IMRA Middle East News Updates https://www.imra.org.il Middle East News & Analysis en-US 1767966144 1767966144 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Capalon Internet 2.0 imra@netvision.net.il (Aaron Lerner) News & Analysis IMRA Middle East News Updates https://www.imra.org.il https://www.imra.org.il/imra_sm.png 144 97 Weekly Commentary: Poll Shows Saudis See Israel Differently Than Others https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74406 <p>Weekly Commentary: Poll Shows Saudi Street Sees Israel Differently Than<br /> Others<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 9 January 2026</p> <p>Take a look at some of the results of this poll of our neighbors:</p> <p>"Which country do you consider the greatest threat to the security of your<br /> country?"<br /> (percentage identifying Israel as the greatest threat)<br /> Mashreq (Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syria) 53%<br /> Nile Valley (Egypt, Sudan) 38%<br /> Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar) 9%</p> <p>Do you support or oppose your country recognizing Israel?<br /> (% opposing recognition)<br /> Jordan 95%<br /> Egypt 87%<br /> Lebanon 89%<br /> Syria 74%<br /> Saudi Arabia 61%</p> <p>Is the Palestinian cause a collective Arab cause or only a Palestinian<br /> cause?<br /> (% saying "The Palestinian cause is a collective Arab cause")<br /> Jordan 93%<br /> Egypt 69%<br /> Lebanon 67%<br /> Syria 69%<br /> Saudi Arabia 62%%</p> <p>The Arab Opinion Index 2024-25 was conducted between November 2024 and<br /> August 2025, according to the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.<br /> The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, which produced the survey,<br /> is based in Doha, Qatar<br /> https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-index-2<br /> 025-in-brief-en.pdf</p> <p>While these results don't indicate that Saudis would be dancing in the<br /> street to celebrate Saudi-Israeli diplomatic relations, they certainly<br /> indicate that the Saudi leadership faces less pressure than others in our<br /> neighborhood to avoid improved relations with the Jewish State.<br /> ________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Fri, 09 Jan 2026 08:42:24 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74406 Weekly Commentary: Trump's Unprecedented Threat to Iran Over the Killing of Protesters https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74405 <p>Weekly Commentary: Trump's Unprecedented Threat to Iran Over the Killing of<br /> Protesters<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 2 January 2026</p> <p>"If Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their<br /> custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are<br /> locked and loaded and ready to go. Thank you for your attention to this<br /> matter!"<br /> President DONALD J. TRUMP<br /> 2 January 2026, Truth Social</p> <p>As far as I can tell, no American president has ever issued such a clear<br /> warning to a foreign country regarding the consequences of killing peaceful<br /> protesters.</p> <p>I am not going to engage in speculation as to whether Mr. Trump's team will<br /> resort to hyper-technical analyses of each incident in which protesters are<br /> killed in order to avoid being put to the test.</p> <p>#1. Was the shooter a true representative of the Iranian regime?<br /> #2. Were those killed truly "protesters"?<br /> #3. Were they 100 percent "peaceful"?</p> <p>I will suggest only this: if, in the coming days, more Iranian protesters<br /> are killed and no action is taken to come to their rescue - despite the<br /> declaration that "we are locked and loaded and ready to go" - this may<br /> undermine the deterrent effect of other warnings issued by President Trump.</p> <p>And that could be very dangerous for all of us.<br /> ________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Fri, 02 Jan 2026 09:38:32 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74405 When Demilitarization Commitments Ignored: Violation Facilitated Germany's Invasion of France https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74404 <p>When Demilitarization Commitments Ignored: Violation Facilitated Germany's <br /> Invasion of France <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 28 December 2025 <br /> <br /> Step-by-Step Explanation of the French Withdrawal from the Rhineland in 1930 <br /> and Subsequent Events <br /> Background: Demilitarization of the Rhineland under the Treaty of Versailles <br /> (1919) <br /> <br /> After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles imposed strict limitations on <br /> Germany to prevent renewed aggression. The Rhineland-defined as the <br /> territory west of the Rhine River and a strip extending 50 kilometers east <br /> of the Rhine-was designated a demilitarized zone. <br /> <br /> The relevant provisions were: <br /> <br /> Article 42: <br /> "Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on <br /> the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn <br /> 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine." <br /> <br /> Article 43: <br /> "In the area defined