Russia Stations Fighter Jets in Iran for Use in Syria
INSS Insight No.847, August 21, 2016
Ephraim Kam, Zvi Magen
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12235

SUMMARY: On August 16, 2016, the governments of Russia and Iran announced
that Russia deployed fighter jets in western Iran, southwest of Tehran, and
that the planes have already executed sorties against military targets in
Syria. Operationally, flying the Russian planes out of Iran does not in and
of itself have much effect on Israel. Either way, Russia is attacking
jihadist organizations in Syria – a shared Israeli interest – and it does
not much matter to Israel if the planes take off from Russia, Syria, or
Iran. Planes leaving Iran to fight in Syria should also not affect the
operational coordination agreed upon between Russia and Israel. More
important, however, is the overall context of the growing cooperation
between Russia and Iran. Iran is already pushing for a large arms deal with
Russia, which is liable to change important components in Iran’s military
capabilities. Although such arms supplies have been banned by UN Security
Council resolutions for the next few years, Iran might try to exploit its
hosting of the Russian planes to seal the deal. Furthermore, Russia’s
participation in the expansion of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, also under
discussion between the two states, runs counter to Israel’s interests.
.
On August 16, 2016, the governments of Russia and Iran announced that Russia
deployed fighter jets at the Iranian airbase in Hamadan in western Iran,
southwest of Tehran, and that the planes have already executed sorties
against military targets of the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Fateh a-Sham
(formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) in Aleppo, Deir a-Zor, and Adlib, in Syria. The
planes stationed are of two models: heavy long range bombers of the TU-22M3
model, and SU-34 bombers. The announcement did not specify how many bombers
were deployed to Iran, or how long they could be expected to operate from
Iranian soil.

This development is an important turning point. To date, the Iranians have
allowed Russia to use their airspace for attacks in Syria as part of the
military cooperation between the two states, which has grown tighter since
September 2015. But Iran, in the post-Islamic Revolution era, has never
allowed another country, especially not Russia, to station military troops
on its soil, given Iran’s lingering suspicions of Russian intentions. In the
past, Russia posted military units elsewhere in the Middle East: it deployed
battle squadrons and aerial defense units in Egypt in its war of attrition
against Israel, and stationed air defense forces in Syria during the Yom
Kippur and First Lebanon Wars. In the current crisis too, Russia has
operated fighter jets from the Hmeimim air base near Latakia in Syria, but
it is the first time has Russia operated planes from a base in Iran.

The direct cause of this development seems to be operational. To date,
Russia has used its planes to help the Assad regime from its own bases in
southern Russia and the Hmeimim base in Syria. The south Russian bases lies
some 3,000 km from Syria, while flying the planes out of Hamadan cuts the
route to Syrian targets down to only 700 km. The change means that the
TU-22s can bear more ammunitions on each sortie, increasing payloads from
5-8 tons when flying out of Russia, up to 22 tons when flying out of Iran.
The SU-34s cannot reach Syria from Russia without mid-air refueling.

Operationally, the development is an improvement, though not a dramatic
change in Russian capabilities, as Russia could also have operated its heavy
planes – as well as cruise missiles –from its own territory, and in any
case, there is no critical operational need for fighting in Syria. It may be
that the timing of the deployment is connected to the deterioration of Assad’s
position and the rebels’ achievements in the Aleppo region, which required
an immediate response. It may also be that the change stems from the many
losses incurred by the Revolutionary Guards and Iranian ground troops
fighting in Syria, which led to Iranian complaints about insufficient
Russian air force assistance in the Syrian civil war.

But it is more important to view the deployment of the planes from Iran as
another step in the improvement of relations between Iran and Russia over
the last five years, and especially in the last year. The improvement is
evidenced by the many meetings between high ranking personnel on both sides,
their cooperation in Syria to save the Assad regime, and – in the
foreseeable future – a large arms deal, now under discussion, and close
cooperation in the nuclear as well as economic and commercial fields.
Indeed, Mikhail Bogdanov, Putin’s special representative for the Middle East
and Africa, met recently with the Iranian foreign minister for talks about
further regional cooperation (which also touched on the Israel-Palestinian
issue, in which Russia has recently taken a growing interest). It was also
announced that President Putin will visit Iran this November. Furthermore,
Russia is now in the midst of a large naval exercise in the Mediterranean
and the Caspian Seas; it seems that the Iranians are participating in the
Caspian part of the exercise.

A closer relationship between Russia and Iran, even after the deployment of
Russian planes in Hamadan, neither translates into an alliance or treaty nor
obviates opposed interests, different objectives, and disagreements and
mutual suspicions, even when it comes to Syria. But the improvement does
reflect shared interests, mutual needs, and common intentions to expand
realms of cooperation in some key areas. In this sense, the stationing of
the Russian planes on Iranian soil is of strategic importance: both Russia
and Iran are using this to send a message to the United States and the West
that they are the leading and most influential forces in the region, and
that they are playing a central role in shaping the developing new order.
For its part, the first US response to the Russian-Iranian move was
low-keyed: official sources in Washington said that they have known for some
time about Russia’s intention to use an Iranian air base, although they
didn’t know exactly when it would happen, describing the move as
“unfortunate though not surprising.”

As to Turkey’s position in the Russian-Iranian context, given its renewed
closeness with Russia, challenging the United States: Turkey may be
interested in becoming the third arm of a regional triangle alongside Russia
and Iran. Should such a process mature, the results will challenge both the
United States and Israel.

Operationally, flying the Russian planes out of Iran does not in and of
itself have much effect on Israel. Either way, Russia is attacking jihadist
organizations in Syria – a shared Israeli interest – and it does not much
matter to Israel if the planes take off from Russia, Syria, or Iran. Planes
leaving Iran to fight in Syria should also not affect the operational
coordination agreed upon between Russia and Israel. More important, however,
is the overall context of the growing cooperation between Russia and Iran.
Iran is already pushing for a large arms deal with Russia, which is liable
to change important components in Iran’s military capabilities. Although
such arms supplies have been banned by UN Security Council resolutions for
the next few years, Iran might try to exploit its hosting of the Russian
planes to seal the deal. Furthermore, Russia’s participation in the
expansion of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, also under discussion between
the two states, runs counter to Israel’s interests.