On June 28 and 29, 2009, the Goldstone Commission recorded Palestinian
statements at the UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City, and posted the questions
and answers on the commission's website.1 The following is an analysis of
the four main statements, the way the commission interpreted them, and
reports from other Palestinian sources which contradict the testimony
presented to the commission:

Blocking the Truth of the Gaza War:

How the Goldstone Commission Understated the Hamas Threat to Palestinian
Civilians

Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 9, No. 10 18 September 2009

Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi

http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=3086&TTL=Blocking_the_Truth_of_the_Gaza_War

a.. Was the UN commission's approach one-sided against Israel, or unbiased
and objective as commission chairman Richard Goldstone contended? Statements
of Palestinians recorded by the commission and posted on the UN website
provide authentic evidence of the commission's methodology and raise serious
questions about its intentions to discover the truth.
a.. Commission members did not ask the interviewed Palestinians questions
about the activities of Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist
organizations operating in the Gaza Strip which could be classified as war
crimes or that were potentially dangerous to innocent Palestinians.
Furthermore, there was no serious consideration of Palestinian "friendly
fire" incidents, and we can only guess how many Palestinian civilians were
killed or wounded by Palestinian fire.
a.. Reports issued by the Palestinian terrorist organizations themselves
detailed the fighting in a way that often contradicted the Palestinian
witnesses. In addition, the witnesses hid vital information from the
commission regarding the presence of armed terrorists or exchanges of fire
in their vicinity.
a.. On June 28 and 29, 2009, the Goldstone Commission recorded Palestinian
statements at the UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City. The following is an
analysis of the four main statements, the way the commission interpreted
them, and reports from other Palestinian sources which contradict the
testimony presented to the commission.

On September 15, 2009, the UN investigating commission known as the
Goldstone Commission published its conclusions regarding Israel's Gaza
operation (December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009), accusing Israel of violating
both international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, and
committing war crimes.

In response, the Israel Foreign Ministry issued an official statement
accusing the commission of bias and one-sidedness, and of ignoring the
thousands of Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli civilians which, Israel
claimed, made the military operation an absolute necessity. "The one-sided
mandate of the Gaza Fact-Finding Mission, and the resolution that
established it, gave serious reasons for concern....At the same time the
report all but ignores the deliberate strategy of Hamas of operating within
and behind the civilian population and turning densely populated areas into
an arena of battle," said the ministry.

The Goldstone Commission Never Asked About Palestinian War Crimes

Was the UN commission's approach one-sided against Israel, or unbiased and
objective as commission chairman Richard Goldstone contended? Statements of
Palestinians recorded by the commission and posted on the UN website provide
authentic evidence of the commission's methodology and raise serious
questions about its intentions to discover the truth. Commission members did
not ask the interviewed Palestinians questions about the activities of Hamas
and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza
Strip which could be classified as war crimes or that were potentially
dangerous to innocent Palestinians. They never asked about:

1.. Launching rockets at Israeli towns and villages from within
residential dwellings;
2.. Firing mortar shells into Palestinian neighborhoods when IDF forces
were operating in or near the area;
3.. Firing anti-tank missiles, rifles, and machine guns at Palestinian
buildings in Gaza suspected of having been entered by IDF forces despite the
presence of Palestinian civilians in the area;
4.. Seizing private homes from which to ambush IDF forces;
5.. Booby-trapping houses before and during the war and detonating the
bombs;
6.. Planting various types of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle IEDs near
houses and detonating them;
7.. Sniping and firing heavy machine guns at IDF forces within Palestinian
residential areas.
None of the statements taken by the commission (as posted on the UN website)
reported even one single instance of the presence of armed Palestinians, or
of armed Palestinians firing rockets at Israel or shooting at IDF forces
operating in the Gaza Strip. There was no serious consideration of
Palestinian "friendly fire" incidents, which occurs with the most
disciplined armies, but is not adequately examined as an explanation for
Palestinian losses, and we can only guess how many Palestinian civilians
were killed or wounded by Palestinian fire. In fact, they reported that
throughout the entire three weeks of fighting there was no significant
Palestinian resistance.

