MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis |699|June 24, 2011
Hamas/Palestinians

The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Was There an Agreement?
By: Y. Yehoshua*

For more from the MEMRI Palestinian Media Studies Project, visit
http://www.memri.org/palestinianmediastudies.

Introduction

The story of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement is a "Rashomon" of
conflicting versions and interpretations. Today, one month after the
reconciliation ceremony, the details of the agreement remain uncertain. The
only uncontested element is the document of understandings that accompanied
the agreement, an initialed copy of which was published in the Arab and
Palestinian press. As for the document to which these understandings
relate – namely the agreement itself – its precise content remains unclear,
and there seems to be tacit agreement to refrain from officially releasing
it. On this backdrop, different versions of the agreement and its details
have been published, and there may have even been deliberate attempts at
deception.

Apparently, the main purpose of the inter-Palestinian agreement was to make
a show of unity at any cost, despite the disagreements between the sides, in
order to promote the Palestinian diplomatic initiative planned for September
2011 – though there are those on both sides who doubt the efficacy of this
diplomatic initiative.

An examination of the understandings between the two sides suggests that, in
the short term, Fatah has gained the upper hand. The agreement, formulated
against the backdrop of the uprisings in the Arab world, met the demand of
the Palestinian public to end the Fatah-Hamas schism, thereby freeing the PA
and PLO if this public pressure, which was focused mostly on them. Moreover,
though Fatah has granted Hamas a share in the government, the latter
movement has made a series of concessions: It has been decided that, until
the elections are held, a government of technocrats – rather than a unity
government – will be established, which, contra to Hamas's former demand,
will not handle diplomatic affairs. Moreover, as PA president, Mahmoud
'Abbas will direct the negotiations with Israel in the coming year, if any.
It has also been agreed that the interim leadership framework – a body
comprising representatives of all the Palestinian factions that is to handle
diplomatic affairs in the coming year – will not infringe upon the PLO's
authority.

The sides have also agreed that in the coming year – until elections are
held for the presidency, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the
Palestinian National Council (PNC) – the security and political status quo
will be maintained. According to some reports, Hamas has granted the PLO one
more year to continue negotiations with Israel, during which time it will
maintain the tahdiya (calm) and refrain from firing rockets at Israel from
the Gaza Strip.

According to Hamas senior officials, these concessions by Fatah are meant to
facilitate the Palestinian initiative to seek U.N. recognition for an
independent Palestinian state in September, by removing the main obstacle to
this initiative, namely the Fatah-Hamas schism. Hamas has expressed its
willingness to accept a state in the 1967 borders, presenting this as an
interim stage in the process of eliminating Israel, and as a strategy
approved by Hamas's former leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. At the same time,
Hamas officials have stressed that the Palestinian state will not be
established by the U.N. but only through jihad.

Apparently, Hamas believes that cooperation with Fatah will serve it in the
long run, because the implementation of the agreement and the outcome of the
elections will bring about a profound change in the makeup of the
Palestinian leadership and in its strategy. Moreover, fully integrated in
the Palestinian government, the PLC and the PLO, Hamas will gain the
international legitimacy it has been seeking since its takeover of Gaza.
Hamas downplayed the significance of its concessions by stressing that the
negotiations between the PLO and Israel are bound to fail anyway, which will
force the Palestinians to come up with a new strategy vis-à-vis Israel. The
movement also explained that its temporary commitment to the tahdiya does
not mean that it has opted for peace and abandoned the resistance.

It is noteworthy that, alongside the involvement of the Egyptian government,
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood played a key role in brokering the
agreement. In a statement he issued, the movement's general guide, Muhammad
Badi', related that representatives of the Palestinian factions had convened
at the Muslim Brotherhood's new headquarters in Muqattam, and had reached an
agreement in just four days.[1] The Muslim Brotherhood's involvement can be
regarded as one of the reflections of the cooperation between this movement
and Egypt's post-revolution government; it can also be seen as an attempt by
the Muslim Brotherhood to restrain its Palestinian branch, Hamas, in order
to improve its own image in advance of the Egyptian elections. Hamas, for
its part, may be worried about the possible collapse of the Syrian regime.
These apprehensions may have prompted it to rely more heavily on the new
Egyptian administration and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

The agreement was signed amid profound disagreement between the sides.
Most points of contention were not settled in the agreement itself but
deferred for discussion at a later date; some of them are to be discussed
only after the elections in about a year. These disputes and the fact that
the agreement has not been made public, as well as the conflicting
statements and interpretations given by the spokesmen of the two movements
after its signing, cast serious doubt over the agreement's chances of
success.

This report will attempt to determine which document the sides have signed,
what the goals of the reconciliation are, and what understandings have been
reached on the political and security levels despite the principled
disagreements between Fatah and Hamas in these domains.

What Documents Have Been Signed?

Even today, about a month and a half after the reconciliation ceremony, it
is not yet clear what documents were signed by the parties.[2] To probe this
question, one must examine two documents: the understandings document and
the reconciliation agreement:

1. The Document of Understandings

On April 27, representatives of Fatah and Hamas signed a document of
understandings, an initialed copy of which was widely published in the
Palestinian and Arab media. This document mainly addresses Hamas's
reservations about the reconciliation agreement, which it refused to sign in
2009. There is no controversy over the content of the understandings
document, though there is disagreement about the interpretation of certain
clauses.

The main points of the document of understandings are as follows: An
elections committee will be appointed on an agreed-upon basis; an electoral
court will be established; elections will be held for the presidency, the
PLC and the PNC within one year; a supreme security council will be
appointed on an agreed-upon basis; an "interim leadership framework" will be
appointed, whose decisions will not conflict with those of the PLO; and a
government will be appointed on an agreed-upon basis, whose tasks will be to
prepare the elections, handle all issues pertaining to the reconciliation,
rehabilitate Gaza, end the siege, unify the PA institutions in the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank and Jerusalem, manage charity associations and NGOs,
and activate the PLC.[3]

2. What Is the Document to Which the Understandings Relate?

As for the main document to which these understandings relate – namely the
agreement signed in May 2011 – the situation is far less clear. Egypt and
Hamas have refrained from publishing any version of this document, whereas
the PA and Fatah have published two different versions of it. Unlike the
understandings document, neither bore the signatures of the parties.

The two versions are:

A. An Egyptian document titled "The Egyptian Approach to Ending the
Palestinian Schism," which was presented to the Palestinian factions in
September 2009 when the Egyptian efforts to mediate a reconciliation were at
their height. Following the May 2011 reconciliation ceremony in Cairo, the
Palestinian news agency WAFA published this document, along with the
document of understandings, as the agreement that was signed (see WAFA, May
6, 2011).

This "Egyptian Approach" document sets out the points of agreement between
the two sides as well as the points of contention, along with ideas by the
then Egyptian administration for bridging the differences. The document was
initially published in the Palestinian media in September 2009 (see for
example Al-Ayyam, September 12, 2009).

