About Us

IMRA
IMRA
IMRA

 

Subscribe

Search


...................................................................................................................................................


Sunday, October 4, 2009
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's Two -Year Path to Palestinian Statehood: Implications for the Palestinian Authority and Israel

Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood:
Implications for the Palestinian Authority and Israel
Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 9, No. 11 2
October 2009

In August 2009, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a
unilateral plan to establish a de facto Palestinian state in the West Bank
and eastern Jerusalem following a two-year state-building process. Fayyad's
plan is the first serious Palestinian outline of a state-building effort
since the PLO was founded in 1964 and replaces the traditional PLO position
of armed struggle to "liberate Palestine."
The Fayyad plan represents a bold anti-Fatah posture and is seen to pose a
direct challenge to Fatah and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas. Fayyad enjoys only
limited political backing and his political rivals, such as Tawfiq Tirawi,
Abu Maher Gneim, and Mahmud al-Alul, who were recently elected to the new
Fatah Central Committee, have already blasted Fayyad's plans.

Israel supports "bottom up" Palestinian state-building. However, Israeli
leaders have voiced legal and security-based concerns over Fayyad's
intention that the PLO would unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood in
2011 based on the June 4, 1967, lines. The one-sided establishment of a
Palestinian state would contravene a key provision of the Oslo Interim
Agreement, according to which: "Neither side shall initiate or take any step
that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the
outcome of the permanent status agreement."
Another direct challenge to Israel is that Fayyad's "blueprint" calls for
massive Palestinian development in Area "C" of the disputed West Bank, which
is under Israeli civil and security control, and which directly challenges
the delicate, agreed-upon framework of the 1993 Oslo accords.

Israel's requirement of "defensible borders" involves its continuing control
in Area "C," including the strategically vital Jordan Valley and the high
ground surrounding Jerusalem and overlooking Israel's vulnerable cities
along the Mediterranean coast. Hizbullah's 4,000 rocket attacks from the
north in 2006 and Hamas' 10,000 rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza,
culminating in the 2009 Gaza war, both underscore the potential rocket
threat against Israel's cities that could emerge from a Palestinian state in
the West Bank if Israel were to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines.

Introduction
In August 2009, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a
unilateral plan to establish a de facto Palestinian state in the West Bank
and eastern Jerusalem following a twenty-four-month state-building process.
Fayyad's 54-page plan to build Palestinian infrastructure and establish
Western-style public institutions is the first of its kind since the signing
of the 1993 Oslo accords.
Fayyad's state-building vision has already elicited Western enthusiasm and
financial and political support from the Obama administration and European
countries. However, Western optimism may have underestimated the ominous
political tensions which the plan has exacerbated among the fractured
Palestinian leadership. Fayyad, as an unelected prime minister of the
Palestinian Authority, has provoked some in the Palestinian leadership by
announcing his far-reaching program without first seeking approval from the
PA Legislative Council or the PLO governing bodies, without whose support
such an initiative cannot be implemented.1
Israel supports "bottom up" Palestinian state-building. However, Israeli
leaders have voiced legal and security-based concerns over Fayyad's
intention that the PLO governing bodies will unilaterally declare
Palestinian statehood in 2011 based on the June 4, 1967, lines. Such a move
would be unacceptable to Israel, as it would contravene the internationally
recognized principles of a negotiated settlement and secure and recognized
boundaries - defensible borders - that were firmly established in UN
Security Council Resolution 242 following the 1967 Six-Day War. This
resolution, passed in November 1967, has governed all Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations since then, including the Oslo process, the Roadmap, and
Annapolis.
Israel would welcome the opportunity to share its vast experience in
state-building to help Fayyad achieve his "bottom up," state-building vision
within a strong Israeli-Palestinian partnership. However, any unilateral
Palestinian declaration of statehood would preclude Israel's vital security
requirements, its internationally-sanctioned legal rights, and could end up
derailing the peace process and lead to armed conflict between PA forces and
Israel.

