Winograd Committee Press Release Monday, 30 April, 2007

"we determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and
the way they were made. We impose the primary responsibility for these
failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defence and the (outgoing)
Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these
decisions and the way in which they were made."

1. On September 17th 2006 The Government of Israel decided, under
section 8A of The Government Act 2001, to appoint a governmental commission
of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political
and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern
Campaign which started on July 12th 2006". Today we have submitted to the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence the classified interim report,
and we are now presenting the inclassified report to the public.

2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong sense of a crisis
and deep disappointment with the consequences of the campaign and the way it
was conducted. We regarded accepted this difficult task both as a duty and
a privilege. It is our belief that the larger the event and the deeper the
feeling of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change and improve
matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state
and society in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great strength and
resilience, with a robust sense of the justice of its being and of its
achievements. These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon and
after it. At the same time, we must not underrated deep failures among us.

3. This conception of our role affected the way we operated. No-one
underestimates the need to study what happened in the past, including the
imposition of personal responsibility. The past is the key for learning
lessons for the future. Nonetheless, learning these lessons and actually
implementing them are the most implication of the conclusions of the
Commission.

4. This emphasis on learning lessons does not only follow from our
conception of the role of a public Commission. It also follows from our
belief that one Israeli society greatest sources of strength is its being a
free, open and creative. Together with great achievements, the challenges
facing it are existential. To cope with them, Israel must be a learning
society - a society which examines its achievements and, in particular, its
failures, in order to improve its ability to face the future.

5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the Commission will
serve as an incentive to accelerate learning processes in the relevant
systems, while we are working, so that we could devote our time to study all
of the materials in depth, and present the public with a comprehensive
picture. However, learning processes have been limited. In some ways an
opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process of 'waiting' for the
Commission's Report before energetic and determined action is taken to
redress failures which have been revealed.

6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an Interim Report,
focusing on the decisions related to starting the war. We do this in the
hope that the relevant bodies will act urgently to change and correct all
that it implies. We would like to reiterate and emphasize that we hope that
this Partial Report, which concentrates on the functioning of the highest
political and military echelons in their decision to move into the war will
not divert attention from the overall troubling complete picture revealed by
the war as a whole.

7. The interim report includes a numer of chapters dealing with the
following subjects:

a. The Commissions' conception of its role, and its attitude to
recommendations in general and to recommendations dealing with specific
persons in particular. (chapter 2): We see as the main task of a public
commission of inquiry (or investigation) to determine findings and
conclusions, and present them- with its recommendations - before the public
and decision makers so that they can take action. A public commission should
not - in most cases - replace the usual political decision-making processes
and determine who should serve as a minister or senior military commander.
Accordingly, we include personal conclusions in the interim report, without
personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider this matter towards
our Final Report in view of the depiction of the war as a whole.

b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in a speedy and efficient
investigation with the rights of those who may be negatively affected to
'natural justice' (chapter 3): The special stipulations of the Commissions
of Inquiry Act in this regard do not apply to a governmental commission of
Examination, but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under the
general principles of natural justice. The commission notified those who may
be affected by its investigation, in detailed letters of invitation, of the
ways in which they may be negatively affected, and enabled them to respond
to allegations against them, without sending "notices of warning" and
holding a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions. We believe
that in this way we provided all who may be negatively affected by our
report with a full opportunity to answer all allegations against them.

c. The processes and developments in the period between the withdrawal
of the IDF from Lebanon until July 11, 2006 which contributed to the
background of the Lebanon War (Chapter 4): These processes created much of
the factual background against which the decision-makers had to operate on
July 12th, and they are thus essential to both the understanding and the
evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding them is also essential
for drawing lessons from the events, whose significance is often broader
than that of the war itself.

8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the
decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the
decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on
the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on
the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and
end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when
he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were
critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We
should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the
government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.

9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very
serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose
the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the
minister of defence and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a
decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they
were made. Howwever,, there are many others who share responsibility for the
mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.

10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making
processes can be summed up as follows:

a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike
was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan,
based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena
. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed
the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant
political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would
inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was
not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an
extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the
missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not
enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with
the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.

b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government
did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing
the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves
with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations
without immediage military action -- so as to maintain for Israel the full
range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in
strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more
comprehensive and encompassing picture.

c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through
ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that
ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it.
The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing
its nature and implications. They authorized to commence a military campaign
without considering how to exit it.

d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not
be achieved, and in part were not achieveable by the authorized modes of
military action.

e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action
possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the
discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action,
and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early
mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a
ground operation would be required.

f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they
failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality
on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it
was publicly states that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But
the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.