B. The National Accord Agreement, which was published in the Palestinian
press one day before Fatah signed the reconciliation agreement on October
15, 2009 (see for example Al-Ayyam and the Hamas-affiliated website
Palestine-info.info, October 14, 2009). This document was posted on
Fatehwatan.ps, the recently launched website of the Fatah National
[Inter-Palestinian] Relations Commission, as "the document signed in Cairo
in May 2011." The website of the Fatah National [Inter-Palestinian]
Relations Commission (Fatehwatan.ps), which was recently launched and is
associated with Fatah official 'Azzam Al-Ahmad, published this document as
"the document signed in Cairo in May 2011."

Doubts Regarding the Version Published by WAFA

The fact that there does not exist one official version of the agreement
bearing parties' signatures (as well as the conflicting reports in the Fatah
and PA media as to which document was signed), suggest that there is a
Palestinian and Egyptian effort to obfuscate the facts and conceal the exact
wording of the agreement (assuming that any agreement was signed at all).
This, in contrast to the document of understandings, which was definitely
signed, and was published by various media outlets with the signatures of
the Fatah and Hamas leaders.

An analysis and comparison of the documents suggests that the version
presented by the Palestinian news agency WAFA as the agreement is not the
correct version; its publication possibly constitutes a deliberate attempt
to mislead and to conceal the text that was actually signed.[4]

It is far more likely that the agreement actually signed (if any), to which
the document of understandings relates, is the document that was published
in the Palestinian media on the eve of Fatah's signing of the reconciliation
agreement in 2009, under the heading "National Accord Agreement," or else a
document very similar to it.

This assumption is based on the following facts:

The document titled "The Egyptian Approach to Ending the Palestinian Schism"
is worded as a preliminary mediation paper, and was presented to the
Palestinian factions as early as September 2009. It was posted in the
Palestinian media (e.g., in Al-Ayyam) on September 12, 2009, when the
Egyptian mediation efforts were at their height.
One month later, shortly before Fatah signed the agreement proposed by the
Egyptians, the Palestinian media (Al-Ayyam, Palestine-info.info, October 14,
2011) published a different (and presumably more up-to-date) version of the
Egyptian agreement, under the heading "National Accord Agreement". This
document is more detailed and is phrased as an agreement rather than a
mediation paper. Moreover, it is generally agreed to be the document signed
by Fatah in October 2009.
After the Egyptian brokering attempts failed, in October 2009, and after
Fatah signed the agreement proposed by the Egyptians while Hamas refused to
sign it, Hamas submitted a memorandum to the Arab League detailing its
reservations about the agreement Fatah had signed. This memorandum quoted
excerpts from the National Accord Agreement.[5] This indicates that the
document Fatah signed was indeed the National Accord Agreement and not the
Egyptian mediation document recently published by Wafa as "the
reconciliation agreement."
Egypt's official statement from April 27, 2011 said explicitly that Hamas
had signed the National Accord Document signed by Fatah in October 2009.[6]

Does the Agreement Include the Charter of Honor?

It is unclear whether a charter of honor has been appended to the agreement.
In October 2009, on the eve of Fatah's signing of the reconciliation
agreement, it was reported that a document called the Charter of Honor had
been appended to it. A version of this charter was published on the
Hamas-affiliated website Palestine-info.info and in the Qatari daily
Al-Sharq on October 14, 2009.[7] According to the Fatehwatan.ps website,
this document has also been appended to the May 2011 reconciliation
agreement.

Who Is Party to the Agreement?

Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the other Palestinian factions
are party to the agreement. According to some sources, all the Palestinian
factions have signed it.[8] Other sources, in particular Islamic Jihad
officials, have claimed that the agreement is bilateral, i.e., between Hamas
and Fatah alone, and that the other factions that were invited to sign it
have agreed to commit to it only partially.[9] Islamic Jihad
Secretary-General Ramadan 'Abdallah Shalah told the daily Al-Hayat that he
had made it clear to the Egyptians "that Islamic Jihad is determined not to
be party to the reconciliation agreement, but to participate only as an
observer." He added that, "consequently, the Egyptians added a full clause
to the document of understanding specifying that the [Palestinian] factions
would be bound by the agreement to the extent to which they endorsed it and
accepted its clauses."[10]

The Agreement: A Show of Accord amid Disagreement; A Challenge to Israel and
U.S. Policy

The reconciliation agreement was signed amid intense controversy between
Fatah and Hamas. Reports have it that the reconciliation ceremony was
preceded by a hostile meeting between PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas and Hamas
leader Khaled Mash'al, and that 'Abbas refused to sit beside Mash'al at the
ceremony and objected to him giving a speech there.[11]

However, the sides were interested in signing the agreement as a display of
national unity, both towards the Palestinian public and towards the
international community. The agreement met the demand of the Palestinian
public to end the internal schism, and at the same time paved the way for
the declaration of a Palestinian state in September 2011 by removing a major
political obstacle to this initiative, namely the inter-Palestinian rift.

In their speeches at the reconciliation ceremony in Cairo, the leaders of
the two movements stressed their commitment to Palestinian unity. Khaled
Mash'al said: "The members of Hamas and Fatah must always stand united, so
that blood does not flow like water. The era of division is behind us. I
hereby declare on behalf of Hamas that we are ready to pay any price, and
have decided to pay any price, in order to achieve reconciliation and make
the agreement a reality. We want to quickly overcome this difficult stage,
and gather the fragments into the framework of the [Palestinian] National
Authority and the PLO, [so as to] become a single authority, a single
organization and a single [source of] authority."[12] Mahmoud 'Abbas said at
the ceremony: "The people of Hamas are our brothers, residents of our
[homeland], and a part of our people."[13] He rejected the claim of Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he must choose between reconciliation
with Hamas and negotiations with Israel, saying: "We have never asked
anyone's permission to handle our internal Palestinian affairs, and we never
will." He added that the Palestinian people was "a victim of state terrorism
perpetrated by the Israeli occupation, and of the settlers' terrorism."[14]

Some Fatah officials presented the reconciliation as an act of choosing
Hamas over Israel and the U.S. Fatah Central Committee member 'Azzam
Al-Ahmad, who headed Fatah's delegation to the recent reconciliation talks,
said at a Cairo press conference that Israel had warned 'Abbas against
signing a reconciliation agreement with Hamas, but 'Abbas had replied, "Yes,
we do want Hamas. It is part of the fabric of the Palestinian nation, [just]
like Fatah, the Popular [Front], the Democratic [Front]... and the rest of
the factions... National unity is the sharpest weapon we possess in
confronting the occupation."[15] Another Central Committee member, 'Abbas
Zaki, said: "Better the hell of Hamas than the dungeon of Israel, because
Hamas... is part of the Palestinian fabric. Our conflict with Hamas is
temporary and momentary, whereas our conflict with Israel is strategic... We
sought peace in order to alleviate the problems in the region, but it was
proven beyond a doubt that we and Hamas are in the same trench in the
conflict with Israel."[16]