above, the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, <br /> either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as <br /> well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same <br /> way forbidden." <br /> <br /> Article 44: <br /> Any violation of Articles 42 or 43 would be regarded as a hostile act <br /> against the treaty powers and as an act calculated to disturb the peace of <br /> the world. <br /> <br /> These provisions created a security buffer intended to protect France and <br /> Belgium from renewed German attack. <br /> <br /> To guarantee compliance, the treaty also provided for Allied military <br /> occupation of the Rhineland. Under Articles 428-432, occupation was to last <br /> 15 years from the entry into force of the treaty, with withdrawals in three <br /> stages (after 5, 10, and 15 years), conditional on German compliance. <br /> <br /> The Locarno Treaties (1925): Reconfirmation and Guarantee of <br /> Demilitarization <br /> <br /> In 1925, Germany (under Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann), France, <br /> Belgium, Britain, and Italy signed the Locarno Treaties. The key agreement <br /> was the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (Rhineland Pact). <br /> <br /> Under this treaty: <br /> <br /> Germany, France, and Belgium mutually recognized the inviolability of their <br /> western borders as fixed by Versailles. <br /> <br /> Britain and Italy acted as guarantor powers, pledging to assist any victim <br /> of aggression. <br /> <br /> Crucially, the parties explicitly guaranteed "the observance of the <br /> stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles concerning <br /> the demilitarised zone." <br /> <br /> Locarno did not replace Versailles. Rather, it reconfirmed and guaranteed <br /> the existing demilitarization regime within a new diplomatic framework. It <br /> was politically significant because Germany accepted these obligations <br /> voluntarily, unlike the imposed terms of 1919. <br /> <br /> French and Allied Withdrawal from the Rhineland (1930) <br /> <br /> Although occupation was originally scheduled to continue until the <br /> mid-1930s, events accelerated its end: <br /> <br /> In 1929, the Young Plan restructured Germany's reparations, reducing annual <br /> payments and extending the payment period. <br /> <br /> As part of the Hague agreements linked to the Young Plan, the Allied powers <br /> agreed to accelerate evacuation of the Rhineland. <br /> <br /> France, initially reluctant, accepted early withdrawal in exchange for <br /> financial and political concessions. <br /> <br /> The final Allied troops-primarily French-completed their withdrawal on 30 <br /> June 1930, five years earlier than originally planned. <br /> <br /> Importantly, the end of occupation did not terminate demilitarization. The <br /> legal obligation to keep the Rhineland free of German troops and <br /> fortifications remained fully in force under Articles 42-44 of Versailles <br /> and was reaffirmed by Locarno. <br /> <br /> Germany's Violation: Remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936) <br /> <br /> Under Adolf Hitler, Germany openly violated these obligations. <br /> <br /> On 7 March 1936, Germany sent 19 battalions (approximately 20,000-30,000 <br /> troops) into the demilitarized Rhineland. <br /> <br /> Hitler claimed that the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact (1935) <br /> constituted a threat to Germany and rendered Locarno void. <br /> <br /> This action directly violated: <br /> <br /> Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade the presence or <br /> assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone. <br /> <br /> Article 42, once Germany subsequently began constructing fortifications. <br /> <br /> The Locarno Rhineland Pact, which guaranteed observance of those Versailles <br /> provisions. <br /> <br /> Britain and France protested diplomatically but took no military action. The <br /> matter was referred to the League of Nations, but no enforcement measures <br /> followed. Hitler had instructed his forces to withdraw if met with <br /> resistance; none came. The episode emboldened further German expansion. <br /> <br /> Role of Rhineland Remilitarization in the German Victory over France (1940) <br /> <br /> The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a critical enabler-though not the <br /> sole cause-of Germany's rapid victory over France in May-June 1940. <br /> <br /> Its strategic consequences included: <br /> <br /> Elimination of France's primary security buffer. The demilitarized Rhineland <br /> had allowed France to threaten rapid entry into western Germany in the event <br /> of German aggression. Remilitarization removed this deterrent. <br /> <br /> Construction of the Westwall (Siegfried Line). After 1936, Germany built <br /> extensive fortifications along the western frontier, opposite the French <br /> Maginot Line. This reduced German fear of a French counteroffensive. <br /> <br /> Greater freedom of force concentration. With the western frontier secured, <br /> Germany could allocate forces with greater confidence to