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Wednesday, March 20, 2019
INSS Policy Recommendation For Gaza: Either Military Campaign or Recorgnize Hamas And Let Them Continue Preparing For War Against Israel?

Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:

Dekel writes that "Israel must display the will and preparedness for a large
scale military confrontation against Hamas’s military capabilities" - but
there's not a word about addressing these military capabilities should
Israel opt to "grant official recognition to the Hamas regime".

No. I am not making this up.

Read this item and ask yourself what security measures Udi Dekel envisions
if Israeli policy makers were to adopt his proposed option " to grant
official recognition to the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip"?

Yes. Some kind of international inspection of materials entering the Gaza
Strip.

But not a word about addressing the ARMS FACTORIES INSIDE THE GAZA STRIP.

Just a few days after the IDF finally actually hit a significant rocket
production target, INSS is proposing policy that turns a blind eye to a
critical and essential issue that must be addressed arms production within
Gaza.

Suffice it to say that all the production equipment and raw materials used
for making weapons - including guided missiles - is dual use and could
readily pass a third party inspection.

======
Israel’s Exhausted Strategy of Deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas
Udi Dekel
INSS Insight No. 1151, March 19, 2019
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/israels-exhausted-strategy-deterrence-vis-vis-hamas


The two Fajr/M-75 rockets fired at Tel Aviv on the evening of March 14, 2019
caught the Israeli security establishment – as well as the political
echelon – by complete surprise. Whether the rocket fire was a mistake, as
declared by Hamas and the IDF, or intentional, both the rockets and the
Israeli response are further evidence that Hamas continues its policy of
defiance while controlling escalation and dictating the rules of the game
with Israel. This means that Israel’s policy of deterrence with regard to
Hamas and the other organizations active in the Strip has been eroded.
Israel’s current policy, which seeks to contain escalation by easing the
closure and strengthening deterrence, fails to deal with the area’s
fundamental problems. The Gaza Strip is experiencing a longstanding
humanitarian crisis with no hope of reconstruction; it is ruled by Hamas, a
radical element waging terrorist activity against Israel; and the chances
that the PA will regain control of Gaza are rapidly diminishing. To resolve
these problems, Israel may take one of two radical approaches. One approach
is to grant official recognition to the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip and
sever the area’s connection with the West Bank. The second option is a
military confrontation to dismantle the military wing of Hamas and the other
terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. To pursue either option, Israel
must display the will and preparedness for a wide scale military
confrontation against Hamas’s military capabilities that will change the
rules of the game that have become rooted over recent years. The Israeli
government is urged to abandon its concept of deterrence against Hamas
because its validity has eroded, and instead strive to change its Gaza Strip
policy in an effort to transform the area from the ground up.

The two Fajr/M-75 rockets fired at Tel Aviv on the evening of March 14, 2019
caught the Israeli security establishment – as well as the political
echelon – by complete surprise. Although escalation with Hamas before the
forthcoming Knesset elections on April 9 is considered a distinct
possibility (also because it has been a year since the March of Return
events began, as well as the ensuing incidents on the Israel-Gaza Strip
border), the rockets were fired in the middle of Egyptian efforts to mediate
between Hamas and Israel over implementing the next stage of understandings:
security quiet on the Israel front in exchange for further easing of
restrictions on the import and export of goods to and from the Gaza Strip,
and progress on infrastructure projects to improve the quality of life
there. Hence, it is unclear who decided to gamble by launching strategic
weapons against the greater Tel Aviv area, and why now.


All armed entities in the Gaza Strip immediately denied responsibility. Only
two organizations – Hamas and Islamic Jihad – have the capability to launch
75-km. range rockets (i.e., Fajr or M-75). Islamic Jihad generally operates
independently, though at times is directed by the Iranian Quds Force.
However, its denial is credible, because responsibility for the rocket fire
would serve the belligerent image it likes to project. Hamas, too, was
circumspect. Initially, it denied launching the rockets, but after the IDF
revealed that this was in fact a Hamas incident, the official version
changed: now, they said, the launch was the result of a command or technical
mishap (Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, relayed a message
to the Egyptian delegation that the rockets were launched by mistake while
being serviced). The Hamas leadership understands that Israel would like to
avoid escalation, at least until the election, and is therefore prepared to
raise the threshold of risk. Still, the launch of rockets aimed at Tel Aviv
is a dangerous deviation from the rules of the game tacitly formulated by
the sides at this time.


