[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: One of the key features of the entire Oslo
process was that you could count on less than the fingers of one hand the
number of Israelis who actually went to the trouble to read anything beyond
a few lines from an executive summary - and that includes the ministers who
voted to accept various agreements.

So take a look at this article. In the summary it reads "On the security
level, the IDF would remain in the West Bank and continue to be responsible
for security" .

But if you have the patience to actually read the article you will find that
Mr. Sher's program is to find a way to also pull out the IDF and find a way
to have the Palestinians take over security - this even if the "PA ceases
security cooperation in response to a withdrawal."

Don't be fooled: feeding the withdrawal Molech with the wholesale uprooting
of Jewish communities outside of the "main settlement blocs" won't bring
calm. It will only encourage an increase in the "struggle".]

Disengaging from the West Bank Short of a Permanent Agreement: Tenable
Security-Wise?
INSS Insight No. 770, November 24, 2015
Gilead Sher, Avner Halevi .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=10981

SUMMARY: This article considers whether it is possible to ensure security
in the context of an independent Israeli disengagement from the West Bank
without a permanent status agreement in place. The underlying condition is
that any withdrawal from all or part of the West Bank and any separation
from the Palestinians would not compromise the personal safety of Israel’s
citizens and national security as a whole. The security framework proposed
is fundamentally different from the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. On
the civilian level, the evacuation from the West Bank would be partial and
the main settlement blocs where most of the population lives would stay in
place. On the political level, the PA would continue to be a partner and the
negotiations for a bilateral agreement could continue, if the PA is
interested. Regional dialogue would likewise not be negated by this option.
On the security level, the IDF would remain in the West Bank and continue to
be responsible for security, despite the political cost this entails in the
international arena, especially the expected refusal of many to recognize
the fact that Israel will in fact have withdrawn from much of the West Bank
and the occupation in those areas will have ended.

During his visit to Washington earlier this month, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu spoke about possible Israeli unilateral action vis-à-vis the
Palestinians, stressing that such action “would have to meet Israeli
security criteria” and “would also require broader international
understandings than exists.” Subsequently, the Prime Minister retracted his
statement and issued explanations. Either way, however, it is important to
consider whether it is possible to ensure security in the context of an
independent Israeli disengagement from the West Bank without a permanent
status agreement in place. The underlying condition is that any withdrawal
from all or part of the West Bank and any separation from the Palestinians
would not compromise the personal safety of Israel’s citizens and national
security as a whole. These would have to be ensured for such a move to be
possible.

Any withdrawal from the West Bank could occur in the absence of a permanent
agreement and would represent an alternative to a situation in which it
became patently clear that a full two-state agreement with the Palestinians
is impossible to achieve is the foreseeable future. The purpose of such a
withdrawal would be to implement a temporary border that would create a
reality of two nation states without undermining the possibility of
continuing negotiations, while also improving the daily lives of the
Palestinians until an agreement is reached. An independent withdrawal, as
well as a partial or an interim agreement, would in all probability involve
the evacuation of some 100,000 people from the Jewish settlements located
beyond the security fence or on the eastern mountain ridges, out of a total
of some 380,000 Israelis living east of the Green Line, and would preserve
the large settlement blocs that are home to the vast majority of this
population.

Given the short distance between the West Bank and Israel’s large population
centers and its strategic rear, the country is very vulnerable to fire and
other attempted attacks from the West Bank. Therefore, as long as there is
no bilateral security arrangement with the Palestinians, the IDF would
remain responsible for security in the West Bank. Unlike the Gaza Strip, the
model for maintaining security must be constructed for the most part on
preventing terrorism before it happens and fighting terrorism as needed
rather than on deterrence. It must prevent terrorist infrastructures from
being built and prevent the development of manufacturing and/or smuggling
capabilities of weapons, munitions, and/or dual-purpose materials as well as
assistance from outside advisors. To that end, the IDF must continue to
isolate the West Bank envelope, i.e., maintain security control of the
Jordan Valley, the Jordan crossings, West Bank crossings to Israel, and the
aerial space above the West Bank. In this framework, Israel maintains
intelligence capabilities for foiling terrorism and freedom of movement in
the West Bank needed by the IDF and the general Security Services. At the
same time, the IDF would be prepared to combat terrorism and violence
whenever necessary. Should the security situation deteriorate and Hamas
attempts to seize control of the West Bank, Israel would be able to stop
such a takeover; Israel would have to make its intentions clear ahead of
time.