The Fayyad Plan
Fayyad's plan is the first serious Palestinian outline of a state-building
effort since the PLO was founded in 1964 and replaces the traditional PLO
position of advocating a "struggle of every means" including armed struggle
to "liberate Palestine," that was reaffirmed at the Sixth Fatah Congress in
Bethlehem in August 2009.2 Fayyad's stated intention is to dedicate the next
24 months until 2011 to building physical infrastructure, public
institutions, public services, and tax incentives for foreign investors.3
These state-building assets would anchor a viable de facto state throughout
the West Bank including areas that, in line with signed agreements between
Israel and the PLO at Oslo, fall under Israeli control, such as the hills
that overlook Jerusalem and Israel's coastal cities to the west, as well as
the strategically important Jordan Valley to the east.
Fayyad's intention is to create facts on the ground that will garner major
international support and lead to pressure to transform recognition of a de
facto Palestinian state in 2011 into a de jure state in the event that the
Palestinian Authority and Israel fail to reach a negotiated solution.4
Fayyad said: "If occupation has not ended by then (2011) and the nations of
the world from China to Chile to Africa and to Australia are looking at us,
they will say that the Palestinian people have a ready state on the ground.
The only problem is the Israeli occupation [the Israeli communities and
security presence] that should end."5

Fayyad's Plan Sidelines Fatah
Despite the plan's explicit "full commitment to the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) program," the Fayyad plan represents a bold anti-Fatah
posture.6 The plan's opening sentences omit any mention of Fatah, despite
its role as the leading Palestinian political movement that has defined the
Palestinian liberation narrative for nearly half a century. Fayyad writes:
"The establishment of a Palestinian state requires collective dedication to
this national goal, which is shared by the various political and social
organizations, academic and cultural institutions, non-government
organizations, local government councils, the private sector, the
land-protection and anti-settlements and anti-wall committees, and the
national organizations of women and youth."7
Fayyad's Western approach in language, substance, and style represents a
sharp break from both past PA governments and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas'
Fatah movement. Fayyad's glaring omission of mentioning Fatah, and the
plan's commitment to political struggle based on "peaceful and popular
movements," together with "building a government based on the principles of
justice and the rule of law, equality and tolerance, safeguarded by a clear
separation of powers of the executive, the legislature and judiciary," is
language uniquely befitting the U.S.-trained Palestinian economist, who told
Newsweek that former U.S. President Alexander Hamilton, the New York
federalist, was a role model.8 Fayyad has a staunch reputation in the West
as a "technocrat and pragmatist."9

Western Support for the Fayyad Plan
Fayyad's unilateral Palestinian state program has already earned the broad
backing of the UN, the Quartet, and European leaders, as well as the Obama
administration. The Quartet issued a joint statement on September 24, 2009,
that "welcomes the Palestinian Authority's plan for constructing the
institutions of the Palestinian state within 24 months as a demonstration of
the PA's serious commitment to an independent state."10 On September 22,
2009, Tony Blair, the Middle East Quartet Special Envoy, hosted the UN Ad
Hoc Liaison Committee on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, where
donor nations promised $400 million to the PA by the end of 2009.11 Blair
has characterized Fayyad's performance as "absolutely first class -
professional, courageous, intelligent."12 Norway's foreign minister, Jonas
Gahr Store, a committee member, praised donor support of the Fayyad plan as
"an investment in a political project."13 UN Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry has also publicly backed the Fayyad
plan.14 In fact, on July 12, 2009, Javier Solana, the European Union's top
diplomat, reportedly called on the UN Security Council to recognize a
Palestinian state even without a final-status agreement between Israel and
the Palestinians. He said the UN "would accept the Palestinian state as a
full member of the UN, and set a calendar for implementation."15
While the U.S. administration has not officially announced explicit support
for Fayyad's state project, President Barack Obama has also envisioned a
two-year path to Mideast peace.16 There are other indications of support as
well. Shortly after the plan's publication in August, the Obama
administration announced a $20 million grant to back the effort.17 A few
weeks earlier, the U.S. Congress approved a $200 million deposit into the PA
treasury, which falls under Fayyad's direct control.18 Washington also
committed $109 million in 2009 to finance an expanded, U.S.-backed training
program for the PA security forces that since 2005 have been under Fayyad's
control, under the close supervision of U.S. Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton.19