offensive <br /> operations. <br /> <br /> Strategic risk acceptance in 1940. During the Battle of France, German <br /> forces bypassed the Maginot Line by advancing through Belgium and the <br /> Ardennes. The existence of the Westwall helped reassure German planners that <br /> France could not easily strike into Germany during the campaign. <br /> <br /> The result was the rapid encirclement and defeat of Allied forces in <br /> northern France and Belgium, culminating in the evacuation at Dunkirk and <br /> the fall of France within six weeks. <br /> <br /> Summary <br /> <br /> The 1930 Allied withdrawal ended military occupation but did not end <br /> demilitarization, which remained guaranteed under both the Treaty of <br /> Versailles and the Locarno Treaties. Germany's 1936 remilitarization was a <br /> clear treaty violation that removed France's principal security safeguard, <br /> enabled German western fortifications, and altered the strategic balance in <br /> Europe. This unopposed breach played a significant role in creating the <br /> conditions that made Germany's 1940 Blitzkrieg against France possible and <br /> devastatingly effective. <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Sun, 28 Dec 2025 08:54:01 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74404 Weekly Commentary: Deploying Turks in Gaza Risks Catastrophic Conflict https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74403 <p>Weekly Commentary: Deploying Turks in Gaza Risks Catastrophic Conflict <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 24 December 2025 <br /> <br /> President Trump's team continues to press for us to accept the participation <br /> of Turkish troops in the International Stabilization Force (ISF) to be <br /> deployed in the Gaza Strip. <br /> <br /> These Turkish forces can be expected to do everything in their power to help <br /> Hamas effectively remain heavily armed and dangerous. <br /> <br /> I write "effectively" because the Turks could certainly participate in <br /> meaningless photo-op disarmament events. <br /> <br /> Turkish forces could not only deploy as human shields for the benefit of <br /> Hamas, but also as a force positioned opposite Israeli lines to intercept <br /> and/or repel Israeli attacks against Hamas targets. <br /> <br /> I appreciate that President Trump is not on the same page as we are when it <br /> comes to Turkey in general and Erdoğan in particular. <br /> <br /> Washington completely ignored Erdoğan's 30 March 2025 call during Eid <br /> al-Fitr prayers: "May Allah destroy Zionist Israel." <br /> <br /> Instead, President Trump praised Erdoğan as "tough" and "very smart." <br /> <br /> But Washington's attitude toward Turkey is irrelevant. <br /> <br /> Under all circumstances, the Trump team does not want a catastrophic <br /> conflict involving Israel and Turkey. <br /> <br /> I appreciate that even if one were to carry out a series of conflict <br /> simulations examining how the deaths of Turkish soldiers in Gaza might play <br /> out under various scenarios, the outcome is never escalation to the point of <br /> a catastrophic armed conflict between Turkey and Israel. <br /> <br /> The experts would note that decision-makers would have no choice but to show <br /> restraint, knowing full well that everyone would have too much to lose. <br /> <br /> But these simulations take place before real Turks with real families are <br /> killed by Israel. <br /> <br /> Not killed in one isolated incident but repeatedly killed as Turkish forces <br /> refuse to back down from shielding Hamas. <br /> <br /> A series of deaths that ignites the Turkish street. <br /> <br /> This would be followed by a spiraling conflict caused by misjudgments by <br /> both sides and a great deal of bad luck. <br /> <br /> Are the odds 50%? 20%? Even just 10%? <br /> <br /> None of us - Americans, Turks, or Israelis - can afford to roll the dice on <br /> this. <br /> <br /> For everyone's sake, Turkish forces cannot be part of the ISF. <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Wed, 24 Dec 2025 16:17:01 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74403 Observation: Difficulties in the IDF for the Religious Don’t Negate Their Duty to Serve https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74402 <p>Observation: Difficulties in the IDF for the Religious Don’t Negate Their Duty to Serve <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 18 December 2025 <br /> <br /> Someone shared this article with me: <br /> <br /> “The IDF Doesn’t Want Chareidim; It Wants to Re‑Educate Them,” Noam Chairman Says <br /> The Yeshiva World December 15, 2025 <br /> https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/israel-news/2486186/the-idf-doesnt-want-chareidim-it-wants-to-re%E2%80%91educate-them-noam-chairman-says.html <br /> <br /> I posted my observation in the comments section following the article: (posting times are apparently USA) <br /> <br /> DR_AARON_LERNER says: <br /> December 16, 2025 2:55 pm at 2:55 pm <br /> If this were any other mitzvah which secular elements made harder for religious Jews to carry out I am certain that Noam Party chairman MK Avi Maoz would be among the first to call on religious Jews to overcome the obstacles to perform the mitzvah. <br /> <br /> That’s the bottom line. <br /> <br /> I am proud that my children and nephews all carried out the mitzvah of serving in this latest war. <br /> <br /> Someone responded: <br /> coffee addict says: <br /> December 16, 2025 7:17 pm at 7:17 pm <br /> “If this were any other mitzvah which secular elements made harder for religious Jews to carry out I am certain that Noam Party chairman MK Avi Maoz would be among the first to call on religious Jews to overcome the obstacles to perform the mitzvah.