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Saturday, June 24, 2017
The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973 The USSR's Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973
The USSR's Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez (Oxford University Press)

A history of how the Russians, ever since the Six Day War, were involved in
planning, instigating and supporting further Arab military action against
Israel.

Challenges long-accepted notions about Soviet intervention in the
Egyptian-Israeli conflict.

Includes unique source material such as memoirs from Soviet soldiers.

Description
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the
accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s,
highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the
USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history.

This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the
Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces
and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the
Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in
this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of
Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope,
timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the
conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrain
Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967.
Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new
genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans
themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit
this pivotal moment in world history.

Tbale of Contents
PART ONE: "WE WILL NOT LEAVE EGYPT IN THE LURCH"
1. Rescuing and Rearming the USSR's Allies in June 1967
2. Holding the Line on the Suez Canal
3. The Soviet Presence Is Formalized and Expanded
PART TWO: OPERATION KAVKAZ
4. Framing the Cross-Canal Goal and the Attrition Strategy
5. The Nuclear Non-issue
6. "Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes"
7. Facing the Barlev Line
8. A New Phase from March '69?
9. What Triggered Kavkaz? Refuting Heikal's Version
10. Dr. Chazov's "Vacation in Egypt"
11. The Soviet Regulars Move in
12. Operation Kavkaz is Formally Organized
13. The Soviet-Israeli Battle is Joined
14. "A Famous Indiscretion" as the Air War Peaks
15. A MIA Mystery and Soviet Intelligence Methods
16. SAM Successes and a MiG Debacle
17. Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain
PART THREE: A DECEPTIVE END
18. Sadat Proves his Stability and Loyalty
19. Return of the Foxbats
20. Trial Balloons from Both Sides
21. Flexing Muscles while Offering a Pullback
22. Jockeying and Posturing
23. The Deal at the Summit and the "Expulsion" Myth
24. Withdrawn Regulars Conceal "Banished" Advisers
25. Deception-on- Nile, July 1972
26. The Soviets "Return" in October
PART FOUR: "WE PREPARED THE WAR"
27. "We Can't Control the Arabs but Must Support Them"
28. "We Will Be Two Ismails"
29. The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan
30. In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War
31. The Soviet Nuclear Threat and Kissinger's Defcon-3
Epilogue: So What Went Wrong, and When?

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