11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the
Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the
(outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely
that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and
the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been
significantly better.

12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.

a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility
for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His
responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war
stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led
the decisions which were taken.

b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that
no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one.
Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of
the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options
available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation
with others, especially outside the the IDF, despite not having experience
in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not
adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him
before the fateful decisions of July 12th.

c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the
campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no
serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the
authorized modes of military action. He nade a personal contribution to the
fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.

d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that
the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and
were not materializing.

e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment,
responsibility and prudence.

13. The Minister of Defence is the minister responsible for overseeing
the IDF, and he is a senior member in the group of leaders in charge of
political-military affairs.

a. The Minister of Defence did not have knowledge or experience in
military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good
knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve
political goals.

b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period
without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional
experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did
not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he
attended.

c. The Minister of Defence did not act within a strategic conception of
the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and
did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF;
and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action
presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions
made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table -
and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for
discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.

d. The Minister of Defence did not develop an independent assessment
of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper
response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and
diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented
him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, over which he was in
charge, and the Prime Minister.

e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defence failed in fulfilling his
functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defence during the war
impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.

14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the
main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and
recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's
personal involvement with decision making within the army and in
coordination with the political echelon were dominant.

a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the
abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he
responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the
complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments
and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and
approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.

b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to
the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed
forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In
addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of
the arena were that a military strike against Hezbollah will with a high
probability make such a move necessary.

c. The COS's responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well
that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate
knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led
them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational
plans fitting the situation.

d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservation
about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first
days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the
internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals
and the authorized modes of actions.

e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in
chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military
leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and
judgment.

15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the
outcomes of the war, had many other partners.

a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically outside Israel's
control.

b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit 'on the border', its ability to
dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities
and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel's
unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been
hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel.

c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army,
its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture
and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and
political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister,
Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.

d. On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness
was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel's
security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it
could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the
challenges facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an updates
national security strategy lies with Israel's governments over the years.
This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to
the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military
strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security
strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel's overall
balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the
civil population.

e. Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the
weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This
weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing
failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current
political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this
lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the
security system that could have helped it.

f. Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political function
of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek
adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized
an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from
over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.

g. Members of the IDF's general staff who were familiar with the
assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious
deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should
be considered within the army, and did not alert the political leaders
concerning the flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.

16. As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and
institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:

a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making
within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict
enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all
members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges, and orderly
procdures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.

b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security
decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.

c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security
Council, the establishment of a national assessment
team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister's
Office.

17. We regard it is of great importance to make findings, reach
conclusions and present recommendations on the other critical issues which
emerged in this war. We will cover them in the final report, which we strive
to conclude soon. These subjects include, among others, the direction of
the war was led and its management by the political echelon; the conduct of
the military campaign by the army; the civil-military relationship in the
war; taking care of Israel's civilian population under missile attack; the
diplomatic negotiations by the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs; censorship, the media and secrecy; the effectiveness of
Israel's media campaign; and the discussion of various social and political
processes which are essential for a comprehensive analysis of the events of
the war and their significance.

18. Let us add a few final comments: It took the government till March
2007 to name the events of the summer of 2006 'The Second Lebanon War'.
After 25 years without a war, Israel experienced a war of a different kind.
The war thus brought back to center stage some critical questions that parts
of Israeli society preferred to avoid.

19. The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this
we can mention a few: Some of the political and military elites in Israel
have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had
enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war
against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to
anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate
a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces
would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts.

20. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need to be prepared for
'real' war. There was also no urgent need to update in a systematic and
sophisticated way Israel's overall security strategy and to consider how to
mobilize and combine all its resources and sources of strength - political,
economic, social, military, spiritual. cultural and scientific - to address
the totality of the challenges it faces.

21. We believe that - beyond the important need to examine the failures
of conducting the war and the preparation for it, beyond the need to
identify the weaknesses (and strengths) in the decisions made in the war -
these are the main questions raised by the Second Lebanon war. These are
questions that go far beyond the mandate of this or that commission of
inquiry; they are the questions that stand at the center of our existence
here as a Jewish and democratic state. It would be a grave mistake to
concentrate only on the flaws revealed in the war and not to address these
basic issues.

We hope that our findings and conclusions in the interim report and in the
final report will not only impel taking care of the serious governmental
flaws and failures we examine and expose, but will also lead towards a
renewed process in which Israeli society, and its political and spiritual
leaders will take up and explore Israel's long-term aspirations and the ways
to advance them.