The commission did not press the witnesses in order to elicit more
information and did not confront them with the reports issued by the
Palestinian terrorist organizations themselves, which detailed the fighting
in a way that often contradicted the Palestinian witnesses. It did not
adequately examine Palestinian rules of engagement - or the lack of any such
rules. In addition, the witnesses hid vital information from the commission
regarding the presence of armed terrorists or exchanges of fire in their
vicinity, casting doubt on their reliability.

Case Studies: Analysis of Palestinian Testimony to the Goldstone Commission

On June 28 and 29, 2009, the Goldstone Commission recorded Palestinian
statements at the UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City, and posted the questions
and answers on the commission's website.1 The following is an analysis of
the four main statements, the way the commission interpreted them, and
reports from other Palestinian sources which contradict the testimony
presented to the commission:

Statements from the al-Silawi Family

Three members of the al-Silawi family were interviewed by the commission:
Moussa al-Silawi (91, blind), Sabah al-Silawi (Moussa's wife), and Mouteeh
al-Silawi, a Hamas official.2 The most detailed statement was that of
Mouteeh al-Silawi, deputy director of the Hamas administration's Muslim
religious endowments ministry for the northern Gaza Strip, who said he was
giving a sermon when the mosque was attacked. He claimed that there was no
military activity in the Ibrahim al-Maqadma mosque or around it during the
attack. Worshippers came to the mosque seeking a safe haven on the
assumption that it was a secure place. The evening and night prayers were
said one after another to prevent unnecessary movement of worshippers
outside the mosque. Israel committed a war crime in violation of
international law by attacking civilians in a mosque.

The commission members asked: What is the name of the mosque and where is it
located? What was the date of the event? Was a warning given before the
attack? When was the mosque built? Were the people killed the supporters of
families? Was there a noise before the explosion and what damage did it do?
How many people were killed and wounded in the attack? How many people were
in the mosque when it was attacked? How far is the mosque from the nearest
hospital? Does the hospital have a sufficient quantity of medical equipment
and are its services sufficient?

They also asked: Under what conditions are the two prayers [evening and
night) joined? Do more people come when prayers are joined? Was this the
first time the prayers were joined? When does the evening prayer begin and
when does it end? When prayers are joined, exactly how much time elapses
between them? When, during the confrontation, did the mosque begin joining
the prayers? Was January 3 the first day the prayers were joined?

Many of the questions were irrelevant and unconnected to the circumstances
of the event. The commission members did not ask about armed men in the
mosque, whether it was used for military purposes or incited worshippers to
carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. They did not ask if there were
weapons in the mosque, if armed men were operating near the mosque, whether
Hamas and its Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades controlled the mosque and used
it to recruit operatives, or the identity of the casualties and their
organizational affiliation (including members of the al-Silawi family).

An examination of freely accessible Palestinian sources shows that the
casualties in this incident were terrorist operatives and included members
of the al-Silawi family, who were represented to the commission as innocent
civilians.

The terrorists killed in the attack included:

