[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Stuart Cohen is hardly alone in suggesting that
settlers be expelled from a given area while the IDF remain because Israel
needs the IDF to remain in the area.

But experience has demonstrated time and again that for a variety of
reasons - be it lack of will or something else - when Israeli civilians are
no longer in an area, the IDF is ultimately pulled from it.

Would it have been easier not having to devote IDF resources protecting
civilians in area "X"?

Perhaps.

But. Again. Is that really the relevant policy consideration?

Isn't the overarching policy consideration, if control of area "X" is vital
to Israeli interests, is how to insure that in a moment of weakness that the
Israeli leadership doesn't retreat from it?

Yes. It certainly sounds like an expensive way to insure that spineless or
shortsighted leaders don't screw up.

But it is a small price to pay compared to the cost of the screw up being
prevented.]

================

Flaws in General Eiland's Alternatives

Stuart A. Cohen

BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 99, February 7, 2010

www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives99.html

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In his recent BESA monograph on "Regional Alternatives to
the Two-State Solution," General Giora Eiland faults all the currently
conventional approaches to Israeli-Palestinian relations - a spectrum that
is not restricted to the two-state solution but also extends to the belief
in the efficacy of "interim" arrangements as well as the notion that Israel
might somehow "manage" the current conflict indefinitely. Instead, he
proposes two "regional" solutions. The present article argues that Eiland's
suggestions suffer from several fundamental flaws and that there in fact
exists no alternative to an option that Eiland did not examine in any depth:
a unilateral Israeli dismantlement of the civilian settlements established
since 1967 in Judea and Samaria.

General Giora Eiland divides his recent BESA monograph "Regional
Alternatives to the Two-State Solution," BESA Memorandum No. 4, January
2010. into two sections. The first is diagnostic, and analyzes drawbacks
that invalidate the currently conventional approaches to Israeli-Palestinian
relations - a spectrum that is not restricted to the two-state solution but
also extends to the belief in the efficacy of "interim" arrangements as well
as the notion that Israel might somehow "manage" the current conflict
indefinitely and thereby keep its dimensions within tolerable bounds.

In the second section of his memorandum, General Eiland presents a
prognosis, and tables two alternative courses - both regional in scope.
· The first is the promotion of a Jordanian-Palestinian
"federation" - an arrangement that would require Israel to renounce claims
to all but a fraction of Judea and Samaria, but would also prevent the
establishment of an independent, and intrinsically unviable, Palestinian
state in that area.
· The second is a three-way exchange of territory between Egypt,
Israel and Jordan - designed to upgrade the economic viability of Gaza, to
facilitate the marketing of goods, services and raw resources between the
Jordanian hinterland and the Mediterranean shore; and, not least, to allow a
higher proportion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank to remain in situ.

The present paper presents a critique of those two alternatives. It argues
that the soundness of General Eiland's diagnosis of the reasons for the
current impasse in Israeli-Palestinian relations itself undermines the
validity of his prognosis with respect to their future "regional" course.
Closer examination indicates that neither of General Eiland's alternatives
is as realistic as he would have us believe.

Rather, they suffer from at least three fundamental flaws.

Flaw I: Has Anyone Asked The Bride(s)?

General Eiland details the several benefits that in his judgment will accrue
to the Jordanians and the Palestinians as a consequence of their adoption of
the Federation scheme (alternative 1). He also itemizes the advantages that
he calculates that they - together with the Egyptians and indeed the entire
Middle East - will gain as a result of the proposed territorial exchange
(alternative 2).

Unfortunately, however, he provides no evidence whatsoever that his
assessments are shared by any individual in Jordan, in Palestine or in
Egypt. This is especially surprising in view of the possibility, perhaps
even probability, that all three partners might turn both alternatives down
flat.

In ascending order:
· Are the Egyptians likely to regard with equanimity the presence of
a stronger and perhaps larger Gaza, which for all we know might still be
under Hamas control, right on their doorstep?
· Is it realistic to expect the present rulers of Jordan to agree to
a Federation, an arrangement that however construed would augment even
further the Palestinian presence in their country and thus endanger the
stability of what is already a fragile society?
· Most important of all, does there exist a single Palestinian leader
capable of substituting the aspiration for an independent Palestinian state
with the far more amorphous notion of a Federation, in which - as General
Eiland concedes - the Palestinians will be granted no greater a degree of
independent national recognition than are the residents of New Jersey in the
United States?

