The Peace Index – September 2013
(N=601)
30.9-1.10.2013
1. What is your position on holding peace negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority?
Jews / Arabs
1. Strongly in favor 27.1 / 61.6
2. Somewhat in favor 33.6 / 26.7
3. Somewhat opposed 12.1 / 1.7
4. Strongly opposed 21.4 / 6.3
5. Don’t know / Refuse 5.8 / 3.8

2. Do you believe or not believe that negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority will lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians
in the coming years?
Jews / Arabs
1. Strongly believe 7.6 / 3.7
2. Somewhat believe 18.3 / 39.4
3. Somewhat don’t believe 27.0 / 36.4
4. Don’t believe at all 44.6 / 18.0
5. Don’t know / Refuse 2.5 / 2.5

3. What, in your opinion, is Israel’s overall situation at present?
Jews / Arabs
1. Very good 7.2 / 16.0
2. Quite good 31.3 / 37.3
3. So-so 45.2 / 24.0
4. Quite bad 7.1 / 15.4
5. Very bad 8.2 / 5.8
6. Don’t know / Refuse 1.0 / 1.5

4. In your view, does the U.S. government’s handling of the Syrian issue
project power or weakness?
Jews / Arabs
1. It projects power 22.2 / 27.5
2. It projects weakness 65.8 / 49.0
3. Don’t know / Refuse 12.0 / 23.5

5. On the Iranian issue, in your view is the U.S. government projecting
power or weakness?
Jews / Arabs
1. 1. It projects power 20.1 / 30.9
2. 2. It projects weakness 64.1 / 39.5
3. Don’t know / Refuse 15.8 / 29.5

6. In the opinion of some experts, Iran will be able to produce a nuclear
weapon in 6–9 months. In light of the United States’ current behavior toward
Iran, will President Obama fulfill or not fulfill his promise that the
United States will prevent Iran’s development of nuclear weapons at all
cost?
Jews / Arabs
1. I’m sure he will fulfill the promise 10.5 / 15.2
2. I'm quite sure 16.8 / 26.3
3. I'm not so sure 39.2 / 26.6
4. I'm not sure at all 27.5 / 11.5
5. Don’t know / Refuse 6.1 / 20.4

7. In Iranian President Rouhani's recent address to the United Nations,
which was conciliatory compared to the speeches of his predecessor
Ahmadinejad, he called for reaching an agreement between Iran and the West
on the nuclear question. In your assessment, does this indicate a real
change in Iran’s position on the nuclear question, or is it just a different
rhetorical style?
Jews / Arabs
1. I’m sure it indicates a real change in Iran’s position 4.7 /
13.2
2. I think it indicates a real change 9.3 / 33.4
3. I think it does not indicate a real change, just a change in
rhetorical style 32.0 / 26.5
4. I’m sure it does not indicate a real change, just a change in
rhetorical style 47.6 / 15.8
5. Don’t know / Refuse 6.3 / 11.1

8. While Western leaders such as the President of France and the U.S.
Secretary of State are meeting with Rouhani and holding discussions with him
aimed at improving relations and reaching an agreement on the nuclear issue,
Prime Minister Netanyahu keeps warning that Iran poses a danger to the free
world and therefore the struggle against it must continue. Who in your
opinion is more correct?
Jews / Arabs
1. The Western leaders 13.5 / 56.3
2. Netanyahu 76.9 / 19.5
3. Don’t know / Refuse 9.7 / 24.2

9. Some claim that apparently, it will be impossible to prevent Iran from
nuclearizing in the long term, and therefore Israel should come to terms
with this and devise a defense strategy based on the assumption that Israel
is not the only nuclear state in the region. Do you agree or disagree with
this approach?
Jews / Arabs
1. I don’t agree at all 25.0 / 7.5
2. I moderately disagree 12.6 / 10.4
3. I moderately agree 29.2 / 38.1
4. I strongly agree 28.0 / 27.0
5. Don’t know / Refuse 5.2 / 17.0

10. There is widespread support in the world today for the claim that
Israel should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel refuses to
do so out of fear that this would subject the Israeli nuclear industry to
international supervision. In your opinion, should or should not Israel sign
this treaty?
Jews / Arabs
1. I’m sure it should not sign 50.8 / 6.3
2. I think it should not 19.9 / 12.8
3. I think it should 12.4 / 20.4
4. I’m sure it should sign 8.4 / 48.7
5. Don’t know / Refuse 8.6 / 11.7