a.. Ibrahim Moussa Issa al-Silawi, an operative in the Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military-terrorist wing. Born December 1, 1946,
in Jabaliya in the northern Gaza Strip. According to the Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades website, Ibrahim "received his love of jihad and hatred
for the Zionist enemy with his mother's milk." In 1984 he joined the Islamic
Movement (which later became Hamas) and was a Muslim Brotherhood operative.
He had close relations with Nizar Riyyan, a senior Hamas terrorist
operative, and joined the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in 2003, at the age
of 38. He was posted to the northern Gaza Strip brigade and participated in
military missions: manning front-line positions in Jabaliya, fighting IDF
forces, and digging and preparing tunnels for Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
use.3
a.. Omar Abd al-Hafez Moussa al-Silawi (Abu Souheib), an Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades operative. Born in Saudi Arabia on September 29, 1981,
and joined Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2004 he joined the Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and was posted to front-line positions on the
eastern border of Jabaliya. He also prepared and planted IEDs, participated
in fighting the IDF, and launched mortar shells and Kassam rockets at
Israeli towns and villages.4
a.. Sayid Salah Sayid Batah, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative.
Born on April 7, 1986, in Jabaliya. A Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood
operative, he joined the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and was deployed in
the northern Gaza Strip brigade. He was posted to front-line positions in
Jabaliya, prepared and planted IEDs, and dug and prepared tunnels for Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades use.5
a.. Ahmed Hamad Hassan Abu Ita, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
operative. Born in Saudi Arabia on February 15, 1984. A Hamas and Muslim
Brotherhood operative, he joined the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in 2006
and was posted to front-line positions. He fought the IDF in the Jabaliya,
al-Salatin and al-Atatra regions, prepared and planted IEDs, was deployed in
the suicide bombers' unit, and regularly participated in ambushes against
IDF soldiers. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website reported that he was
one of the operatives who received instructions, after the initial Israeli
air attack on December 27, to deploy in accordance with previous
instructions. According to the website report, on January 3 he went to the
Ibrahim al-Maqadma mosque to meet "young people" and was killed in the IDF
attack there.6 [Note: The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades version clearly
shows that Hamas uses mosques as meeting places for its operatives to
coordinate their fighting against the IDF.] His father said that during the
first week of the fighting his son launched rockets into Israeli territory
every day.7
a.. Muhanad Ibrahim al-Tanani (Abu Islam), an operative in the Al-Quds
Battalions, the military-terrorist wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
born April 23, 1988. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad website reported that his
parents brought him up to love jihad. When the Second Intifada broke out he
was 12, and often went to the Erez crossing with other children to throw
rocks at the IDF post and confront the soldiers. In 2002 he joined the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and later its military-terrorist wing. He
underwent military training and was posted to front-line positions on the
northern border of the Gaza Strip. In addition to his military activities he
participated in Palestinian Islamic Jihad meetings and events, and led the
organization's Internet forums.8
a.. Rajah Nahad Rajah Ziyyada, 18, an Al-Quds Battalions operative.9
a.. Ahmed Assad Diyab Tabil, 16, a Hamas operative, was a member of the
Hamas student organization, which recruited him into the Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades.10

Statement of Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar

Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar represented himself to the commission as the
director-general of Hamas' ministry of Muslim religious endowments.11 He
said he had been detained in Israel in 1992 for belonging to Hamas. He told
the commission that his house was "unjustly" blown up by the IDF. He said he
had received a telephone call warning him to evacuate the house from someone
who identified himself as an IDF representative and that twenty minutes
later his house was struck from the air.

Askar said a short time later the area around the Al-Fakhura school was also
bombed. The school served as a shelter for many Palestinians from Beit
Lahiya, Al-Salatin and Al-Atatra, who regarded it as a safe haven because it
was located in the middle of the refugee camp and it was flying the UNRWA
flag. He said he saw three bombs hit the school region and he heard more.
Two hit the house of the Diyab family, killing 11 people. Dozens of people
were killed near the school and most of the casualties were children. There
were no armed men in the area, as opposed to Israeli claims. Two of his
children, Khaled and Imad, were killed, as was his bother Raafat, all of
them, according to Askar, innocent civilians.

The commission members asked: Was the telephone warning you received a
recorded announcement and what did you do following it? Did you receive the
call via a land line or cell phone? Where did you go when you left the
house? How much time passed between the attack on the Al-Fakhura school and
the attack on the Diyab family house? Did you or any of your family visit
the Diyabs' house after the attack on yours?

Although Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar admitted being a Hamas operative and
having been detained by Israel, the commission did not think to ask whether
he was connected with the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. They did not ask
him whether those killed near the school belonged to any organization or
were military-terrorist operatives.