The expectation of Palestinian cooperation in a territorial exchange
(alternative 2) seems even more unrealistic. As proposed by General Eiland,
this arrangement would officially concede 12 percent of the West Bank to the
state of Israel. Hence, it would require the Palestinians to relinquish all
claims not merely to Jerusalem and its environs, but also to Ofra, Kiryat
Arbah, and Ariel. The argument that Palestinian residents of the West Bank
will pay this price in order to help the inhabitants of Gaza to attain a
viable port etc., surely attributes to them a degree of altruistic
compatriotism that their history has - thus far - belied.

In brief: Is General Eiland in effect suggesting that Israel play chess with
itself - precisely the fault that he identifies in much of the current
two-state discourse, which is likewise characterized by the absence of a
viable Palestinian discussant?

Flaw II: Don't Fix What Ain't Broke

In a region notorious for its shifting political sands, anchors of stability
are precious commodities and hence must be preserved with care. Currently,
Israel possesses just two such local anchors, the peace treaties with Egypt
(1979) and with Jordan (1994), both of which have survived despite being
subject to numerous domestic and international strains.

General Eiland's proposed alternatives, however, threaten to undo that
achievement.
· The establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian Federation will
clearly require significant modifications in Israel's existing treaty with
Jordan (for instance, in order to cover the de-militarization of the West
Bank and allocate water rights there), and hence its re-negotiation.
· Likewise, and as General Eiland admits, any territorial
re-alignment on the Israeli-Egyptian border will require re-negotiating the
existing treaty with Egypt (he specifically mentions revision of its
de-militarization clauses).

Neither prospect is attractive. At best, re-negotiations will involve
protracted wrangling over extremely delicate issues (such as the
de-militarization of the Sinai) which, if past experience is anything to go
by, will almost inevitably lead to mutual charges of bad faith. At worst,
re-negotiations might become so bogged down that they could lead to the
suspension of relations. Wherein lies the political wisdom of inviting such
risks at the present juncture in Middle Eastern history, when regional
stability is being undermined by events in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and
Afghanistan, and is likely to be buffeted further by the impending departure
of President Husni Mubarak.

As far as Israeli-Palestinian relations are concerned, there seems an even
greater likelihood that the introduction of new proposals at the present
juncture might backfire and defeat the very purposes that General Eiland has
in mind. Only last year, Israel's Prime Minister publicly announced his
acceptance of the Palestinians' right to statehood. To inform them that
Israel is now backtracking from that position, and has reverted to the idea
of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation (a notion that Israel itself did much
to torpedo in the past) is to invite even the most moderate of Palestinians
to believe that Hamas has been right all along. Israel simply does not want
any agreement with the Palestinians, who hence have no choice other than to
resort to a renewed campaign of violence.

Flaw III: If It's Worth Doing, Then Why Not Do It - Even Unilaterally?

Essential to General Eiland's prognosis is the argument that both of his
alternatives are inherently good for the state of Israel, which is likely to
benefit from their implementation at least as much as its neighbors. A
Jordanian-Palestinian Federation, the Palestinian section of which will
encompass virtually all of Judea and Samaria, will relieve Israel of the
onus and stigma of internationally disputed occupation and settlement; a
territorial exchange will lead to an improvement of trade and atmosphere,
which will likewise redound to Israel's advantage.

But if such is indeed the case, why wait for the agreement of other parties?
The question is especially pertinent where the Jewish settlements are
concerned. If, as General Eiland's diagnosis suggests, the overwhelming
majority do need to be dismantled - for Israel's own sake - then why not do
so unilaterally, leaving in Judea and Samaria only an IDF presence, required
to maintain Israel's security needs?

Sadly, Gen. Eiland studiously avoids analyzing this alternative. All he is
prepared to say is that although the 2005 disengagement was a good idea in
principle, it was mishandled tactically. Mr. Sharon, he argues, would have
done far better to have maneuvered others into proposing that initiative.
Surely the issue warrants much more attention. How would Israeli public
opinion have responded to Eiland's proposed scenario? Wouldn't it have been
feasible - and politic - to retain a military presence in Gaza, even after
the dismantlement of the settlements? Gen. Eiland's failure to consider
these and other questions intimates an uncharacteristic hesitancy to think
as openly about future options as his own diagnosis requires.

This is unfortunate. As General Eiland himself points out, unless the
present impasse is broken, the inevitable alternative to a two-state
solution will be a one-state solution, in which the Palestinians would
either be denied equal rights or constitute a minority sufficiently large to
imperil its Jewish character. Both outcomes would mean the bankruptcy of
Zionism. Hence, both must be avoided, if necessary by action of a drastic
kind. The time for half-measures, if it ever existed, has by now certainly
passed.

Stuart A. Cohen is a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies, and a professor of political science at Bar-Ilan
University.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family.