Two explanations for what lay behind the launch come to mind. According to
the first explanation, the launch was in fact unintentional, occurring
because of an error in Hamas’s chain of command, or less likely, a rocket
maintenance failure. The launch occurred while Hamas leaders were in talks
with the Egyptian delegation about attaining greater calm, and challenged
the trend toward greater quiet that had marked the previous week (as a
result of Egyptian pressure, the nightly protests along the fence were
suspended, and fewer incendiary balloon were sent across the border). Israel
agreed to cooperate with the effort to attain a long term period of quiet,
beyond the election period; the government’s lack of desire to go to war in
Gaza is entirely clear. Israel’s goal vies with Hamas’s strategic rationale,
which says that it is best to strive for Gaza’s stability, reconstruction,
and greater economic activity, while simultaneously pursuing an operational
strategy of controlled escalation and risk-taking vis-à-vis Israel. This
seeming duality perhaps reflects tension within the organization’s ranks,
specifically between the political leadership, which seeks an arrangement,
and the military branch, which believes that Hamas will attain its goals
only through force.


According to the second explanation, and contrary to the announcements by
Hamas and the IDF, the launch was intentional. It is hard to believe that a
strategic rocket launch occurred without the organization’s leaders knowing
and without their oversight, if not initiative. Hamas is suspected of having
deployed launchers ready to fire at a moment’s notice, and the organization
is known for its use of fire as a tool in managing Egypt-mediated
negotiations with Israel. A similar incident occurred in October 2018 when
Hamas operatives fired two rockets, one at Beer Sheva and the other at
central Israel, just before the end of Sinwar’s ultimatum on lifting the
Gaza Strip blockade. Another catalyst for the launch could be the widespread
demonstrations by refugee camp inhabitants against the cost of living and
the rampant poverty – manifestations of fury that erupted without warning
and were violently suppressed by Hamas. It may be that Hamas chose to divert
the public’s attention toward Israel.


While the IDF and defense establishment assessed that the launch at greater
Tel Aviv was a mistake (did they rely on Sinwar’s report to Egypt?), the
military response made it clear that Israel sees Hamas as responsible for
all that happens in the Gaza Strip. According to the IDF spokesperson, the
IAF attacked some hundred Hamas targets through the Strip within hours after
the launch, including the offices of Hamas’s West Bank headquarters, located
in the Rimal neighborhood of downtown Gaza City; an underground site for the
central manufacturing of operational rockets; an outpost of Hamas’s naval
force; a military training compound that is also the center for Hamas’s UAVs
in the southern part of the Strip; and other outposts and underground
infrastructures.


The next day, following the IDF attacks and Egypt’s efforts to achieve calm,
the Supreme National Authority, which coordinates the activities of all
factions in the Strip, decided to stop the attacks on Israel and suspend the
weekly Friday marches along the border. Islamic Jihad spokesman Daoud Shahab
made it clear that the Palestinian factions and the Egyptians had been in
contact during the night, that the factions welcomed the Egyptian efforts to
institute a ceasefire, and that they were committed to observe it as long as
Israel “ceases its aggression.”


Egypt, having assumed responsibility for keeping the calm, has for the past
year been deeply involved in mediating between Israel and Hamas, and among
the Palestinian organizations. This time too, it succeeded in curbing any
escalation. Cairo is acting in coordination with UN emissary Nikolay
Mladenov and Jason Greenblatt, the US envoy to the Middle East, in order to
demonstrate to the administration its critical importance in the arena and
to make a regional statement. It seems that Egypt has promised the US
administration (and perhaps also Israel) to prevent an eruption of violence
on the Israel-Gaza border before the election.


