IDF Spokesperson Announcement
For Immediate Release
July 12h, 2010 17:00

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland Presents the Chief of the General Staff with the
Conclusions of his Examination Team

The IDF Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, received the
conclusions reached by a team of experts, headed by Maj. Gen. (Res.) Giora
Eiland, tasked with examining the incidents that took place at sea on May
31st 2010.

Maj. Gen. Eiland presented the team's findings and conclusions to the Chief
of the General Staff as well as to officers from the General Staff and from
other IDF branches and directorates who were involved in the preparations
and in the actual boarding of the flotilla. The core of the report was
presented the Minister of Defense of Israel as well.

The team was appointed by the Chief of the General Staff to examine the
deployment towards the flotilla, the chosen course of action and other
possible alternatives, advance preparations, and the operation's
implementation.

The team included eight officers and their examination focused on
intelligence, Naval command, the naval commando unit responsible for
carrying out the operation, the Israel Air Force, media relations,
technological alternatives, medical aspects and legal counsel and
international law.

The examination presented various lessons on a broad, systemic level, not
only as regards this specific operation (stopping the flotilla).

In terms of the intelligence effort, the team concluded that not all
possible intelligence gathering methods were fully implemented and that the
coordination between Navy Intelligence and the Israel Defense Intelligence
was insufficient. At the same time, the team emphasized that it is not
certain that an optimal intelligence effort would create a complete
intelligence picture. The team also pointed out that the anticipated level
of violence used against the forces was underestimated.

In terms of situation assessments towards the flotilla, the team clarified
that the operation relied excessively on a single course of action, albeit a
probable one, while no alternative courses of action were prepared for the
event of more dangerous scenarios.

Regarding technological alternatives, the team determined that on the day of
the incident, decision makers were not presented with alternative
operational courses of action other than a full boarding of the flotilla.
The team emphasized the fact that as far as is currently known, no country
in the world holds the ability to stop a vessel at sea in a non hostile
manner. Therefore statements made on this matter following the incident are
unfounded and irresponsible. At the same time, the team determined that
alternative courses of action could have existed had the process of
preparation begun enough time in advance, and recommended to accelerate the
process of examining alternative methods.

The expert team determined that regarding media relations, the preparations
made in advance were good. However, the release of press statements and
visual materials was delayed due to the need to maintain reliability, the
obligation to notify the families of the critically injured soldiers and the
long authorization process at the levels above the IDF Spokesperson Unit.
The team noted with favor the work of the IDF spokesperson following the
incident and emphasized the need for better coordination between the IDF,
the foreign ministry and other foreign affairs institutions.

In terms of commanding over the operation, the team determines that the
location of the commanders during the incident and the presence of the
Commander of the Israel Navy at sea during the operation, was proper and fit
with the Chief of the General Staff's view regarding the role of commanders
at the front lines of IDF activity. His presence proved effective in terms
of the decision making process, saving lives and more. The team praised the
Israel Navy combat protocols, the preparations of the Naval Commando Unit,
the Navy Command, the Electronic Warfare Formation and the medical
evacuation.

The team determined that the Navy Commando soldiers operated properly, with
professionalism, bravery and resourcefulness and that the commanders
exhibited correct decision making. The report further determines that the
use of live fire was justified and that the entire operation is estimable.

The team noted with favor the various stages of medical evacuation of the
injured by air and by sea, including the injured passengers of the Mavi
Marmara. In addition the team pointed out the serious attitude with which
the General Staff and the Israel Navy approached the matter, as expressed in
the preparations.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland noted with favor the degree of cooperation and
transparency exhibited by those involved in the examination at all levels.
In the summary of the examination Maj. Gen. Eiland determined that the issue
should be viewed with perspective, being that the damage caused to Israel is
not as severe as it seemed following the incident. In addition, he said that
a there's a tendency to draw general conclusions based on a single incident
and that "the fact that the IDF examines itself and others do not, results
in that only the errors of the IDF are publicized", according to Maj. Gen.
Eiland.