Palestinian Opposition to the Fayyad Plan
Despite robust Western support, Fayyad's ambitious plan has enjoyed a mixed
reception in Palestinian circles. Fatah has decided to give Fayyad's plan a
chance due to the prospect of his implementing Palestinian state projects on
an unprecedented scale.20 At the same time, Fayyad's agenda has triggered
tensions in Fatah and the PLO and has drawn sharp criticism from the Arab
media for co-opting the power and legitimacy of official PLO bodies.21
Fayyad has emphasized that any decision on a declaration of statehood at the
end of two years would be made by the PLO organs.22 However, the Fayyad plan
is seen to pose a direct challenge to Fatah and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas,
who reiterated, when Fayyad presented the plan, that "negotiations with
Israel are the only option for the Palestinian Authority."23 Furthermore,
Fayyad's approach collides with Fatah's traditional platform of "armed
struggle" to "liberate Palestine" using "all options" available, as
confirmed at the recent Fatah Congress.24 Fayyad's program also contradicts
the Fatah Congress' reaffirmation of a "one-state" solution in the event
that negotiations over a "two-state" solution fail.25
Fayyad, who is not a member of the ruling Fatah movement, enjoys only
limited political backing in the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority,
particularly following the latest central committee elections in August
2009. Fatah's rejection of Fayyad was manifested in the rejection of his
candidacy to the PLO executive committee, which, had he been elected, would
have empowered him to declare a Palestinian state as part of the PLO
political hierarchy. However, Fayyad reached a limited understanding with
powerful Fatah warlord Mohammed Dahlan. In fact, Dahlan is currently one of
Fayyad's staunchest supporters in the complex constellation of Palestinian
politics. However, Fayyad's political rivals, such as Tawfiq Tirawi, Abu
Maher Gneim, and Mahmud al-Alul, who support "armed resistance" against
Israel and were recently elected to the new Fatah Central Committee, have
already blasted Fayyad's plans as being a "governmental intifada" that
contradicted the "armed struggle."
Fayyad will also face a major challenge in financing his state-building
program. International donor countries have not yet fulfilled the billions
of dollars in pledges made at the 2007 Paris donors conference, as well as
the nearly $5 billion pledged at the 2009 Gaza war donors conference in
Cairo.26 Fayyad has faced difficulties in the past simply paying the monthly
salaries of the 130,000 employees on the PA payroll. Nevertheless, lately
salaries have been paid on time, and Fayyad is inaugurating development
projects on a daily basis due to the support his plan is receiving from the
donor community.27
One potentially prohibitive roadblock to Fayyad's statehood plan is that it
calls for a reconnection of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip to the
Fatah-ruled West Bank. This would imply that Hamas would have to accede to
holding elections in January 2010 which it currently opposes, relinquish its
de facto rule over Gaza, and once again accept living under Fatah control.
Yet it seems more likely that Hamas would initiate a military confrontation
with Fayyad's PA forces, as it did in its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Indeed,
following Fayyad's most recent appointment as prime minister in May 2009,
Hamas officials labeled him a "traitor" and promised an "earthquake" of a
response.28 A few days later, Fayyad-led PA security forces and Hamas
engaged in a deadly firefight in the West Bank town of Kalkilya in which
three PA security forces and three Hamas operatives were killed.29