Assessment


Both the rocket launch and the Israeli response are further evidence that
Hamas continues its policy of defiance while controlling escalation and
dictating the rules of the game with Israel. This means that Israel’s policy
of deterrence with regard to Hamas and the other organizations active in the
Strip has been eroded. The most recent events underscore that as long as the
organization’s leadership feels threatened or pressured, even if the source
is internal/populist, it will opt for violent defiance toward Israel,
knowing that Israel does not seek to topple it or destroy the organization’s
military capabilities. IDF operations in the Gaza Strip, which have always
sought to strengthen Israel’s deterrence, have had limited, if any, effect.
Therefore, Israel must undertake an in-depth reassessment of its patterns of
action.


Israel’s current policy, which desires to contain escalation by easing the
closure and strengthening deterrence, fails to deal with the area’s
fundamental problems. The Gaza Strip is experiencing a longstanding
humanitarian crisis with no hope of reconstruction; it is ruled by Hamas, a
radical element waging terrorist activity against Israel; and the chances
that the PA will regain control of Gaza are rapidly diminishing. To resolve
these problems, Israel may take one of two radical approaches.


One approach is to grant official recognition to the Hamas regime in the
Gaza Strip and sever the area’s connection with the West Bank. Consequently,
the naval blockade would be lifted and the region opened to the outside
world, not by way of Israel. The preferred route in and out of the Gaza
Strip would be Egypt. To soften Cairo’s resistance, it would be necessary to
offer extensive international aid and begin economic projects in the
northern part of the Sinai Peninsula that would serve both Egypt and the
Gaza population. If the Egyptian route nonetheless stays closed, Israel will
be forced to allow the construction of a seaport in Gaza to be operated by
an international apparatus with passage of goods through a transit port in
Cyprus or el-Arish, where security checks would be carried out to reduce the
risk of weapons smuggling.


The second option is a military confrontation to dismantle the military wing
of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. This would
require a long, extensive operation that includes both ground maneuvers deep
into the Strip and severe attacks on military infrastructures in the region,
including fighters, weapons, tunnels, manufacturing and storage sites, and
command and control outposts. The objective of such a campaign would be
threefold: eliminating Hamas’s ability to blackmail and harm Israel, to the
point that its rule collapses; realizing and entrenching Israel’s demand to
disarm Palestinian areas of terrorist and military capabilities threatening
Israel, which at this point applies only to PA-controlled areas in the West
Bank; and creating the conditions to restore the Gaza Strip to PA control
and promote a political move (in the spirit of Trump’s peace plan) that
includes extensive resources to reconstruct the Strip. If the PA initially
refuses to accept responsibility for the Gaza Strip, it would be necessary
to establish an international or pan-Arab mechanism – a type of trusteeship
regime – to create the conditions the PA would need to return to the Strip
or construct a mechanism for the population’s self-rule. A military campaign
would necessarily be long and result in many civilian and military
casualties on both sides, and would therefore require broad public support
in Israel. At the same time, in any such scenario, the IDF must not remain
in the Gaza Strip, even if no responsible element is found to govern the
area. A military campaign to dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities would
create an infrastructure for a subsequent confrontation after the IDF forces
depart to carry out raids as needed to dismantle terrorist infrastructures,
as in the West Bank, and change the operational approach to terrorism.


The Israeli government is urged to abandon its concept of deterrence against
Hamas because its validity has eroded, and instead strive to change its Gaza
Strip policy as part of an effort to transform the area from the ground up.
To pursue either option, Israel must display the will and preparedness for a
large scale military confrontation against Hamas’s military capabilities to
change the rules of the game that have become rooted over recent years.
Preparations for a military campaign must include the formulation of
mechanisms, preferably international, to manage the Gaza Strip after the
dismantlement of Hamas’s capabilities and perhaps the collapse of its
government. Concrete preparations for a military confrontation against Hamas’s
capabilities and government would change the organization’s calculations. It
would no longer be able to rely on its insurance policy that facilitates its
violent defiance of Israel, based on both the notion that there is no
substitute for its government and Israel’s reluctance to engage in large
scale military action.

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