the information regarding the killing
perpetrated by Assad and Hezbollah in Syria and the use of chemical weapons.

Second, a dialogue with the United States must be launched regarding the
formulation of a strategy to remove the Assad regime, Iranian forces,
Hezbollah, and the Islamic State from Syria. Israel should stipulate – and
in doing, it so would be in the same camp as Saudi Arabia and Turkey (both
allies of the United States) – the following order: Assad first, and then
the Islamic State. It is important both to discuss with the Americans the
importance of not remaining silent in the face of the chemical weapons use
and to take action against the central elements of power within the regime,
including the security services headquarters, the chemical weapons units,
and perhaps also elements within the air force and air defenses, all in
accordance with demonstrating a credible international norm and President
Obama’s commitment to punish a regime that used chemical weapons and prevent
any further use of such substances. At the same time, it is necessary to
seek additional ways of strengthening moderate opposition groups, including
by supplying greater quantities of advanced weapons to those that have
proven their ability to fight the Assad regime.

Third, Israel must prove that it too has red lines and moral principles.
Such elements should be considered when deliberating the implementation of
limited military operations aimed at conveying an ethical message and saving
human life, such as strikes against Syrian military helicopters dropping
barrel bombs in densely populated areas. Such military actions can be
carried out using stand-off capabilities and would require neither entering
into a broad air campaign to achieve air superiority nor collisions with
Russian forces in Syria.

Fourth, in parallel, and in a manner that does not run counter to strikes
against elements of the Assad regime implicated in injuring innocent
civilians, Israel can confront the threat posed by the Islamic State in the
southern Golan Heights by the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. Such action would
demonstrate that the struggle against Assad can be pursued along with
fighting the Islamic State. Also important is the continued provision of
intelligence and other assistance to the coalitions fighting the Sunni
jihadist groups, most importantly the Islamic State.

Fifth, Israel, with regional and international backing, should encourage
humanitarian stabilization in southern Syria along the borders with Israel
and Jordan. The efforts to stabilize the situation in this region should
also include adaptation of the capabilities of the UN forces operating in
the region to ensure their suitability for the task. This will involve
closer cooperation with Jordan in southern Syria, for the sake of
strengthening parties that share common interests with Israel and Jordan,
and the concurrent expansion of Israeli humanitarian aid to refugees,
besieged populations, and the wounded (elsewhere in Syria as well). The
United States and Turkey can take part in in such efforts in northern Syria
within the framework of broad-based humanitarian activity.

Sixth, understandings must be hammered out with Russia to advance these
efforts while preserving Russian interests in northern Syria. It is
important to consult with Moscow regarding a replacement for the Assad
regime that will be more oriented toward Russia and less oriented toward
Iran.

Seventh, efforts should be made to encourage and support to the extent
possible Arab measures against Hezbollah and Iran in the regional and
international arenas.

The Middle East is being reshaped by an extended process that began over
five years ago, and its end-point is currently impossible to predict. Still,
it can be assumed that the parties involved with the conflicts in the region
in general, and in Syria in particular, seek resolutions through an attempt
to reshape the power relations between them and the state structures in the
area. Against this background, Israel has a fundamental interest in ensuring
that Iran and Hezbollah will not be the forces that are strengthened within
the framework of a new order in the Middle East. When Assad is ultimately
ousted, it is important that the Arab and Muslim world know that Israel was
on the right side of the struggle and operated correctly from both a moral
and a strategic perspective.

Gone are the days in which Israel could impartially observe the developments
in Syria from the sidelines. If Israel wants to help shape the nature of the
surrounding region in the years to come and improve its standing in the
region, it must not hesitate, as doing so could mean missing this
opportunity to undermine its most bitter enemies. An assertive, moral,
proactive, and creative policy against the radical axis, revolving around
the ousting of the pro-Iranian Assad regime, is the path Israel must follow.
This insight was already applicable three years ago, after the Assad regime
made use of chemical weapons, and its validity increased substantially when
such weapons were used again.