Know Thine Enemy: From GWOT to CVE to DIT?
By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman, February 12, 2017
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 411, February 12, 2017
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: To fight an enemy effectively, that enemy must be clearly
defined. George W. Bush spoke of a war on terror, but conducted a crusade
against tyranny. Barack Obama gave lip service to the freedom agenda, but
employed a "realist", non-interventionist policy on most issues, was
reluctant to speak of "enemies" beyond al-Qaida and IS, and never called the
enemy by name. The Trump administration is reportedly planning to scrap the
conceptual framework of Obama’s "CVE" – Countering Violent Extremism – and
focus more explicitly on the Islamist threat, but it remains to be seen just
how he defines that threat.
With President Trump’s administration now busily dismantling much of what
his predecessor left behind, it is more important than ever to proceed from
a clear identification of adversary forces. "Know thine enemy" is an ancient
strategic precept that has been largely been forgotten in recent years. The
fuzzy concepts of the Obama era have now given rise to the contrarian
tendency towards an outspoken determination to defeat radical Islam.
Some, in Israel and elsewhere, find this approach refreshingly
straightforward, but one must be careful not to take this strategy in the
wrong direction. There is an enemy to defeat and destroy, but it is not
Islam as such. It is the modern, totalitarian (per)version of Islam known as
Islamism is a poisonous tree with three current main branches: Iran and its
proxies, IS and other al-Qaida clones, and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is
these forces that should be confronted and ultimately destroyed, as other
totalitarians were in the last century. This needs to be done with the help
of moderate, non-radicalized, and de-radicalized Muslims.
A clear understanding of the forces one is up against is the foundational
element for all intelligence work, as well as for strategic planning and the
proper mobilization of national resources and international alliances.
“Knowing thine enemy” was easier in World War II and in the days of the Cold
War than it is today. With the "New World Order", the political, economic,
and intellectual hegemony of the West has been violently challenged by
unexpectedly ferocious elements.
Who are these enemies and how are they to be defeated? After 9/11, the Bush
administration launched what came to be called a "Global War on Terror"
(GWOT). But terror is, after all – while morally repugnant and legally
banned – a tool of war, not an enemy. The term was parodied as an analogy to
calling WWII "a war on tanks".
The real enemies were identified, at first, as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But
once Afghanistan was liberated, the neoconservative agenda, inspired by
Reagan’s success in bringing down the Soviet empire, transformed the War on
Terror into a War on Tyranny: hence the retroactive justification for the
invasion of Iraq as an act of deliverance and democratization.
Obama did not entirely abandon the so-called Freedom Agenda, echoing it
during his Cairo speech in 2009 and in his reactions to the turmoil in the
Arab world since 2011. But generally speaking, he took a cautious line,
focusing on "root causes" and social and political ills rather than on
enemies (the main exception being Bin Laden and, later, IS). His persistent
refusal to "call a spade a spade" – to look upon Islamist radicals as an
enemy force in the full sense, not just as a sub-species of the social
phenomenon "Violent Extremism" – came to be seen by many as a highly
problematic exercise in conflict avoidance and a willful denial of political
and strategic realities.
This dismay probably played a role in empowering forces on both sides of the
Atlantic that aggressively challenged the predominant, politically correct
culture; hence Trump and his parallels in Europe and elsewhere. But to let
the pendulum swing all the way over, as some fear, into a Huntingtonian
template in which all of Islamic civilization is the enemy is to go too far
in the wrong direction. True, the executive order suspending entry to the US
from seven hostile or chaotic countries is not in itself anti-Islamic, but
the clumsy way it was handled gave rise to this interpretation of the
administration's long-term intentions – not least because of the views
ascribed to Steve Bannon and to President Trump himself.
Still, people in high positions in Washington are attentive to other Muslim
voices. President Sisi of Egypt, with whom President Trump has struck a good
relationship, is a strong advocate of "reforming the [Islamic] religious
discourse" and reversing the Salafi-Jihadi tendencies that have stained it
since the nineteenth century. The Saudi perspective – which has the
attention of Secretary of State Tillerson, a former Exxon CEO, and Secretary
of Defense Mattis, a former C-in-C of Centcom – has shifted in a similar
direction, despite residual influences of the Wahhabi worldview. Even in
Israel, sober voices prefer a nuanced worldview (and a warm relationship
with Muslim nations from Jordan to Central Asia to Africa) over
It is in the interests of all the key players to latch onto a coherent
interpretation of who the enemy is and how to defeat it. That war could be
called by the shorthand DIT, or Defeating Islamist Totalitarianism.
Modern Islamist totalitarianism draws on traditional elements in Islam,
including the notion of jihad, the idea of Islam as a religion of conquest,
and the central role of political power (e.g., the question of the Khilafa,
or who can be "Caliph" or successor to Muhammad's mantle, both religious and
temporal) in shari'a (religious law). But it also draws on twentieth century
models of political action from Lenin to Hitler. The Islamists’ slogan,
"al-Islam hu al-hal", or “Islam is the solution”, speaks to the political,
social, and economic ills of today's societies rather than to theological
This distinction has several implications.
First, modern political movements – unlike ancient religious affiliations –
can be tested and broken on the field of battle. Their legitimacy flows from
their success, not from the validity of their arguments, and will ebb with
Second, drawing a clear line helps mobilize moderate and pragmatic Muslim
forces that are elements of stability within the existing power system.
These include Sufi mystics violently targeted by Islamist Salafis, as well
as those, like Sisi, who speak the idiom of Islamic modernist
"enlightenment" (Tanwir) and rationalism (emphasized, for example, in the
preamble to the current Egyptian constitution). All these forces have a
vested interest in the defeat of IS, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Third, it suggests a workable agenda rather than a millennial war. IS and
its like can and should be "eradicated" (to use President Trump's term from
his inauguration). Attention should then turn to the Iranian regime and its
proxies, notably Hezbollah, and subsequently to the Brotherhood and its
offshoots, like Hamas.
Fourth and most important, clarifying this distinction can lay the
foundations – as Prime Minister Netanyahu attempted to do in his message to
the Iranian people – for a strategy of harnessing the growing alienation of
many across the region from the horrors inflicted upon them by Islamist
totalitarians. These include the citizens of Iran who are tired of living
under a repressive regime.
"Know Thine Enemy" is also the name of a book written some two decades ago
by a former CIA operative, "Edward Shirley" [Reuel Gerecht]. Upon leaving
the Agency, Gerecht found a way to break the rules and pay a short visit to
Iran, where he heard public sentiment firsthand. His most profound insight,
even more relevant today than it was then, was that many Iranians are sick
and tired of the mullahs' regime and all it has inflicted on them since
Khomeini's triumphant return from Paris.
This can well be a strategic cornerstone of policy for the next few years.
Nothing will make the region safer, in a more profound and lasting way, than
lending a helping hand to the forces of change within Iran.
Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is a senior research associate at the BESA
Center, and former deputy for foreign policy and international affairs at
the National Security Council. He is also a member of the faculty at Shalem
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
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