The Fateful 2010 Palestinian Elections
Fayyad has launched his state-building plan as his opening gambit for the
scheduled elections in January 2010, when the terms of Palestinian Chairman
Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Legislative Council are due to expire.
Since Fayyad now serves as Abbas' appointed prime minister, he will be able
to advance his state-building project and unilaterally declare Palestinian
statehood in 2011 only if he wins by a landslide either in a bid for the
presidency or as a newly-elected prime minister. Fayyad has already hit the
campaign trail, admitting to Newsweek's Kevin Peraino: "Part of what you
have to do is to be on a campaign all year long."30 Competition for Abbas'
job will be fierce and will likely be led by extremist Fatah leaders such as
Abu Maher Gneim and Tawfiq Tirawi who vehemently oppose Fayyad. However,
Fayyad's grassroots popularity has blossomed significantly in recent months
among West Bankers in smaller towns and villages, where he has delivered
essential services such as upgraded water projects, electricity, and other
basic infrastructure that Fatah and PA organs had failed to deliver.
Analysts estimate that Fayyad could win as much as 15 percent of the vote in
the next elections, currently scheduled for January 2010.31

Israel's Legal and Security Concerns
Aside from formidable challenges on the Palestinian front, Fayyad's plan
creates serious legal and security concerns for Israel. It is true that
Israel has long supported Palestinian institution-building and has even
based its current policy towards the Palestinian Authority on "bottom up"
state-building and "economic peace."32 However, Israel strongly opposes any
unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood, as this would contravene
the principle of a negotiated solution between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, as enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242, of November
22, 1967, which has governed all Arab-Israeli peace efforts for the past 42
years.
Alan Baker, former legal advisor to Israel's Foreign Ministry and one of the
legal "engineers" of the Oslo accords, warned that Fayyad's one-sided
establishment of a Palestinian state contravenes a key provision of the Oslo
Interim Agreement, according to which: "Neither side shall initiate or take
any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
pending the outcome of the permanent status agreement."33 Baker noted: "The
intention of the parties during the negotiations was clear: the Palestinian
side will not declare a unilateral Palestinian state and the Israelis will
not declare annexation."34
Another direct challenge to Israel is that Fayyad's "blueprint" calls for
massive Palestinian development in Area "C" of the disputed West Bank, which
is under Israeli civil and security control, and which directly challenges
the delicate, agreed-upon framework of the 1993 Oslo accords.35 Palestinian
plans include building an airport in the Jordan Valley, taking control of
Atarot airport near Jerusalem, establishing new rail links to neighboring
states, and water installation projects near Tulkarem and Kalkilya close to
the pre-1967 "green line."36 Israeli security echelons firmly oppose
Palestinian airport development plans near Jerusalem and in the Jordan
Valley.37 Furthermore, Fayyad's agenda has broader designs on Area "C."
Fayyad told the Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat in a September 1, 2009,
interview: "Many think that zone "C" areas have become disputed territories
rather than occupied territories in the public consciousness. We assert that
these are PNA territories where the state will be established."38