11. When you think of the Palestinians today, do you think of them more
as enemies or more as neighbors?
Jews / Arabs
1. Much more as enemies 40.7 / 4.1
2. A little more as enemies 15.9 /
3. Not as enemies and not as neighbors 14.1 / 12.0
4. A little more as neighbors 17.2 / 14.8
5. Much more as neighbors 7.7 / 64.8
6. Don’t know / Refuse 4.4 / 4.2

12. In your opinion, what are the chances that the official talks taking
place between Israel and the Palestinians in recent months, which are headed
by Minister Tzipi Livni and are being conducted under U.S. auspices, will
eventually lead to a significant agreement between the sides?
Jews / Arabs
1. Very high chances 0.6 / 5.3
2. High chances 13.6 / 14.7
3. Low chances 44.4 / 39.7
4. Very low chances 36.8 / 24.7
5. Don’t know / Refuse 4.6 / 15.6

13. Recently, there were two cases of murder of Israeli soldiers by
Palestinians. The Israeli defense establishment claims that the cases
involved individual murderers and are not the beginning of a Third Intifada.
Do you accept or not accept this explanation?
Jews / Arabs
1. Accept 60.2 / 41.9
2. Don’t accept 32.5 / 48.1
3. Don’t know / Refuse 7.3 / 10.0

14. In your opinion, in return for a permanent peace agreement, should or
should not Israel agree to the return of a limited number of Palestinian
refugees to Israel?
Jews / Arabs
1. I’m sure it should agree 3.8 / 53.0
2. I think it should 11.3 / 26.7
3. I think it should not 20.2 / 1.5
4. I’m sure it should not 61.2 / 15.0
5. Don’t know / Refuse 3.4 / 3.9

15. In return for a permanent peace agreement, would you support or
oppose Israel accepting partial responsibility for the suffering that was
caused to the Palestinians—for example, for creating the refugee problem?
Jews / Arabs
1. I’m sure I would not agree 53.2 / 7.8
2. I think I would not agree 17.0 / 1.4
3. I think I would agree 17.7 / 23.8
4. I’m sure I would agree 6.2 / 57.4
5. Don’t know / Refuse 5.8 / 9.7

The Peace Index:
September 2013
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=256

Date Published: 10/10/2013

Survey dates: 30/09/2013 - 01/10/2013

In this month’s survey we focused on two issues: the U.S. administration’s
positions regarding actors in our region, namely Syria and Iran, and the
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

The image of American power: A clear majority (66%) of the Jewish public
thinks the U.S. administration’s handling of the Syrian issue projects
weakness. This view prevails in the Arab public as well, though at a lower
rate (49%). It also holds true regarding U.S. behavior toward Iran, with 64%
of the Jewish respondents saying the American behavior projects weakness.
Among the Arab respondents, the higher rate also “smells” of weakness
(39.5%); however, the rate of Arabs who see the U.S. as projecting power is
not much smaller (31%), and one-third have no clear opinion on the matter. A
segmentation of the Jewish sample’s responses by self-placement on a
political right-left continuum shows that in the case of Syria, in all the
camps, a majority views the U.S. as showing more weakness than power,
although the rate of those on the right who perceive weakness (75% on
average) is definitely higher than in the center (56%) and on the left
(58%). Regarding U.S. behavior toward Iran, the picture is somewhat
different; among those placing themselves on the “hard” left, there is, in
fact, a majority (56.5%) that sees U.S. policy as projecting power. In the
rest of the camps, the prevailing view is that U.S. behavior toward Iran
shows weakness.

Obama's credibility regarding preventing a nuclear Iran: Apparently
influenced by the widespread view that the U.S. is displaying weakness on
the Syrian and Iranian issues, two-thirds of the Jewish public tends to
doubt that President Obama will fulfill his promise that the U.S. will
prevent Iran’s development of nuclear weapons at all cost. Indeed, a
cross-checking between the two questions reveals that among those who see
U.S. behavior on the Syrian issue as projecting power, 69% believe Obama
will fulfill his promise, while among those who see American policy as
reflecting weakness, only 14% believe that Obama will fulfill his promise. A
segmentation of the responses to this question by self-placement on a
political right-left continuum reveals that among respondents on the right,
with all its different shadings, and in the center, the rate of doubters is
higher than believers. The moderate left is evenly split between believers
and doubters, while on the “hard” left, the rate of believers that Obama
will uphold what he has pledged is higher than the rate of those who doubt
it (56.5% vs. 39%). The Arab public sees this matter differently: the rate
of those who are sure or who think Obama will fulfill his promise is
slightly higher than the rate of those who doubt that he will (41.5% vs.
38%).

