A Unilateral Move: Preferable to a Bad Agreement with a Terrorist
Organization
INSS Insight No. 583, August 3, 2014
Amos Yadlin .

Hamas=92 flagrant violation of the ceasefire on August 1, 2014 enabled Isra=
el
to change its strategic position and choose an alternative that, at least in
the short term, places Hamas in a difficult strategic situation. Israel
regained international legitimacy for its actions; Hamas was again cast as a
terrorist organization lacking all credibility that for the sixth time
violated a ceasefire that Egypt and the international community initiated
and Israel accepted. Changing strategic course, Israel decided to deny
Hamas veto power over ceasefires and took the initiative back into its own
hands, clarifying that it was not negotiating with Hamas and not granting it
any achievement, neither in terms of a ceasefire nor in terms of an
agreement.

This past weekend, the Israeli government significantly changed its military
and political strategy vis-=E0-vis Hamas in Gaza. Midway through the fourth
week of Operation Protective Edge, Israel faced four strategic alternatives
in order to attain the operation=92s objectives:

1. End the operation unilaterally, similar to Operation Cast Lead (2009).

2. Accept a mutual ceasefire and negotiated agreement, similar to
Operation Pillar of Defense (2012).

3. Expand the operation, by air and on land, to heighten the attack on
the Hamas military wing (an alternative I recommended).

4. Occupy the Gaza Strip and topple Hamas in order to thoroughly cleanse
the Gaza Strip of terrorism in what would necessarily be an extended
campaign (a far from desirable alternative, which incurs very high costs and
means that Israel returns to govern over 1.7 million Palestinians).

From the point when talk of exit strategies began, a fundamental
disagreement between Israel and Hamas emerged. The framework Israel sought
was, first and foremost, an end to the fighting =96 =93calm for calm=94 =96=
followed
by negotiations with Egyptian mediation toward an agreement. By contrast,
Hamas =96 fighting for the strategic goal of lifting the siege of Gaza, alo=
ng
with additional and unacceptable demands =96 was not prepared to commit to a
ceasefire before determining the principles of the arrangement to follow.

Until this past weekend, in every debate held, the Israeli cabinet opted for
the second alternative, i.e., a mutual ceasefire and arrangement, based on
acceptance of the Egyptian ceasefire proposal or a UN-initiated humanitarian
ceasefire, to be followed by discussions in Cairo with Hamas about the terms
of the arrangement for the short and mid-terms. Aside from the problem of
concluding an agreement with a terrorist organization and the problematic
history of Hamas=92 force buildup following previous arrangements, it seemed
impossible to achieve a good or even reasonable arrangement under the
strategic conditions in which Hamas was relating =93the story of its victor=
y.=94

The cabinet met on Friday evening, August 1, 2014, against the background of
the difficult humanitarian crisis and the growing number of civilian
casualties in the Gaza Strip, which were intensifying criticism of Israel
and placing it in a difficult position vis-=E0-vis the international commun=
ity
and the United States. The UN secretary-general and US Secretary of State
had made it clear to Israel that it had no choice but to agree to a 72-hour
humanitarian ceasefire, which Israel did. Hamas=92 flagrant violation of the
ceasefire =96 the attack on Givati Brigade=92s reconnaissance forces and the
attempted abduction of 2nd Lt. Hadar Goldin =96 enabled Israel to change its
strategic position and choose an alternative that, at least in the short
term, places Hamas in a difficult strategic position. Israel regained
international legitimacy for its actions; Hamas was again cast as a
terrorist organization lacking all credibility that for the sixth time
violated a ceasefire that Egypt and the international community initiated
and Israel accepted.

Changing strategic course, Israel decided to deny Hamas veto power over
ceasefires and took the initiative back into its own hands, clarifying that
it was not negotiating with Hamas and not granting it any achievement,
neither in terms of a ceasefire nor in terms of an agreement. Israel
rejected the familiar =93time is on Hamas=92 side=94 mantra, bringing its
asymmetrical advantages to bear on the campaign, including stamina, economic
power, military might, and the resilience of Israeli society that was not
deterred by the casualties sustained and provided remarkable support for the
IDF and government. Hamas was left incapable of threatening to escalate
events further. After Israel provided an excellent operational response to
Hamas=92 rocket fire and destroyed its attack tunnels, it is now disengaging
from areas in which its soldiers are vulnerable to attacks and abductions.

By this Israel establishes four premises that present Hamas with a new
strategic situation:

1. The demands for which Hamas went to war are no longer on the table.
Hamas is left without the siege being lifted, without an airport or seaport,
without salaries, without prisoner releases, and without the reconstruction
of Gaza. Its situation is far worse now than it was at the beginning of the
fighting.