An examination of freely accessible Palestinian sources shows that contrary
to his claims, he and his sons were directly and closely linked to the Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, a connection which included providing terrorist
operatives with weapons and ammunition, and that there were a number of
Palestinian terrorist operatives in the Al-Fakhura school area, as follows:

a.. Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar himself plays a key role in the Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades.12 Some of his sons also belonged to the Brigades, among
them Khaled (killed in the attack), Ahmed (killed on July 7, 2006, when he
tried to launch an anti-tank missile against an IDF force),13 and Osama
(critically wounded fighting the IDF on October 13, 2004).14
a.. Khaled Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar (Abu al-'Izz), Mohammed's son, an Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, was born on December 12, 1989, in
Jabaliya. At the age of 15 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was active
in the Hamas student organization, which serves as a recruiting agency for
the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. In 2006 he was accepted into fighting
groups posted in front-line positions. He underwent an advanced military
training course and was posted to a special unit of the north Gaza battalion
where he participated in dozens of ambushes and fought against IDF forces.
He served as a military instructor in the Imad Aqel battalion and supervised
the ambush and suicide unit.
He was supposed to be the third member of a Hamas squad in a suicide bombing
attack on October 26, 2007, but an operative named Ghassan al-Ela was sent
in his place. Khaled was offended and demanded to be sent on a suicide
bombing mission. In March 2008 he was sent to ambush IDF forces operating in
the northern Gaza Strip, but because of conditions on the ground the attack
was aborted. He again demanded to be put at the top of the suicide bomber
list. On June 4, 2008, he and four other Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
operatives prepared a suicide bombing attack, but a technical error caused
the bomb to explode and he was the only one who survived. He again demanded
to be sent on a suicide bombing mission, although he had gotten married on
December 12, 2008.

He was killed in January 2009 in the attack in the region of the Al-Fakhura
school. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website reported that during the
last months of his life he worked for the military supply unit and provided
operatives with weapons, missiles, and military equipment. This information
is particularly important because it supports IDF intelligence that the
house of Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar, where his son Khaled lived, served as an
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades weapons storehouse.15

Others terrorist operatives killed in the same incident included:

a.. Bilal Hamzah Obeid, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, who
was killed along with Khaled Abu Askar in the attack near the Al-Fakhura
school.16
b.. Raafat Abu Askar, a military-terrorist operative in the security
services with the rank of warrant officer, killed in the attack near the
Al-Fakhura school.
c.. Osama Jemal Obeid, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, killed
in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.17
d.. Iyad Jaber Aman, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, killed in
the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.18
e.. Abd Muhammad Abd Qudas, a Fatah operative active in Palestinian
Military Intelligence, killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.19
f.. Atia Hassan al-Madhoun and his son, Ziyad al-Madhoun, operatives in
the Brigades of National Resistance, the military-terrorist wing of the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Atia was regional
commander for Jabaliya. The two were the father and brother of Hassan
al-Madhoun, one of the senior commanders of Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades, who was lynched by Hamas in the summer of 2006. The two were
killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.20

Statements of Wail and Salah al-Samouni

Wail and Salah al-Samouni described the shelling of Wail's house, where the
extended al-Samouni family had sought shelter and where more than 20 people
were killed.21 They told the commission: At about 5:30 a.m. on the morning
of January 5 Wail left the house with some other men to bring wood for a
fire. As soon as they left the house a helicopter filed a missile at them
and then a number of missiles as the house. After the house was hit the
wounded proceeded toward Salah a-Din Street and were refused medical
attention by the IDF soldiers. Salah claimed that the soldiers fired shots
over their heads to frighten them and make them leave more quickly. They
said there was no activity of armed Palestinians around the house where the
family members had sought shelter. Salah al-Samouni said that "everyone is a
farmer, I swear to Allah that everyone is a farmer," and rejected the
possibility that they were armed or wanted.

The commission members asked: Can Wail describe the soldiers and identify
them according to their voices and uniforms? How did the IDF forces destroy
the agricultural land near the house? How large was the agricultural area
destroyed by the IDF? Was the witness treated at the Shifa Hospital?

The commission did not ask about the identity of the dead Palestinians and
about the possibility that some of them were terrorist operatives. It did
not challenge their claim that there were no armed Palestinians in the area,
despite reports by both Palestinian terrorist organizations and the IDF
about exchanges of fire in the area. In addition, the commission did not
press the witness about his claim that the soldiers did not provide medical
attention, in contradiction of a statement given by a female member of the
family who told the NGO B'tselem that the soldiers had given them medical
aid.