The reconciliation with Hamas caused a further deterioration in the PA's
relations with the U.S., which had not been privy to the plans to sign the
agreement. PA and Fatah officials condemned America's unenthusiastic
response to the agreement, stressing their commitment to Palestinian unity.
'Abbas Zaki said: "For a while, Israel and the U.S. sowed division and
strife [among us]. They are enemies of the Palestinian people, who have
never done a thing for us or given us anything we would be sorry to lose.
America employs a double standard, allows Israel [to commit its] crimes, and
deprives us of our rights, so we have nothing to lose. It is Palestinian
unity that will compel America and Israel to back down... After we
[Palestinians] sort out our affairs, they will come to us, groveling."[17]

Fatah spokesman Ahmad 'Assaf likewise condemned the American stance on the
reconciliation, saying: "The official American position was always in favor
of ending the schism, but now that this has happened, the Americans have
taken a position of blindly favoring Israel."[18] In an interview with
Al-Ayyam, 'Azzam Al-Ahmad attacked the U.S. Congress for threatening to stop
the aid to the Palestinians: "Those who threaten us with stopping the aid,
it is time they began to treat us like human beings. In my opinion, the
Palestinian people must choose between money and its national honor."[19]

Hamas, for its part, saw the reconciliation as proof that the PA was
distancing itself from the U.S. In an interview with a Hamas-affiliated news
agency on the eve of the agreement, Hamas Prime Minister Isma'il Haniya
said, "The reconciliation will become a reality only when the PA's decisions
are free from American and international pressures, and when [Fatah]
realizes that the path of negotiations has failed and that the Palestinian
people needs to agree on a new strategy that will guarantee its rights and
preserve its steadfast principles."[20] After the initialing of the
understandings document, Hamas official Mahmoud Al-Zahhar remarked: "We have
managed to make an achievement not on America's terms but on purely
Palestinian terms."[21] PLC Deputy Speaker Ahmad Bahr, from Hamas, said that
the signing of the reconciliation agreement was a great triumph for the
Palestinian cause and a defeat for the American enterprise in the
region.[22]

The Inter-Palestinian Reconciliation Removes a Major Obstacle – the
Palestinian Schism – from the Path of the September Initiative

The two sides mentioned several motivations for signing the reconciliation
agreement at this time. In addition to pressure by the Palestinian public to
heal the internal rift, they mentioned the political changes in the Arab
world and particularly in Egypt, the deadlock in the negotiations with
Israel, and the bid to obtain recognition for a Palestinian state in
September 2011.[23]

PA spokesmen stressed that the reconciliation will facilitate the September
initiative, because lack of unity serves Israel and is an obstacle to
gaining international support for this move. Palestinian Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad welcomed the reconciliation, calling it a "crucial step" that
will allow the Palestinian people "to exercise self-determination and
establish its independent state with noble Jerusalem as its capital, on all
our land that has been occupied since 1967."[24] 'Azzam Al-Ahmad said that
'Abbas and Fatah firmly insisted upon the need to unite around the principle
of resistance to the occupation, in preparation for the demand to have
Palestine recognized as an independent state with full U.N. membership.[25]
At a press conference, he said: "The occupation exploited the [Palestinian]
schism in order to Judaize Jerusalem, complete the construction of the
[separation] fence, and gobble up large parts of the West Bank... Israel
used [the schism] in order to evade its obligations according to the
legitimate international resolutions. The U.S. and [other] elements in the
international community have likewise evaded their duty towards the
Palestinian people and the Arab nation, [which is to work towards] ending
the last occupation that still exists in the annals of history. That is why
we feel proud to have united the Palestinian will and decision, and to have
met the need to end the schism in order to end the occupation."[26]

The sides have agreed on a common goal, at least for the time being: the
establishment of a state in the 1967 borders along with the realization of
the Palestinian refugees' right of return.[27] Khaled Mash'al said at the
reconciliation ceremony that "the Palestinian national goal" is to
"establish a sovereign Palestinian state in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza]
Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital, and without relinquishing a single
grain of soil or the right of return."[28] In an interview with the daily
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat he said: "We must not reduce the rights of the Palestinian
people to [obtaining] recognition for a state and nothing more. The
important thing is for the occupation forces to withdraw to the June 4
lines, and for a Palestinian state to be [established] in this territory – a
state with sovereignty over its land, airspace, resources and water, and
empty of [Israeli] settlers and settlements."[29]

While Fatah presents the establishment of the Palestinian state in the 1967
borders and the realization of the right of return as the final goal, for
Hamas it is only an interim goal. Columnist 'Issam Shawar, who is close to
Hamas, wrote in the Gazan daily Falastin: "The Palestinian factions have
agreed on a joint political plan... The minimum [they aim to achieve] is the
establishment of a Palestinian state on part of Palestine. Fatah and the PLO
may regard this as the final goal, [whereas] Hamas regards it as a mere step
towards the full liberation [of Palestine]. [The two movements] must work
together to realize their [joint] aim."[30]

Hamas members clarified that seeking recognition for a Palestinian state in
the 1967 borders did not mean giving up the goal of liberating all of
Palestine. Hamas Poltical Bureau member Salah Al-Din Abu Sharakh, commander
of the Gaza security apparatuses, described this as "a move formerly
initiated by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in order to divide the liberation [into
several stages]. This is permitted, and does not constitute giving up the
rest of our beloved land."[31]

Moussa Abu Marzouq likewise described the establishment of a Palestinian
state in the West Bank as a stage in Hamas's strategy: "Hamas's strategy has
not changed, but since we won the PLC elections we have had an immediate
goal, an important national goal that we strive to [realize] and take part
in [pursuing] – namely [to establish] a Palestinian state in the West Bank,
Gaza and occupied Jerusalem without recognizing Israel, and to rebuild the
PLO in terms of its programs, structures and institutions. This is the goal
which we aspire to realize in the next stage."[32]

Writing in the Hamas newspaper Al-Risala, Ibrahim Dahbour, a PLC member from
Hamas, likewise stated that the idea of accepting a state in the 1967
borders was nothing new, because Hamas had proposed it as early as 1988. He
added: "Establishing a state... is the outcome of an ongoing, escalating and
gradual jihad operation on the way to realizing the goal: the liberation of
Palestine as a whole and the actual return of all the refugees."[33] In
response to the statement of U.S. President Barack Obama in favor of a
Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, Hamas senior official Mahmoud
Al-Zahhar said: "[Obama] talks about the 1967 borders as though they are
sacrosanct, but who said we agree to the 1967 borders and are not talking
about the 1948 borders? Why does he not talk about the [Palestine] Partition
Resolution [i.e., U.N. Resolution 181], which is an international
resolution?"[34]