Beyond the imperative of preventing West Bank terrorism, Israel would have
to place the political instability in the Middle East and the security
challenges liable to develop in the future from Jordan at center of its
strategic security considerations. Strategic security requires maintaining
Israeli control of the Jordan Valley and operational flexibility, as long as
no appropriate security arrangements with the Palestinians and/or
satisfactory regional security arrangements have been achieved, and as long
as there is no fundamental change in the region’s level of stability.

An inseparable part of the required security outline consists of
non-military moves necessary to help the Palestinian Authority establish a
stable government and effective control, weaken the roots of terrorism and
the security threat emanating from the West Bank, and thereby help promote
negotiations for a permanent settlement. The main moves include reducing
army and Civil Administration involvement in the fabric of Palestinian life,
transferring most authority for civilian matters still in Israel’s hands to
the PA in coordination with it, preventing an economic crisis in the West
Bank by providing maximal economic freedom of action and movement to the
Palestinians, encouraging economic initiatives involving Palestinians and
partners abroad, and offering Israeli partnership and help in constructing
economic infrastructures for the future Palestinian state.

As long as there is effective security coordination with the PA and there
are no renewed waves of terrorism from the West Bank, the IDF would have to
develop, gradually and in a controlled fashion, greater flexibility in the
methods it uses to ensure routine security in the West Bank; this, in order
to strengthen the PA’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its own public. The IDF in the
West Bank must gradually and carefully adopt a lower profile, especially in
Palestinian populated areas. According to an operational program to be
developed by the IDF, it would be necessary to concentrate to the extent
possible the deployment of army bases near central traffic arteries and the
security envelope and to transition, in a controlled manner, to long
distance command and control. These steps must be taken while considering
all the elements involved in disengagement, such as the stages for the
evacuation of the civilians and the conditions of routine security, while
retaining the operational ability to return and operate deep in the heart of
the West Bank should it prove necessary.

If, despite Israel’s wishes, the PA ceases security cooperation in response
to a withdrawal, implementation of the move would be more difficult and
require the security outline to be stricter. To the extent the security
framework proceeds well, it would be possible to incorporate other steps,
such as transferring security responsibility in Areas B and Areas C to the
PA where there are no more Israeli settlements, restoring some civilian
supervision at the Jordan border crossings to the Palestinians, and
incorporating foreign supervisors in security checks at the crossings, while
leaving highest security control of the crossings in Israel’s hands.

An internal security challenge lies in confronting the deep rift in Israeli
society over the division of the land and the future of the West Bank. There
is a not unfounded concern that some Israelis would react violently to a
withdrawal or the evacuation of land and/or settlements, especially if this
comes as a unilateral step rather than as part of a bilateral permanent
agreement. Such actions could be expected to occur from the moment there is
talk of a withdrawal or the initiation of a partial agreement in the public
sphere or in the government, and continue until the start, during, or even
after an actual evacuation. Violence might be aimed at Jews or Arabs, occur
in Jerusalem, within the Green Line, or in the West Bank, and target public
figures, individuals, public groups, or the IDF. Building the right response
to such a danger requires preliminary planning with comprehensive staff work
by all the security establishments involved.

From a security perspective, in the security framework described above, any
disengagement from the West Bank and the Palestinians is feasible; an
appropriate, balanced response to the security issue is doable, and is
relevant as well to scenarios of partial or interim agreements that do not
amount to a full and comprehensive resolution of the conflict. In addition,
it would be highly desirable to try to include an effort to achieve a long
term period of calm in the Gaza Strip by taking steps to attain a long term
ceasefire and a controlled reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, two aims that
are in Israel’s best political and security interests.

This security framework does not refer to a comprehensive and overall
security arrangement that would be required in a permanent status agreement,
which, by its very nature, requires completely different types of
arrangements. However, in this plan, a withdrawal from the West Bank would
be fundamentally different from the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. On
the civilian level, the evacuation from the West Bank would be partial and
the main settlement blocs where most of the population lives would stay in
place. On the political level, the PA would continue to be a partner and the
negotiations with it for a bilateral agreement could continue, if the PA is
interested, but would have to exclude Hamas. Regional dialogue with actors
such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states would
likewise not be negated by this option. On the security level, the IDF would
remain in the West Bank and continue to be responsible for security, despite
the political cost this entails in the international arena, especially the
expected refusal of many to recognize the fact that Israel will in fact have
withdrawn from much of the West Bank and the occupation in those areas will
have ended.
_______________________________________
Gilead Sher is as senior research fellow and head of the Center for Applied
Negotiations at INSS. Avner Halevi is an economist with expertise in
strategy and national security.