An examination of freely accessible Palestinian sources shows that Wail and
Salah al-Samouni hid important details from the commission which could shed
light on the event. An examination of their statements and the statements of
other members of the al-Samouni family to human rights organizations and
published in Palestinian newspapers raises questions as to the veracity of
their version of what actually happened on January 5.22

Members of the family repeatedly claimed that all the people in the house
were ordinary civilians. However, at least three were affiliated with
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Meisa al-Samouni did not tell B'tselem that her
husband, Tawfiq Rashad Hilmi al-Samouni, who was killed on January 5, was a
Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist operative. She and the other members of
the extended family, including Wail and Salah (who gave statements to the
Goldstone Commission), never mentioned or hinted that other family members
in the house at the time were Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives, among
them Muhammad Ibrahim Hilmi al-Samouni and Walid Rahad Hilmi al-Samouni. A
Palestinian Islamic Jihad flyer noted that Muhammad and Walid al-Samouni
were active in fighting against the IDF in the Zeitun neighborhood.

The al-Samouni family members firmly adhere to the version that there was no
Palestinian military activity near the house and that the nearest military
activity was at least a mile away, and that, they claimed, was limited to
firing rockets into Israeli territory, not close fighting.

However, the official Palestinian Islamic Jihad version is completely
different. In a statement issued on January 5, Palestinian Islamic Jihad
said that on the evening of January 4 its fighters had fired an RGP from the
Zeitun neighborhood at an Israeli tank and had opened fire at IDF soldiers.
At 1:20 a.m. on January 5, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad engineering unit
detonated a 50-kg. bomb near an Israeli tank not far from the Al-Tawhid
mosque near the house of Wail al-Samouni. At 6:30 a.m., the engineering unit
detonated a bomb near an IDF infantry unit operating near the Al-Tawhid
mosque in the Zeitun neighborhood.23 According to another official
Palestinian Islamic Jihad statement, one of its operatives was killed in
fighting nearby. His name was Muhammad Ibrahim al-Samouni.

The significance of the foregoing is that the four men who left the
al-Samouni house in the early hours of the morning, among them Muhammad
Ibrahim al-Samouni, did not necessarily do so for the innocent reasons given
by their family. They might have gone out for a reason connected to the
military activities taking place in the same area between Palestinian
Islamic Jihad terrorist operatives and IDF forces. Palestinian Islamic Jihad
reported that operatives of its military-terrorist wing, the Al-Quds
Battalions, "surprised the occupation forces and attacked them from behind
their lines, and there was a fierce battle in the southern part of the
Zeitun neighborhood." Another report, given "exclusively to the Muslim
Brotherhood website," detailed Palestinian Islamic Jihad activities in the
Zeitun neighborhood on January 5: "According to eye-witnesses, the fighters
of the resistance waited and barricaded themselves in secure locations,
remaining in places inhabited by civilians, from which they left to carry
out planned attacks against the forces of the Zionist occupier."

Statement of Khaled Muhammad Abd Rabbo

Khaled Abd Rabbo reported on the deaths of two of his children on January 7,
2009.25 Khaled lives in Jabaliya near the Israeli border in a four-story
house. He and his family did not leave it even when the land battles began.
He claimed he saw no activity of armed Palestinians in the area. He said
that on January 7 an IDF force entered the area around his house and
positioned tanks nearby. The soldiers used a megaphone to call the residents
out of the house. They came out holding a white flag, and one of the
soldiers got out of a tank and shot at his children for no reason. He said
two of his daughters were killed, another was seriously wounded, and his
wife was also wounded.

No questions were asked by the members of the commission, not about the
events, or whether there was fighting in the area, or whether there were
armed Palestinians.