2. Hamas is left with a Gaza in ruins, a humanitarian crisis, hundreds of
dead, thousands of wounded, and one-quarter of a million refugees. Hamas is
responsible for a tsunami of destruction in Gaza and has no way to deal with
it. The Gaza public, which was promised numerous benefits =96 promises that
cannot be met without an agreement =96 will presumably want to settle scores
with Hamas.

3. If Hamas continues to fire at Israel, despite Israel=92s vastly super=
ior
firepower, Israel will continue to pummel Hamas, no longer by attacking
empty training camps but by attacking Hamas=92 most important targets. The
political and military leadership of Hamas will continue to live in
underground bunkers, and be hard pressed to broadcast credible claims of
imaginary victories. Similarly, Hamas leaders will have to explain to the
Gazan public why they brought additional destruction on Gaza instead of
resolving the humanitarian crisis.

4. Unlike in previous rounds of fighting, Israel and Egypt will ensure
that Hamas will be unable to rebuild its force =96 Egypt by continuing to
prevent smuggling and Israel by the freedom of action it has reserved itself
in a unilateral move in which it decides the rules of the game, chiefly, the
of prevention of Hamas=92 force buildup.

This move on Israel=92s part may interface with two of Hamas=92 strategic
approaches and force Israel to reformulate its strategy so as to attain its
own strategic goals:

1. Joining the unilateral ceasefire, similar to what occurred in
Operation Cast Lead, based on an understanding of its loss of military
measures against Israel, the depth of the humanitarian crisis, and the
wishes of the Gazan public. In this scenario, Hamas will try to reach an
agreement with Egypt and the Palestinian Authority and impose it on Israel.
Hamas will try to use the humanitarian crisis to gain international
assistance and regain the international and Arab sympathy it lost in this
campaign. At the same time, Hamas will try to promote an agreement to ease
the siege of Gaza, and Israel will gain the calm it tried to attain. Israel=
=92s
other objectives =96 strengthening deterrence and weakening Hamas =96 will =
have
to stand the test of time.

2. Continuing the level of fire at Israel as of the past month: This
approach will force the Israeli government =96 in case the military campaign
fails to provide a sufficient response and Hamas=92 military capabilities do
not ebb sufficiently =96 to reconsider the option of expanding the military
operation. A significant expansion of the operation could then be more
carefully planned, enjoy a greater element of surprise, and be free of the
need to deal with the attack tunnels. Hamas could choose the =93drizzle
option,=94 i.e., returning to the situation of limited fire on the Israeli
communities bordering the Gaza Strip, in order to preserve its position as
an armed resistance organization, though without the risk of dragging Israel
into an extensive move. In such a case, Israel will have to make it clear to
Hamas that the policy of response preceding Operation Protective Edge is no
longer valid and that any fire will be met with an extreme response. Should
the drizzle continue, expanding the operation can be reconsidered, and if
that occurs, Hamas will begin from a far weaker position.

Unilateral withdrawal of its ground forces provides Israel with a greater
variety of options. Israel can continue to attack Hamas and weaken it; the
move provides an opportunity for a ceasefire, followed by an extended period
of calm; it allows the formulation of international and regional cooperation
to handle the Gaza problem; and it also allows reaching understandings and
making arrangements with the PA and Hamas via Egypt. The unilateral move can
succeed only if it is closely coordinated with the United States and Egypt.
Coordination with Egypt would be based on the shared antagonism to Hamas and
the common desire to undermine Hamas and change the regime in Gaza.
Coordination with the United States would be conditional on Israel=92s
willingness to make progress in the political process in the medium term.
Converging Israeli and US interests seek to deny Hamas any achievements,
encourage the Palestinians who do not support the use of terrorism and
violence, and weaken Hamas to the point where it is replaced by a more
moderate regime.

The unilateral move is useful for the immediate and mid-terms. In the
immediate future, the test will be the willingness of Israelis to return to
their homes near the Gaza Strip. In the longer term, after the smoke has
cleared and strategic trends have emerged, the alternative of seeking an
agreement should be revisited. Indeed, in the future, it will be necessary
to examine the viability of attaining a =93good agreement=94 that prevents =
Hamas=92
force buildup and ties the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip to its
demilitarization. If such an agreement is reached, it would then be a
suitable replacement for the unilateral move. Now, however, Israel=92s
unilateral move is a better alternative than the =93bad agreement=94 Hamas
currently advocates. =

________________________________________
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