From Gaza to Lebanon: Following Operation Protective Edge
INSS Insight No. 608, September 22, 2014
Omer Einav
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7730

SUMMARY: With their respective processes of political evolution and military
buildup, Hizbollah and Hamas have gradually assumed semi-state governmental
characteristics. Particularly given the weakening of the regular armies in
the region in recent years, they now represent the two main immediate
threats to Israel. In the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge, therefore,
Israel would do well to consider the significance of the recent round of
fighting on a possible future campaign against Hizbollah. In other words, at
issue is what Hizbollah can learn from the campaign in Gaza, and how this
will affect the way it uses its power against Israel. Indeed, Israel must
keep in mind the mutual learning between Hamas and Hizbollah, which grows
with each round of conflict. As such, Israel’s policy toward one
organization has significance for the other.

With their respective processes of political evolution and military buildup,
Hizbollah and Hamas have gradually assumed semi-state governmental
characteristics. Particularly given the weakening of the regular armies in
the region in recent years, they now represent the two main immediate
threats to Israel. In the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge, therefore,
Israel would do well to consider the effects of the military campaign in
Gaza on other fronts, in terms of both the current goal of preventing
escalation and the significance of the recent round of fighting on a
possible future campaign against Hizbollah. In other words, at issue is what
Hizbollah can learn from the campaign in Gaza, and how this will affect the
way it uses its power against Israel. That Israel must deter its enemies at
all times is a familiar platitude; in the case of Hizbollah, however, this
mantra is not enough.

In the past, Hizbollah and Hamas underwent a mutual learning process
supported by countries like Iran and Syria. This process was reflected in
the training of Hamas operatives by Hizbollah and its patrons, which
included sharing fighting methods, weapons, and knowledge on how to
manufacture rockets and construct underground infrastructures, and sharing
lessons learned in the military campaigns against Israel. Moreover, while
the two organizations have become more distant over the past two years,
Hamas has implemented processes that proved successful for Hizbollah.
Examples include a transition to a structured hierarchal military framework
with clear command and control capabilities, alongside continued guerilla
warfare characteristics; procurement of high trajectory weapons of all
ranges, anti-tank weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); experience
in placing sophisticated explosive devices; and construction of an extensive
underground system of movement and communications.

Over the past three years, Hizbollah has accumulated diverse operational
experience in the fighting in Syria, but following the prolonged quiet on
the Israel-Lebanon border, compared with the recurring conflicts between
Hamas and Israel, the roles of “teacher” and “student” have been somewhat
reversed. Hamas displayed creativity in Operation Protective Edge in its
ability to challenge Israel with its extensive infrastructure of tunnels
penetrating into Israeli territory, diversification of the launch ranges of
its rockets, and its effective operation of a command and control mechanism.
These methods of warfare are not new, but the extent to which they were used
is unprecedented in the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The impression is
that Hamas has implemented and even expanded Hizbollah concepts. In his
public speeches – speeches that were recently cited in Israel – Nasrallah
threatened that his organization would surprise Israel in the next war and
would move the battlefield to the Galilee. This can be interpreted as
referring to a plan of action aimed at a hitherto unknown extent of
penetration into Israeli sovereign territory and a challenge to the IDF on
the eastern front – a method that to some extent was tried by Hamas. The
important question arising from Operation Protective Edge, therefore, is how
Israel coped with the range of threats by Hamas, and what the implications
will be for the northern front.