Hamas Sticks to Its Position: No Recognition of Israel; The Quartet and Its
Terms Are Obsolete

The reconciliation agreement was signed without Hamas having met the terms
of the Quartet, namely recognizing Israel and past agreements with it, and
relinquishing violence. Fatah pointed out that it did not require Hamas to
recognize Israel. Addressing this issue, Mahmoud 'Abbas said: "Hamas is not
obliged to recognize Israel. We will establish a government of technocrats
and we will not demand that Hamas recognize Israel."[35] The establishment
of a unity government composed of independent technocrats (rather than
representatives of the various movements), whose authority is limited almost
exclusively to rebuilding Gaza and preparing for the elections, in effect
frees the PA from international pressure and from economic sanctions, which
may have resulted had Hamas joined the PA government without meeting the
terms of the Quartet.[36]

Hamas officials reiterated their refusal to recognize Israel in many media
interviews and appearances. After the initialing of the understandings
document, Moussa Abu Marzouq said at the Cairo press conference: "We did not
mention the word 'Quartet' or [the Quartet] terms even once in these
understandings."[37] In an interview with Al-Hayat he said: "Hamas has a
principled position, namely that we will not recognize the Zionist entity.
Our rights are still denied [us], and it does not make sense to recognize
the Zionist entity, because this will be at the expense of our stolen land
and our people [who are living] in refugee camps." He explained that there
was no connection between establishing a Palestinian state and recognizing
Israel, as evident from the fact that many Arab states refuse to recognize
Israel yet maintain ties with the international community.[38] Abu Marzouq
related that, in previous talks between Fatah and Hamas, "there were
arguments about the diplomatic program of the national unity government, and
the point of contention was the terms of the Quartet. [But] now the Quartet
and its terms are obsolete, [so] we did not mention it or its terms in our
understandings."[39] Hamas Prime Minister Isma'il Haniya even called on the
PLO to withdraw its recognition of Israel, because "[Israel's] existence on
our land is illegal, so it cannot be recognized."[40]

Hamas official Mahmoud Al-Zahhar assessed that, despite Hamas's refusal to
accept the terms of the Quartet, and in particular the demand to recognize
Israel, the movement's international status would improve in the wake of the
reconciliation with Fatah. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, he said: "After
the establishment of the Palestinian government, Hamas's relations with
large parts of Europe are bound to improve." He explained: "The European
Union is a member of the Quartet. [However,] the Quartet's voice has grown
gradually weaker in the recent period, especially as a result of the
Goldstone Report, the Palestinian peoples' steadfastness, and the pure blood
shed near the Gaza coast [by the activists of] the Freedom Flotilla... We
are bound to encounter problems with Israel, the U.S. and the occupation,
but at the same time, [other] doors will gradually open in the international
community, including among the Quartet [countries]. So the picture is not so
bleak..."[41]

Controversial Issues Will Be Handled at the Stage of Implementing the
Agreement

In order to make reconciliation possible, it was decided that certain
controversial issues will be implemented only at a later stage. Among these
issues are the establishment of the government; poltical issues, including
the policy towards Israel; the security issue, and the reforms in the PLO.
They are to be handled by joint committees to be established in the coming
year, as stated in the understandings document. Some of them will be handled
only after the elections, to be held a year from now.

Referring to the disagreements between the two sides, Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said
to Al-Jazeera TV: "There were understandings about some issues, for instance
about the government... [However,] we have not determined who will head it,
but have left all these [issues] for negotiations at a later date. After we
sign the reconciliation document on Wednesday, we will convene the
Palestinian General Steering Committee [this presumably refers to the
interim leadership framework], which is to include the secretaries of all
the movements and factions, as well as Abu Mazen and the PNC chairman, and
propose a mechanism for implementing the agreement. This will require the
release of prisoners on both sides... We will make every effort to find a
mechanism for [sorting out] all the details... Within a year, a committee
will determine how to unite the Palestinian police forces. During [this]
year, all the committees will convene to shape our future [policy] vis-à-vis
the government, security, and the elections, while the national accord
government [i.e., the government of technocrats] will govern."[42]

Isma'il Haniya likewise listed many issues whose resolution has been
postponed to the stage of implementing the agreement. He said: "The
implementation stage of the reconciliation agreement will focus on practical
matters: [reaching] an agreement on establishing a Palestinian government
that will be honored by all elements and by the Palestinian people, and
[agreeing on] the identity of the independents who will join the Palestinian
leadership. We must stop the [mutual] attacks in the media, agree on the
establishment of a supreme security council according to the provisions of
the [reconciliation] agreement, outline a security policy, agree on
establishing a supreme elections committee and an electoral court, [set out]
a joint diplomatic program and a joint security program, and activate the
Legislative Council so that it perform its duties."[43]

PLC Second Deputy Speaker Hassan Kharisha said that, in the coming year, the
Legislative Council will refrain from discussing issues disputed by Fatah
and Hamas, in order to strengthen the reconciliation.[44]

Hamas and the Other Palestinian Factions Will Be Incorporated into the PLO

The sides have reiterated past understandings regarding reorganizing the PLO
to incorporate all the Palestinian factions, including Hamas. (This was part
of the 2005 Cairo Agreement; the 2006 National Accord Document, aka the
Prisoners' Document, and the 2007 Mecca Accord). It was agreed that "the PLO
must be activated and developed to the satisfaction of [both] sides, so as
to incorporate all the Palestinian factions and forces." It was also agreed
to "reinforce the PLO's status as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people" and to elect a new PNC in proportional representation
elections.

As for the elections to the PLC, the PNC and the presidency, the document of
understandings states that they are to be held within a year. The
Palestinian factions are expected to take part in these elections, and
Islamic Jihad movement has already announced its intention to
participate.[45]

It should be noted that the incorporation of elements that do not recognize
Israel into the PLO may weaken the international support for negotiations
with this body. One week after the signing of the reconciliation agreement,
Hamas official Salah Al-Din Abu Sharah implied that, after joining the PLO,
Hamas will work to change the PLO's agenda: "Hamas will join the PLO not in
order to recognize Israel or the decisions of the Quartet, or [in order to
recognize] agreements that could degrade our people, but in order to reform
this organization and revive it."[46]

The Interim Leadership Framework

Prior to the signing of the agreement, one of the main points of contention
between Fatah and Hamas was the question of who would wield authority in the
period between the signing of the agreement and the holding of elections to
the PNC. Hamas demanded that an "interim leadership framework" be
established, which would function as the Palestinian source of authority
until the reforms in the PLO are enacted, and whose decisions would be
binding.[47] Fatah, who saw this as an attempt to form a substitute for the
PLO, objected on the grounds that the PLO was the sole Palestinian source of
authority.[48]

