Russia and Iran: Friends and Foes
By Emil Avdaliani
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 718, January 17, 2018
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/russia-iran-friends-foes/

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Russia and Iran have been geopolitical rivals for
centuries – but over the past couple of years, the Moscow-Tehran axis has
grown exponentially. This creates major headaches for the US and other
western powers that are concerned about how far this cooperation could go.
The two powers share common interests in the South Caucasus and the Middle
East, but are wary of one another’s growing influence in their own
backyards.

Iran was a regional power for centuries. Powerful Iranian dynasties, such as
the Achaemenids and the Sasanians in the ancient period and the Safavids and
the Kajars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, aspired to take a
major role in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and elsewhere. In the
decades following the Cold War, however, when western countries imposed
sanctions on Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran was constrained from projecting
its economic and political influence abroad.

However, with sanctions officially lifted in early 2016 and the Trump
administration’s refusal (despite its rhetoric) to scrap the Iran nuclear
deal for the time being, Tehran now sees avenues for projecting its economic
and political clout from the Mediterranean to the South Caucasus and
elsewhere.

The hitch for Iran is that its geopolitical ambitions overlap those of
Russia. Moscow has its own imperatives in the South Caucasus, where it
struggles to keep the EU and the US at bay; and in Syria, where the
Europeans and the Americans likewise have interests of their own.

The logic behind the current cooperation between Russia and Iran ranges from
economic and military to purely geopolitical. For instance, both want to
initiate or increase their oil and gas exports to the European market. Iran
is particularly well positioned to take a share of the European gas market
as the EU is worried about Russian predominance in that area. Iranian gas
could be a very good tool with which to assuage European fears, but to
export its gas, Tehran will need the Black Sea ports, such as Batumi and
Poti in Georgia, and has also expressed its willingness to use the
Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline.

As a result, Iran has made progress in establishing itself on the Black Sea
coast. In late 2016 it was agreed that Tehran would construct oil
reproduction facilities near Georgia’s Black Sea city of Supsa on
approximately 1.2 square kilometers.

There nevertheless remain significant constraints facing Iran in the South
Caucasus as Russia and Turkey are well represented, both militarily and
economically, in the region. Moscow, for example, has successfully
obstructed all Iranian attempts to establish independent pipelines and
railways to Armenia and Georgia.

Another area of involvement for Iran in the Russian sphere of influence
could be the simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the early 1990s, the
Iranian government made several unsuccessful attempts to mediate the
conflict. Since both Armenia and Azerbaijan border on Iran, it is natural to
expect Tehran to try to play a bigger role here. However, Russia, which is
still the dominant power in the conflict resolution process, will oppose any
Iranian initiatives that threaten to diminish Moscow’s role.

Despite rivalry, Iran and Russia can also cooperate

Although from a geopolitical standpoint Russo-Iranian relations are not
devoid of difficulties, there are grounds for cooperation. The map of
Eurasia provides a glimpse into the rationale behind the Russian political
elite’s desire for closer cooperation with Tehran.

Russian political thinkers of the 1990s largely believed that Iran and
Turkey should have been the pillars of future Russian influence in the
Middle East. The so-called Eurasianists – those who believe Russia is in
neither Europe nor Asia – felt that Moscow needed Tehran and Ankara if it
were to compete successfully with western powers. Russian President Vladimir
Putin put those notions aside officially, but not in practice. It is in
Russia’s perennial interest to keep Iran at least neutral, as it was during
both the Romanov period and the Soviet empire.

It is in both countries’ interests to cooperate in obstructing western
military encroachment in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Both
consider the evolving US grand strategy in the Eurasian landmass detrimental
to their respective geopolitical imperatives. To Russia, the US violates the
post-Cold War order by ramping up military pressure on Moscow in the former
Soviet space. To Iran, the US is trying to limit its nuclear ambitions as
well as its geopolitical outreach throughout the Middle East.

This common fear of the US could be considered one of the drivers behind the
close Russo-Iranian cooperation. Washington did, after all, recently unveil
a new national strategy document enumerating major problems across Eurasia –
and identified Moscow and Tehran as most problematic for its interests.

One theater of Russo-Iranian cooperation is in Syria, where both are
interested in stopping western (primarily American) influence. Much has been
written on the military and economic measures Moscow and Tehran have been
implementing in Syria for years – but differences tend to appear between
wartime allies after hostilities end. Indeed, there have already been hints
in the media about disagreements between Russia and Iran on methods, aims,
and results of the war in Syria.

Although Moscow and Tehran cooperate, they loathe each other’s geopolitical
ambitions. Iran has very nearly solidified its land reach to the
Mediterranean, and Moscow could well be worried that a strong Iran will be
less inclined to follow the Russian lead.

Despite the fact that Russia and Iran have political differences,
geopolitical forces continue to be strong enough to keep them cooperating
for the time being.

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Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State
University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various
international consulting companies and currently publishes articles focused
on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
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