In exchange for a $140-160 million price tag per plane, the Israel Air Force
will take delivery of planes that are not yet certified to carry any sort of
weapon systems, are not certified for the entire flight envelope, and will
almost certainly have to be upgraded to repair flaws that will only emerge
during later flight tests.
More Trouble for the F-35?
INSS Insight No. 314, February 15, 2012
Shapir, Yiftah
In early December 2011, a US Department of Defense report about the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was leaked to the media.[1] The report, dubbed
the "Quick Look Review" (QLR), was written by a committee that included some
senior US defense establishment figures who were charged specifically with
looking into the question of "concurrency," i.e., selling the airplane while
the flight testing is still underway. The committee was set up in light of a
less than glowing report about the flight tests submitted at the end of
October.
Concurrent acquisitions have been part of virtually every large weapons
acquisition project in the West in recent decades. The extended development
and production timetables have always required the start of low rate initial
production (LRIP) before the conclusion of all testing and sometimes even
before the end of the final development. The assumption is that flaws that
surface during testing can be fixed later in units manufactured in the early
batches.
In the case of the F-35, this method has been stretched to unprecedented
lengths. The plane’s developers relied on the fact that the development
methods, particularly regarding the computer simulations – based on the
experience with development of the F-22 at Lockheed Martin – would allow
them to reach a design mature enough to begin procurement even before flight
tests began. Thus, the first batch was ordered in FY 2007, even though
flight tests only started in 2008. By FY2011, 88 planes had already been
ordered and the acquisitions for the next few years are planned at the rate
of 30-40 additional planes every year.
Toward the middle of 2011 it became clear that the flight tests were not
progressing at the anticipated rate and indicated that the design of the
three F-35 models was not as mature as had been expected. The bottom line of
the QLR report was that while there is no reason to stop concurrent
acquisition altogether, there are, in the language of the report, several
problems with “major consequences” regarding continued production.
So far, more than 700 change requests (CRs) have been submitted. The
committee noted that it takes 24 months on average from the time a CR is
submitted until the change is actually introduced in the planes on the
production line. As for the planes made up until then – they will have to be
modified at a later date, with an additional cost to the plane.
Among the problems of major consequence are problems with the pilot’s helmet
mounted display system (HMDS).[2] There are severe safety problems with the
fuel dump subsystem, and problems with the reliability of the integrated
power package (IPP).[3] The report’s authors also indicated problems whose
full extent would only become apparent during later testing.
The flight test program is only in its initial stages. So far only 19
percent of the planned testing is complete, and all tests were within the
more “conservative areas” of the flight envelope. Likewise, no testing has
yet been undertaken to certify weapon systems.
The QLR report does not deal with the cost of the plane, but recently
published data indicates that the cost of planes from LRIP 5 (whose
production has recently begun) will reach some $160 million. This price does
not include the cost of the modifications and repairs that have already
become evident or those that will appear during later testing.[4]
According to the current schedule (which may yet change), only the planes
going into production after 2018 will have full operational capabilities.
These planes will only be supplied some time after 2019-20.
In August 2010, the Israeli Ministry of Defense announced its intention to
acquire 20 F-35 planes (the security cabinet’s approval was granted in
October 2010). During the negotiations over the issue, there was talk of
delivering the planes starting in 2014 at the earliest. As of now, the order
is for 19 planes to be delivered starting in 2016 at the earliest. The
latest report published has direct implications for the Israeli Air Force’s
ability to take delivery and integrate the planes. Some estimate that the
delivery date will be postponed, perhaps even until 2018.
The F-35 is without a doubt the most advanced combat aircraft in terms of
its stealth, ability to pinpoint and identify targets, and help the pilot's
situational awareness. Indeed, one could accept the proponents' claim that
the transition to the fifth generation fighter is a huge technological leap.
However, the most recent report shows that even if the first planes are
supplied in 2018, these will come from one of the LRIPs before the end of
the flight tests. In exchange for a $140-160 million price tag per plane,
the Israel Air Force will take delivery of planes that are not yet certified
to carry any sort of weapon systems, are not certified for the entire flight
envelope, and will almost certainly have to be upgraded to repair flaws that
will only emerge during later flight tests.
The defense establishment is thoroughly convinced that the planes will be
supplied by the end of 2016. Air force pilots will start training on them in
the United States even earlier than that. Furthermore, sources in the
defense establishment say that changes and improvements in fighter jets,
even new ones, are a routine matter. In the past too, Israel acquired planes
that underwent such changes as soon as they landed here. As for the flaws
noted in the QLR, the defense establishment is aware of them and is also
aware of the technological solutions to fix them – solutions that will be
incorporated into the planes intended to be delivered here.
Were Israel to buy the fighter jets with Israeli taxpayer money, it is
certainly a question whether the acquisition of the F-35 is a worthwhile
deal at this stage. However, even under current circumstances, when the
planes are bought with the special American defense aid funds, it is worth
giving serious reconsideration to the questions: On which weapon systems
does it make sense to use the defense aid money in the next few years? Is
not a good idea to postpone the purchase of the F-35 until the coming decade
and in the meantime invest the money in different weapons systems?
At the same time, it should be asked: in what ways have the threats against
Israel changed, and to what extent can the existing aircraft array confront
them? Fifth generation planes would certainly improve capabilities, but does
a possible postponement in acquisition seriously affect Israel’s response to
the new threats?
In addition, it is necessary to examine the F-35’s special capabilities,
some of which – though assuredly not all – are technologies one can install
on combat aircraft already in the IAF ORBAT. While such upgrades will not
turn the enhanced planes into fifth generation fighters, they will certainly
improve their capabilities to confront the new threats.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] For the full report, see
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/274217/dod-quick-look-ahern-report.pdf.
[2] In the F-35 there are several displays, including images from the
infrared cameras, screened on the visor of the pilot’s helmet. Damage of
this sort can impede the airplane’s ability to operate at night
[3] The integrated power package includes the engine starter, power
generator, and the environmental control system. Loss of the IPP means the
loss of some of the avionics systems and the loss of the systems supplying
oxygen and regulating air pressure in the cockpit.
[4] Calculating the cost of the planes per unit is a complex matter and
different methods will generate different results. So, for example, it was
recently stated that Lockheed Martin received a contract for the production
of LRIP 5 for a total of $4.01 billion. The contract is for 30 planes of the
three models (LRIP5: the batch includes 21 F-35A 's for the USAF, 6 F-35C
for the Navy, and 3 F-35Bs for the Marine corps). Seemingly, the cost would
then be $133.7 million per plane, but this does not include the following
costs: $12.4 million per plane paid in July 2010 for "long lead items" and
the cost of the engine ordered separately and estimated at $13.6 million per
engine. The total cost: $159.9. The Israeli deal is for $2.75 billion, i.e.,
$144 million per plane.
The Institute for National Security Studies • 40 Haim Levanon St. • Tel
Aviv 61398 • Israel • 03-640-0400 • e-mail: info@inss.org.il
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