Eventually, the sides agreed that an "interim leadership framework" would be
established, but refrained from explicitly stating which body would be the
source of authority during the interim period. This interim leadership is
mentioned both in the reconciliation agreement (i.e., the National Accord
Agreement published in Al-Ayyam on October 14, 2009) and in the document of
understandings. The reconciliation agreement states that a joint committee
will be established comprising the chairman of the PNC (i.e., Mahmoud
'Abbas), the members of the PLO Executive Committee, the
secretaries-generals of all the Palestinian factions, and independent
national figures. The agreement stipulates further that this committee will
function as the "interim leadership framework" until the PNC elections are
held, while emphasizing "the authority of the Executive Committee and other
PLO institutions." According to the agreement, the interim leadership will
oversee the development of the PLO and define its relationship with the PA,
as well as the relationship between the PLC and the PNC, while preserving
the PLO as the source of authority and preventing overlaps in authority. The
interim leadership will also be in charge of "political and national issues
of crucial importance" and of taking agreed-upon decisions regarding them,
of formulating the principles and mechanisms of the PNC, and of overseeing
the implementation of the movements' joint decisions.[49]

In response to Hamas's reservations about the phrasing of this clause in the
reconciliation agreement, and its demand that the decisions of the interim
leadership be binding, the sides reached a compromise by adding the
following clause to the understandings document, in the subsection dealing
with the PLO: "The Fatah and Hamas movements have agreed that the tasks and
decisions of the interim leadership framework will be irrevocable, as long
as they do not conflict with the authorities of the PLO Executive
Committee."[50]

This deliberately ambiguous phrasing – which reflects the deep controversy
over this issue – leaves it unclear which body is to function as the supreme
Palestinian authority during the transitional stage: the interim leadership
or the PLO, and avoids defining the exact division of labor between them. It
thus allows the two sides to adhere to their conflicting positions regarding
the supreme source of authority, each side interpreting the clause as it
wishes. This fact is reflected in conflicting statements by Hamas and Fatah
officials: 'Azzam Al-Ahmad, of Fatah, told the daily Al-Bayan that the
interim leadership "belongs to" (i.e., is subordinate to) the PLO, and that
its authorities will not conflict with those of the PLO Executive
Committee.[51] Conversely, Salah Al-Bardawil, the head of Hamas's
information department in Gaza, said that the role of the interim leadership
will be "to restrain the existing diplomatic process," led by the PLO, "in
order to prevent concessions."[52]

Political analyst Hani Al-Masri, who was involved in brokering the
agreement, referred to the ambiguous phrasing of this clause: "The Cairo
agreement calls for the rapid convening of the interim Palestinian
leadership, and this is an important matter for which we have long been
waiting. But there is a need to resolve a contradiction that exists in the
agreement. [One] sentence [says that] 'the tasks and decisions of this
leadership will be irrevocable.' Hamas takes this to mean that the interim
leadership will be the supreme source of authority, superior to the PLO,
otherwise [this leadership will be] useless. [However, the next sentence
says that the interim leadership's tasks and decisions are irrevocable] 'as
long as they do not conflict with the authorities of the PLO.' Fatah takes
this to mean that the interim leadership will be subordinate to the PLO,
[for] otherwise it will undermine [the PLO's] legitimacy and achievements.
If each side adheres to its own interpretation... the agreement could
fail..."[53]

The Diplomatic Level: No Joint Program until after the Elections

Fatah and Hamas signed the agreement without formulating a joint diplomatic
program. Addressing this issue in an interview on Al-Jazeera TV, Hamas
official Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said: "Let me clarify that the diplomatic
programs [of Hamas and Fatah] will remain distinct. The question is how to
formulate them so that they do not conflict... Our perspective is completely
different from that of Fatah. Fatah believes in negotiations, whereas we
believe that negotiations with the Israeli enemy are futile."[54] In an
interview with Al-Hayat, Khaled Mash'al explained that a joint diplomatic
program will be formulated only after the elections, in about a year: "After
the elections, we will choose our leadership and agree on diplomatic plans."
He stressed, however, that "after the reconciliation, no [side] will have
the right to take diplomatic decisions on its own."[55] Also, the two sides
have agreed that urgent diplomatic issues will be handled by the interim
leadership and not by the government of technocrats to be established.

PA officials stressed that the reconciliation agreement did not change
anything on the diplomatic level, because negotiations with Israel would be
under the authority of the PLO, rather than the authority of the government
of technocrats – this, without addressing the question of the PLO's status
vis-à-vis the interim leadership. The Palestinian news agency WAFA even
reported that Hamas had withdrawn its demand that the government of
technocrats handle diplomatic affairs, and had agreed that the negotiations
with Israel and the peace process be handled by the PLO.[56]

PA officials expressed a willingness to renew the negotiations with Israel
if the latter suspended construction in the settlements. They explained that
the reconciliation with Hamas did not conflict with the negotiations with
Israel, but only strengthened them, because these negotiations were under
the authority of the PLO, rather than the PA. President Mahmoud 'Abbas said
in a meeting with consuls in Ramallah that the reconciliation would promote
opportunities for peace by uniting the efforts in this domain.[57] In a
meeting with an Israeli delegation, he reiterated that diplomatic issues
would be handled by the PLO and its president, not by the government of
technocrats, whose responsibilities would be limited to preparing the
elections and rebuilding Gaza.[58]

Statements made by Khaled Mash'al at the May 4 reconciliation ceremony in
Cairo were interpreted to mean that Hamas was granting the PLO a one-year
extension for the negotiations with Israel while expressing profound
pessimism regarding their outcome and calling to formulate an alternative
strategy vis-à-vis Israel. Mash'al said: "I hereby address the new Egyptian
leadership in this new revolutionary era, saying: We have given peace [a
chance] for 20 years, from the Madrid [Conference] until today. We are
willing to reach an agreement among the Palestinians, in an Arab framework
and with [Arab] support, in order to give [the negotiations] another chance,
in an agreed-upon manner. But, my brothers, since Israel does not respect
us, since it opposes all our initiatives and insists on rejecting the
Palestinians' rights and [on rebuffing] all Palestinians, [whether from]
Fatah or Hamas, and since it wants the land and wants security, claiming
falsely that it wants peace, [we must find an alternative.] Egypt, as a
leading country, as well as the Arab League and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, must turn over a new leaf and look for a different
strategy. We do not want to declare war on anyone. We [only] want to claim
our right and formulate a new strategy using any tool and any powerful means
that can compel Netanyahu to withdraw from our land and recognize our
rights. And we will call upon the international community to stand by
us."[59]

Al-Hayat quoted Mash'al as saying at a press conference: "In 20 years of
negotiations, [including] the Oslo [Accords], the Israel-Jordan peace
agreement, and the Annapolis [Conference], we never managed to get anywhere.
How long will we continue spinning our wheels? Unless we change our opening
position, the results will not change. We are willing to give it one more
year, for the sake of Egypt and the Palestinian reconciliation. Then we will
come up with a new strategy."[60]