The Israeli government is aware of the possibility of unilateral Palestinian
moves in the ongoing dispute over the future of the West Bank. Foreign
Minister Avigdor Lieberman told Quartet envoy Tony Blair and EU policy chief
Javier Solana soon after the plan's release in August 2009: "Palestinian
unilateral initiatives do not contribute to a positive dialogue between the
parties and if the unilateral initiative presented by Salam Fayyad is
promoted, Israel will respond."39 In a September 17, 2009, interview, Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his rejection of the Palestinian
demand that the 1967 lines will become Israel's eastern border, which is a
central part of Fayyad's plan. Netanyahu told the Israeli daily Israel
Today: "There are those who prophesized that the 1967 lines would be
(Israel's eastern) border, but these are indefensible, something that is
unacceptable to me. Israel needs defensible borders and also the ongoing
ability to defend itself."40
Netanyahu's comments were not made in a vacuum. They were based on Israel's
international legal rights as preserved in UN Security Council Resolution
242. Netanyahu's insistence on "defensible borders" also stems from
understandings Israel has secured with the U.S. in the past. The concept of
"defensible borders" was a central element in President George W. Bush's
letter to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of April 14, 2004, with a
commitment made by the White House as a diplomatic quid pro quo for Israel's
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005.41 The Bush letter was
approved overwhelmingly by both houses of the U.S. Congress immediately
afterward.
President Bush reiterated his public commitment to defensible borders for
Israel on January 10, 2008, during his first visit to Israel as president.42
Prime Minister Netanyahu also emphasized Israel's requirement for
"defensible borders" in his first major policy address on June 15, 2009, at
Bar-Ilan University. The achievement of "defensible borders" was one of
several key security requirements that would anchor Israel's agreement to
the establishment of a future demilitarized Palestinian state.43
Israel's requirement of "defensible borders" involves its continuing control
in Area "C," including the strategically vital Jordan Valley and the high
ground surrounding Jerusalem and overlooking Israel's vulnerable cities
along the Mediterranean coast. The Jordan Valley serves as a vital barrier
against any potential invasion from the east. Despite the treaty of peace
with Jordan and the U.S. military occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan,
potential threats from the east are still tangible. The Iranian-backed
Hizbullah's 4,000 rocket attacks from the north in 2006 and the
Iranian-backed Hamas' 10,000 rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza,
culminating in the 2009 Gaza war, both underscore the potential rocket
threat against Israel's cities that could emerge if Israel withdrew to the
pre-1967 lines.
Former IDF Intelligence Assessment Chief Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror
notes that the Jordan Valley now serves as an important natural barrier to
the potential flow of rockets to the West Bank hilltops overlooking Israel's
coastline, where they could easily strike Israel's main airport, key
utilities, and most of Israel's major cities.44 Former IDF Chief of Staff
Shaul Mofaz made a similar assessment to the Israeli cabinet in 2000 at the
time of the Clinton proposals,45 while his successor as chief of staff,
Moshe Yaalon, underscored the same requirement for defensible borders in the
West Bank in 2008.46

