BESA Center presents "Dror Report"on Lebanon War

Dr.Aaron Lerner - IMRA 29 April 2007

Prof. Yehezkel Dror, a member of the Winograd Committee, prepared and
circulated a draft of a study he prepared regarding the Lebanon War before
he was appointed to the Committee.

He authorized BESA to release the draft of the report in light of the
leaking of the Winograd Report to Channel 10.

The report can be found in Hebrew at

www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/dror.pdf

BESA's press release in Hebrew provides a number of excerpts:

Page 12: War was a "system failure"

Page 26: High tech weapons systems that are very effective against states
and regular forces have low effectiveness against determined guerilla forces
and attacks of large quantities of low tech rockets.

Page 21: A deep and painful reform is required including the replacement of
a considerable number of commanders.

Pages 32-33 lists questions that the prime minister and his advisors should
ask the COS and his staff before a meeting considering a significant
operation such as the war in the North, with the implication that they
weren't:

- What are the principle alternatives that the IDF can carry out within set
periods of time - week, two weeks, month, more?

- What are the principle goals of each alternative?

- What will the situation be at the end of it?

- What is the possible range of expected outcomes in military achievements
and damage to the enemy, the diplomatic significance, IDF losses, Israeli
civilian losses and economic cost?

- What are the expected short term and long term ramifications vis-a-vis
relations with the USA and other principle countries, the Palestinians, Arab
and other Islamic countries?

- What are the ramification regarding Israel's deterrence, diplomatic plans
such as the unilateral withdrawal plan and developments in the Middle East
in general

- With regard to every alternative, what IDF forces are required during the
various stages of operation?

- What are the principle uncertainties?

- What can go wrong?

- What is a pessimistic projection of the outcome?

- What of the concern of "losing control" and the situation worsening an
uncontrolled manner?

- What are these answers based on?

- Have staff and force exercises served as a basis for these projections?

- To what extent are the forces and the methods of operation ready for the
implementation of the alternatives?

-Does the IDF rely on weapons and methods of operation that have yet to be
used in conditions similar to those that are expected?

- What of preparation of reserve forces? Are they properly trained and
equipped? If not, what is required to close the gaps?

- What of preparations of the homefront? What attacks and damage can be
expected to the homefront under optimistic and pessimistic scenarios? What
is the situation regarding shelters? What of preparations for evacuation?
Were operations practiced in the homefront with the cooperation of all the
elements involved in the matter such as police, Ministry of Internal
Security, emergency services and in particular the local authorities? Has a
clear hierarchy been set for handling the homefront?

- To what extent is the intelligence reliable and complete that serves as
the basis for the answers?

- How were estimates made regarding the effect on the enemy and their
response?

- Are these answers acceptable to all the entire senior officers?

- What are their objections?

- After taking all this into account, what is the IDF's first and second
choice of option? Why?

Pages 75-78: Significant consideration is required regarding defense of the
home against rocket systems.