Israel demonstrated its ability to locate and destroy a large portion of the
offensive tunnels, for example, but it must calculate whether this
capability also exists on the northern border, where the topography is
diferent and where Israel’s intelligence coverage is less effective.
Regarding the rocket fire, Hamas adopted Hizbollah’s operational concept,
based on multiple launchings from launchers concealed underground in
built-up areas, mostly designed for one-time launching, understanding that
Israel can locate and destroy the launchers once the rockets have been
fired. Hizbollah almost certainly already possesses concealed stores of
launchers and rockets, which deprive Israel of the ability to neutralize the
launching system. In the field of aerial defense, Israel has demonstrated
its improved capability in providing warning to its citizens, intercepting
rockets with Iron Dome, and intercepting UAVs. With Iranian assistance,
Hizbollah will analyze Israel’s interception capability for missiles and
rockets, and attempt to identify the weaknesses and gaps in the Israeli
aerial defense envelope. Hizbollah will presumably adopt a strategy of
barrage launchings of a mixture of rockets and missiles with various ranges.

With its aerial supremacy, the Israeli Air Force demonstrated its complete
control of the air, marked by advanced intelligence and precise and
effective offensive capabilities. Intelligence and air attacks, however, did
not provide an adequate solution for Hamas’ underground capabilities,
underground launching systems, or far-reaching network of tunnels. Hizbollah
understands the significance of Israeli air supremacy and is trying, with
partial success, to procure ground-to-air missiles systems in order to
deprive Israel of its freedom of action in the air and, less likely, of its
ability to gather intelligence. With respect to land-based maneuvering,
Hizbollah is likely to reinforce its operational concept of operating from
within built-up areas, in view of the IDF’s focus on tunnels and efforts to
avoid a massive entry into populated areas, due to concern about its own
losses and heavy collateral damage to the civilian population. At the same
time, the extensive destruction in certain regions in the Gaza Strip could
indicate Israel’s intentions with respect to villages in southern Lebanon
and the Dahiyeh neighborhood in Beirut. Hizbollah is concerned by the
possibility of a large scale land-based campaign by the IDF in southern
Lebanon, and will therefore act to draw IDF forces into built-up regions
where ambushes can be laid that can inflict many casualties and deny the
image of an Israeli victory. Hizbollah will do this while making the
necessary adjustments for the major differences between the Gaza Strip and
southern Lebanon in land contours and the nature of combat.

During the fighting in the Gaza Strip, Hamas tried to cause escalation in
other theaters in the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and even within Israel by
encouraging protest on the part of Israeli Arabs. Hizbollah could conclude
that it might be necessary to expand the conflict theater to other areas on
the Golan Heights, where it currently has an infrastructure and a presence,
as well as in the Palestinian theater. A conflict theater conflict that
includes both Lebanon and the Golan Heights will require major investment by
Israel, including the mobilization of reservists on a large scale, which
would have a negative impact on the Israeli economy if the conflict drags on
for a prolonged period. It is hard to calculate what a conflict with two or
more theaters would involve, but it is likely that Israel will have to take
such a scenario into account in the next round of hostilities.

Finally, Israel’s room for decision making would likely be an important
factor for consideration. Hizbollah will analyze conflicting messages
arising from Operation Protective Edge: broad support in Israel for widening
the operation, together with encouragement from Egypt and relative passivity
on the part of the West, combined with an evident reluctance on the part of
the Israeli government to undertake another ground operation in the Gaza
Strip. At the same time, Hizbollah is likely to realize that Israel is ready
for a prolonged conflict that includes aspects of attrition, and that its
national resilience is relatively stable. How Hizbollah will weigh these
factors is an open question, specifically, whether a prolonged conflict
suits its approach and whether it will try to focus on undermining Israeli
national resilience.

In conclusion, Israel must prepare itself for Hizbollah’s next would-be
strategic surprise in order to neutralize its effect and obtain an advantage
in the conflict, which may involve an offensive operation in Israeli
territory. Unexpected weapons may be used. In any case, Israel must keep in
mind the mutual learning between Hamas and Hizbollah, which grows with each
round of conflict. Particularly since the two organizations are the two
immediate threats on Israel’s borders, Israel’s policy toward one has
significance for the other. The lessons from the strategy employed in
Operation Protective Edge must therefore also be addressed in their
implications for future conflicts in other theaters, especially the northern
front against Hizbollah.