Conclusions
PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's two-year, unilateral, state-building plan
signals a positive shift away from the politics of armed struggle that has
characterized the Fatah leadership to date. The current policy of the State
of Israel advocates "bottom up" state-building as well as security,
political, and educational reform and economic peace as necessary stages to
achieve a demilitarized Palestinian state. In this sense, Fayyad has
demonstrated political boldness in unilaterally transforming the failed
Fatah policies of the past and in standing firm against Hamas.
The Obama administration has indicated its support for Fayyad's
state-building project. However, the risks and dangers of such a plan in
view of the growing tensions and competition for power in the Palestinian
arena likely outweigh the plan's potential to unify Palestinian ranks and
end the conflict with Israel.
Furthermore, the Fayyad plan would unilaterally transform the diplomatic
paradigm between the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel from a
legally-sanctioned, negotiated process to a unilateral Palestinian
initiative that has far-reaching and even troubling legal, political, and
security implications for Israel and, by extension, for the Palestinians and
other regional actors. A unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood
would also free Israel from the restrictions and obligations it accepted
under the Oslo agreements, with all that implies,47 and would further
complicate the Middle East peace process.
Fayyad's strategy to enlist U.S. and international support for his
unilateral steps to pressure Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines could very
well backfire. Far from building the foundations of a Palestinian state, a
unilaterally declared state that claims the pre-1967 lines as its borders
could end up thrusting Israel, the PA, and other regional actors into a
storm of instability and possibly armed conflict.
* * *
Notes
1. Salam Fayyad interview with Ali al Salih in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September
1, 2009. Al Salih charged that Fayyad has been subject to personal attack
and his unilateral plan "strongly criticized by some Palestinian factions
including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and
Hamas." Ali attacked Fayyad saying, "every Fatah official I have talked to
criticized your initiative and considered it encroachment, an attack on the
powers of the President."
2. See the political program of Fatah, as affirmed at the Sixth Fatah
Conference, Bethlehem, Palestinian Authority, August, 2009,
http://www.fatehconf.ps/pdfs/fatehpolitical.pdf.
3. Salam Fayyad, Palestine National Authority, Ending the Occupation,
Establishing the State, Program of the Thirteenth Government, August 2009.
See also "Palestinian PM: 'We'll Form De Facto State by 2011'," Ha'aretz,
August 25, 2009.
4. "Palestinian PM Expounds Plan to Proclaim Statehood by 2011," Al-Sharq
al-Awsat, September 1, 2009.
5. Fayyad interview.
6. Ibid.
7. Fayyad, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, p. 3.
8. Kevin Peraino, "Palestine's New Perspective," Newsweek, September 14,
2009.
9. Ibid.
10. Joint Statement by the Quartet, Washington, D.C., September 24, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/129602.htm.
11. Press Conference of Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to
Palestinians, United Nations, September 22, 2009,
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/090922_AHLC.doc.htm. See also Avi
Issacharoff, "Abbas: Palestinians Can't Negotiate with Netanyahu," Ha'aretz,
September 24, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1116693.html.
12. Peraino.
13. Press Conference of Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to
Palestinians.
14. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=221642.
15. "Solana Wants UN to Establish Palestine," Jerusalem Post, July 12, 2009,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1246443786047.
16. Barak Ravid and Akiva Eldar, "Obama Envisions Two Years until Mideast
Peace Deal," Ha'aretz, September 1, 2009.
17. USAID official Hayward Sumka confirmed the $20 million U.S. financial
assistance package to support the Fayyad vision during a September 2009
visit to the West Bank. See also Maan news agency (Arabic), August 27, 2009,
http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=222018.
18. Peraino.
19. Jim Zanotti, "U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority,"
Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2009,
http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/R40664.pdf.
20. Meeting with senior Fatah source and former senior Palestinian official
in Jerusalem, September 10, 2009.
21. Fayyad interview. See also note 1 for attacks on Fayyad by Palestinian
factions.
22. Fayyad interview. Fayyad said, "I absolutely do not cast doubts on the
fact that the PLO is responsible for proclaiming the state."
23. Maan news agency (Arabic), August 17, 2009,
http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=219746.
24. Pinhas Inbari, "Will Fatah Give Up the Armed Struggle at Its Sixth
General Congress?" Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 9, No. 6, August 4, 2009.
25. Ibid.
26. Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari, "Is the Palestinian Authority Stable Enough
for Peace Talks? Assessing the Resignation and Return of Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 9, No. 3, June 16, 2009.
27. Maan news agency (Arabic), September 23, 2009,
http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=227336.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Peraino.
31. This assessment of Fayyad's dramatically increased popularity was made
to the authors by three senior Palestinian analysts in separate meetings in
Jerusalem, September 28-30, 2009.
32. Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Yaalon coined the term "bottom
