End of the Classic War Era
Israel has been engaged in a different kind of war since the late 1990s. The
defense establishment must, therefore, develop relevant new tools for
dealing with the challenges and threats looming along our borders
Atai Shelach 20/1/2015
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3319

End of the Classic War Era In order to understand what could happen in 2015
it is important to carry out the analysis through the perspective of the
past decades and even regard 2014 as a stand-alone year, a test case –
nothing more.

The year 2014 also evolved as a year that represents the broadest common
denominator in the world generally and in the Middle East and Israel in
particular. That common denominator is the phenomenon of uncertainty and
surprise developments. When I refer to "surprises" it is not my intention to
claim that only national leaders and decision makers are "taken by
surprise". What I have in mind is that in view of the actual results,
looking back – whether I am a national leader or an ordinary citizen – we
can honestly say: "In all honesty, we never anticipated that or thought
that's how it would happen."

If we had attempted to predict, a year ago, what the end of this year (2014)
would be like, it is doubtful whether anyone would have hit the mark, even
if he had access to what ISA and/or Israeli Military Intelligence knew at
the time. In effect, the State of Israel and the range of difficulties with
which it has to cope is a mirror image of all of the occurrences in the
Middle East and around the globe.

In recent years we have experienced in our region the famous "Spring of
Nations", whose manifestations were the rise of radical Islamist
organizations and the emergence of ungoverned areas (UGA). Additionally, the
simmering pot that is the Gaza Strip and the ever glowing embers of
Hezbollah and its satellite organizations in Lebanon and Eastern Syria are
still there, as always.

The reader has already gathered by now that it is not my intention to
address specific events. Instead, I intend to address their implications on
the future on the one hand, and equally importantly – how they reflect on
us, in terms of the endless ritual ("spiral of challenges") involving the
aspects of operational readiness and competence, along with political and
international leverages, in our daily routine as a state, and particularly
on the defense and security organizations charged with the task of
safeguarding our homeland in conjunction with all of our intelligence
agencies.

So, what factors derived from the range of threats and operational
challenges around us shape our defense and security?

It is important to view that range of threats as a multiple-theater vector
that keeps developing under slightly different characteristics. It is
geographically and organizationally biased, but has a very broad common
denominator that produces, for all of the world's classic states including
Israel, a significant security challenge. That challenge is the endless
struggle against small, threatening molecules, dispersed over different
geographic spaces and jointly weaving a disturbing cobweb that threatens
various elements within the states. On the other hand, when those states go
out of their own territories in order to crush that threat, they will
encounter anything but regular, structured military fighting forces or state
assets. This actually means that various sorts of scattered and unrelated
phenomena that were elements of different conflicts here and there over the
last decades have amalgamated into one solid mass of threats and challenges
for many countries around the world. This is not a passing phenomenon but a
solid fact that strikes deeper and deeper roots.

By the end of 2014 and going into 2015, the State of Israel is engaged in
about 7 circles of conflict, with varying intensity levels, at the same
time: in the Judea & Samaria district, the third Intifada ("The Jerusalem
Intifada"?) is on the way. In the Gaza Strip, Operation Protective Edge has
just ended – when will the next round take place? In Lebanon, Hezbollah has
remained a "glowing ember" – when will it develop into a fire again? Syria
has evolved into an ungoverned area and a habitat for Global Jihad – when
will it strike us? On the Israeli-Egyptian border, the security fence
project has been effective for the time being – how long will it remain
effective? Iran, the "third circle" with its nuclear program, has been
regarded as the No.1 threat until recently. Global jihad means international
terrorism against Jewish institutions all over the world (Burgas, Mumbai,
Brussels, et al.). All of the radical Jihadist organizations and their
various factions are gaining strength, with the various branches of ISIS
and, naturally, Al-Qaeda, occupying center stage.

The End of Classic Wars

The kind of warfare we have faced for a number of years now is not
asymmetrical warfare. It is not a phenomenon – it is a reality, a fact for
which we should prepare – with consciousness preparation being out topmost
priority.