Contrary to the claims made by Khaled Abd Rabbo, Palestinian sources
reported on armed Palestinian activity in the area near the incident and on
exchanges of fire between Palestinians and IDF forces. At the time Khaled
claimed his daughters were shot by IDF soldiers, four other Palestinians
were killed nearby: Ibrahim Abd al-Rahim Suleiman, 19, an Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades operative; Shadi Issam Hamad, 33, a Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (George Habash) operative; Muhammad Ali al-Sultan,
55, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative; and Ahmad Adib Faraj Juneid,
26, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative.26

The circumstances of Ahmed Juneid's death shed light on the event: Ahmed
Juneid joined Hamas in 2003 and later joined the Muslim Brotherhood and also
became an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative. He was posted to the
front-line positions in Jabaliya, joined the Brigades' sabotage and suicide
bomber unit, and participated in ambushes and fighting with IDF forces.
According to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, Ahmed Juneid was
another one of its operatives who, after the IDF attack on December 27,
2008, was ordered to take up a position at the front according to previous
instructions. According to the website report, on January 7 he participated
in an ambush of IDF soldiers in one of the houses in the eastern part of
Jabaliya along with other Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operatives. The
Hamas squad was identified by the IDF and an exchange of fire ensued. The
IDF force was forced to withdraw and armed vehicles were brought in, forcing
Juneid to leave the house he was in and go elsewhere. A surveillance plane
located him and fired a rocket, killing him.27

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades report reveals information about the
exchange of fire between the IDF and armed Palestinians in the area where
Khaled Abu Rabbo's daughters were killed, and its closeness in time to the
events he reported. His version and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
website provided similar descriptions of the advance of IDF armored vehicles
into the area at the same time. However, Khaled Abu Rabbo did not tell the
UN commission about the exchanges of fire between IDF forces and Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades operatives. The possibility cannot be ruled out that his
children were caught in the crossfire and may have been killed by
Palestinians.

As we can see from a detailed analysis of freely accessible Palestinian
sources (in Arabic), competing explanations exist that counter the claims of
the Palestinian witnesses who testified before the Goldstone Commission. At
the same time, questioning by the members of the commission proved to be
superficial and was ill-suited to elicit the truth about events in Gaza.

* * *

Notes

1. http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090628

2.
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/gaza/gaza01-orig.rm?start=01:35:05&end=02:15:20

3. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=1495

4. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=1416

5. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?sub_action=sera&id=1373

6. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?sub_action=sera&id=1356

7. http://www.sabiroon.org/news/specialNewsDetails.php?code=731&category=7

8. http://www.saraya.ps/forum/showthread.php?p=112352

9. http://www.saraya.ps/forum/showthread.php?t=9356

10. http://www.sabiroon.org/news/specialNewsDetails.php?code=1373&category=7

11.
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/gaza/gaza02-orig.rm?start=00:02:36&end=00:32:17

12.
http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7E2vaEXQm5C6U%2bt%2b%2bd65eOED%2bs9lqg5clKspsNLv%2bC4NbAGvmPHDv0t8StBpxSdkUfNb0gKi7pZyx6VahFdoaCrgX%2f%2bPH3ywxc%2fm1BpLmoow%3d

13. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=652

14. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=652

15. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=1441

16. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=1439

17. http://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=416258

18. http://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=346094

19. http://www.palvoice.com/forums/showthread.php?t=210507

20. http://www.alhourriah.org/?page=ShowDetails&Id=3061&table=articles

21.
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/gaza/gaza02b-orig.rm?start=00:01:26&end=00:24:12

22. The full investigation of the events at the al-Samouni house, including
references, can be found at
http://www.jcpa.org.il/Templates/showpage.asp?FID=586&DBID=1&LNGID=2&TMID=99&IID=22500

23. http://www.saraya.ps/view.php?id=10389

24. http://www.almoltaqa.ps/arabic/showthread.php?t=126200

25.
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/gaza/gaza02b-orig.rm?start=01:10:57&end=01:26:08

26. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=7417

27. http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=1315

* * *

Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi is the research director for the Orient
Research Group and a research fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs. Halevi previously served as a senior adviser for political planning
in Israel's Foreign Ministry and as head of the data and information branch
in the IDF Spokesperson's Unit. This article was written in conjunction with
the Global Law Forum sponsored by the Legacy Heritage Fund.