Lack of belief in Iran’s promises and lack of trust in the West: The Jewish
public does not “buy” the conciliatory spirit emanating from Iranian
President Rouhani’s address to the UN General Assembly. Within this
population, there is a broad consensus (80%) that Rouhani does not represent
a real change in Iran’s policy but only in style. Opinions in the Arab
public are divided, with a small majority (47% vs. 42.3%) believing a real
change has occurred. It comes as no surprise, then, that an overwhelming
majority (77%) of the Jewish public concurs with the stance of Prime
Minister Netanyahu, who has warned repeatedly that Iran constitutes a danger
to the Free World. This public prefers Netanyahu's view to the positions of
the Western leaders, who are holding talks with Rouhani aimed at improving
relations and reaching an agreement on the nuclear issue. However, a reverse
pattern of responses is found in the Arab public, where 56% believe that the
Western leaders are on the right track and only 20% think the same about
Netanyahu.

Additional nuclear powers in the region are bearable: In light of the
animated debate on this issue recently, we repeated a question we first
asked in November 2011 and again in July 2012: “Some claim that apparently,
it will be impossible to prevent Iran from nuclearizing in the long term,
and therefore Israel should come to terms with this and devise a defense
strategy based on the assumption that Israel is not the only nuclear state
in the region. Do you agree or disagree with this approach?” In the two
previous measurements, about 60% of the Jewish respondents answered
positively; that is, they thought it was possible to live with a nuclear
Iran and that Israel should formulate a security strategy that suits the
change in circumstances. In the present measurement, this rate stood at 57%.
(The corresponding rate in the Arab public was 65%.)

Opposition to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The Jewish
public’s assessment that the leaders of the international community do not
sufficiently grasp the Iranian danger apparently also contributes to strong
opposition (71%) to the claim that Israel should sign the NPT, which would
subject the Israeli nuclear industry to international supervision. A
segmentation of the answers by self-placement on a political-security
right-left continuum reveals that in all groups, there is a majority, albeit
variable, of respondents opposed to signing the treaty (“hard” right—79%,
moderate right—77%, center—69.5%, moderate left—60%, “hard” left—50%).
Positions in the Arab public are the opposite, with 69% supporting the
demand that Israel sign the NPT.

Nothing new on the Palestinian issue: As in the past, a majority of the
Jewish public (61%) indeed supports the peace negotiations with the
Palestinians, but almost all of the Jewish public (81%) sees no real chance
that the talks lately being held under U.S. auspices will eventually lead to
a real agreement between the sides. This assessment is undoubtedly
influenced by the fact that the rate of those who currently also see the
Palestinians as "enemies" (57%) is much higher than that of those who regard
them as "neighbors" (25%). Moreover, a sweeping majority of over 80% of the
Jewish public opposes the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel—even a
limited number—as a quid pro quo for a peace agreement, even though the
Palestinians insist on the right of return as a condition for an agreement.
In addition, 70% of the Jews do not support the possibility that as a quid
pro quo for a permanent peace agreement, Israel would acknowledge partial
responsibility for the suffering that was caused to the Palestinians with
the creation of the refugee problem.

Among the Arabs, a much larger majority (88%) than in the Jewish public
supports negotiations with the Palestinians. But a majority of the Arabs
(64%), like the Jews, view the current negotiations as having a low chance
of success. In stark contrast to the Jews, however, almost all the Arabs
(80%), not surprisingly, view the Palestinians as "neighbors" rather than
"enemies" and support both the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel and
the demand that Israel accept partial responsibility for the suffering of
the Palestinian refugees.

The Negotiations Index for September, 2013
The Peace Index project includes ongoing monitoring of the Israeli public's
attitudes towards peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority. The monthly Negotiation Index is comprised of two questions, one
focusing on public support for peace negotiations and the other on the
degree to which the public believes that such talks will actually lead to
peace. The aggregated replies to these two questions are calculated,
combined, and standardized on a scale of 0–100, in which 0 represents total
lack of support for negotiations and lack of belief in their potential to
bear fruit, and 100 represents total support for the process and belief in
its potential. Each month, the Negotiations Index presents two distinct
findings, one for the general Israeli population and the other for Jewish
Israelis.

Negotiation Index: General sample: 46.8; Jewish sample: 43.2.

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The Peace Index is a project of the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict
Resolution at Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute. This
month's survey was conducted by telephone on September 30-October 1, 2013 by
the Midgam Research Institute. The survey included 601 respondents, who
constitute a representative national sample of the adult population aged 18
and over. The survey was conducted in Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian. The
maximum measurement error for the entire sample is ±4.5% at a confidence
level of 95%. Statistical processing was done by Ms. Yasmin Alkalay.