IMRA Middle East News Updates

Video - PM Netanyahu offers $5 million reward for each hostage freed

Tue, 19 Nov 2024 16:12:41 -0500

Video - PM Netanyahu offers relocation overseas for any Gazan and their
families who brings a hostage to freedom plus $5 million per hostage reward
(starts at 1:00)
https://youtu.be/5m9s8mHU1J8

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Parody: SGS To Document And Supervise Hezbollah's Weapons Inventory

Tue, 19 Nov 2024 12:26:33 -0500

Parody: SGS To Document And Supervise Hezbollah's Weapons Inventory
Dr. Aaron lerner 19 November 2024

Dear Reader,

Yes - it would be absurd for the international inspection company, SGS, to
catalog and label all the weapons Hezbollah has at the moment of a ceasefire
and then serve as an intermediary when Israel claims Hezbollah has added
weapons to their inventory.

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein is working on an equally absurd proposal.

Correction: a WORSE proposal.

Why worse?

Because, beyond allowing Hezbollah to keep all their weapons, U.S. envoy
Amos Hochstein is proposing that we enter into negotiations for "border
adjustments".

That's right.

The Biden administration thinks it would be a swell idea to reward Hezbollah
with Israeli territory.
=====
[PARODY] Protocol for Inspection and Oversight of Hezbollah Weapons
Inventory under Ceasefire Agreement

Objective

This protocol establishes a framework for inventorying, monitoring, and
overseeing Hezbollah’s arsenal of rockets, missiles, drones, and related
weaponry during a ceasefire. It aims to ensure compliance with the ceasefire
terms while respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and minimizing civilian harm.

Section I: Initial Inventory and Identification by Société Générale de
Surveillance (SGS)

1. Inventory Procedure
• SGS will conduct a comprehensive inventory of all rockets,
missiles, drones, and other weaponry in Hezbollah’s possession.
• Hezbollah will grant SGS unrestricted access to its storage
facilities and weapons caches under strict confidentiality to ensure
transparency.

2. Identification and Tagging
• SGS will apply tamper-proof stickers or markers to each
weapon. These stickers will:
• Be uniquely numbered to correspond with the weapon.
• Include security features to prevent counterfeiting.
• Be durable and resistant to environmental damage.
• Each weapon will be photographed and cataloged alongside its
unique number in a secure, centralized database maintained by SGS.

3. Reporting and Documentation
• SGS will produce an inventory report listing all weapons,
their unique identifiers, and storage locations. This report will be shared
confidentially with the ceasefire stakeholders: Hezbollah, Israel, and the
designated ceasefire monitoring body (e.g., UN representatives).

Section II: Handling Claims of Additional Weapons

1. Submission of Evidence
• If Israel identifies suspected new weapons not included in
the initial inventory, it will submit evidence to SGS. Evidence must
include:
• Location coordinates.
• Supporting data from satellite imagery, reconnaissance, or
other verifiable sources.

2. Unannounced Inspections
• SGS will dispatch inspectors without prior warning to the
specified locations to verify the claim.
• Inspectors will document their findings, including
photographing the weapons and checking for the absence of inventory
stickers.

3. Resolution of Violations
• If SGS confirms the presence of new, undocumented weapons:
• Hezbollah will be given the opportunity to destroy the
weapons under SGS supervision.
• If Hezbollah refuses, Israel will have the right to
neutralize the weapons.
• Israel’s actions must comply with proportionality
requirements outlined in international humanitarian law:
• Civilian casualties must be minimized.
• If weapons are in a civilian-populated area, Israel must use
precision methods or seek alternative solutions to avoid significant harm to
non-combatants.

Section III: Replacement of Defective Weapons

1. Procedure for Replacement
• Hezbollah may replace defective weapons with functional ones
under SGS supervision.
• SGS will:
• Verify the defectiveness of the weapon being replaced.
• Assign a unique sticker to the new weapon and update the
inventory database.

2. Transparency and Accountability
• All replacements will be documented in a supplemental report
by SGS and shared with ceasefire stakeholders to ensure transparency.

Section IV: Provisions for Unilateral Destruction of Inventory Weapons by
Israel

1. Documentation of Destruction
• In the event that Israel conducts a unilateral attack
against Hezbollah, causing damage or destruction to weapons included in the
official inventory, SGS will verify and document the losses.
• The verification process will involve:
• Inspecting the destroyed sites.
• Comparing the destroyed weapons to the inventory database
using their unique identifiers.