The era of classic wars is over. If such wars ever recur, they will be
regarded as a new phenomenon at this time, while the kind of warfare that is
common everywhere around the globe is the current warfare. This is by no
means an occurrence that is likely to fade away. On the contrary – it will
consolidate itself further as the threats with which we cope set forth a
fundamentally different warfare pattern. It will be wrong to devote a
separate chapter in the various military courses where guerrilla
organizations, what they plan and what they do, etc. are being analyzed.
These are the primary, dominating chapters, the main compass for the
build-up of force in all of the world's military organizations including
IDF. Accordingly, we must not look at the reality-shaping operations in the
Gaza Strip (Operation Pillar of Defense, Operation Cast Lead and Operation
Protective Edge) and say: "Well, these were localized and non-characteristic
conflicts, and we should not draw any conclusions from them with regard to
other places as they only apply to the Gaza Strip as a specific, localized
case" – that would be a serious mistake.

The various operations in the Gaza Strip, including the events of Operation
'Shuvu Achim' (the military operation pursuant to the kidnapping and
murdering of the three Jewish youngsters in the Judea and Samaria in June
2014) should be regarded as events that will become increasingly more
frequent, not because the opponent has just decided that this is what they
are going to do until the next full-scale war, but rather as a clear
understanding that this will be the form of the present conflict in the
coming decades.

To the best of my understanding, the deceptive reality of 2014 will continue
to produce local surprises and flare-ups of various types, along with the
increasing probability of a higher intensity confrontation opposite
Hezbollah in Lebanon. This will not necessarily happen, but is definitely
likely to materialize, and then we will find ourselves, once again, engaged
in combat in areas saturated with uninvolved civilians, trying to cope with
the evolving phenomena of the subterranean medium. We will definitely
experience steep trajectory attacks into central Israel, except there is
nothing new about this particular threat. In addition, I fear, however, that
they will attempt to damage our fundamental airspace defense capabilities by
intensively employing unmanned vehicles, extensive and sophisticated cyber
warfare and other means.

Additionally, as long as we're referring to Hezbollah, one cannot ignore the
various empowerment processes this organization has undergone since the
Second Lebanon War. Accordingly, we must not be surprised if we find
ourselves being attacked by sizable ground forces – even up to an infantry
brigade – inside Israeli territory, in the areas close to the northern
border.

But even if a confrontation against Hezbollah does not materialize, a
confrontation along the eastern border, facing Syria, will present a
substantial, large-scale operational challenge possessing various
characteristics that will require an extremely high level of preparedness on
our part. Our ground forces will be required to further expand and hone
their capabilities and competence so that they can effectively engage in
dense, close-range combat in the midst of uninvolved civilians.

The world of natural and man-made obstacles will expand and challenge us
with booby-traps, subterranean systems and other "goodies". In addition to
the ground forces, there is no doubt that safeguarding the national airspace
and retaining our naval superiority, air superiority and equally
importantly – cyber superiority, will continue to be major objectives of our
force build-up process as well as primary criteria for operational
battlefield effectiveness.

Any confrontation on one front could – and is highly likely to – ignite
other and/or additional sectors. Accordingly, we should prepare (and there
is nothing new about this either) for fighting on more than one front and/or
in more than one theater.

In my estimate, 2015 will prove to be the continuation of 2014. On the one
hand, everything appears to be calm, but on the other hand – anything is
likely and possible. In the era of social media and global jihad, the law of
connected vessels of terrorism is working overtime. Consequently, at any
given moment, a terrorist organization in some territory is poised to attack
and terrorize us.

The supreme imperative at this time, just like in the past, is not to
prepare for the past but for the future. The future is not always clear or
predictable, and for this purpose we should develop "toolboxes" that offer
adaptability and flexibility to the maximum extent possible. The State of
Israel is hard at work building its layouts, and should persist with the
build-up of a force that would match the reality we face. .

Our toolboxes must be filled with modern tools that are relevant to the
present reality and to the reality we will face in the future. 
================
Colonel (res.) Atai Shelach is a former senior officer in the IDF Combat
Engineering Corps. Among other positions, he served as the commander of the
YAHALOM Unit, as the commander of the IDF Dignitary Protection Unit and as
the commander of the IDF CBRN Warfare Center. Today, he is the CEO of the
Engineering Solutions Group (ESG).