“ <br /> <br /> Ever heard of a Mitzva Habaah BeAveira <br /> <br /> I guess you didn’t learn that when you became a doctor <br /> <br /> I replied: <br /> <br /> DR_AARON_LERNER says: <br /> December 17, 2025 2:45 am at 2:45 am <br /> Thank you for raising the issue. The principle you are referring to — often rendered as “a mitzvah that comes through a transgression” — is indeed a genuine concept in Jewish law, but its scope is frequently misunderstood. <br /> <br /> The Talmud (Sukkah 30a) establishes that a stolen lulav is invalid because the act of theft is inseparable from the performance of the mitzvah. Maimonides codifies this explicitly in Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shofar, Sukkah v’Lulav, chapter 8, where he lists stolen items among the four species that are invalid for the mitzvah, with related disqualifications discussed in the surrounding halachot. <br /> <br /> Crucially, this rule applies only where the mitzvah itself is performed through an inherent wrongdoing. It does not apply where external difficulties, burdens, or sacrifices make fulfilling a mitzvah harder. <br /> <br /> Jewish tradition consistently teaches the opposite principle: hardship does not negate a mitzvah but can enhance its value — “the reward is according to the effort” (Ethics of the Fathers 5:23). <br /> <br /> Accordingly, many leading authorities classify the defense of the Jewish people as a milchemet mitzvah (obligatory war), following Maimonides (Hilchot Melachim 5:1), a category that obligates participation precisely because of its necessity. <br /> <br /> Jewish law therefore draws a clear distinction between: <br /> <br /> A mitzvah invalidated because it is inseparable from wrongdoing, and <br /> <br /> A mitzvah that remains binding — and even elevated — when fulfilling it entails real sacrifice. <br /> <br /> That distinction is well grounded in the classical sources. <br /> <br /> [Since then no comments have followed] <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Thu, 18 Dec 2025 10:03:02 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74402 Weekly Commentary: Act on Zini's Warning and Adopt Standards for Handling Kidnappings https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74401 <p>Weekly Commentary: Act on Zini's Warning and Adopt Standards for Handling<br /> Kidnappings<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 17 December 2025</p> <p>"The threat of kidnappings has not diminished; it has increased and will<br /> continue to increase, because there is a price to the way in which we paid<br /> for the release of the hostages."<br /> - Shin Bet head Maj. Gen. (res.) David Zini, briefing ministers at the 11<br /> December 2025 political-security cabinet meeting, as reported by Ynet<br /> https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14614905</p> <p>Our demonstrated willingness to trade large numbers of terrorists in<br /> exchange for the release of hostages isn't our only hostage-related problem.</p> <p>Yishai Elmakis-Elram revealed in a report published in the 12 December 2025<br /> edition of Makor Rishon that the IDF was ordered not to encircle or attack<br /> Hamas forces in areas where Israeli hostages might be located.</p> <p>Now that our enemies know that Israeli hostages can be used strategically as<br /> human shields, there is no telling how Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and<br /> Israel's other enemies will exploit this Israeli Achilles' heel in future<br /> wars.</p> <p>It did not have to be this way.</p> <p>"Soldier Gilad Shalit has returned home, and the time has come to regulate<br /> the treatment of captive and missing soldiers, and to stop the slippery<br /> slope we find ourselves on following the Jibril deal, the Tannenbaum deal,<br /> and the exchange of Gilad himself."<br /> - Defense Minister Ehud Barak, upon receiving the Shamgar Report, May 2011</p> <p>Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to seek Cabinet approval for the<br /> guidelines and restrictions proposed by the Shamgar Report, and they were<br /> never enacted into law.</p> <p>As politically challenging and painful as it is, adopting and enacting into<br /> law clear guidelines and restrictions governing how Israel deals with the<br /> challenge of Israeli hostages is necessary to remove hostage-taking from our<br /> enemies' portfolio of effective tools in their war against Israel.<br /> ________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Wed, 17 Dec 2025 16:51:37 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74401