2. Replacement of Destroyed Weapons
• Hezbollah will have the right to replace weapons destroyed
in unilateral Israeli attacks, subject to the following conditions:
• Replacements must be of the same type and quantity as the
destroyed weapons.
• The replacement process will be conducted under SGS
supervision to ensure transparency.
• The new weapons will be assigned unique stickers and updated
in the inventory database.

3. Reporting
• SGS will provide a detailed report on the destruction and
replacement process to all ceasefire stakeholders to ensure accountability.

Section V: Israel’s Monitoring Restrictions

1. Respect for Sovereignty
• Israel will not conduct monitoring activities that violate
Lebanon’s territorial integrity.
• Monitoring will rely on:
• Satellite imagery.
• Reconnaissance conducted from beyond Lebanese airspace or
territorial waters.

2. Monitoring Distance
• A minimum distance of:
• 20 km offshore from Lebanese territorial waters for maritime
surveillance.
• 5 km from the Lebanon-Israel border for land-based
monitoring, ensuring no violation of airspace.

3. Altitude Considerations
• Israel will utilize high-altitude surveillance methods that
do not infringe upon Lebanese airspace sovereignty. While there is no
universally agreed-upon vertical boundary between national airspace and
outer space, the Kármán line at 100 km altitude is commonly used as a
reference point. Israel will ensure that any aerial surveillance platforms
operate at altitudes above 100 km to avoid violating Lebanese airspace.

4. Reporting Mechanisms
• Israel will submit findings to SGS for verification rather
than act unilaterally, ensuring all claims are addressed through the
protocol.

Section VI: Oversight and Compliance

1. Ceasefire Monitoring Body
• A neutral monitoring body (e.g., the United Nations) will
oversee the implementation of this protocol and address disputes.

2. Regular Audits
• SGS will conduct periodic audits of Hezbollah’s weapon
inventory to ensure compliance.
• Any discrepancies will be reported immediately to all
stakeholders.

3. Accountability Measures
• Violations of the protocol by either party will be referred
to the ceasefire monitoring body for resolution and potential sanctions.

Section VII: Conclusion

This protocol balances the need for accountability with the respect for
sovereignty and international law. By leveraging the expertise of SGS and
implementing clear procedures, it ensures that all parties adhere to the
ceasefire terms while minimizing risks to civilians and maintaining regional
stability.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Proposed: Critical Security Information Reporting Law to the Political Echelon, 2024

Sun, 17 Nov 2024 06:55:06 -0500

Proposed: Critical Security Information Reporting Law to the Political
Echelon, 2024
Dr. Aaron Lerner 17 November 2024

Background:

The Israeli security establishment provides that anyone in a security
branch, IDF, Mossad, etc., is able to reach out to the head of their
respective branch to communicate vital information they believe is not be
relayed through the formal chain of command.

There is no arrangement for someone in a security branch to relay such vital
information to the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense if the head of
their respective security branch opts not to share this information.

Recent developments have demonstrated that this is not a theoretical
problem.

The following is the wording of a proposed law to address this critical
flaw:

Critical Security Information Reporting Law to the Political Echelon, 2024

1. Purpose:

This law is designed to allow any individual within the security
establishment to report critical information directly to the political
echelon in exceptional cases where there is a well-founded concern that the
information has not been transmitted for non-objective reasons. The law
ensures the reporting individual's right to act, while preserving the
security system's ability to assess the impact of the action on their career
within the system.

2. Definitions:

1. Critical Information: Information of significant importance
to national security or human life, where failure to transmit such
information could cause serious harm.
2. Political Echelon: The Prime Minister, Minister of Defense,
or their designated representatives.
3. Reporter: Any soldier, officer, or employee of the security
establishment who holds critical information and believes it has not been
properly conveyed to the political echelon.

3. Right to Report:

1. Any reporter has the right to directly transmit critical
information to the political echelon if the following conditions are met:
. The information pertains to an immediate threat or a
strategically significant matter.
. The reporter has attempted to transmit the information
through the chain of command but was unsuccessful, or there is a
well-founded concern that the information has been withheld for
non-objective reasons.