up" in 2008 as a new approach to Palestinian society-building. See Moshe
Yaalon, "A New Strategy for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," Jerusalem
Issue Brief, Vol. 8, No. 10, September 2, 2008,
http://www.jcpa.org/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=2515&TTL=A_New_Strategy_for_the_Israeli-Palestinian_Conflict.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coined the phrase "economic peace" in 2008
with regard to developing the Palestinian Authority's economy as a key
prerequisite for viable and stable Palestinian statehood.
33. Alan Baker, "De Facto Deliberations," Jerusalem Post, August 26, 2009,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1251145125233&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
34. Ibid.
35. According to the 1993 Oslo Accords that were signed on September 13,
1993, at the White House by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and
Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, until a
final status accord was established, the West Bank and Gaza would be divided
into three zones: Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority; Area
B - Palestinian civil control, Israeli military control; Area C - full
Israeli control.
36. Fayyad, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, p. 35. Fayyad's
aggressive plans to build in Area "C" of the West Bank is the most
far-reaching attempt by the Palestinian Authority to establish de facto
control outside of Palestinian Areas "A" and "B" as defined at Oslo. See
also Alan Baker, "De Facto Deliberations." Baker, former legal advisor to
Israel's Foreign Ministry and a legal architect of the Oslo accords, notes:
"The concept of a one-sided establishment of a de facto state outside the
agreed-upon process would appear to ignore a central component of the
framework in which Fayyad himself is permitted to function, and from which
he derives his own authority." The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "still remains the valid
source of authority for the Palestinian administration in the territories,
as well as for the entire functioning of Palestinian governance. This
agreement sets out and enables the establishment and functioning of the
Palestinian Council (which serves as the parliament of the Palestinian
Authority), details the mode of election of its members and appointment of
its ministers, and defines its jurisdiction, its legislative and other
powers, structure and prerogatives."
37. Meeting with a former senior IDF source who was directly involved in
security aspects of the previous negotiations with the PA that included
plans for airports and other transportation projects mentioned in the Fayyad
plan, Jerusalem, September 23, 2009.
38. Fayyad interview in Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
39. "FM: Bilateral Steps Will Bring Peace," Jerusalem Post, August 31, 2009.
40. Shlomo Tzna and Mati Tuckfeld, "The Prime Minister in a Special Holiday
Interview: The Land Is Already Divided," Israel Today, September 16, 2009,
http://www.israelhayom.co.il/site/newsletter_article.php?a=3738. Netanyahu's
opposition to returning to the June 4, 1967, lines is based on the
internationally sanctioned legal principle of "secure and recognized
boundaries" - "defensible borders" in diplomatic shorthand - that has been a
fundamental security doctrine of Israeli governments since the June 1967 war
and which was also enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242.
Netanyahu's insistence on defensible borders follows the same demand made by
former prime ministers Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Golda Meir, and Levi
Eshkol. Prime Minister Rabin told the Knesset in 1995 that Israel's future
borders would "include the Jordan Valley in the broadest meaning of that
term."
41. The 2004 Bush letter stated: "The United States remains committed to the
security of Israel including secure, recognized and defensible borders and
to preserving and strengthening the capability of Israel to deter enemies
and defend itself against any threat." See Defensible Borders for a Lasting
Peace. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, 2008, Appendix 3, p.
73.
42. Herb Keinan, "Bush Tells Israel: End the Occupation," Jerusalem Post,
January 10, 2008.
43. For the Netanyahu speech, see
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechbarilan140609.htm.
44. See also Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, "Israel's Requirement for
Defensible Borders," in Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace," pp. 17-39.
45. In December 2000, former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz had emphasized
similar resultant dangers to those that the new Fayyad plan poses to Israel
when he warned the Israeli cabinet on behalf of the IDF General Staff that
the Clinton parameters, which were also based on the June 4, 1967, lines,
"would endanger Israel's security." Mofaz's professional opposition to the
adoption of the Clinton parameters, which like the Fayyad plan called for
Israel to return to the June 4, 1967, lines, was headlined in Israel's
Yediot Ahronot newpaper on December 29, 2000. See Dore Gold, The Fight for
Jerusalem (Washington: Regnery, 2007), p. 9.
46. Moshe Yaalon, "The Second Lebanon War, from Territory to Ideology," in
Iran's Race for Regional Supremacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
Jerusalem, 2008, p. 33.
47. Baker, "De Facto Declarations."
* * *
Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari are senior foreign policy analysts at the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Search For An Article
....................................................................................................

Contact Us

POB 982 Kfar Sava
Tel 972-9-7604719
Fax 972-3-7255730
email:imra@netvision.net.il IMRA is now also on Twitter
http://twitter.com/IMRA_UPDATES

image004.jpg (8687 bytes)