[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:

"Security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting
Palestinian sovereignty"

This is just the tip of the iceberg of the "if pigs could fly" approach
embraced by this group.]

The full text follows:

'BECAUSE FAILURE RISKS DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES, IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT
THAT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE SUCCEED.'
www.prospectsforpeace.com/2007/10/bipartisan_foreign_policy_lead.html

The following letter on the Middle East peace conference scheduled for
Annapolis, Maryland in late November, was addressed by its signatories to
President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The
statement is a joint initiative of the U.S./Middle East Project, Inc., the
International Crisis Group, and the New America Foundation/American Strategy
Program.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace conference announced by President Bush and
scheduled for November presents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a
two-state solution. The Middle East remains mired in its worst crisis in
years, and a positive outcome of the conference could play a critical role
in stemming the rising tide of instability and violence. Because failure
risks devastating consequences in the region and beyond, it is critically
important that the conference succeed.

Bearing in mind the lessons of the last attempt at Camp David seven years
ago at dealing with the fundamental political issues that divide the two
sides, we believe that in order to be successful, the outcome of the
conference must be substantive, inclusive and relevant to the daily lives of
Israelis and Palestinians:

The international conference should deal with the substance of a permanent
peace: Because a comprehensive peace accord is unattainable by November, the
conference should focus on the endgame and endorse the contours of a
permanent peace, which in turn should be enshrined in a Security Council
resolution. Israeli and Palestinian leaders should strive to reach such an
agreement. If they cannot, the Quartet (US, EU, Russia and UN Secretary
General)-under whose aegis the conference ought to be held- should put
forward its own outline, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the
2003 Roadmap. It should reflect the following:

. Two states, based on the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor, reciprocal,
and agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap;

. Jerusalem as home to two capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods falling under
Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty;

. Special arrangements for the Old City, providing each side control of its
respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them;

. A solution to the refugee problem that is consistent with the two-state
solution, addresses the Palestinian refugees' deep sense of injustice as
well as provides them with meaningful financial compensation and
resettlement assistance;

. Security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting
Palestinian sovereignty.

The conference should not be a one-time affair. It should set in motion
credible and sustained permanent status negotiations under international
supervision and with a timetable for their completion, so that both a
two-state solution and the Arab peace initiative's full potential (normal,
peaceful relations between Israel and all Arab states) can be realized.

The international conference should be inclusive:

. In order to enhance Israel's confidence in the process, Arab states that
currently do not enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel should attend the
conference.

. We commend the administration for its decision to invite Syria to the
conference; it should be followed by genuine engagement.

A breakthrough on this track could profoundly alter the regional landscape.
At a minimum, the conference should launch Israeli-Syrian talks under
international auspices.

. As to Hamas, we believe that a genuine dialogue with the organization is
far preferable to its isolation; it could be conducted, for example, by the
UN and Quartet Middle East envoys.

Promoting a cease-fire between Israel and Gaza would be a good starting
point.

The international conference should produce results relevant to the daily
lives of Israelis and Palestinians: Too often in the past, progress has been
stymied by the gap between lofty political statements and dire realities on
the ground. The conference therefore should also result in agreement on
concrete steps to improve living conditions and security, including a mutual
and comprehensive cease-fire in the West Bank and Gaza, an exchange of
prisoners, prevention of weapons smuggling, cracking down on militias,
greater Palestinian freedom of movement, the removal of unjustified
checkpoints, dismantling of Israeli outposts, and other tangible measures to
accelerate the process of ending the occupation.

Of utmost importance, if the conference is to have any credibility, it must
coincide with a freeze in Israeli settlement expansion. It is impossible to
conduct a serious discussion on ending the occupation while settlement
construction proceeds apace. Efforts also should focus on alleviating the
situation in Gaza and allowing the resumption of its economic life.

These three elements are closely interconnected; one cannot occur in the
absence of the others. Unless the conference yields substantive results on
permanent status, neither side will have the motivation or public support to
take difficult steps on the ground. If Syria or Hamas are ostracized,
prospects that they will play a spoiler role increase dramatically. This
could take the shape of escalating violence from the West Bank or from Gaza,
either of which would overwhelm any political achievement, increase the
political cost of compromises for both sides and negate Israel's willingness
or capacity to relax security restrictions. By the same token, a
comprehensive cease-fire or prisoner exchange is not possible without Hamas's
cooperation. And unless both sides see concrete improvements in their lives,
political agreements are likely to be dismissed as mere rhetoric, further
undercutting support for a two-state solution.
The fact that the parties and the international community appear-after a
long, costly seven-year hiatus-to be thinking of resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is welcome news. Because the stakes are so
important, it is crucial to get it right. That means having the ambition as
well as the courage to chart new ground and take bold steps.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy
Carter
Lee H. Hamilton, former Congressman and Co-chair of the Iraq Study Group
Carla Hills, former U.S. Trade Representative under President George H.W.
Bush
Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, former Senator
Thomas R. Pickering, former Under-Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor to President Gerald Ford
and President George H.W. Bush
Theodore C. Sorensen, former Special Counsel and Adviser to President John
F. Kennedy
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal
Reserve System