Operation Cast Lead and the Civilian Front: An Interim Assessment
Elran, Meir INSS Insight No. 87, January 7, 2009
www.inss.org.il:80/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2516

Already by the second week of Operation Cast Lead, a number of initial
insights about Israel's civilian front have emerged. First, the statistics:
In the first six days of the operation, 182 improvised Qassam rockets and 65
standard Grad katyusha rockets were launched against Israel - an average of
41 rockets per day (compared with an average of nine rockets per day in all
of 2008). In addition, 277 mortar shells were fired. These numbers are far
fewer than what was expected in Israel before the operation. They represent
about 30 percent of the daily average of rockets launched by Hizbollah
during the Second Lebanon War. The rockets fired at Ashdod and Beer Sheva
reflect a significant upgrade in Hamas' range capabilities. This expanded
capability relies on standard katyusha rockets smuggled into the Gaza Strip,
some probably during the recent six-month lull. Thus far, four people in
Israel were killed (eight in all of 2008) and a few dozen wounded by Gaza
Strip fire.

These figures are important in evaluating the performance of the civilian
front after the first week of warfare. There is no belated Hanukah miracle
here. The relatively low number of launchings and hits is a combined result
of the air force's attacks and the relatively limited supply of launching
equipment possessed by Hamas and the other organizations in the Gaza Strip.
The relatively few losses also result from proper conduct by the home front
in response to the threat, in accordance with the instructions of the Home
Front Command. The conclusion is that the threat to the home front in the
south has so far been limited. While the routines of hundreds of thousands
of civilians under the threat have been disrupted, this does not approach
what Hizbollah achieved in 2006 in terms of severity, extent, or results. It
is also far from representing the potential threat to the Israeli home front
in the event of a large scale conflict.

It is important to keep the current limited nature of the threat in mind
while drawing initial conclusions about the home front. Utmost caution is
required before the current experience becomes a basis for overall decisions
for the future. At the same time, it is already clear that a number of areas
require more updated thinking once the shooting stops.

The first is the need to reinforce effective tactical defense. Until now,
Israel has devoted most of its efforts and investments to strengthening its
attack capabilities (mostly from the air), and to a lesser degree to
strengthening its effective long range strategic defense, mostly against the
Iranian threat. Regarding the tactical counterpart, the process has been
slower and more hesitant. The result is that as of now, and probably also in
the near future - barring a decision to switch from developing an
independent defense system to purchase existing systems on the market -
Israel lacks a defensive military capability that can reduce the number of
rockets that reach the home front. This is not only a question of budget:
the source of the hesitation is conceptual and requires rethinking.

The second concerns passive defense. Not long ago the government decided
after much hesitation and repeated postponements to spend NIS 600 million on
expanding the shelters and fortifications in the Gaza Strip envelope. It is
obvious that this decision had no significant effect on the current
conflict, and that its implementation will take a long time. There have been
interesting improvisations related to temporary shelters at distant sites
where protection was clearly lacking, but not enough has been done in this
area. This effort demands extensive investment and is aimed at strengthening
a personal and community sense of security, beyond actual physical defense.

The third involves the function and responsibility of the Home Front
Command. Overall the Home Front Command is earning justified praise for its
deployment and management in the field, both in terms of the extensive and
qualitative instruction to civilians, and for direct assistance to the local
authorities, mostly through the important innovation of IDF liaison units
with local authorities and direct assistance to civilians in distress. At
the same time, until now the challenge to the Home Front Command has been
limited. It is evident that as to advanced preparation, the Home Front
Command naturally spent most of its efforts on the communities located near
the Gaza Strip. The larger and more remote areas such as Beer Sheva and
Ashdod reached the current conflict at a lower level of readiness, despite
talk before the outbreak of warfare about the expanding threat reaching
them. Beyond this, however, the main question is to what degree the Home
Front Command should and can be the authorized entity to manage the
emergency routine in Israel (as per the current law, which dates back to
1951). For example, is it appropriate that IDF officers decide when to close
the schools? Clearly the Home Front Command's expertise must constitute
decisive input in the general considerations, but questions of this sort
that have major civil, economic, and social ramifications should be decided
by a civilian authority.

The fourth involves the local authorities. Displaying major improvement over
past performances, the local authorities are more prepared, function more
effectively, and above all, project to civilians an appropriate level of
confidence, stability, and efficiency. This is of decisive importance in an
emergency. The way the local authorities behave as the entity responsible
for coordinating all activities among the many state and volunteer groups
operating in the field is the principal key to success or failure. Local
leadership has been particularly prominent over the past week - not only in
providing an appropriate solution for most of the problems facing it, but
also in building and leading the local civilian public's steadfastness. This
is important on the national level as well and constitutes a vital
contribution to national resilience.

The fifth deals with the Israeli media. Even in an era of competitive
commercial media, there is room to demonstrate responsibility and restraint
in extreme portrayal of home front damage. What the media shows has a strong
impact on the national mood - often more so than other factors.

Thus in terms of the limited threat evidenced thus far in Operation Cast
Lead, all elements of the home front functioned reasonably. The important
result has been the maintenance of a high degree of national resilience and
public morale in Israel, as illustrated by the demonstration of broad
support for the civilian and military leadership, with no expression of any
desire for a restriction on the government's freedom of decision and the IDF's
operational space. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that this
essential element is potentially very volatile; changes on the battlefield
are liable to have a rapid effect on it.

_______________________________

From the Home Front Command website

The Home Front Command is a civil defense service under the Civil Defense
Law (1951) whose purpose is "to take all the necessary steps to protect the
populace in the event of any attack by hostile forces or to minimize the
results of such an attack, the emphasis being on saving lives." In the
context of the Civil Defense Law and government decisions, the Home Front
Command acts to:

1. Formulate, establish, and publish civil defense doctrine.

2. Instruct the home front population, together with civilian bodies,
in order to prepare it for an emergency, supply it with the means of civil
defense, and instruct it in civil defense in the event of a special
situation.

3. Instruct and guide auxiliary organizations in civil defense, and
employ them and their equipment in a state of war.

4. Coordinate the activities of the government ministries, local
authorities, and private enterprises in civil defense matters.

5. Act with the approval of the minister of defense - whether as a
matter of routine or for a specific purpose - and in coordination with the
relevant authorities to save lives and property not covered by existing
civil defense.