Mash'al clarified his position in an interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "We
have been probing Israel's intentions for 20 years, and today, for the sake
of Egypt and the reconciliation agreement, we are giving Israel another
chance. However, we must already [begin to] formulate a new strategy. This,
not in order to declare war on Israel – after all, between war and
submission there is considerable leeway – but in order to add some powerful
[tools] of pressure [that can be used] during this interim period, so as to
promote the Palestinian rights through diverse means, including resistance,
popular action, action against the separation fence, diplomatic action,
[various other means of] hounding Israel everywhere, and, on the economic
level, the weapon of boycott. We have a golden opportunity to hound Israel,
which is hostile to peace. That is [what I meant] when I said there was a
need to propose a [new] plan of action that will be prepared in the Arab and
Palestinian political kitchen, some [aspects] of which we will declare
[openly] and some [aspects] of which we will conceal, depending on what
serves the peace process."[61]

Mash'al's statements about giving the PLO one more year for diplomatic moves
vis-à-vis Israel sparked intense controversy within Hamas. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar
criticized them harshly, saying that the movement had not changed its
position about negotiations with Israel and still supported resistance as
the only option. In an interview with the Palestinian daily Al-Quds, he
said: "Some claim we are giving Abu Mazen another chance to negotiate [with
Israel]. We have not given him [another] chance. We have not agreed to
negotiations, nor have we encouraged him to [negotiate]. On the contrary, we
have constantly put him on the spot about the negotiations. What happened on
the day of the reconciliation celebrations [i.e., Mash'al's statements at
the reconciliation ceremony] was not with our consent and we had no [prior]
knowledge of it. I think that these statements do not represent the position
of Hamas, whose program is based on resistance rather than negotiations...
The world should know that the [Hamas] movement has not changed its position
that resistance is the only option."[62] Al-Zahhar made similar statements
in an interview with the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar. [63] Moussa Abu Marzouq
likewise spoke against negotiations: "We were against the dialogue and the
negotiations that the PLO launched with Israel from the very beginning.
Would I do something that I have condemned others for doing? In our opinion,
this issue is not a [pointless] political quarrel but an essential
Palestinian interest, because it is impossible to have a dialogue between an
occupier and an occupied people when the balance of power is as it is, and
when the occupier is holding so many of the cards. It is impossible to
conduct a dialogue when your enemy refuses to recognize you and to restore
the rights he has stolen from you... As long as this hasn't happened,
[negotiations] are considered a kind of capitulation [that we accept] even
before it has actually occurred."[64]

Other Hamas members defended Mash'al and attacked Al-Zahhar. Poltical Bureau
member 'Izzat Al-Rishq and foreign liaisons chief Osama Hamdan said that it
was Al-Zahhar's statements (rather than Mash'al's) that did not reflect the
movement's position and contravened its procedures and policy, because only
Mash'al and other Poltical Bureau members were authorized to speak on the
movement's behalf. [65]

Hamas official Salah Al-Bardawil tried to downplay the conflict, saying that
there was no contradiction between Mash'al's statements and Al-Zahhar's.
Mash'al, he said, had merely promised that in the coming months Hamas would
not interfere with the PLO's efforts to realize the Palestinian goals;
however, Mash'al had been speaking hypothetically, since Hamas does not
believe in the efficacy of negotiations.[66]

The Security Level: Upholding the Right to Resistance While Maintaining
Tahdiya, Security Coordination

On the security level, Fatah and Hamas have agreed to maintain the status
quo until the elections in a year; that is, Hamas will continue to maintain
the tahdiya vis-à-vis Israel, and the existing security apparatuses in the
West Bank and Gaza will remain as they are.[67] Only after the elections
will the security apparatuses be unified and a joint security policy be
formulated. This decision is presumably meant to buy peace and quiet on the
security front, so as to facilitate the diplomatic moves towards the
announcement of a state in September. Isma'il Haniya said in a Gaza speech:
"It has been decided to maintain the security status quo in each region
[i.e., in the West Bank and Gaza]. Matters of mutual interest will be
discussed at a later time."[68] Mahmoud Al-Zahhar likewise told the Lebanese
Al-Akhbar daily that "the security apparatuses in the West Bank and Gaza
will remain as they are for a year."[69] 'Azzam Al-Ahmad told the UAE daily
Al-Bayan that "the issue of security will be resolved only after the
elections."[70] The following is a review of the understandings reached by
the two sides in the domain of security:

Resistance against Israel

The National Accord Agreement (which is presumably the document that was
signed) states that both parties endorse the Palestinian people's right to
resistance: "The security apparatuses will respect the Palestinian people's
right to resist and to defend the homeland and its residents."[71]

Immediately following the announcement of the impending agreement, on April
28, 2011, PA officials hurried to reassure Israel and the West regarding the
security issue. They stressed that understandings have been reached
regarding the need to restrain the resistance, i.e., to maintain the tahdiya
(it should be noted that Fatah has been claiming for years that Hamas
relinquished the path of resistance when it decided to uphold the tahdiya).
Fatah official 'Azzam Al-Ahmad said that the sides have agreed to wage
"positive resistance."[72] At the reconciliation ceremony, 'Abbas said: "We
oppose violence and firmly condemn terrorism of any kind. We emphasize that
we will not tolerate the existence of security apparatuses belonging to
several [different] elements. There will be one gun, one [Palestinian]
Authority, one law and one source of authority…"[73] 'Abbas's poltical
advisor, Nimr Hammad, said that the PA would not allow the existence of
armed militias and organizations that would set up rocket launchers in
civilians' homes.[74]

Egyptian businessman Mounib Al-Masri, considered to be one of the architects
of the reconciliation, who was recently mentioned by Hamas as a possible
agreed-upon candidate for the role of prime minister, said that Hamas had
taken an "unprecedented" decision to refrain from firing rockets at Israel
and to maintain the tahdiya. In an interview with Al-Hayat he explained: "It
has been agreed with Hamas to emphasize the Palestinians' right to resist
the occupation by all means recognized by the humane international law. The
ways to exercise this right will be agreed upon [later], according to the
Palestinian interest and in the framework of a supreme source of authority
[in charge of directing] the resistance... As for all [issues] pertaining
to weapons and rockets – we will find the right formula [for handling] these
issues, for one cannot fire rockets and other weapons as part of the
resistance when there is a clear agreement that the government [to be
established] must comply with the [international] law and the U.N. Charter."
He added: "The commitment to refrain from firing rockets and [to maintain]
the tahdiya means that Israel too is obligated to [maintain] the tahdiya.
For it is inconceivable that we should agree to refrain from firing rockets
and to halt the operations [against Israel], while Israel [continues to]
invade Gaza and fire missiles at [members of] the Palestinian
organizations."[75]