4. Reporting Procedure:

1. The reporter must provide written notice to their immediate
superior or another appropriate senior official of their intention to
transmit the information to the political echelon.
2. The reporter must act with full transparency within the
system and provide a copy of the information to their superior.

5. Consequences of Reporting:

1. Responsibility of the Reporter:
. The reporter will bear full responsibility for the accuracy
and implications of the information reported.
. The system retains the right to consider the impact of the
reporting on the reporter's career or advancement within the organization.
2. Limited Protection:
. The reporter will not automatically be protected from
internal organizational consequences (such as impact on career progression)
but will be immune from criminal or administrative penalties.
3. Confidentiality:
. The information will remain confidential and will only be
transmitted to the authorized political echelon.

6. Applicability:

This law applies to all security and intelligence units, including the IDF,
Shin Bet, and Mossad.

7. Regulations:

The Minister of Defense, in coordination with the Chief of Staff, is
authorized to establish regulations for the implementation of this law,
including defining reporting procedures and information transfer protocols.

Summary:

This law enables reporters to transmit critical information directly to the
political echelon in exceptional cases but does not provide immunity from
internal organizational consequences. It maintains the balance between the
right to report and the system's authority to manage the implications on the
reporter's career.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Dangerous Precedent - Inaugural Gift of Bad Lebanon Deal

Thu, 14 Nov 2024 06:17:33 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Dangerous Precedent - Inaugural Gift of a Bad Lebanon
Deal
Dr. Aaron Lerner
14 November 2024

Reports indicate that Prime Minister Netanyahu is pushing hard for a
"Lebanon deal" as an inaugural gift to President-elect Trump.

We cannot afford to rush into a deal that relies on shortcuts, implicit
understandings, and bilateral agreements that might only be viable as long
as someone like Mr. Trump occupies the White House.

Israel needs an agreement with contours and details that address our
security and strategic needs not only for today but for many years to come,
regardless of who may sit in the Oval Office in the future.

Any compromises, shortcuts, or disregard for legitimate concerns raised
within Israel in a hasty attempt to prepare this "inaugural gift" will set a
dangerous precedent. It will also establish expectations about what Israel
might be willing to concede on critical issues such as the Gaza Strip, the
Palestinian Authority, gestures to the Saudis, Iran, and more.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Deal which only stops Hezbollah from adding weapons recipe for disaster

Mon, 11 Nov 2024 03:27:39 -0500

Deal which only stops Hezbollah from getting more weapons recipe for disaster
Dr. Aaron Lerner 11 November 2024

While UNSCR 1701 requires that Hezbollah be completely disarmed (see below), reports of the "deal" only describe measures to prevent Hezbollah from getting MORE weapons.

Under the deal, Hezbollah holds onto, among other things, the long-range and mid-range missiles it has today.

We are assured "yihyeh b'seder" (it will be ok) because 80% of Hezbollah's missiles have been destroyed.

So if we accept this deal we will find ourselves participating in a debating society in the future as to whether a particular missile that Hezbollah has in its possession was added to its inventory after the ceasefire.

And we are going to have the Russian apparently as a participant in the debating society.

Anyone who thinks that this debating society arrangement is going to work simply has no business engaging in policy making.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11 August 2006
"The Security Council,
... 8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support ...full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;"

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

KAN reaches new low - Covers small protests for hostage release

Sat, 09 Nov 2024 13:02:06 -0500

KAN reaches new low - Covers small protests for hostage release
Dr. Aaron Lerner, 9 November 2024

Public broadcaster KAN Radio has become an active participant in the
"hostage deal at any cost" movement.

It accomplishes this by including sound bites in nearly every hourly
bulletin - often as the lead story - featuring families of hostages
criticizing Prime Minister Netanyahu for refusing to make a deal at any
price to secure the hostages' release.

These clips rarely provide new information.

For all intents and purposes, KAN is effectively using its hourly news
bulletins as a platform to align with the protest movement.

Over hours and days of broadcasts emphasizing calls for Israel to retreat
from Gaza, KAN has rarely provided a platform for voices to discuss the
consequences of leaving Hamas intact in the Gaza Strip.

The 18:00 bulletin tonight also covered protests in Haifa and Neveh Ilan
advocating for a deal at any cost, attended by "tens of protesters,"
including sound bites from attendees.

Such small-scale protests would not typically merit coverage in a KAN news
bulletin, let alone the inclusion of sound bites.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il