Hamas officials admitted that they had agreed in principle to "conduct the
resistance in a way that would preserve the reconciliation," as Khaled
Mash'al put it.[76] At the same time, they clarified that the ways of waging
resistance would be deliberated at a later stage by the interim leadership,
which will deal with political matters, including the management of the
struggle against the occupation.[77] In an interview for the Al-Aqsa
channel, Mash'al added: "We uphold the resistance in all its forms.
[However,] for the sake of the reconciliation and in order to strengthen our
unity, we are willing to agree on procedures for taking decisions regarding
the resistance, just as there is a need to reach agreements regarding the
way to take decisions on the political and security level."[78]

Hamas stressed in an apologetic vein that there was no contraction between
maintaining the tahdiya and upholding the right of resistance. Mahmoud
Al-Zahhar told the Palestinian news agency Maan that the tahdiya did not
contravene the program of resistance against Israel, but was part of this
program. He clarified: "The hudna [i.e., tahdiya] does not mean opting for
peace."[79]

Security Coordination with Israel

The issue of security coordination remains in dispute between the two sides.
The PA security apparatuses have continued their security coordination with
Israel without making any change to their policy since the signing of the
agreement.[80] Fatah members explained to the Hamas website alresalah.net
that the coordination with Israel was crucial, especially in order to ensure
the even flow of civilian life, such as movement of people and goods between
the Palestinian territories and Israel.[81]

Senior officials in Hamas stressed that they opposed the security
coordination, and that this issue, like the resistance issue, had not been
thoroughly discussed in the recent round of talks, but would be discussed by
the supreme security council to be established. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said to
Al-Jazeera: "The issue [of security coordination] did not come up in the
negotiations… It is an important issue, [which] is to be discussed in the
government and also [in dialogue between] Fatah, Hamas and the other
Palestinian factions. What is the point of security coordination between the
[Palestinian] security apparatuses and the Israeli enemy? What are the
components of the security coordination? It is two-sided or one-sided? If
it is one-sided, then it is a crime – [and] the truth is that it is [indeed]
one-sided. We have never heard that the Israeli side informed the
Palestinians [in advance] about its intention to launch the war against
Gaza, or about its intention to invade the West Bank in order to carry out
an assassination… The next government will have to determine its position on
this issue, and this government will be established with the consent of
Hamas and the [other] Palestinian factions. [Is it conceivable that] we will
require this government to carry out security coordination with
Israel?!..."[82] On another occasion Al-Zahhar said: "It is impossible to
combine the program of resistance with coordination with Israel. We will not
allow the Preventive Security officers and commanders to resume [their
work], and I publicly advise them to stay out of Gaza and the West Bank, for
their own good."[83] Isma'il Haniya said: "[Under] the national accord
government, the Palestinian security apparatuses will have to refrain from
[maintaining] security coordination with the occupation."[84]

At the same time, according to some Hamas members, Hamas acknowledges the
need to continue the security coordination with Israel until next years'
elections. Moussa Abu Marzouq explained to the daily Al-Hayat: "The issue
[of security coordination] has many components. We are still a people under
occupation, and there are constraints and matters that cannot be ignored or
avoided."[85]

Unifying the Security Apparatuses

The sides have decided to form a supreme security council made up of expert
officers who will work under Arab and Egyptian supervision. This council
will work to build up and unify the security apparatuses in the West Bank
and Gaza after the elections.[86] According to Hamas officials, Fatah has
agreed to leave the Hamas security apparatuses in Gaza as they are, until
their unification with the PA apparatuses.[87] Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said on
this issue: "The security apparatuses in the West Bank and Gaza will stay as
they are for a year. The [new] interior minister will coordinate them, [and]
a supreme security council will be established to coordinate these
issues."[88]

Release of Political Prisoners

The Egyptian agreement stipulates that, after the signing, both sides will
release Poltical prisoners. This issue, which has yet to be realized, may be
an obstacle to the implementation of the agreement. The prisoners have not
been freed, and, what's more, Fatah is still arresting members of Hamas and
Islamic Jihad. Hamas official Rafat Nassif even called to suspend contacts
with Fatah until it stops the arrests and summons for questioning.[89]
Mahmoud 'Abbas, for his part, said that the PA would continue to arrest
individuals suspected of smuggling arms and explosives or of laundering
money, but would not arrest people for poltical reasons or for expressing
opinions.[90]

Skepticism about the Agreement's Success in Light of the Differences between
the Sides

In light of the profound ideological differences between the two movements
and the bitterness engendered by years of hostility, and considering that
many issues have not been resolved but rather put aside for later, the
agreement seems likely to fail in the long term, just like previous
agreements between Fatah and Hamas, such as the 2005 Cairo Agreement and the
2007 Mecca Accord.

Palestinian officials have acknowledged these difficulties. PLO chief
negotiator Saeb 'Ereqat said: "The way [will be] long and difficult, but
failure must not be one of our options."[91] Fatah Revolutionary Committee
member Sufyan Abu Zaida said: "The truth is that the task is not easy and
there will be difficulties, because there are families whose sons have been
killed [in clashes between Fatah and Hamas] and the social fabric has been
badly damaged... The only reward that will make all the sacrifices and
anguish worthwhile is Palestinian unity, the healing of the social fabric,
and the completion of the reconciliation [process]."[92]

The Palestinian daily Al-Quds stated in an editorial titled "The
Reconciliation Agreement Must Be Implemented, Not Just Signed": "Everyone
remembers the Mecca Accord, praised by the Palestinian people and the Arab
nation, which formed the basis for the establishment of a Palestinian unity
government in 2007. Sponsored by [Saudi] King 'Abdallah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz,
it was signed near the holy Kaaba and the holy house of Allah. Nevertheless,
the agreement and the Palestinian unity government lasted only a few months,
until [they both] collapsed under the burden of the Hamas [takeover] of Gaza
in June of that year... There are several internal obstacles, primarily the
different security outlook of Gaza [i.e., Hamas] and the West Bank [i.e.,
the PA], which make it difficult to reunify the security apparatuses in both
parts of the homeland."[93]

Hani Al-Masri wrote: "There are several serious flaws in the agreement that
must be fixed in order to ensure its realization... The most deadly flaw is
the absence of the diplomatic aspect... In political life, there is no such
thing as a government without a diplomatic plan. The essence of every
government is its diplomatic activity, even if it is a government of
independents or experts."[94]

Skepticism was also expressed on the Hamas website: "Many landmines and
obstacles are expected [to be found] on the way to reconciliation. The most
serious [difficulty is working out] the precise details of the general
agreement, and another is the ultimate implementation [of the agreement] on
the ground. Though the signed agreement contains several [clauses]
pertaining to the government, to security, to the PLO, and to the elections,
these issues still require extensive deliberation."[95]

* Y. Yehoshua is Director of Research at MEMRI

[1] Ikhwanonline.com, May 26, 2011.

[2] Islamic Jihad leader in Lebanon Abu Samer Moussa expressed puzzlement
about this, demanding that the understandings be revealed and that all the
"hidden documents" be exposed. Paltoday.ps, May 14, 2011.

[3] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 30, 2011; Al-Akhbar (Egypt), Palestine-info.info,
April 29, 2011. The chief points of the understandings document were drafted
during discussions held in Damascus in late September 2009 and in Gaza in
April 2010, and also on the basis of 'Abbas's March 16, 2011 initiative for
the establishment of a government of independent experts that will work
toward holding elections to the presidency, the PLC and the PNC.

[4] The mediation document omits some points that the PA may be interested
in concealing. For example, it does not mention the Palestinian people's
right to resistance, whereas the National Accord Agreement does mention
this.

[5] Fajer.ps, March 27, 2010; Al-Hayat (London), October 26, 2010.

[6] Al-Hayat (London), April 28, 2011. On the National Accord Agreement, see
Inquiry and Analysis No. 566, "Egypt's Palestinian Reconciliation Document,"
November 23, 2009, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3805.htm.

[7] The daily Al-Ayyam mentioned the existence of this document but did not
publish it.

[8] See statements by 'Azzam Al-Ahmad in Al-Quds (Jerusalem), May 4, 2011.

[9] Islamic Jihad leader in Lebanon Abu Samer Moussa said that "the
reconciliation is between two [movements] only, and is not a national
reconciliation." Paltoday.ps, May 14, 2011. The Al-Quds Al-Arabi daily
likewise noted the bilateral character of the agreement, stressing that the
other factions have not signed an agreement that mentions a tahdiya with
Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. The Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), May 3,
2011.

[10] Al-Hayat (London), May 4, 2011.

[11] Kul Al-Arab (Israel), May 6, 2011. In an interview on Al-Jazeera TV,
Mash'al said: "I was [willing to] forgo sitting beside 'Abbas [at the
ceremony] in order to avoid jeopardizing the [Palestinian] reconciliation,
though 'Abbas was unreasonable in refusing to have me sit beside him. We are
willing to pay a price for the sake of the people. Felesteen.ps, May 8, 2011

[12] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), May 5, 2011.

[13] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), may 5, 2011.

[14] Al-Ayyam (PA), May 5, 2011. PA chief negotiator Saeb 'Ereqat called the
demand to choose between Hamas and Israel "political insolence," adding:
"Hamas is a Palestinian movement, and cannot be equated with the
occupation." Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), May 2, 2011. Columnist 'Adli Sadeq
wrote in Al-Hayat Al-Jadida: "Hamas is not a terrorist [organization], the
occupation is terrorist. Despite everything Hamas is doing in the internal
arena, the [proper] response to the racist position [of the Israeli
government] vis-à-vis the PA, which is undermining the very foundations of
the peace process, is to withdraw the recognition of Israel, firmly and
immediately." Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), May 1, 2011.

[15] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 28, 2011.

[16] Kul Al-Arab (Israel), April 29, 2011.

[17] Kul Al-Arab (Israel), April 29, 2011.

[18] Wafa.ps, April 28, 2011.

[19] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 29, 2011.

[20] Palestine-info.info, April 26, 2011.

[21] Kul Al-Arab (Israel), April 29, 2011.

[22] Palestine-info.info, May 2, 2011.

[23] See Moussa Abu Marzouq's statements to the London daily Al-Hayat (May
1, 2011).

[24] Wafa.ps, April 27, 2011.

[25] Wafa.ps, April 28, 2011.

[26] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 28, 2011.

[27] Addressing the right of return at the reconciliation ceremony, 'Abbas
called to "resolve the refugee problem according to the U.N. resolutions, in
particular Resolution 194, and based on the Arab peace initiative..." In
response to a call from the audience to address the refugee problem, he
replied that he had just addressed it, and added: "I am a refugee myself."
Al-Ayyam (PA), May 5, 2011.

[28] Felesteen.ps, May 5, 2011.

[29] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 9, 2011.

[30] Felesteen.ps, May 4, 2011.

[31] Paltoday.ps, May 11, 2011.

[32] Al-Rai (Kuwait), June 20, 2011.

[33] Al-Risala (Gaza), May 9, 2011.

[34] Al-Imarat Al-Yawm (UAE), May 23, 2011.

[35] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), May 4, 2011.

[36] See statements by 'Azzam Al-Ahmad in Al-Bayan (UAE), May 15, 2011.

[37] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 28, 2011.

[38] Al-Hayat (London), May 1, 2011.

[39] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), April 28, 2011.

[40] Palestine-info.info, April 29, 2011.

[41] Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar), April 28, 2011.

[42] Al-Ayyam (PA), May 4, 2011.

[43] Al-Ayyam (PA), May 4, 2011.

[44] Palestine-info.info, May 1, 2011.

[45] Al-Hayat (London), May 12, 2011.

[46] Paltoday.ps, May 11, 2011.

[47] In 2009, Hamas senior official Salah Al-Bardawil explained that "the
PLO [no longer] constitutes a Palestinian source of authority, because many
factions are not represented in it. Hence, Hamas is proposing [to establish]
a body that will not replace the PLO but will function as a temporary source
of authority and will take decisions until the reforms in the PLO are
completed. Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), March 28, 2009. See also Moussa Abu
Marzouq's statements to Hamas's Al-Aqsa channel. Paltimes.net, October 22,
2009.

[48] Al-Ayyam (PA), March 23, 2011.

[49] Al-Ayyam (PA), October 14, 2009.

[50] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 30, 2011; Al-Akhbar (Egypt), April 29, 2011.

[51] Al-Bayan (UAE), May 15, 2011.

[52] Palestine-info.info, May 16, 2011.

[53] Al-Ayyam (PA), May 10, 2011.

[54] Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar), April 27, 2011.

[55] Al-Hayat (London), May 9, 2011.

[56] Wafa.ps, April 28, 2011.

[57] Wafa.ps, April 28,29, 2011.

[58] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 29, 2011; Wafa.ps, April 28, 2011.

[59] Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar) May 4, 2011.

[60] Al-Hayat (London), May 9, 2011.

[61] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 9, 2011.

[62] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), May 17, 2011. It should be noted that, one month
earlier, Al-Zahhar spoke in a less radical vein, saying, "Hamas [represents]
the position of the entire Palestinian people, which sees no point in the
negotiations launched in 1991... The occupation did not leave Gaza thanks to
the negotiations, but thanks to the resistance. If Fatah wants to continue
the negotiations, that is its own position." Al-Khabar (Algeria), April 29,
2011.

[63] In the Al-Akhbar interview, he said: "We were not aware of Khaled
Mash'al's position. He did not consult with anyone on this matter. This
position is wrong. We never gave Fatah a chance or a mandate to negotiate on
our behalf or on behalf of the Palestinian people. Our program objects to
this kind of negotiation, because it is a waste of time, as our practical
experience has proven [time and again] since the Madrid Conference 20 years
ago. We are always hearing 'negotiations, negotiations, negotiations.' The
disgraceful deeds of the [PLO] negotiation t